Can Idaho county commissioners hire an outside private lawyer for the county's civil work on a long-term contract, instead of using the elected county prosecutor?

Plain-English summary

Two county prosecutors, David Johnson of Bonneville County and Bill Douglas of Kootenai County, asked the AG the same question: could their boards of county commissioners hire outside private civil counsel on a long-term retainer, sidestepping the elected prosecutor's office? The question was practical. County prosecutors are general practitioners, often handling everything from felony trials to land-use litigation to employment matters. Some commissioners wanted to retain a private firm with subject-matter specialty, year after year, instead of using the prosecutor's civil division.

The AG (writing for AG Larry EchoHawk) said no, not as routine practice. The starting point is Idaho Const. art. 18, § 6, which establishes the office of county prosecuting attorney as an elected county officer. The constitution presumes the prosecutor handles county legal work. Idaho Code § 31-2604 makes that explicit on the civil side: the prosecutor "shall prosecute or defend all civil actions in which his or her county is a party." Idaho Code § 31-813 grants commissioners authority "to hire counsel with or without the prosecutor," but the AG read the constitutional structure as imposing a "necessity" limit on that authority. § 31-813 cannot be used to install a parallel civil-counsel system that displaces the elected prosecutor.

The "necessity" test, drawn from older Idaho case law, requires the commissioners to make a case-by-case showing of actual necessity (e.g., the prosecutor has a conflict of interest, the matter requires specialized expertise the prosecutor's office does not have, the workload genuinely cannot be absorbed). The findings must be entered into the commissioners' record. The findings are reviewable by Idaho courts. Mere comfort, convenience, or political preference for outside counsel does not satisfy "necessity."

The opinion's structural point: the prosecutor's duty under § 31-2604 supersedes the commissioners' authority under § 31-813. Where the two statutes overlap, the more specific duty wins.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What does "necessity" actually require?

The AG drew on older case law applying art. 18, § 6 to insist on a case-specific factual showing. Examples that would clearly meet the standard: the prosecutor has a personal or professional conflict of interest in a particular matter, the matter requires specialized expertise (complex bond financing, esoteric environmental litigation) that the prosecutor's office does not possess and cannot reasonably acquire in time, or the case load on the office is genuinely beyond capacity such that outside help is the only way to meet a court deadline. Examples that would not meet the standard: the commissioners prefer a particular private firm, the commissioners want a second opinion as a matter of comfort, the matter is politically sensitive and the commissioners want a politically aligned lawyer.

Why does the constitution care who handles civil work?

Because the prosecutor is an elected county officer, accountable to the voters. Outsourcing civil work to a private firm not selected by the voters reduces accountability for the legal positions the county takes. Art. 18, § 6 frames the prosecutor as the county's lawyer because the voters elected that lawyer. The "necessity" doctrine prevents commissioners from making an end run around the voters' choice by hiring private counsel of the commissioners' own choosing.

Are commissioners liable if they hire counsel without showing necessity?

The opinion does not directly address commissioner liability, but it makes the point that the necessity findings are "reviewable by the courts of this state." A taxpayer or the prosecutor could challenge an outside-counsel arrangement that did not meet the necessity standard. Public funds spent on improperly retained counsel would presumably be recoverable. The opinion's tone treats the necessity standard as a real constraint, not a paper formality.

Can the prosecutor refuse to handle a particular matter?

The prosecutor's duty under § 31-2604 is mandatory: "shall prosecute or defend all civil actions in which his or her county is a party." A prosecutor with a conflict of interest must withdraw, which would itself be the kind of "necessity" that justifies outside counsel. A prosecutor who simply did not want to handle the matter would be derelict; the office is not optional.

How does this opinion interact with the AG's role?

The Idaho Attorney General is the state's chief legal officer and provides legal advice to state agencies under Idaho Code §§ 67-1401 to 67-1411. The county prosecutor's role under Title 31 is the county-level analog. This opinion confirms that the same elected-counsel principle applies at the county level: the elected official, not a privately retained firm, is the default county lawyer.

