Can Idaho's property tax law treat developers who hold six or more subdivision lots more favorably than someone who owns a single similar lot, by valuing the developer's lots based on how long it will take them to sell?

Plain-English summary

Senator John Peavey and Ada County Assessor W. R. Schroeder asked the AG whether 1993's House Bill 389 (codified at Idaho Code § 63-202) was constitutional. H.B. 389 directed the State Tax Commission to write rules requiring that, when a taxpayer owns six or more lots in a single subdivision held for resale, "the lots shall be valued under a method which recognizes the time period over which those lots must be sold in order to realize current market values for those lots until such time as a building permit is issued for each lot."

The substantive concern: if read as a discount available only to multi-lot owners, the statute would violate Idaho Constitution art. 7, § 2 (proportional and uniform taxation according to value) and art. 7, § 5 (uniformity within taxing district). Two taxpayers could own physically similar parcels in the same subdivision; one with five lots and one with six. The five-lot owner would not get the time-to-sell discount; the six-lot owner would. That is a discriminatory assessment scheme. Idaho courts have repeatedly held that property-tax statutes cannot burden similarly situated taxpayers differently based on factors unrelated to value.

The AG's solution was a saving construction. The Tax Commission's existing rules already recognize "reasonable time to consummate sale" as a factor in market-value determinations for all taxpayers, not just multi-lot owners. If H.B. 389 is read as restating, in the multi-lot context, what the existing rules already do for all taxpayers, the statute is constitutional. The legislature cannot reasonably have intended to enact an unconstitutional discrimination, so courts should give the statute the constitutional reading where one is available. Under that reading, the State Tax Commission's existing rules do not need to change. Multi-lot owners get the time-to-sell factor as the rules already provided, and so do single-lot owners.

The opinion's structural point: the statute is constitutional only if it does not in fact create a multi-lot-only discount. If the Tax Commission interpreted H.B. 389 to require special favorable treatment of multi-lot subdivision owners, the rules implementing it would face constitutional challenge. The constitutional reading collapses the new statute into the existing valuation framework.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What does the uniformity clause actually require?

Idaho Const. art. 7, § 2 requires the legislature to provide for "such methods of assessment as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal." Article 7, § 5 requires that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." Together, these provisions require that property be valued consistently and that similarly situated property bear similar tax burdens. Special discounts available only to one class of owners (developers, multi-lot holders, etc.) violate both provisions unless the classification rests on a real difference in value.

Why is "reasonable time to consummate sale" a legitimate factor?

Because it goes to actual market value. The market value of a lot held for sale by a developer is influenced by how long the lot will sit on the market before a buyer is found. A subdivision with 50 unsold lots cannot be valued as if all 50 will sell tomorrow; the market price reflects the holding period. Standard appraisal practice uses absorption-rate analysis to discount future sales to present value. The same factor applies to single-lot owners who are also selling: their market value also reflects time-to-sell. The factor is not unique to developers; it just affects them more visibly.

Could H.B. 389 still be challenged?

Yes, if the Tax Commission's implementing rules treat multi-lot owners more favorably than single-lot owners on the same factor. The AG's saving construction depends on uniform application. If the Commission writes a rule that says "multi-lot owners get a 30% discount based on absorption rate, single-lot owners get nothing," that rule would fail uniformity review. The legal question is one of consistent application, not one of whether the underlying valuation factor is permissible.

What if a developer relied on a statute that turned out to be unconstitutional?

Idaho's tax-refund procedures generally let taxpayers challenge specific assessments. If a developer paid tax under an unconstitutional discount scheme and was assessed at the discounted rate, the developer's tax bill would be lower than the constitutional baseline, so the question of refund would not arise. The opposite scenario, a developer assessed at the higher non-discounted rate while a similar single-lot owner got a lower rate, would justify a refund or assessment-reduction claim. Limitation periods and procedural rules apply.

Did the legislature follow up?

