When a Kansas county adds new commissioner seats, do the old 25-day nomination deadlines apply even if the new seats are filled at the regular general election?

Plain-English summary

After Russell County voters approved expanding their county commission from three seats to five in November 2023, Governor Kelly decided the new commissioner seats would be filled at the next regularly scheduled general election in November 2024, rather than through a special election. Two political parties held nominating conventions in January 2024, but the county attorney asked whether the fast-turnaround, 25-day nomination and petition deadlines written into the old version of K.S.A. 19-203a actually applied here, since the vacancies were being filled at a general election rather than a special one.

The Attorney General concluded those expedited deadlines applied only to special elections. The statute's text could be read two ways, its subsections were formatted as independent parts that might each stand alone, but a paragraph break within the timing subsection suggested the fast-track nomination rules were meant to attach only to the special-election scenario described in that same paragraph. Turning to the statute's purpose, and reading it alongside Kansas's ordinary candidate-filing calendar, the opinion explained the puzzle resolves itself: because a vote to expand a county commission always happens at a November general election, and the Governor's follow-up decision always comes within days after that, there is always enough lead time to meet Kansas's normal summer nomination deadlines if the vacancies are filled at the next general election. The expedited process only becomes necessary when the Governor instead calls a special election, since the old law's 90-day cap on scheduling a special election could push the vote earlier than the normal candidate-filing calendar would allow. Since Russell County's vacancies were set for the general election, not a special election, the ordinary statewide nomination deadlines controlled, and the county's January conventions held under the shortcut timeline were not effective.

What this means for you

County clerks, commissioners, and county attorneys administering a commission expansion: the opinion holds that once the Governor selects the next general election (rather than a special election) as the date for filling new commissioner seats, candidates must follow Kansas's standard statewide filing and convention deadlines (generally by June 1 of the election year), not any expedited timeline tied to the Governor's declaration date.

Political party officials planning nominating conventions for new commissioner seats: the opinion warns that holding a convention on an accelerated timeline meant for special elections, when the seats are actually being filled at the next general election, risks the nomination being ineffective.

Anyone tracking how Kansas amended its county-commission-expansion vacancy law: the opinion notes the Legislature rewrote K.S.A. 19-203a in 2024 to eliminate the special-election option entirely and require all such vacancies to be filled at the next general election, partly in response to a similar scheduling dispute in Pottawatomie County.

Common questions

If a Governor lets new county commissioner seats fill at the next general election, do special expedited nomination deadlines still apply?
No, according to the opinion; those 25-day deadlines in the old K.S.A. 19-203a were tied specifically to the special-election track, so when the Governor chooses the general election instead, Kansas's normal statewide candidate-filing calendar governs.

Why would a special election need different, faster nomination deadlines than a general election?
Because the old law required any special election to be held within 90 days of the county commission adopting new district lines, which could land earlier in the calendar than Kansas's standard summer filing deadlines would otherwise allow, according to the opinion's analysis of the statute's purpose.

Has Kansas changed this law since the Russell County dispute?
Yes. The opinion notes the Legislature amended K.S.A. 19-203a in 2024 to eliminate special elections and the associated expedited nomination process for these vacancies entirely, requiring all such seats to be filled at the next regularly held general election (in either an odd or even year) going forward.

Background and statutory framework

Before an April 2024 amendment, K.S.A. 19-203a governed how vacancies created by expanding a county commission's size, per a countywide vote under K.S.A. 19-204(c), would be filled. The Governor had five days after the county adopted new commissioner districts to choose either a special election (to be held 75 to 90 days later) or the next regularly scheduled general election. If a special election was chosen, subsections (b) and (c) required party conventions within 15 to 25 days of the Governor's declaration and independent nominating petitions within 25 days. Kansas's ordinary election calendar, by contrast, generally requires candidates to file for a primary or be reported via party convention by June 1 of the election year, with primaries held the first Tuesday in August and independent petitions due by the Monday before that.