Background and statutory framework

Idaho Const. art. 18, § 6 lists the prosecuting attorney among the constitutional county officers. Idaho Code § 31-2604 sets out the prosecutor's duties, including the duty to handle civil matters where the county is a party. Idaho Code § 31-813 grants commissioners authority to hire counsel, with or without the prosecutor's involvement. The interplay between the two statutes had been a recurring subject of AG opinions since at least the early 20th century.

The 1993 opinion fits within a broader framework that treats the elected county officers as constitutionally protected. Commissioners have broad budgetary and managerial authority but cannot, through that authority, displace constitutional officers (sheriff, clerk, treasurer, assessor, prosecutor) from their core functions. The "necessity" test is the standard tool for evaluating how far the commissioners can go before they cross that line.

Citations

• Idaho Const. art. 18, § 6
• Idaho Code §§ 31-2604, 31-813

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
• Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/OP93-08.pdf

Original opinion text

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 93-8
To:

David A. Johnson
Bonneville County Prosecuting Attorney
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Bill Douglas
Prosecuting Attorney
Kootenai County
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Per Requests for Attorney General's Opinion
QUESTION PRESENTED
Do county commissioners have the ability to retain civil counsel outside the
county prosecutor's office on a long-term or continuous basis?
CONCLUSION
1.

Pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, statutes and case law, county commissioners
do not have the authority to hire civil counsel outside of the county prosecutor's
office on a long-term or continuous basis unless they comply with Idaho's
constitutionally mandated standard of "necessity."

2.

It is the county prosecutor's duty to try civil matters in which the county is a party
and give the board legal advice. Before the board of county commissioners may
hire private counsel, the board must conduct a case-by-case analysis and state the
facts which create the necessity of hiring such counsel. It must also make these
reasons a matter of record and this factual justification is reviewable by the courts
of this state. Mere comfort level or convenience does not rise to the level of
"necessary" in this context.

3.

The duty of a prosecutor "to prosecute or defend all civil actions in which his or
her county is a party," pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-2604, supersedes the power of
the county commissioners "to hire counsel with or without the prosecutor" granted
by Idaho Code § 31-813.

ANALYSIS
Your opinion request concerns the ability of the Bonneville and Kootenai County
commissioners to employ, on a retained basis, a private civil attorney not affiliated with
the duly elected county prosecutor. Art. 18, sec. 6, of the Idaho Constitution places a
limitation on the discretion of a board of county commissioners and allows it to hire
counsel only when the circumstances warrant such action.
1.

The Plain Meaning of Art. 18, Sec. 6, of the Idaho Constitution

Since statehood, art. 18, sec. 6, of the Idaho Constitution has provided the board of
county commissioners with the ability to hire counsel when special circumstances arise.
Art. 18, sec. 6, reads, in pertinent part: "The county commissioners may employ counsel
when necessary." (Emphasis added.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the rules of statutory construction apply to
constitutional provisions. Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990). A
fundamental rule of statutory and constitutional construction is if a statute or
constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the language will be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991). By this
notion, the plain meaning of the word "necessary" is presumed to be the meaning given
to it in common parlance. The term "necessary" has been defined as follows:1
An indispensable item; essential; absolutely needed; required.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 790 (9th ed. 1991).
The term "necessity" is defined as:
The quality of being necessary; pressure of circumstance; physical
or moral compulsion; impossibility of a contrary order or condition; the
quality or state of being in need. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 790
(9th ed. 1991).
1

The definition of "necessary" in Black's Law Dictionary reads:
This word must be considered in the connection in which it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various
meanings. . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1029 (6th ed. 1990).

This is the only definition which creates an issue of ambiguity. It indicates that the meaning of the word is
controlled by the context in which it is used. The constitutional context in which art. 18, sec. 6, was adopted
indicates that when the framers incorporated the "necessary" standard into the constitution they had in mind exigent
or special circumstances. The case law has also interpreted the necessary standard to be much more than mere
convenience.

Controlling force; irresistible compulsion; a power or impulse so
great that it admits no choice of conduct; a condition arising out of
circumstances that compel a certain course of action. Black's Law
Dictionary 1030 (6th ed. 1990).
These entries indicate that the words "when necessary" are words of limitation as
used in the constitution. Given their natural significance these words bridle the discretion
of county commissioners when they are considering hiring private counsel. Thus, it is
the opinion of this office that mere convenience or personal preference does not rise to
the level of "necessary" or "necessity" in this context.
2.