The opinion does not predict what the legislature would do. The 1993 House Bill 389 amendment was the action; the AG's role was to flag the constitutional path forward. Whether the legislature subsequently revisited § 63-202 is a separate question that requires session-law research.

Background and statutory framework

Idaho's property-tax statutes in Title 63 set out the framework for valuing and taxing real and personal property. The State Tax Commission has rulemaking authority over assessment standards, and county assessors apply those standards to specific properties. The constitutional uniformity provisions (art. 7, §§ 2 and 5) are the core constraints on differential treatment.

H.B. 389 was a 1993 measure responding to developer concerns that lots held for resale were being assessed at full market value as if they could be sold immediately, when in fact the market would take years to absorb them. The bill directed the Tax Commission to write rules using a time-to-sell-aware valuation method for multi-lot subdivision owners. The constitutional concern, raised by Senator Peavey and Assessor Schroeder, was the limitation to six-or-more-lot owners.

The AG's saving construction was a familiar tool: when a statute is reasonably susceptible to two readings, one constitutional and one not, courts adopt the constitutional reading. The reading the AG offered, "this codifies what the existing rules already do for all taxpayers," kept H.B. 389 alive without writing a constitutional inequality into Idaho property-tax practice.

Citations

• Idaho Const. art. 7, §§ 2, 5
• Idaho Code § 63-202 (as amended by 1993 H.B. 389)
• 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 1473

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
• Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/OP94-01.pdf

Original opinion text

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 94-1
To:

Honorable John Peavey
Idaho State Senate
STATEHOUSE MAIL
Boise, ID 83720
Honorable W. R. Schroeder
Ada County Assessor
650 Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

Per Request for Attorney General's Opinion
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
House Bill 389 passed by the 1993 Idaho Legislature (1993 Idaho Sess. Laws
1473) amended Idaho Code § 63-202 to require that the State Tax Commission's
administrative rules relating to assessment of property for ad valorem property taxes shall
comply with the following:
The rules shall provide that if property consists of six (6) or more lots
within one (1) subdivision, and the lots are held under one (1) ownership
and which lots are held for resale, the lots shall be valued under a method
which recognizes the time period over which those lots must be sold in
order to realize current market values for those lots until such time as a
building permit is issued for each lot.
(Emphasis added.) The issue presented by your two requests for an Attorney General's
opinion is whether this amendment to Idaho Code § 63-202 would require the State Tax
Commission to adopt rules that violate either section 2 or section 5 of article 7 of the
Idaho Constitution.
CONCLUSION
If the intent of Idaho Code § 63-202, as amended by House Bill 389, is to
discount assessed values for some taxpayers, but not for others, owning similar parcels, it
violates the proportionality and uniformity provisions of article 7, sections 2 and 5 of the
Idaho Constitution. Appraisal methods that favor persons owning multiple lots and deny
equal treatment to persons owning single lots of the same type are frequently referred to
as "developers' discounts." Such discounts are not allowed by the Idaho Constitution.
Unconstitutional results must be avoided. Therefore, a reasonable alternate interpretation

of H.B. 389 must be given if it is possible to construe the statute in a constitutional
manner. In our opinion, H.B. 389 can be construed in a constitutional manner if
construed consistent with State Tax Commission rules that already recognize the
reasonable time to consummate a sale as to all taxpayers. H.B. 389 requires assessed
values to reflect the reasonable time to consummate sales for persons owning six or more
lots. Assuming this is not interpreted as providing a discriminatory assessment scheme
and is merely recognition of the general rule which takes into account a reasonable time
to consummate sales, the statute is valid. No change in State Tax Commission rules is
necessary to carry out H.B. 389 in a constitutional manner.
ANALYSIS
1.

