Does Michael Madigan keep his Illinois state pension after his federal corruption conviction?

Plain-English summary

Attorney General Kwame Raoul concluded that former Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan forfeits his General Assembly Retirement System (GARS) pension because his July 2025 federal convictions for bribery, wire fraud, and Travel Act violations all grew directly out of his role as a state representative and Speaker.

Section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code says a member of GARS loses pension benefits if convicted of "any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member." Illinois courts have used three alternative tests to decide whether that connection exists: a "but for" test, a "material element and substantial factor" test, and a broader "causal connection" test. The AG worked through all three and found that Madigan's convictions clearly satisfy each one.

The opinion walks through both schemes Madigan was convicted in: the eight-year ComEd bribery scheme, in which Madigan accepted indirect payments and benefits in exchange for advancing ComEd's legislative agenda (EIMA, Senate Bill 9, FEJA), and the "Alderman A" honest-services scheme, in which Madigan agreed to recommend a Chicago alderman for a paid state board seat in exchange for legal-business referrals. In both schemes, Madigan's official position was not just incidental, it was the entire point.

The Executive Secretary of the General Assembly Retirement System asked for the opinion as part of the formal process for stopping pension payments after a public corruption conviction. The opinion gives the retirement system the legal cover it needs to deny benefits.

What this means for you

If you're a member or beneficiary of an Illinois public pension system

Felony forfeiture under the Illinois Pension Code is service-specific, not blanket. A public servant's pension is at risk only when the underlying crime is connected to the job. A public employee convicted of an unrelated felony (say, a DUI causing death after work hours, or a drug crime that has nothing to do with the office) does not automatically lose their pension. The "nexus" question asks whether the crime grew out of the work.

For elected officials and high-level public officers, that nexus is often hard to escape: bribes and kickbacks are paid because of the office, and votes and approvals are exchanged in return. Convictions for bribery, official misconduct, federal program bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666), wire fraud through honest services, or RICO offenses involving the office are almost always going to trigger forfeiture.

If you administer a public pension fund

The opinion is a roadmap. When a member is convicted of a felony, the retirement system should:

1. Get the indictment, plea agreement, jury verdict, and judgment.
2. Identify the elements of each offense and the conduct described in the charging instruments and sentencing memoranda.
3. Apply each of the three Illinois nexus tests (but-for, substantial factor, causal connection). If any of the three is satisfied, forfeiture applies.
4. Document the analysis in writing before suspending benefits, because the member is entitled to challenge the decision.
5. Where the conviction is for a federal offense (especially 18 U.S.C. § 666, which by its terms requires that the person was acting as an agent of state or local government), the nexus is likely apparent on the face of the conviction.

If you defend a public official or employee facing felony charges

A guilty plea or conviction has consequences far beyond imprisonment and fines. Pension forfeiture is automatic once the retirement board finds the nexus, and there is no due-process violation in denying benefits after a conviction (the criminal trial provided due process). When negotiating a plea, be aware that:

• The number of years contributed does not protect benefits already vested. Forfeiture wipes out the annuity entirely.
• A federal program bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666) plea is essentially a stipulation that the defendant was acting as an agent of state government in connection with state business, which is the exact "nexus" the Pension Code requires.
• A negotiated plea to a single count of an offense unrelated to office (for example, structuring or tax evasion that did not flow from the public service) might preserve the pension where a plea to honest-services wire fraud will not.

If you're a public corruption prosecutor

The opinion confirms that even where you cannot or do not pursue a state bribery charge, federal convictions under § 666 (federal program bribery), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 + 1346 (wire fraud / honest services), or the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952) trigger Illinois pension forfeiture. A federal-only prosecution still produces the state pension consequence.

If you're a journalist or constituent

The opinion is a public, plain-language ratification of what most Illinois voters expected: convicted public officials do not retire on the public's dime. The General Assembly Retirement System cannot pay Madigan a pension. The opinion also explains why the answer is not different just because Madigan's conviction is on appeal or because some counts were dismissed: the convictions on which the analysis rests were affirmed in the judgment, and forfeiture follows from conviction.