The opinion resolved an ambiguity in the old statute's structure, whether the 25-day deadlines in subsections (b) and (c) applied to all vacancy elections or only special elections, by reasoning from the statute's evident purpose: because a commission-expansion vote always occurs at a November general election and the Governor's declaration always follows within days, there is always enough time before the next general election to use Kansas's ordinary summer filing deadlines, making the expedited process necessary only for the compressed special-election timeline. The Legislature's 2024 rewrite of K.S.A. 19-203a, prompted in part by a similar scheduling conflict in Pottawatomie County, eliminated special elections for this purpose altogether and now requires these vacancies to be filled only at the next regularly held general election, with staggered-term provisions to keep no more than a simple majority of commissioners elected at once.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- K.S.A. 19-202(c); 19-203 (incl. (c)); 19-203a; 19-204(c); 19-204a
- K.S.A. 25-202 (incl. (a), (b)); 25-203; 25-205(a); 25-305 (incl. (a), (h)); 25-2502

Cases:
- State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 175 P.3d 840 (2008)
- Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335 (2005)
- Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 343 P.3d 515 (2015)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ks.gov/reports-resources/ag-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.ks.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/22862/638723796947570000

Original opinion text

July 23, 2024

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 2024-5

Daniel W. Krug
Russell County Attorney
PO Box 3
Russell, KS 67665

Re: Vacancy in office of commissioner; Vacancies created by increase in
number of districts; Governor; Election options

Synopsis: The expedited process in subsections (b) and (c) of the former version of
K.S.A. 19-203a only applied when county commissioner vacancies were
to be filled at a special election.

Dear Mr. Krug:

As the Russell County Attorney, you ask whether the timelines in K.S.A. 19-203a,
as it existed prior to April 18, 2024, applied to all vacancy elections under that
statute or merely special elections. We conclude that the timelines applied only to
special elections.1

1. Statutory Background

K.S.A. 19-203a was enacted as part of a 2017 bill that removed the Governor's
ability to appoint the new county commissioners when a county opts to add
commissioner seats. The 2017 law created a vacancy election process instead.2 That
version of K.S.A. 19-203a, which prevailed from 2017 through earlier this year,
stated:

1 Given impending election deadlines, this conclusion was communicated to you via letter on May 3,

2024, noting that a formal opinion would be forthcoming. This, of course, is that formal opinion.
2 See H.B. 2006 § 2, ch. 36, 2017 Kan. Sess. Laws 216, 216-17.

   (a) The governor, within five days of the board of county commissioners
   adopting a resolution dividing the county into the number of districts
   approved by voters following the election expanding the size of the board
   of county commissioners as provided in K.S.A. 19-204(c), and
   amendments thereto, in consultation with the board of county
   commissioners, shall either: (1) Declare the election to be held at the
   next regularly scheduled general election; or (2) declare the date of the
   special election required under K.S.A. 19-203(c), and amendments
   thereto.

   If the decision is to call a special election, the vacancy election shall be
   on a day not less than 75 days nor more than 90 days from the date of
   the board of county commissioners adopting such resolution.

   (b) The county chairperson of each political party that has obtained
   official recognition shall call a convention for a date not less than 15
   days and not more than 25 days after the governor's declaration. Such
   party shall nominate a candidate to fill the vacancies that have occurred
   due to the expansion of the size of the board of county commissioners.

   (c) Independent candidates may be nominated by petition of not less
   than 5% of the qualified electors within the county commission district.
   Any such petition shall be filed with the county election officer within
   25 days of the governor's declaration.3

During its most recent session, however, the Legislature amended that statute.4

3 K.S.A. 19-203a.
4 Now it reads:

   (a) Vacancies created in the office of commissioner by the board of county
   commissioner's [sic] adoption of a resolution or by judicial order pursuant to K.S.A. 19-
   204a, and amendments thereto, dividing the county into the number of districts
   approved by voters following an election expanding the size of the board of county
   commissioners pursuant to K.S.A. 19-204(c), and amendments thereto, shall be filled
   at the next regularly held general election.
   (b)     (1) If at the next regularly held general election more than a simple majority
           of commissioners are elected, persons elected to the positions created by an
           increase in the number of commissioner districts shall be elected for two-year
           terms and shall serve until their successors are qualified. Thereafter, such
           commissioners shall be elected to four-year terms and shall serve until their
           successors are qualified.
           (2) If the next regularly held general election is in an odd-numbered year,
           persons elected to the positions created by an increase in the number of
           commissioner districts shall be elected for either one-year or three-year terms
           as determined by the board of county commissioners so as to prevent the
           election of more than a simple majority of commissioners at any subsequent
           general election. Such persons shall serve until their successors are qualified.