Introduction

The 1993 session of the Idaho Legislature, by H.B. 389, amended Idaho Code
§ 63-202. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 1473. The question asked is whether the amendment
violates either the proportionality provision of section 2 or the uniformity provision of
section 5 of article 7 of the Idaho Constitution.
Section 2 of article 7 requires that property be taxed "in proportion to" its value. It
provides:
Section 2. Revenue to be provided by taxation.--The legislature
shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by
valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
to the value of his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter
otherwise provided.
Section 5 requires that property tax levies "be uniform" on all nonexempt property
within the boundaries of the governmental entity levying the tax. It provides in pertinent
part:
Section 5. Taxes to be uniform--Exemptions.--All taxes shall be
uniform upon the class of subjects within the territorial limits, of the
authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general
laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of all property, real and personal . . . .
The requirement that taxes be uniform applies to property taxes and is self-enacting. Orr
v. State Board of Equalization, 3 Idaho 190, 28 P. 416 (1891).

The mandate of these two sections of the Idaho Constitution was concisely stated
in Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 72 Idaho 344, 348, 241 P.2d 167, 171
(1952), when the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
The Constitution requires that for tax purposes the ad valorem tax must be
uniform and on the same basis of valuation as other property in the county,
and if this requirement of uniformity has not been attained and retained,
then the mandate of Article VII, Sections 2 and 5 of the Constitution, has
been violated. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of
taxation and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the
mode of assessment as well as in the rate of tax.
(Citations omitted.) In Merris v. Ada County, 100 Idaho 59, 63, 593 P.2d 394, 398
(1979), the court stated:
In our opinion the valuation of taxable property for assessment purposes
must reasonably approximate the fair market value of the property in order
to effectuate the policy embodied in Id. Const. Art. 7, § 5, i.e., that each
taxpayer's property bear the just proportion of the property tax burden.
Idaho Code § 63-202 requires the State Tax Commission to promulgate rules and
distribute them to each county assessor and board of county commissioners directing the
manner in which market value for assessment purposes is to be determined for the
purpose of ad valorem taxation. The State Tax Commission must require each assessor
to find market value for assessment purposes of all the property within his county using
recognized appraisal methods and techniques.
As required by this statute, the State Tax Commission has promulgated such rules
for county authorities to follow. State Tax Commission Property Tax Rule 204.01 states:
Market value is that amount of United States dollars or equivalent for
which, in all probability, a property would exchange hands between a
willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer,
with a reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a
reasonable down or full cash payment.
(Emphasis added.) This conforms with the command of Idaho Code § 63-202 to use
recognized appraisal methods and techniques.1
With this introduction, it is possible to restate the question presented: May the
State Tax Commission adopt rules that conform to this newly enacted statutory

requirement and that do not also violate section 2 and section 5 of article 7 of the Idaho
Constitution?
2.

Presumption of Constitutionality

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts as to
constitutionality must be resolved in favor of validity. Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho
796, 451 P.2d 542 (1969). Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a
statute that will uphold its constitutionality. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856
(1985). An analysis of the constitutionality of the H.B. 389 amendment to Idaho Code
§ 63-202 must begin with the assumption that the amendment is constitutional. If doubts
as to the amendment's constitutionality arise, an interpretation must be sought that will
preserve the amendment's constitutionality. Cowles Publishing Co. v. Magistrate Court,
118 Idaho 753, 800 P.2d 640 (1990).
At the same time, when applying legislative acts, there is a duty to ascertain and
give effect to the legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho
537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1980). Standard rules of statutory construction require giving effect
to the legislature's intent and purpose, and to every word and phrase employed. Sweitzer
v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990).
3.

