Can the Kansas Governor veto just the strings attached to a school grant while leaving the money itself untouched?

Plain-English summary

Two legislators asked the Attorney General to review Governor Kelly's 2024 line-item veto of a budget proviso attached to a $5 million school safety and security grant program. The Legislature had appropriated the $5 million but also spelled out, in detailed conditions, exactly what it could buy: automated external defibrillators, security cameras, and firearm detection software meeting a long list of technical and vendor requirements, plus a dollar-for-dollar local matching requirement. The Governor vetoed only those spending conditions, leaving the $5 million appropriation itself standing.

The Attorney General concluded that crossed a constitutional line. Kansas's line-item veto power under Article 2, Section 14(b) lets the Governor reject individual "items of appropriation of money" in a bill while approving the rest, and past opinions have read that power fairly broadly to include budget provisos, not just bare dollar figures, when the proviso is a genuinely separable piece of a lump-sum appropriation. But that broader reading comes with a limit drawn from Kansas and out-of-state case law: a proviso that is "closely linked" to a specific appropriation cannot be vetoed on its own while leaving the money untouched, because doing so lets the Governor manufacture an entirely different appropriation, one with no strings attached, that the Legislature never actually passed. Here, the spending conditions were tightly tied to this specific $5 million grant, not a general lump-sum item, so vetoing only the conditions turned a narrowly restricted grant into an unrestricted one, which the opinion concluded is an unconstitutional rewriting of the law rather than a valid veto.

What this means for you

Legislators and legislative budget staff drafting appropriations bills: the opinion confirms that attaching detailed spending conditions to a specific appropriation, rather than writing them as generic conditions across an agency's whole lump-sum budget, makes those conditions much harder for a Governor to strip away while keeping the money, because a proviso "closely linked" to one appropriation cannot be vetoed separately from that appropriation.

Governor's office and budget staff evaluating a line-item veto strategy: the opinion signals that vetoing only the restrictions on a narrowly targeted appropriation, while leaving the appropriation itself in place, risks being found unconstitutional; the safer options are vetoing the appropriation and its conditions together, or vetoing neither.

School districts and agencies affected by grant conditions in an appropriations bill: the opinion illustrates that a veto fight over "strings attached" money can leave the underlying legal status of both the funding and its conditions uncertain until the constitutional question is resolved.

Common questions

Can a Kansas Governor ever veto just part of a budget proviso and leave the funding alone?
Sometimes, according to the opinion; prior Attorney General opinions have upheld line-item vetoes of provisos in lump-sum appropriations bills, but only where the proviso is separable from the specific dollar item, not closely tied to it.

What made this particular veto different from those earlier, upheld vetoes?
The opinion distinguishes this case because the vetoed proviso was closely linked to one specific $5 million appropriation rather than being a general condition on a lump-sum agency budget, so removing the conditions effectively created a new, broader appropriation the Legislature never passed.

What Kansas Supreme Court test governs whether something counts as an "item of appropriation" subject to veto?
The opinion cites State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, which defined an "item of appropriation of money" as the designation of a specific sum the Legislature authorizes for a specific purpose, while noting that subsequent AG opinions have applied a broader, fact-specific test balancing the Legislature's and Governor's constitutional roles.

Background and statutory framework

Article 2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas Constitution allows the Governor to disapprove one or more "items of appropriation of money" in a bill while approving the rest of the bill. The Kansas Supreme Court's 1981 decision in State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin defined that phrase narrowly as designating specific sums for specific purposes, but later Attorney General opinions adopted a broader, case-by-case approach informed by the veto power's three purposes: preventing legislative logrolling, imposing fiscal restraint, and strengthening the Governor's role in the budget process. Under that broader approach, a budget proviso in a lump-sum appropriation can be a valid subject of a line-item veto if it is a truly separable item not closely linked to a single appropriation.