In summary, the recent bill (1) eliminated the Governor's choice between a special
election and general election, mandating that all such vacancy elections occur in
conjunction with the general election; (2) clarified that "general election" includes
both odd- and even-year elections; (3) eliminated the special nomination process
associated with these vacancy elections; and (4) imposed procedures to make sure
the commissioner terms remain staggered.

2. Factual Background

In November 2023, Russell County voted to increase the size of its county
commission from three seats to five. After that vote, and in accordance with the
version of K.S.A. 19-203a then in effect, Governor Kelly decided that the new
vacancies would be filled at the next regularly scheduled general election, i.e., the
election scheduled for November 5, 2024.5 The Governor's declaration was issued on
December 21, 2023.6

Following this declaration, two of the county's recognized political parties (the
Democrats and Republicans) held conventions and purported to select party
nominees. But only one of those parties did so within twenty-five days of the
declaration. At any rate, both parties had selected their professed nominees by
January 22, 2024.

H.B. 2661, which amended K.S.A. 19-203a, was introduced in the House of
Representatives ten days later, on February 1. It eventually made its way through
both houses and was approved by the Governor on April 4. As mentioned above,
among the things H.B. 2661 did was to eliminate both special elections and the
special nomination process associated with these vacancy elections; however, the
legislative history contains no mention of the nomination process or timelines.7

    (c) For purposes of this section, "general election" means the same as defined in K.S.A.
    25-2502, and amendments thereto.

See H.B. 2661 § 3, 43 Kan. Reg. 451, 451 (Apr. 18, 2024).
5 Letter from Gov. Laura Kelly to Daniel Krug, Russell Cty. Attorney (Dec. 21, 2023) (on file with the

Att'y Gen.).
6Id.
7See S. Comm. on Local Gov't, Minutes, Mar. 5, 2024, at 1-2, available at https://perma.cc/TD56-
SB95; H. Comm. on Local Gov't, Minutes, Feb. 7, 2024, at 2, available at https://perma.cc/DU5B-
SMEB. Despite the timing, the situation in Russell County does not appear to have been on the
legislators' minds. Rather, the primary proponents of the bill were all from Pottawatomie County.
See Kan. Legislature 2023-2024 Session, HB 2661 Committee Minutes and Testimony,
https://perma.cc/BC3L-WNXP (last visited Apr. 12, 2024). That county had voted to expand its
commission in 2022 and the Governor had likewise directed the vacancy election to occur at the next
regularly scheduled general election. The Pottawatomie County Commission believed that general
election would occur in the fall of 2023, but the Governor interpreted the term "general election" as
referring to the election occurring in fall of 2024. This created a conflict with another statute: K.S.A.
19-202(c) states that "terms of office for the board of county commissioners shall be staggered in such
a way that no more than a simple majority of commissioners is elected at any general election";

electing the new Pottawatomie County commissioners at the next general election would've put too
many commissioners on the ballot at once. Letter from John D. Watt, Cty. Counselor, Pottawatomie
County, to Elections Div., Office of the Secretary of State, et al. (Jan. 9, 2023); accord Sen. Kristian
O'Shea et al., Written Testimony in Support of HB 2661, H. Comm. on Local Gov't (Feb. 7, 2024)
(describing Pottawatomie County problem and attaching Watt letter), available at
https://perma.cc/2FJE-3DDM.

3. Analysis and Conclusions

You ask whether the twenty-five-day timelines in the old K.S.A. 19-203a(b) and (c)
applied just to special elections. And we conclude that, yes, the best reading of the
statute is that those subsections only applied when vacancies were to be filled via
special election, not when they were to be filled at the next general election.

But we admit that we do not reach this conclusion easily. When it comes to
interpreting statutes, the language of the statute controls.8 "Ordinary words are
given their ordinary meanings," and we can neither "add language that is not found
in [the statute]" nor "exclude language that is found in it."9 The problem here is that
the text of the statute has at least two permissible readings on the point in
question.