Common questions

Q: Does this opinion only apply to Madigan?
A: No. Section 2-156 of the Pension Code applies to any member of the General Assembly Retirement System convicted of a service-related felony. Parallel provisions in the Pension Code apply the same rule to other public retirement systems for judges, public employees, police, firefighters, teachers, and so on. The opinion's reasoning is the framework retirement boards apply across the board.

Q: What if Madigan wins an appeal?
A: The opinion is grounded in the existing federal court records and convictions. If a higher court reverses a conviction, the underlying basis for forfeiture as to that conviction can change. Pension forfeiture decisions are revisable on changed facts.

Q: Did Madigan get any pension contributions back?
A: The opinion addresses only the forfeiture of the pension annuity itself. Whether a former member can recover their own employee contributions is governed by separate Pension Code provisions, not addressed here.

Q: What are the three tests for the felony-service nexus?
A: First, the "but for" test from Devaney: would the official have been in a position to commit the felony but for the office? Second, the "material element and substantial factor" test from Bloom: was the position a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the criminal conduct? Third, the broader "causal connection" test from Goff: is the conviction in some way connected with the employment? The AG applied all three and concluded each was independently satisfied.

Q: Are health insurance and other retiree benefits affected?
A: Section 2-156 speaks of "the benefits herein provided for," which generally encompasses retirement annuity benefits. Other benefits (such as group health insurance) may be governed by separate statutes. Members in this situation should consult counsel about ancillary benefits.

Q: Why does the federal program bribery statute matter so much?
A: 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal felony for "an agent of a state or local government" that receives more than $10,000 in federal funding to solicit a bribe in connection with state business. A conviction under § 666 is essentially a federal court finding that the defendant was acting in their official capacity. That finding maps almost one-to-one onto Section 2-156's nexus requirement.

Background and statutory framework

Section 2-156 and parallel provisions

Section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/2-156) is the felony-forfeiture provision for the General Assembly Retirement System. It is one of nearly 20 substantially identical provisions scattered through the Pension Code, each governing a different state retirement system: judges, state employees, municipal employees, police, firefighters, teachers, university employees, and others. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the language must be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner (Carmichael, Kanerva), but courts have also been willing to find the nexus when the connection is obvious from the conviction itself.

Why the law exists

The Illinois Supreme Court explained the policy in Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315 (2010), and Kerner v. State Employees' Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507 (1978): pension forfeiture for service-related felonies discourages official misconduct and implements the public's right to conscientious service from those in government. It is a structural backstop on public corruption, separate from the criminal sentence. A pension is deferred compensation; the public bargained for honest service in exchange for it. When that bargain is broken, the deferred compensation is forfeit.

The three nexus tests

The court of appeals in Abbate v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2022 IL App (1st) 201228, confirmed that Illinois retirement boards may apply any of three tests:

• But-for (Devaney): would the public servant, but for the position, have been able to commit the offense?
• Material element and substantial factor (Bloom, drawing from Thacker v. UNR Industries): was the position a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the criminal acts?
• Causal connection (Goff): is the conviction in some way connected with the employment such that there is a causal link?

If any one of the three is satisfied, the felony is "service-related" and forfeiture applies.

How the AG applied them to Madigan

The opinion goes through the ComEd scheme and the Alderman A scheme in detail. For ComEd: but for being Speaker, Madigan would not have been the target of an eight-year scheme of indirect payments to subcontractors and law-firm fees designed to reward him for advancing EIMA, SB 9, and FEJA. For Alderman A: Madigan recommended the alderman for a state board seat using his own role as Speaker, in exchange for business referrals to his law firm. Each scheme was, in the AG's words, "a product of his official status." The opinion notes that Madigan's co-conspirators referred to him as "our Friend" and quotes a ComEd executive describing the relationship as transactional ("you take good care of me and so does our friend"). The connection was not incidental, it was the engine of the conduct.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- 40 ILCS 5/2-156 (Illinois Pension Code, GARS felony forfeiture)
- 18 U.S.C. § 371 (federal conspiracy)
- 18 U.S.C. § 666 (federal program bribery)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (honest services)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act)

Key cases:
- Devaney v. Retirement Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414 (2002) (the "but-for" test)
- Bloom v. Municipal Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 339 Ill. App. 3d 807 (2003) (substantial-factor test)
- Goff v. Teachers' Retirement System, 305 Ill. App. 3d 190 (1999) (causal-connection test)
- Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315 (2010) (purpose of forfeiture)
- Kerner v. State Employees' Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507 (1978) (foundational case)
- Abbate v. Retirement Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2022 IL App (1st) 201228 (three-test framework)