The opinion drew the key limiting principle from out-of-state case law: the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Carson v. Bond and the Louisiana Supreme Court in Henry v. Edwards both held that a governor cannot veto only the restrictions on a specific appropriation while leaving the money item standing, because doing so effectively creates a new, unrestricted appropriation the legislature never enacted, an act of impermissible line-drawing that amounts to legislating rather than vetoing. Applying that principle to House Substitute for Senate Bill 387's school safety and security grant proviso, which was tightly bound to the specific $5 million appropriation rather than a general agency lump sum, the opinion concluded the veto of the conditions alone exceeded the Governor's constitutional authority.

Citations and references

Statutes and constitutional provisions:
- Kan. Const., Art. 2, § 14(b)
- K.S.A. 72-1151; 75-3739

Cases:
- State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, 230 Kan. 252, 631 P.2d 668 (1981)
- State ex rel. Carson v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973)
- Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ks.gov/reports-resources/ag-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.ks.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/22878/638735648793670000

Original opinion text

January 24, 2025

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 2025-2

Honorable Kristey Williams
State Representative, 77th District
606 Stone Lake Court
Augusta, Kansas 67010

Honorable Renee Erickson
State Senator, 30th District
26 N. Cypress Drive
Wichita, Kansas 67205

Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas—Legislative—Approval of Bills;
Vetoes; Governor's Line-item Veto Power

Synopsis: The Governor's use of the line-item veto to excise the questioned
proviso contained within Section 2(a) of 2024 House Substitute for
Senate Bill 387 while leaving the specific item of appropriation of $5
million exceeded the authority granted to the Governor under Article
2, Section 14(b) of the Constitution of the State of Kansas.

Dear Representative Williams and Senator Erickson:

As members of the Kansas Legislature, specifically Chair of the House K-12
Education Budget Committee and Vice-Chair of the Senate Education Committee,1
respectively, you ask whether the Governor's veto of a proviso placing conditions on
the $5 million in Safety and Security Grants appropriated by the Legislature
exceeded the Governor's authority to line-item veto items of appropriations.

1
Representative Williams and Senator Erickson held these committee positions at the time the letter
was written in 2024.

As you are aware, 2024 House Substitute for Senate Bill 387 contained education
appropriations for the fiscal years ending June 30, 2024, June 30, 2025, and June
30, 2026.2 The bill was enrolled and presented to the Governor on May 6, 2024,3 and
signed into law on May 15, 2024.4 The bill became effective on May 30, 2024, upon
its publication in the Kansas Register.5 However, the Governor line-item vetoed a
portion of Section 2(a) of the bill.6 That section included a $5 million appropriation
for school safety and security grants. Included with the $5 million appropriation
was a proviso directing how the appropriation was to be spent. Significantly, the
Governor did not line-item veto the $5 million appropriation, but only the proviso.
This proviso stated as follows:

   Provided, That expenditures shall be made by the above agency from
   the school safety and security grants account for fiscal year 2025 for
   disbursements of grant moneys approved by the state board of
   education for the: (1) Acquisition of automated external defibrillators
   and routine maintenance of such devices; (2) purchase and installation
   of security cameras that are comparable with the firearm detection
   software specified in paragraph (3); and (3) notwithstanding the
   provisions of K.S.A. 72-1151, and amendments thereto, or any other
   statute, acquisition and implementation of firearm detection software
   that: (A) Can reduce the threat and impact of gun violence by
   providing a firearm detection software solution that integrates into
   existing security camera systems; (B) is designated as qualified anti-
   terrorism technology under the federal SAFETY act, 6 U.S.C. § 441 et
   seq.; (C) complies with industry standard information security
   frameworks, including ISO 27001 and SOC 2 type 2; (D) is managed
   through a constantly monitored operations center that is staffed by
   highly trained analysts to ensure rapid communication of possible
   threats to end users; (E) is developed in the United States without the
   use of any third-party or open-source data; (F) is protected by an
   awarded patent that includes a training database populated with
   frames of actual videos of firearms that were taken in relevant
   environments across diverse industries; (G) is utilized in at least 30
   states with customers in the public and private sectors; (H) does not
   store, monetize or collect any biometric data or personally identifiable
   information; and (I) is able to detect three broad firearm classifications
   with a minimum of 300 subclassifications and has the ability to detect
   at least 2,000 permutations: Provided further, That all moneys