Effect of House Bill 389

Sponsors of H.B. 389 expressed an intent to require the State Tax Commission to
mandate by rule the use of an appraisal method commonly known as the "developers'
discount."2 The rationale underlying the developers' discount is that valuing each lot
independently and allowing a reasonable time to consummate the sale of each single lot
does not yield current market value when many lots are on the market.3 Supporters of the
discount argue that a reasonable length of time necessary to sell a lot when only one lot is
for sale is not the same period as a reasonable length of time necessary to sell a given lot
when many lots are on the market. Mandating recognition of this difference when
assessing six lots held under one ownership in a single subdivision is seen as necessary to
correctly determine market values for such lots.
However, if the H.B. 389 amendment to Idaho Code § 63-202 is read to mean that
the developers' discount is to be applied only to some taxpayers' properties, it creates a
non-uniform mode of assessment that results in other taxpayers' properties bearing an
unjust proportion of the property tax burden. This would be an unconstitutional result.
An example makes this clear. Suppose there are seven identical lots in the same
subdivision for sale. Six of them are held by one owner. Another owner has only one
lot. This reading of the H.B. 389 amendment to Idaho Code § 63-202 would require that

each of the six lots held under one ownership be assessed in a way designed to result in
each of those lots having a market value for assessment purposes less than that of the
single lot held under different ownership. The sole criterion for assessing one lot higher
than the other six is ownership. Given the constitutional requirements of proportionality
and uniformity, it is impossible to defend applying different assessment techniques to lots
based solely on ownership.
The reason this is so was well illustrated very recently by the Utah Supreme Court
in Board of Equalization v. Utah Tax Commission, No. 910310, 1993 WL 479711, at
*4797 (Utah Nov. 18, 1993):
Even more troublesome to us, however, is the fuzzy line of
demarcation between a developer and the owner of a single lot. The
premise of absorption valuation is that by listing all of his or her lots for
sale, a developer gluts the market--the number of lots for sale exceeding the
number of willing buyers. In this predicament, the developer is forced to
sell lots over time as willing buyers become available. This reasoning,
according to the Commission, justifies a developer discount reflecting the
absorption period. However, the seller of a single lot is in the same
predicament. By listing his or her single lot for sale, an owner competes
with all other sellers of similar lots for a sale to a limited number of willing
buyers. It is possible, and in many cases probable, that the single lot will
not be sold in the first tax year. The number of sales the market will bear
impacts single lot owners and developers uniformly, but the Commission,
by granting an absorption discount, softens the blow exclusively for the
developers.
Whether a reasonable length of time necessary to sell a lot when only one lot is for
sale is or is not the same period as a reasonable length of time necessary to sell a given
lot when many lots are on the market is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the alleged
cure for this situation provided by reading the developers' discount into the H.B. 389
amendment applies only to that select group of lot owners who own six or more lots in a
single subdivision. Thus, certain lot owners are favored by the discount while other
property taxpayers bear that part of the tax burden which the favored taxpayers escape.
This obviously violates the policy embodied in the Idaho Constitution, as elucidated by
the Idaho Supreme Court, "that each taxpayer's property bear the just proportion of the
property tax burden." Merris v. Ada County, 100 Idaho at 63, 593 P.2d at 398. It
violates this policy by requiring non-uniformity in the mode of assessment. This is
contrary to the dictates of article 7, sections 2 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution. See
Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 72 Idaho 344, 241 P.2d 167 (1952).

Other states with uniformity provisions in their constitutions have also found the
developers' discount to be incompatible with those provisions. The Michigan Supreme
Court addressed the developers' discount in Edward Rose Building Co. v. Independence
Township, 462 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1990). A developer owned 100 developed, vacant
lots in a subdivision. The developer argued that he was entitled to a discount to reflect
"holding of wholesale costs for marketing, financing and risk." He maintained that the
lots should be valued as a group sales transaction. The local appraiser valued the lots by
comparing sales of individual lots. The court held that the developers' discount violated
the state constitution's uniformity requirement. The court said:
It is well established that the concept of uniformity requires uniformity not
only in the rate of taxation, but also in the mode of assessment. The
"controlling principle" is one of equal treatment of similarly situated
taxpayers.
462 N.W.2d at 333-34 (citations omitted).
The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the developers' discount twice. The first
time the court dealt with the issue, Oregon's statutes did not provide for the discount. In
First Interstate Bank v. Department of Revenue, 760 P.2d 880 (Or. 1988), the court held
that the use of the developers' discount method of appraisal was inappropriate.4
In 1989, the Oregon Legislature enacted a developers' discount. It provided that
four or more lots in a single subdivision held by a single owner were to be appraised
using the developers' discount method. In Mathias v. Department of Revenue, 817 P.2d
272 (Or. 1991), the court held that the statute violated the uniformity requirements of the
Oregon Constitution. Oregon's uniformity requirement provides that "all taxation shall
be uniform on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax." This language is virtually identical to that of the Idaho Constitution
found in article 7, section 5.
4.