Case Interpretation of Art. 18, Sec. 6

There are several Idaho Supreme Court cases which have interpreted the language
of art. 18, sec. 6, of the Idaho Constitution. The first was Meller v. Board of
Commissioners of Logan County, 4 Idaho 44, 35 P. 712 (1894). In Meller, the board of
county commissioners for Logan County entered into a contract in which it retained H.S.
Hampton, a private attorney, to provide legal services to the county at $2,000 per year for
a two year period. The supreme court held that the board had gone beyond the scope of
its constitutional and statutory authority by hiring private counsel. The court therefore
found the contract in question to be void and a nullity, and in so holding stated:
We are unwilling to believe that it was the purpose of the framers of
our constitution to "pluck the muzzle of restraint" from the boards of
county commissioners throughout the state, and leave them with the sole
limit of the vagaries of their own sweet wills in imposing burdens upon the
taxpayers of the state.
4 Idaho at 51. It is clear from this language that the court intended to limit the discretion
of county commissioners in hiring counsel to something narrower than the "vagaries of
their own sweet wills." The court also found that "the Legislature cannot take from a
constitutional officer a portion of the characteristic duties belonging to the office, and
devolve them on an office of its own creation. And if this cannot be done by the
Legislature, will it seriously be contended that it can be done by a board of county
commissioners?" Id. The supreme court went on to set forth the standard under which
boards of county commissioners could hire counsel. It stated that "the board of county
commissioners may, when the necessity exists, employ counsel, but that necessity must
be apparent, and the action of the board in each case is subject to review by the courts."
Id. at 53 (emphasis added).

Two years later the supreme court decided Hampton v. Commissioners of Logan
County, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324 (1896). The same facts that gave rise to the decision in
Meller were at issue here. After the Meller decision was handed down, H.S. Hampton,
the attorney who was retained under the void contract, presented an itemized bill for his
services to the Logan County commissioners. The board refused to pay the bill and Mr.
Hampton appealed this decision to the district court which decided he was entitled to
$832 on a quantum meruit basis. In holding that Hampton was entitled to nothing, the
supreme court opined that "before the authority given to the county commissioners by
section 6, article 18 of the constitution can be exercised, the necessity which authorizes it
must not only be apparent, but the facts creating such necessity must be made a matter of
record by the board." Hampton, 4 Idaho at 652 (emphasis added). This holding has
become the controlling standard in construing the language of art. 18, sec. 6, which
relates to commissioners' ability to hire private counsel.
The next case to apply the Hampton "necessity" standard was Ravenscraft v.
Board of Commissioners of Blaine County, 5 Idaho 178, 47 P. 942 (1897). In this case
the board of Blaine County had hired a private firm to defend a single suit in which the
constitutionality of the act creating Blaine County was challenged. Before hiring the
private firm, the board of commissioners had first made a matter of record the
circumstances which gave rise to its decision to retain private counsel. Because of the
magnitude of the legal crisis facing Blaine County, the supreme court held the record
contained "the facts creating the necessity for the employment of counsel by the board of
commissioners of Blaine County." Id. at 183. Once again the Hampton "necessity"
standard controlled the inquiry and was satisfied only because the Blaine County board
had made an official record of the compelling facts which justified their actions to retain
private counsel to defend the county in a single lawsuit.
A similar factual situation was at issue in Barnard v. Young, 43 Idaho 382, 251 P.
1054 (1926). In this case the Power County Board of Commissioners hired private
counsel on a contingent fee basis to assist the prosecuting attorney in collecting deposits
from several bondsmen for deposits of county money in closed banks. The supreme
court followed the principle laid down in Hampton and held: "[B]y the constitution,
section 6, art. 18, county commissioners are expressly empowered to employ counsel in
civil cases when necessary" Barnard, 43 Idaho at 386. The court went on to conclude
that the board had satisfied the necessity standard set forth in Hampton in hiring private
counsel for this matter because the commissioners had identified on the record the facts
which created the need for such counsel before retaining the attorney. It should be noted
that the Power County board in Barnard hired counsel for a single legal issue.
In Anderson v. Shoshone County, 6 Idaho 76, 53 P. 105 (1898), the Idaho
Supreme Court found that a contract for legal services between the board of