2 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws, Ch. 111.
3 http://kslegislature.gov/li/b2023_24/measures/sb387.
4 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws, Ch. 111.
5 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws, Ch. 111, § 23; Kan. Reg., Vol. 43, Issue 22 (May 30, 2024).
6 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws, Ch. 111; Kan. Reg., Vol. 43, Issue 22 (May 30, 2024).

      expended for school safety and security grants for fiscal year 2025 shall
      be matched by the receiving school district on a $1-for-$1 basis from
      other moneys of the school district that may be used for such purpose:
      And provided further, That, notwithstanding the provisions of K.S.A.
      75-3739, and amendments thereto, or any other statute, not less than
      30 days following the effective date of this act, the above agency shall
      publish a list of entities that provide firearm detection software that
      meets the requirements of paragraph (3).

In short, the proviso places limitations on the $5 million appropriation by requiring
the money to be spent for the purchase and maintenance of automated external
defibrillators, the purchase and installation of school security cameras that have
firearm detection capabilities, and detailed specifications on what firearm detection
software must utilized with the security cameras.

Your question requires an analysis of the Governor's line-item veto power. Article 2,
Section 14(b) of the Kansas Constitution grants the Governor the authority in
limited instances to veto less than an entire legislative enactment. This
constitutional provision states in relevant part:

      If any bill presented to the governor contains several items of
      appropriation of money, one or more of such items may be disapproved
      by the governor while the other portion of the bill is approved by the
      governor.

The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he veto power of the executive
under our system of government is not inherent in such officer as a legislative
function, but is a power confided in him by the supreme authority of the state; and
in exercising this function, while he is not confined to rules of strict construction, he
nevertheless must look to the Constitution for the authority to exercise such
power."7 In State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, the Court defined the term "items of
appropriation of money" as used in Article 2, Section 14(b) to mean "the designation
of specific sums of money which the legislature authorizes may be spent for specific
purposes."8 The Court explained:

      Some common examples of "items of appropriation of money" are these.
      There is appropriated (for a named agency) from the state general
      fund: for salaries and wages, $500,000; for operating expenditures,
      $200,000; for the purchase of a site (at a stated location for a certain

7 State v. French, 133 Kan. 579, 300 P. 1082, 1084 (1931).
8 State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, 230 Kan. 252, 256, 631 P.2d 668 (1981).

      purpose) $15,000; and for a certain purpose from a certain fund, no
      limit (the authorized sum being the amount in the described fund).9

This suggests the Supreme Court has adopted a narrow interpretation of the line-
item veto authority and that any provision which does something more or different
than designate a sum of money to be spent on a specific purpose is not an "item of
appropriation of money" subject to veto.10

However, subsequent opinions of our predecessors have rejected this interpretation.
After examining caselaw from other jurisdictions, and viewing the line-item veto
authority through the lens of its three purposes: (1) the rejection of legislative
logrolling; (2) the imposition of fiscal restraint upon the legislature; and (3) the
strengthening of the Governor's role in the formation of the budget,11 our
predecessors have concluded that the term "item of appropriation of money" should
be more broadly construed and requires a fact specific case-by-case analysis to
balance the legislative and executive constitutional powers, ultimately concluding
"that if a provision can be lawfully included in an appropriation bill and is indeed a
separable item not closely linked to a single appropriation, then it is subject to a
line item veto."12