The strongest textual case for applying the timelines to both types of election comes
from the fact that the Legislature cut K.S.A. 19-203a into subsections, all on the
same organizational level (i.e., subsections (b) and (c) are independent portions of
the statute, not subordinate subsections of an overarching (a)). Where a statute is
divided into these distinct parts, each "end[ing] with a period," it "strongly
suggest[s] that each [such part] may be understood" as a complete whole that is not
dependent on the language of any other part for its operation.10 Applying this rule
of construction would thus divide the statute into three distinct subject areas, each
of which is fully effective within itself. Subsection (a) is about the timing of the
vacancy election, subsection (b) is about party nominations for any such vacancy
election, and subsection (c) is about independent candidates who wish to run in any
such vacancy election. Although subsection (a) acknowledges the possibility that the
Governor could order vacancies filled at either a special election or the next general
election, subsections (b) and (c) make no distinction between these two possibilities.
They simply declare that the nomination processes outlined therein shall proceed
from the Governor's declaration and must be completed within twenty-five days.
Thus, one could read the statute to say that subsections (b) and (c) apply to all
vacancy elections, regardless of when they occur.

8 State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 661, 175 P.3d 840 (2008).
9 Id. (citation omitted).
10 Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 344 (2005). See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 156-60 (2012) (discussing the scope-of-subparts canon).

But this organizational logic is complicated by another potentially telling choice the
Legislature made: the paragraph break after the first sentence in subsection (a).
Ordinarily, a subsection containing multiple sentences would just continue on to the
next sentence. Indeed, subsections (b) and (c), both of which contain two sentences
each, do precisely that. "In writing, a paragraph break often signals that a new
idea is coming."11 Arguably, then, the paragraph break was intended to address a
new topic and provide a new umbrella for subsections (b) and (c), thus cabining the
effect of subsections (b) and (c) to the topic of that new paragraph (i.e., special
elections). In other words, the phrase beginning the new paragraph ("If the decision
is to call a special election") could be read as modifying the timelines that follow in
those subsections.

Of course, one must be wary of relying too much on formatting clues such as these.
Sometimes formatting is added by a printer or editor on codification and, in such
cases, is not a reliable guide to legislative intent.12 However, in this specific case the
paragraph break came about through amendments in the Senate Committee on
Ethics, Elections and Local Government13 and thus was part of the text in both
houses when they took final action on the bill, and part of the enrolled bill that the
Governor approved.14

We are thus left to delve into the statute's purpose. Why would the Legislature
mandate a speedy, atypical nomination process for this small subset of elections?

In asking this question, we are cognizant of the pitfalls of a purposive or
consequentialist approach to statutory interpretation. But even the foremost
proponents of textualism only go so far as to call a "half-truth" the idea "that
consequences of a decision provide the key to sound interpretation," and they even
say that "[s]ome outcome-pertinent consequences, what might be called textual
consequences, are relevant to a sound textual decision."15 "[I]nterpretation always
depends on context, [and] context always includes evident purpose."16

The ultimate point is this: statutes should be interpreted to "make . . . sense . . .
where the language permits."17 That last phrase is an important qualifier. The text

11 United States v. Butler, 949 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2020); accord M.F. v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
928 A.2d 71, 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
12 Scalia & Garner, supra, at 156.
13 See H.B. 2006 (2017) (as amended by Senate committee), available at https://perma.cc/7YN3-

M5GC.
14 Furthermore, any weakness in this formatting evidence would apply with equal force to the

argument-from-subparts supporting a contrary reading. So, in the end, it's a wash.
15 Scalia & Garner, supra, at 352.
16 Id. at 63. See generally id. at 56 (distinguishing between purposive interpretation and the proper

use of purpose within a textualist framework).
17 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).

must remain supreme.18 But purpose is relevant insofar as it can be derived from
the text itself.19

Now, the purpose of the speedy nomination/candidate qualification process in
subsections (b) and (c) is not evident from the face of K.S.A. 19-203a alone. But "the
meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts
together and in their relation to the end in view."20 And when we consider the other
laws relating to (a) candidate nomination and qualification and (b) expanding a
county commission, the purpose of the special nominating process and timeline (and
the consequent reason for those provisions only applying to special elections) comes
into focus.