Federal court records cited in the opinion:
- United States v. Madigan, No. 22-CR-115 (N.D. Ill. 2022-2025) (Superseding Indictment, jury verdicts, judgment, sentencing memoranda)

Source

• Index page: https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/
• Original PDF: https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/dA/f84c6f474b/2025%2025-001%20PENSIONS%C2%A0%20Felony%20Forfeiture%20of%20Pension%20Benefits.pdf

Original opinion text

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ILLINOIS

KWAME RAOUL
ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 18, 2025

FILE NO. 25-001

PENSIONS:
Felony Forfeiture of
Pension Benefits

Mr. Timothy Blair
Executive Secretary
General Assembly Retirement System
2101 South Veterans Parkway
P.O. Box 19255
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9255

Dear Mr. Blair:

I have your letter inquiring whether, pursuant to section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2024)), Michael Madigan, a member of the General Assembly Retirement System, has forfeited his pension benefits as a result of his convictions of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 (2018)), federal program bribery (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 666(a)(1)(B) (2018)), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346 (2018)), and the use of interstate facilities to promote unlawful activity (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1952(a)(3) (2018)). For the reasons stated below, it is my opinion that Madigan has forfeited his pension benefits under section 2-156 of the Pension Code because his felony convictions related to, arose out of, and were in connection with his service as a member of the General Assembly.

BACKGROUND

According to the records of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on October 12, 2022, a special grand jury returned a 23-count Superseding Indictment against Madigan. Following a trial, Madigan was found guilty of ten counts, including one count of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States (Count Two), two counts of bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds (Counts Four and Six), three counts of wire fraud (Counts Eight, Nine, and Ten), and four counts of using interstate facilities to promote unlawful activity in violation of the Travel Act (Counts Five, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen). The court sentenced Madigan to 90 months imprisonment for each of the bribery and wire fraud offenses, and 60 months imprisonment for each of the Travel Act violations and for the conspiracy conviction, all to run concurrently. Madigan was also ordered to complete three years of supervised release for each count, all to run concurrently, and pay a fine of $2.5 million. All of the offenses for which the jury returned guilty verdicts and the court sentenced Madigan are felonies under federal law.

The Superseding Indictment against Madigan details the conduct giving rise to his charges and the guilty verdicts. At all times material to the Superseding Indictment, Madigan was the Representative for the State of Illinois' Twenty-Second District, Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives (Speaker), and Chairman of the Democratic Party of Illinois. Madigan was also the Chairman of the Thirteenth Ward Democratic Organization, a political committee that campaigned for candidates for public office. The Twenty-Second District largely consisted of the Thirteenth and the Twenty-Third Wards of Chicago. Madigan was also a partner at Madigan & Getzendanner, a law firm specializing in contesting property tax assessments.

Commonwealth Edison Bribery Scheme

Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six of the Superseding Indictment, pursuant to which Madigan was convicted, relate to his criminal dealings with Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), the largest utility company in the State of Illinois. According to the Superseding Indictment, over an eight-year period, Madigan conspired with ComEd executives, consultants, lobbyists, and others to funnel money and job opportunities to a number of Madigan's political allies and associates who performed political work on Madigan's behalf. The underlying purpose of the scheme was to influence and reward Madigan for his help in securing favorable legislative outcomes for ComEd through his official actions as a member and Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In 2011, Madigan approved a plan for ComEd to make indirect payments to five of Madigan's political allies and associates through third-party intermediaries connected to the company. These individuals were referred to as "subcontractors," even though they performed little to none of the work that ComEd purportedly hired them to do. According to the information in the Superseding Indictment, ComEd paid these so-called subcontractors $4,000 to $5,000 each month, with several receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars over the course of the conspiracy. The payments to the subcontractors totaled $1.3 million.

The conspirators created or caused others to create false and misleading documents to circumvent internal accounting controls at ComEd and its parent company, Exelon Corporation, and to conceal the fact that a substantial portion of ComEd's payments to the third-party intermediaries went to Madigan's associates.