commissioners of Shoshone County and a private attorney was valid. However, in
coming to its conclusion, the court stated: "It is not contended by respondent that no
necessity for the employment of counsel existed, nor that the same is not made apparent
by the records of the board." Id. at 77. It also opined that "it seems to us this objection
should more properly come from the district attorney himself, but that officer does not
seem to have considered himself especially aggrieved by the action of the board; at least,
he has made no moan apparent in the record." Id. It should also be noted that the
respondent cited no relevant cases to support his contention that the board had no
authority to employ counsel.
The most recent published case construing the constitutionally granted power of
commissioners to hire counsel when necessary was decided in 1932. Clayton v. Barnes,
52 Idaho 418, 16 P.2d 1056 (1932). In this case the court found that "section 6 article
18, in providing that the county commissioners may employ counsel when necessary, is a
limitation upon the authority of the county commissioners to employ counsel and a denial
of the authority of all other county officials to do so." Id. at 424 (emphasis added). 2
Since the adoption of the constitution of Idaho, there have been only three
instances where the Supreme Court of Idaho has upheld a board of county
commissioners' decision to hire private counsel. All three are distinguishable from the
situations in Kootenai and Bonneville counties. In Anderson v. Shoshone County, the
respondent neither asserted that the board had failed to meet the necessity standard nor
did he contend the board lacked factual justification for its action. The respondent in that
case did not present a single cognizable argument to support his position. Thus, the
supreme court ruled in favor of the validity of the board's action. The court did,
however, state that the proper person to bring such a complaint was the district attorney.
In Ravenscraft, the very existence of Blaine County was at stake and the court held that
the necessity standard had been met because of the obvious importance of this crisis.
Ravenscraft also only involved the ability of the Blaine County board to hire outside
counsel to handle only one case. Barnard is distinguishable on the same grounds, namely
that the Power County board hired outside counsel for a specific legal problem and not
on a retained or continuous basis. The boards in Ravenscraft and Barnard also made a
record of the factual justification for hiring private counsel.
The situations in Bonneville and Kootenai counties are most closely analogous to
the facts of Meller and Hampton where the Logan County board attempted to retain
private civil counsel, not for a specific case, but rather on a two year retained basis at a
fixed salary. The supreme court ruled that this affiliation was impermissible.
2

The holding in Clayton makes it apparent that the conclusion reached in AG opinion 76-42, that "administrative
boards [created by the board of county commissioners] have the right to hire counsel," is incorrect.

After a thorough examination of the constitution and all relevant case law, this
office concludes that county commissioners do not have the authority to hire civil counsel
outside of the county prosecutor's office on a long-term or continuous basis unless they
comply with Idaho's constitutionally mandated standard of "necessity." Before a board of
county commissioners may hire private counsel, it must conduct a case-by-case analysis
and state the facts which create the necessity of hiring such counsel. The board must also
make these factual justifications a matter of record and that record is reviewable by the
courts of this state.
3.

Proceedings at the Constitutional Convention

Assuming that the language of art. 18, sec. 6, is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, the intent and purpose of the framers controls the provision's
meaning. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991). It is helpful to look
at the context in which this provision was adopted to glean the intent and purpose of its
drafters. The proceedings at the Constitutional Convention in 1889 provide insight into
what the framers intended in enacting the language, "county commissioners may hire
counsel when necessary."
Some historical background is necessary to provide insight into what occurred at
the convention proceedings. From the organization of Idaho as a territory in 1863 to
1883, a system of district attorneys was employed. There was one district attorney for
each judicial district. In 1883 the existing system was modified and provided a county
attorney for each of the seventeen counties. Meller v. Board of Commissioners of Logan
County, 4 Idaho 44. Upon statehood, the framers expressly rejected the county attorney
format and opted for district attorneys. At statehood there were only five judicial
districts, comprised of multiple counties. The framers' obvious motive in adopting the
district attorney system was to save money. At the Convention, delegate Reid stated:
The district attorneys cost this territory now $36,600. We have five
district attorneys already provided for and have fixed their salaries at
$2,500. That makes $7,500, which is a saving on that item of $29,000 to
the people.
Proceedings of the Idaho Constitutional Convention of 1889 at 1821 (Hart ed. 1912).
During the same discussion, the framers decided to adopt the language which allows the
commissioners to "hire counsel when necessary." There was much discussion about
giving the commissioners unbridled discretion to hire counsel at any price they deemed
prudent. In adopting the current language, the following discussion ensued:

Mr. Reid: If the county has an important suit or has important legal
business, the commissioners ought to be allowed to go into the market and
get the best legal talent; and if they do not have the business they do not
have to have to have [sic] the counsel.
Mr. Beatty: Suppose an important murder case has to be prosecuted before
the committing magistrate?
Mr. Reid: There is the district attorney who is already paid by the state to
do that.
Mr. Beatty: But he is off in some other county.
Mr. Reid: I have seen this very system, and if it be necessary, the chairman
of the board is always on hand, and upon application to him, when he sees
public justice is about to fail, he can employ a man.
Id. at 1822. It is apparent from this debate that the framers granted the commissioners
the ability to hire counsel when the district attorney was unavailable or when
circumstances indicated that such counsel was absolutely needed, for example, when
"public justice is about to fail."3
Thus, the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention further bolster the
conclusion that the framers only intended to give county commissioners the ability to hire
private counsel in emergency or special circumstances. This intention controls the
meaning of the words "when necessary" if they are deemed to be ambiguous.
4.

Statutory Duties of County Commissioners and Prosecutors

In addition to the constitutional provision, there are three statutes that relate to this
issue. Idaho Code § 31-813 relates to the power of the county commissioners to hire
counsel. It reads:
31-813. Control of suits.- To direct and control the prosecution and
defense of all suits to which the county is a party in interest, and employ
counsel to conduct the same, with or without the prosecuting attorney, as
they may direct.
3

The district attorney system was ultimately abandoned by returning to the county prosecutor format in 1897 by
constitutional amendment. Since the framers adopted the "necessity" language of art. 18, sec. 6, expressly with a
five member district attorney system in mind, it would appear that a board of county commissioners would be held
to a more exacting "necessity" standard since there are now forty-four county prosecutors.

(Emphasis added.) The Idaho statute which enumerates the duties of the prosecuting
attorney reads as follows:
31-2604. Duties of prosecuting attorney.- It is the duty of the
prosecuting attorney:
1.
To prosecute or defend all actions, applications or motions,
civil or criminal, in the district court of his county in which the people, or
the state, or the county, are interested, or are a party; and when the place of
trial is changed in any such action or proceeding to another county, he must
prosecute or defend the same in such other county.
2.
. . . to prosecute or defend all civil actions in which the
county or state is interested . . . .
3.
To give advice to the board of county commissioners, and
other public officers of his county, when requested in all public matters
arising in the conduct of the public business entrusted to the care of such
officers.
(Emphasis added.) In addition, Idaho Code § 31-2607 provides as follows:
31-2607. Adviser of county commissioners.- The prosecuting
attorney is the legal adviser of the board of commissioners; he must attend
their meetings when required, and must attend and oppose all claims and
accounts against the county when he deems them unjust or illegal.
(Emphasis added.)
It is not immediately clear how these statutes should be reconciled. On the one
hand, Idaho Code § 31-813 authorizes the county commissioners to "employ counsel" to
prosecute and defend all suits "with or without the prosecuting attorney, as they may
direct." On the other hand, Idaho Code § 31-2604 twice makes it the duty of the
prosecuting attorney "to prosecute and defend all civil actions" in which the county is
interested. Similarly, Idaho Code § 31-2607 makes the prosecuting attorney "the legal
adviser of the board of county commissioners."
Fortunately, the apparent conflict between these statutes has been resolved by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Conger v. Commissioners of Latah County, 5 Idaho 347, 48 P.
1064 (1897). In holding that the board had no authority to hire counsel in any criminal