Under ordinary state law, there are two ways for a person to earn a spot on the
general-election ballot: either collect a sufficient number of signatures in support of
one's independent candidacy or be nominated by a recognized political party.21
Independent candidates must file nominating petitions by the Monday prior to the
first Tuesday in August.22 Political-party nominations are obtained by winning a
primary election23 held on the first Tuesday in August24 or, for smaller parties,
being selected by a party convention.25 To appear on their party's primary-election
ballot, candidates must have filed the necessary paperwork (and, if required, paid
the necessary fee) by June 1 of the election year.26 Nominations via convention must
likewise be reported no later than June 1.27

As to expanding a county commission, that can only happen via a countywide vote
at a November general election.28 After a vote to do so, the board of commissioners
must divide the county into new commissioner districts no later than January 1 of

18 See Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 399, 343 P.3d 515 (2015) ("[T]he best and only safe rule
for determining the intent of the creators of a written law is to abide by the language that they have
chosen to use." (citation omitted)).
19 Scalia & Garner, supra, at 56.
20 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("[T]he meaning of a

statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation
to the end in view." (citing Red Bird v. United States (Cherokee Intermarriage Cases), 203 U.S. 76
(1906); McKee v. United States, 164 U.S. 287 (1896); Talbott v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 139 U.S. 438,
443 (1891))); accord State v. Flummerfelt, 235 Kan. 609, 616, 684 P.2d 363 (1984).
21 See K.S.A. 25-202. The law also provides for write-in candidacies. See, e.g., K.S.A. 25-305(h). But

because (former) K.S.A. 19-203a did not address write-in candidacies, we likewise do not address
that type of candidacy here.
22 See K.S.A. 25-305.
23 K.S.A. 25-202(a).
24 See K.S.A. 25-203.
25 K.S.A. 25-202(b).
26 K.S.A. 25-205(a).
27 See K.S.A. 25-305(a).
28 K.S.A. 19-204(c).

the following year.29 And then, under the old version of K.S.A. 19-203a, the
Governor had to decide whether to fill the vacancy via special election or general
election "within five days of the board" adopting the new commissioner districts.

With this background in mind, the purpose of the expedited process in K.S.A. 19-
203a, and why it only applies to special elections, becomes clear. Because the vote
to expand a county commission will always have occurred in a November general
election, and the Governor's election choice will always be made no later than
January 6, there is plenty of time to comply with the various summer candidacy
deadlines when the Governor chooses to have the vacancy filled at the next general
election. However, if the Governor chooses a special election, it becomes impossible
to comply with the ordinary deadlines because the old version of K.S.A. 19-203a
stated that the special election had to be held "not . . . more than 90 days from the
date of the board of county commissioners" adopting the new commissioner districts.
In other words, the latest any special election could be held, assuming all actors
took the maximum time allowed by statute, was April 1 (or March 31 in a leap
year).

Thus, the purpose of the statute's expedited process was to provide an alternate way
to proceed when the ordinary election deadlines could not apply. Because that
would only ever happen in a special election, the best reading of K.S.A. 19-203a is
that the process in subsections (b) and (c) only applied to special elections.

We emphasize that this is a permissible reading of the enacted text (as we
explained in our analysis of the statute's organization and formatting) rather than a
distortion of the text to support some vague purpose or legislative intent. We have
used a purpose evident from reading the statute in pari materia to choose between
two otherwise equally plausible interpretations of the text.30

The consequence of this reading on Russell County's upcoming elections is relatively
straightforward: the nominating conventions held in January were ineffectual;31 the
ordinary nominating process applies.

29 K.S.A. 19-204a. If the county commission fails to act by January 1, the chief judge of the district

court must draw the new lines no later than January 31. Id.
30 Accord Scalia & Garner, supra, at 57.
31 Although Kansas law allows nomination via convention for smaller parties (as mentioned above)

neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party qualifies for this exception. See K.S.A. 25-
202(b).

          /s/ Kris W. Kobach

          Kris W. Kobach
          Attorney General

          /s/ Daniel E. Burrows

          Daniel E. Burrows
          Chief Deputy Attorney General