Alternative Effects of House Bill 389

When the Idaho Legislature enacts a statute it should be presumed to have acted
within the scope of its constitutional authority. Olson v. J.A. Freeman Co. 117 Idaho
706, 971 P.2d 1285 (1990). Thus, a statute will be construed so as to avoid conflict with
the constitution. AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718 P.2d 1129 (1986). In Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Riggs, 66 Idaho 677, 166 P.2d 926 (1946), the Idaho Supreme Court
construed a statute relating to refunds of fuels taxes to avoid attributing an
unconstitutional intention to the legislature. The court said:

Furthermore, a denial of refunds to all non-highway users would
necessarily include appellant and other companies operating railroads in
interstate commerce. We cannot attribute to the legislature an intent to
deny refunds of the one cent per gallon additional tax to all non-highway
users, because that would amount to holding the legislature designedly and
willfully intended to violate the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution . . . by placing a direct burden on interstate commerce which,
of course, it could not do.
66 Idaho at 688, 166 P.2d at 930 (citations omitted).
A statutory provision will not be deprived of its potency if a reasonable alternative
construction is possible. State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972). In this
instance, a reasonable alternative construction is possible. Rather than find the legislature
acted beyond its constitutional authority when it amended Idaho Code § 63-202 by H.B.
389, it is better to conclude that, as amended, that code section incorporates the principle
that a proper determination of market value requires recognition of the time required to
make a sale of property at a price that reflects its market value. See footnote 1 of this
opinion. H.B. 389 directs the State Tax Commission to provide rules which recognize
the time period over which lots must be sold. As previously discussed, the State Tax
Commission's Property Tax Rule 204.01 already embodies appraisal practices that
recognize a reasonable time in which to consummate a sale. Therefore, current rules
already comply with the direction of H.B. 389. Further refinement of the State Tax
Commission's rules and practice is unnecessary.
5.

Implications for Taxing Districts

This construction avoids another practical difficulty for counties and taxing
districts that rely on property tax revenues. There exists the possibility that taxing district
finances may be adversely affected if the State Tax Commission's rules required and
county assessors applied the developers' discounts. Should a group of lot owners who do
not qualify for the developers' discount dispute their assessed valuations, the court may
well hold that the appropriate remedy is to lower the valuations of the protesting lot
owners to be in accord with the lots that do qualify for the discount. In In re Farmer's
Appeal, 80 Idaho 72, 325 P.2d 278 (1958), the Idaho Supreme Court held this was the
appropriate remedy for a property owner who rightfully complained that the methods
used to assess his property resulted in an assessed valuation that was too high when
compared with other similar property. The court said:
Where certain property is assessed at a higher value than all other
property and a standard in determining the value for assessment purposes is
used, which does not conform to the standard generally used, the taxpayer

is entitled to a reduction in conformance to the standard used in assessing
other property.
80 Idaho at 79, 325 P.2d at 285. The result would be loss of revenues and inequitable tax
consequences to those who don't complain about the assessment methods.
CONCLUSION
The amendment to Idaho Code § 63-202 cannot be interpreted to create what is
commonly referred to as the developers' discount. If it did, it would violate article 7,
sections 2 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution. Such a reading might also force other
taxpayers to challenge their assessed valuations on the grounds that developers are
systematically assessed at lower rates. The remedy might well be to lower the assessed
values of the complaining taxpayers. A better interpretation is that the present State Tax
Commission rules are in full compliance with the mandate of Idaho Code § 63-202 both
before and after the 1993 amendment because those rules already require assessors to
take into account a reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale of the property being
assessed.
AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED
1.