As part of the bribery scheme, ComEd hired the law firm of a Madigan ally (Law Firm A) for the years 2011 through 2016. At the insistence of one of Madigan's co-conspirators, ComEd contracted with Law Firm A to perform 850 hours of legal work each year even when there was not enough appropriate legal work for the law firm to perform. Over the course of the conspiracy, ComEd paid Law Firm A $1.8 million.

Among the other benefits to Madigan, ComEd set aside positions in a paid summer internship program for individuals associated with the Thirteenth Ward. Madigan, through his co-conspirators, pressured ComEd to hire certain internship applicants, and ComEd waived minimum academic requirements for individuals referred from the Thirteenth Ward. Finally, Madigan pressed for the appointment of an individual to ComEd's board of directors, and ComEd's chief executive officer arranged for this individual's appointment despite pushback from other executives.

In exchange for these benefits, Madigan worked to advance ComEd's legislative goals in the General Assembly. In particular, the Superseding Indictment cites Madigan's vote for the Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act (EIMA) (Public Act 97-616, effective October 26, 2011), and his vote to override the Governor's veto of EIMA. EIMA amended the regulatory process for setting the rates that ComEd could charge its customers for electricity delivery and helped stabilize the company financially. Madigan also voted in favor of Senate Bill 9 (Public Act 98-015, effective May 22, 2013), which nullified an agency interpretation of EIMA that was unfavorable to ComEd. He then voted to override the Governor's veto of Senate Bill 9. The Superseding Indictment also cites to the passage of the Future Energy Jobs Act (FEJA) (Public Act 99-906, effective June 1, 2017), which extended the favorable regulatory process created by EIMA. Further, ComEd opposed House Bill 5626, a bill that would have "impose[d] certain obligations upon alternative retail electric suppliers[.]" Madigan gave his co-conspirator permission to "go ahead and kill" the bill, and House Bill 5626 did not pass.

Wire Fraud / Honest Services Scheme

Counts Eight, Nine, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen relate to a separate scheme "to defraud the people of Illinois of the intangible right to the honest services of MADIGAN through bribery and to obtain money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises[.]" This scheme centered around Madigan's agreement to help then-Chicago Alderman of the Twenty-Fifth Ward (Alderman A) obtain a lucrative State board position upon Alderman A's retirement from the Chicago City Council. Madigan also agreed to help Alderman A's relative find a State government job. In exchange, Madigan agreed that Alderman A would direct business to Madigan's private law firm. Madigan also asked Alderman A to help Madigan's relative obtain business from a Chicago-based community organization.

Alderman A's support for or opposition to proposed real estate projects was instrumental in deciding whether those projects could move forward in the Twenty-Fifth Ward. Alderman A was also the Chairman of the Committee on Zoning, Landmarks & Building Standards (Zoning Committee) on the City Council. The Zoning Committee decided zoning changes and had the power to grant other authorizations required for real estate development projects. In his capacity as Chairman, Alderman A decided which matters the Zoning Committee would consider.

Madigan met repeatedly with Alderman A to discuss, among other things, a plan for Alderman A to refer real estate developers involved in projects in the Twenty-Fifth Ward to Madigan's law firm and Madigan's plan to recommend the alderman to the Governor-elect for appointment to various State board positions, in Madigan's official capacity as Speaker. In several instances, Madigan used or caused others to send emails and place telephone calls to further the scheme, giving rise to several wire fraud and Travel Act charges for which Madigan was convicted.

ANALYSIS

Section 2-156 of the Pension Code requires the forfeiture of retirement annuities and other pension benefits upon a member's conviction of a service-related felony and provides, in pertinent part:

Felony conviction. None of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member.

The purpose of the felony forfeiture provisions in the Pension Code is to discourage official misconduct and to implement the public's right to conscientious service from those in governmental positions by denying retirement benefits to public servants convicted of violating the public's trust. Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 322 (2010); Kerner v. State Employees' Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1978). The critical inquiry in determining if a felony "relat[es] to or aris[es] out of or in connection with" public service turns on whether a nexus exists between the public servant's criminal wrongdoing and the performance of his or her official duties. Devaney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund for the City of Chicago, 199 Ill. 2d 414, 419 (2002). Further, the language of pension statutes must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. Carmichael v. Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 24. There must be "a clear and specific connection between the felony committed and the participant's" service to justify a forfeiture of pension benefits. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 597 (2005).

