Could a Kentucky county or city enact its own right-to-work ordinance?

Plain-English summary

The Kentucky Attorney General concluded in 2014 that a county, city, or other local government could not enact a right-to-work ordinance. The AG read the National Labor Relations Act’s exception for state and territorial right-to-work laws as limited to those governments, leaving local ordinances preempted.

The opinion responded in part to a proposed Warren County ordinance. It relied on a Kentucky court decision rejecting a Shelbyville ordinance and read that decision’s reasoning as reaching counties as well as cities. The opinion stated that Kentucky had not enacted a statewide right-to-work law at that time.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2014. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did federal law let a Kentucky county pass its own right-to-work ordinance in 2014?

The AG said no. It interpreted the federal exception for state law as excluding political subdivisions, including counties.

Did the answer depend on whether the local government was a city or county?

No. The cited Kentucky case involved a city, but the AG reasoned that its treatment of all local political subdivisions also covered counties.

What did the opinion say about statewide law?

It said federal law permitted states to enact right-to-work laws and stated that Kentucky had not done so as of the opinion’s date.

Background and statutory framework

Two legislators asked about local right-to-work authority. The AG read 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) alongside the state-law exception in 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). Its central authority was Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965), which rejected a city ordinance because the federal exception did not extend to local governments.

Citations and references

Statutes: 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 164(b).

Case cited: Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Pages/Opinions.aspx
• Original Word document: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Opinions/OAG14-007.doc

Original opinion text

OAG 14-007

December 18, 2014

Subject: Whether a local government may enact a right-to-work ordinance

Requested by: Sen. Robert Stivers

Rep. Jeffery M. Donohue

Written by: Matt James

Syllabus: A local government may not enact a right-to-work ordinance.

Statutes construed: 29 U.S.C. § 164

Opinion of the Attorney General

Sen. Robert Stivers and Rep. Jeffery M. Donohue have separately requested this office issue an opinion regarding whether a local government may enact a “right-to-work” ordinance. We advise that a local government may not enact a right-to-work ordinance.

A right-to-work law forbids “employers from contracting or agreeing to exclude persons from employment because they are or are not members of a labor union.” 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 361. Right-to-work laws “outlaw ‘union shops' and ‘agency shops.’” Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Ky. 1965). Sen. Stivers inquires as to whether a county or consolidated local government may enact a right-to-work ordinance. Rep. Donohue inquires as to the validity of a right-to-work ordinance that has been passed by the Warren County Fiscal Court and scheduled for a final reading on Dec. 19. At issue is whether local governments may enact such right-to-work ordinances.

Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), provides that:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) forbids an employer from discriminating in employment based on whether that person is a member of a union, forbidding “closed shops” that only consider union members for employment, although an employee may be required to join a union upon commencing employment, in what is known as a “union shop.” Section 14(b) of the NLRA, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), provides that “nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.” Although 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) allows union and agency shops, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) provides that states may enact right-to-work laws forbidding union and agency shops. Twenty-four states have enacted such right-to-work laws. Kentucky has not.

In Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965), the City of Shelbyville had enacted a right-to-work ordinance providing that “the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in, or conditioned upon payments to, any labor union, or labor organization.” Id. at 361. The court considered the question of “whether Congress has pre-empted the field of regulation of such union-security agreements to the extent that local political subdivisions of a state have no power to legislate in the field.” Id. at 361-62. The Puckett court considered Retail Clerks Int’l. Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1973), which stated that “even if the union-security agreement clears all federal hurdles, the States by reason of s 14(b) have the final say and may outlaw it. . . . . It is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the right of way to state laws . . . .” Id. at 102-03. Based on Schermerhorn, the court reasoned that:

Section 14(b) makes an exception out of the otherwise full pre-emption by the Act. The exception should be strictly and narrowly construed because it represents a departure from the overall spirit and purpose of the Act. . . . We think it is not reasonable to believe that Congress could have intended to waive other than to major policy-making units such as states and territories, the determination of policy in such a controversial area as that of union-security agreements. We believe Congress was willing to permit varying policies at the state level, but could not have intended to allow as many local policies as there are local political subdivisions in the nation.

Id. at 362. The Puckett court construed the exemption for states and territories narrowly to refer only to states and territories, reasoning that Congress did not want variations in right-to-work laws in each local political subdivision. The court then concluded that “Congress has pre-empted from cities the field undertaken to be entered by the Shelbyville ordinance.” Id.

Other courts, following Puckett, have come to the same conclusion. Puckett was cited with approval in Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers, Int’l. Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 413 n. 7 (1976). More specifically, in United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1564 v. City of Clovis, N.M., 735 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.M. 1990), the court expressly addressed the question of whether a municipality with home rule powers could enact a right-to-work ordinance. The City of Clovis court reviewed Puckett in detail with approval. Id. at 1003. The court then turned to the issue of “whether local right-to-work enactments, either through home rule authority or otherwise, constitute ‘state’ law within the meaning of § 14(b). I find that they do not. There is nothing in the legislative history of § 14(b) to indicate that Congress intended a broad reading of ‘state.’” Id. at 1004. The court concluded that “the plain language of the statute indicates to me that only a state, through state legislation, may prohibit union security agreements. Such state legislation does not include a state law granting local political subdivisions permission to prohibit union security provisions.” Id. See also Grimes & Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock, 127 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ohio 1955) (“Section 164(b) has reference to a constitutional provision or a legislative enactment”). The courts are uniform that the exemption carved out in 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) only refers to states themselves, and not political subdivisions of states.

While Puckett expressly dealt only with cities, it was also express that the intent of Congress in enacting 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) was not “to allow as many local policies as there are local political subdivisions in the nation.” Puckett, 391 S.W.2d at 362. “Counties are unincorporated political subdivisions of the state . . . .” Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Ky. 2004). Puckett is clear that 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) preempts all political subdivisions of a state from enacting right-to-work laws, including counties as well as cities.

In summary, local governments have no power to enact right-to-work ordinances, as they are preempted by the NLRA.

JACK CONWAY

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Matt James

Assistant Attorney General