Idaho Constitution:
Article 7, section 2.
Article 7, section 5.

2.

Idaho Statutes:
Idaho Code § 63-202.

3.

Idaho Cases:
AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718 P.2d 1129 (1986).
Chastain's Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 72 Idaho 344, 241 P.2d 167 (1952).
Cowles Publishing Co. v. Magistrate Court, 118 Idaho 753, 800 P.2d 640 (1990).
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1980).
In re Farmer's Appeal, 80 Idaho 72, 325 P.2d 278 (1958).

Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho 796, 451 P.2d 542 (1969).
Merris v. Ada County, 100 Idaho 59, 593 P.2d 394 (1979).
Olson v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 971 P.2d 1285 (1990).
Orr v. State Board of Equalization, 3 Idaho 190, 28 P. 416 (1891).
Sprenger Grubb & Associates v. Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. et al., Fifth Judicial
District Case No. 17059.
State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972).
State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985).
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990).
The Hosac Company, Inc., et al. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, Fourth
Judicial District Case No. 96002.
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Riggs, 66 Idaho 677, 166 P.2d 926 (1946).
4.

Other Cases:
Board of Equalization v. Utah Tax Commission, No. 910310, 1993 WL 479711, at
*4797 (Utah Nov. 18, 1993).
Edward Rose Building Company v. Independence Township, 462 N.W.2d 325
(Mich. 1990).
First Interstate Bank v. Department of Revenue, 760 P.2d 880 (Or. 1988).
Mathias v. Department of Revenue, 817 P.2d 272 (Or. 1991).
DATED this 25th day of January, 1994.
LARRY ECHOHAWK
Attorney General

Analysis by:
TERRY B. ANDERSON

Chief, Business Regulation and
State Finance Division
Deputy Attorney General
1 J. Eckert, Ph.D., Property Appraisal and Assessment 53 (International Association of Assessing
Officers, 1990):
Market price approximates market value and value in exchange under the following
assumptions:
1. No coercion or undue influence over the buyer or seller in an attempt to force the
purchase or sale.
2.

Well-informed buyers and sellers acting in their own best interests.

3.

A reasonable time for the transaction to take place.

4.

Payment in cash or its equivalent.

(Emphasis added.)
2 If this is the intent, the "developers' discount" is by no means limited to developers. Under the statutory
language added by H.B. 389, some developers may not qualify for the discount; some property owners who are not
developers may qualify for it.
3 There is another argument sometimes presented to justify the developers' discount. This argument is that
developers often make multi-lot sales. Supporters of the discount maintain that it is inappropriate to value multi-lot
sales using the single lot market. This position has flaws which need not concern us here since the multi-lot market
argument does not support the developers' discount as embodied in the H.B. 389 amendment. Idaho Code § 63202, as amended by H.B. 389, does not give the developers' discount to all lots held for multi-lot sale; nor does it
deny the discount to lots that are not held for multi-lot sales. For example, six lots held by one owner, but located in
different subdivisions, do not qualify for the developers' discount even if they are held for sale as a package. On the
other hand, six lots held by one owner located in one subdivision do qualify for the discount even if they are on the
market for single lot sales. The H.B. 389 amendment does not address the "different market" argument.
4 Similarly, two Idaho district courts have recently refused to apply the developers' discount in cases for
years prior to the effective date of the H.B. 389 amendment to Idaho Code § 63-202. The cases are The Hosac
Company, Inc., et al. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, Fourth Judicial District Case No. 96002, and Sprenger
Grubb & Associates v. Idaho Board of Tax Appeals et al., Fifth Judicial District Case No. 17059.