Consistent with this thinking, Attorney General Stovall opined that the Governor
properly exercised his line-item veto authority granted by the Kansas Constitution
by vetoing a proviso contained in 2002 Senate Bill 517 which was intended to
prohibit the expenditure of state money to reinforce the State Capitol building dome
in preparation for placement of the Ad Astra sculpture atop the dome.13 Later,
Attorney General Schmidt opined that, from a constitutional perspective, because a
lapse of an appropriation is the same as an appropriation itself, the budget proviso
contained in Section 175 of 2011 Senate Substitute for House Bill 2014, which
directed the manner in which a $5.9 million lapse in appropriation was to be
implemented, was properly line-item vetoed.14 General Schmidt concluded that the
line-item veto was proper because the legislative intent of reducing expenditures by
$5.9 million was kept intact and because the prominent role of the Governor in the

9 Id.
10 Atty. Gen. Op. 2002-47.
11 Atty. Gen. Op. 2012-1.
12 Id.; see also Washington State Legislature v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 885, 889-90 (Wash. 1997) (any
budget proviso with a fiscal purpose contained in an omnibus appropriations bill is item of
appropriation subject to line-item veto); Karcher v. Kean, 409 A.2d 403, 406 (N.J. 1984) (general
conditions or limitations on expenditures of monies found in appropriations act can be discrete
subject of gubernatorial line-item veto).
13 Atty. Gen. Op. 2002-47.
14 Atty. Gen. Op. 2012-1.

budget process had been preserved by eliminating the restrictions on the Governor's
authority as to how to reduce such funding.15

However, the expansive view of the Governor's line-item veto power taken by our
predecessors comes with an important caveat, that a proviso cannot be "closely
linked" to a single appropriation in order to be subject to an item veto.16 Attorney
General Stovall, in her earlier opinion,17 discussed the Missouri Supreme Court's
opinion in State ex rel. Carson v. Bond,18 in which the court held a line-item veto to
be improper where the veto concerned only the limitations on the money but not the
specific appropriation itself. The court held the veto had the effect of increasing a
generic appropriation by eliminating the restrictions on the use of that money.19
Thus, the line-item veto constituted an improper rewriting of the law.20

Attorney General Stovall also discussed a similar opinion by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Henry v. Edwards,21 in which the court emphasized that inherent in the
power to appropriate is the power to specify how such money is to be spent,
concluding that any qualifications added to specific items of appropriations may not
be vetoed by the Governor without vetoing the item of appropriation to which the
qualification modifies.22 "[B]y striking these provisions but allowing the money
'item' of expenditure to stand, the Governor would be able to alter and thus, in fact,
to legislate by creating a new 'item' of appropriation wholly different in nature and
purpose from that originated in the legislature."23 The Court held it could not
"sanction a result so clearly violative of the constitutional prerogative of the
legislature."24

In contrast to the line-item vetoes of provisos approved previously, provisos which
prescribed or directed the expenditure of funds in a lump sum appropriations bill,25
here, Governor Kelly line-item vetoed a proviso closely linked to the $5 million
school safety and security grants contained in Section 2(a) of 2024 House Substitute
for Senate Bill 387. A portion of Section 2(a) provided for $5 million in school safety
and security grants and the related proviso placed restrictions on such grants. The

15 Id.
16 Atty. Gen. Op. 2002-47.
17
Id.
18
State ex rel. Carson v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 390-92 (Mo. 1973).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21
Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 157 (La. 1977); Atty. Gen. Op. 2002-47.
22 Id.; see also Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 517 (Pa. 2008); Karcher, 462 A.2d at 1287.
23 Henry, 346 So. 2d at 157.
24 Id.
25 "[S]o long as the Legislature drafts budget bills as lump sum appropriations to agencies

conditioned by provisos . . . the Governor's appropriations item veto power extends to such proviso."
Lowry, 931 P.3d at 893.

proviso does not apply to the appropriations bill as a whole. The Governor's veto of
the proviso alone without also vetoing the specific appropriation exceeded the
Governor's line-item veto power contained in Article 2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas
Constitution and amounted to an unlawful rewriting of the law by turning a specific
appropriation with specific limitations into a general appropriation.

                                  Sincerely,

                                  /s/ Kris W. Kobach

                                  Kris W. Kobach
                                  Attorney General

                                  /s/ Anthony J. Powell

                                  Anthony J. Powell
                                  Solicitor General