Illinois courts have employed three alternative tests for evaluating whether the requisite nexus exists. Abbate v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 201228, ¶ 44. Specifically, a forfeiture of pension benefits occurs if the facts and circumstances establish that: (1) "but for" the fact that the pension claimant was a public official or employee, he would not have been in a position to commit the felony in question (Devaney, 199 Ill. 2d at 423); (2) the pension claimant's service in public office or employment "was a material element and a substantial factor" in bringing about the subsequent criminal offense (Katalinic, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 928, quoting Bloom, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 815); or (3) the conviction is "in some way connected with the employment so that there is a causal connection" between the employment and the conviction (Goff, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 195).

"But For" Test

In Devaney, a police lieutenant was convicted of federal mail fraud as the result of his involvement in a scheme to defraud an insurance company. Under section 5-227 of the Pension Code, a provision that contains language substantially similar to that used in section 2-156, Devoney was denied his pension benefits upon a finding that "but for" the fact that Devoney was a high-ranking police officer, "he would not have been in a position or selected to participate in the scheme to defraud[.]"

Here, as in Devaney, Madigan's felonious criminal conduct was a product of his official status. But for the fact that Madigan was a General Assembly member, he would not have been in the position to accept bribes from ComEd in exchange for his vote and influence on legislation affecting ComEd and its affiliates. Madigan's status as a member of the Illinois House of Representatives, and in particular, his role as Speaker, uniquely positioned him to influence the direction of ComEd's legislative projects. Madigan's formal and informal powers as Speaker almost certainly influenced his co-conspirators to cultivate a relationship with him and to stay in his good graces. But for Madigan's status as a General Assembly member and Speaker, he would not have been in the position to agree to recommend, in his official capacity as Speaker, Alderman A to the future Governor for a State board position in exchange for Alderman A's business referrals.

"Material Element and Substantial Factor" Test

In Bloom, an alderman pled guilty to filing a federal tax return that falsely listed certain cash payments as rental income. In exchange for the cash payments, Bloom used his name, official position, and influence as an alderman to obtain city-funded services for the private businessman tendering the cash payments. The Bloom court noted that Devaney did not mandate the "but for" test to find causation, and instead employed a "substantial factor" test, holding that the necessary causal link, or nexus, is established if the public official's position "was a material element and a substantial factor" in bringing about the subsequent criminal acts.

Applying Bloom to the current circumstances, a nexus clearly exists between Madigan's felony convictions and his service as Speaker. Madigan's position was a material element and a substantial factor in his resulting convictions. Like Bloom, Madigan used his name, official position, and influence as a General Assembly member and Speaker to enrich himself and his loyalists. He prioritized the financial wellbeing of a private energy company over his constituents' interests. Additionally, he deprived the people of Illinois of his honest services when he agreed to recommend Alderman A for a State board position in exchange for private business opportunities. Madigan's convictions directly resulted from his misuse of his official positions.

"Causal Connection" Test

In Goff, a retired teacher pled guilty to the aggravated sexual abuse of children attending the school in which he worked. Although the conduct underlying the convictions never took place on school property, Goff used his position as a teacher to take sexual advantage of his victims, and, as a consequence, the court found that he "used and abused" his service as a teacher to perpetrate the felonies to which he pled guilty, justifying the forfeiture of his pension benefits.

Here, Madigan's convictions are in some way connected to his service as a General Assembly member and Speaker. Like the plaintiff in Goff, Madigan "used and abused" his official status as a tool to achieve unlawful ends. Indeed, Madigan's criminal conduct not only related to his official duties as General Assembly member and Speaker but, in fact, depended on the exercise of those very duties. Accordingly, based on the information provided to this office, there is a causal connection between the felonies Madigan committed and his service as a General Assembly member and Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives.

CONCLUSION

Applying any of the available tests employed by Illinois courts, based on the records of the United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, it is my opinion that Michael Madigan was convicted of felonies that require the forfeiture of his pension benefits under the General Assembly Retirement System pursuant to section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code.

Sincerely,

KWAME RAOUL
ATTORNEY GENERAL