case, the court discussed § 1759 Revised Statutes of the Territory of Idaho (1887), which
is identical to and the predecessor of current Idaho Code § 31-813. In construing this
statute the court stated "said provision was in force prior to the adoption of our state
constitution and prior to the admission of Idaho into the Union." Conger, 5 Idaho at 352.
The court then discussed the predecessor statute to Idaho Code § 31-2604, § 2052
Revised Statutes of Idaho, amended in 1891. This provision has, in relevant part,
remained unchanged. In reference to the apparent conflict between the two statutes, the
court stated:
Some of the provisions of that section [§ 2052 Revised Statutes] are
repugnant to the provisions of . . . section 1759 of the Revised Statutes, in
that they make it the duty of the district attorney to prosecute or defend in
all cases when a county of his district is an interested party, while the
provisions of [section 1759] authorize the board to employ counsel to
conduct such cases with or without the district attorney, as they may direct.
If there is a conflict, as suggested, the latest expression of the legislative
will must control.
Conger at 354. The court then went on to find that the board had no jurisdiction or
control over criminal matters.
Thus, the discussion in Conger makes clear that where the duties of prosecutors,
embodied in Idaho Code § 31-2604, and the duties and powers of county commissioners,
contained in Idaho Code § 31-813, conflict, the more recently enacted expression of
legislative will must control. As previously stated, the language of Idaho Code § 31-813
pre-dates the statehood of Idaho. R.S. § 1759 (1887). However, the predecessor to
Idaho Code § 31-2604 was adopted four years later in the first legislative session in 1891.
1891 Sess. Laws, p. 47.
Although the language which sets forth the duties of
prosecutors is over one hundred years old, it is, compared to the duties and powers of
county commissioners, "the latest expression of the legislative will" and, therefore, must
control in the event of a conflict.
In short, a prosecutor's statutory duty "to prosecute or defend all civil actions" in
which the county is a party supersedes the statutory ability of the county commissioners
to hire counsel "with or without the prosecutor." The statutory duties of a prosecutor
obviously do not supplant art. 18, sec. 6, of the Idaho Constitution. A board of county
commissioners may still hire private counsel if they meet the constitutionally mandated
necessity standard.
CONCLUSION

Based on the plain meaning of art. 18, sec. 6, of the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho
Supreme Court cases construing this constitutional provision and the history of the
statutes that prescribe the duties of prosecutors and commissioners, it is our conclusion
that the board of county commissioners does not have the authority to hire civil counsel
outside of the county prosecutor's office on a long-term or continuous basis unless they
comply with Idaho's constitutionally mandated standard of "necessity." Before hiring
outside counsel, the board must conduct a case-by-case analysis and state the facts which
create the necessity of hiring such counsel. It must also make these reasons a matter of
record and the facts made of record are reviewable by the courts of this state. Mere
comfort level or convenience does not rise to the level of "necessity" in this context. In
addition, the duty of a prosecutor "to prosecute or defend all civil actions in which his or
her county is a party," pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-2604, supersedes the power of the
county commissioners "to hire counsel with or without the prosecutor" granted by Idaho
Code § 31-813.
AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED
1.

Idaho Constitution:
Art. 18, sec. 6.

2.

Idaho Statutes:
Idaho Code § 31-813.
Idaho Code § 31-2604.
Idaho Code § 31-2607.
1887 Revised Statutes §1759.
1890-91 Sess. Laws, p. 47.

3.

Idaho Cases:
Anderson v. Shoshone County, 6 Idaho 76, 53 P. 105 (1898).
Barnard v. Young, 43 Idaho 382, 251 P. 1054 (1926).
Clayton v. Barnes, 52 Idaho 418, 16 P.2d 1056 (1932).
Conger v. Board of County Commissioners, 5 Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064 (1896).
Hampton v. Commissioners of Logan County, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324 (1896).

Meller v. Board of County Commissioners, 4 Idaho 44, 35 P. 712 (1894).
Ravenscraft v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Idaho 178, 47 P. 942 (1897).
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991).
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990).
4.

Other Authorities:
Proceedings of the Idaho Constitutional Convention of 1889 (Hart ed. 1912).
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1991).
DATED this 20th day of July, 1993.
LARRY ECHOHAWK
Attorney General

Analysis by:
STEVE TOBIASON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Legislative and Public Affairs Division
JOEL HAZEL
Legal Intern