After the U.S. Supreme Court's Casey decision, did Idaho's abortion statutes (the trimester scheme, the informed-consent rules, and the parental-notification clause) still pass constitutional muster?

Plain-English summary

The Department of Health and Welfare asked six questions about the constitutional and operational status of Idaho's abortion statutes after the U.S. Supreme Court's June 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Casey reaffirmed a constitutional right to abortion before viability, but replaced Roe v. Wade's rigid trimester framework with a new "undue burden" test and explicitly upheld informed-consent and 24-hour waiting-period rules. The AG worked through how Idaho's existing statutes fared under that new framework.

Most of the trimester scheme in Idaho Code § 18-608 survived. Idaho Code § 18-604 already defined the second and third trimesters in terms of viability, so the statute could be harmonized with Casey's viability approach. The exception was § 18-608(2), which required all second-trimester abortions to occur in a hospital. The AG read that requirement as still unconstitutional under Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (Akron I) because medical advances had made some second-trimester procedures safe in outpatient settings.

The Department's role under § 18-609 was unchanged: publish detailed informed-consent materials (fetal-development descriptions with photos at two-week intervals from the fourth to twenty-fourth week, abortion-procedure descriptions, lists of services available to women through pregnancy and childbirth) and report annually on abortions performed without those materials being provided. The AG concluded those provisions met Casey's standards.

The parental-notification clause in § 18-609(6) was the closest call. Idaho requires notice "if possible" to the parents of an unmarried minor under 18, but provides no judicial bypass and no other formal mechanism for mature-minor exemption. H.L. v. Matheson upheld a similar Utah statute against a facial challenge, but the U.S. Supreme Court had not squarely decided whether all parental-notification statutes need a bypass. The AG concluded the Idaho clause would likely survive a pure facial challenge but was vulnerable to an as-applied challenge by a mature minor or a minor for whom notice was not in her best interest.

On the criminal-penalty question for § 18-609 violations, the AG noted reasonable arguments on both sides but concluded the more persuasive reading was that § 18-609 only governed civil immunity, not criminal liability. Enforcement of the criminal provisions in chapter 6 falls to county prosecutors under Idaho Code § 31-2227. And the AG saw no Idaho-history basis to read the state constitution as more protective of abortion than the federal one.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. Federal abortion jurisprudence has changed significantly since this opinion was written.

Background and statutory framework

Idaho Code title 18, chapter 6 was rewritten in 1973 (Senate Bill 1184) to bring the state's abortion law into conformity with Roe v. Wade. The 1973 act repealed the older blanket prohibitions in §§ 18-601 and 18-602, defined criminal abortion in §§ 18-605 and 18-606, and created § 18-608, which permitted abortions performed by physicians under specified conditions tied to Roe's trimester framework. § 18-609 was originally a civil-immunity provision conditioning a physician's protection on dual consent (the patient and her husband).

The 1983 amendments rewrote § 18-609. The dual-consent provision was deleted; the requirement of "informed consent" was substituted. The Department of Health and Welfare was tasked with publishing detailed informed-consent materials, and the physician was required to certify in writing that those materials had been provided to the patient at least 24 hours before the abortion (if reasonably possible). Subsection (6), the parental-notification clause, was added at the same time.

By 1993, federal doctrine had moved twice. Akron I (1983) had struck down hospitalization requirements for early second-trimester abortions and had invalidated waiting-period requirements. Casey (1992) reaffirmed the core right but discarded the trimester framework, adopted the "undue burden" test, upheld an informed-consent and a 24-hour waiting-period requirement, and overruled Akron I on those points. The AG's task was to walk Idaho's statutes through the new doctrine and identify what still stood, what fell, and what was uncertain.

Common questions

Was Idaho Code § 18-608 generally still constitutional after Casey?
Mostly. Casey's "undue burden" test allowed more state regulation in early pregnancy than Roe had, and Idaho's trimester language could be reconciled with Casey because § 18-604 already keyed the second and third trimesters to viability. The third-trimester provision (§ 18-608(3)), which barred abortion after viability except to preserve the pregnant patient's life, raised a residual concern because Casey required a "life or health" exception, but the AG did not call it definitively unconstitutional.

What about the second-trimester hospitalization requirement?
That remained unconstitutional. Akron I (1983) held that requiring all second-trimester abortions in a hospital was unreasonable in light of medical advances, and Casey did not undo that holding for the hospitalization rule.

Did the parental-notification clause survive?
The AG concluded it would likely survive a facial challenge under H.L. v. Matheson (which upheld a similar Utah statute), but it was vulnerable to as-applied challenges. The "if possible" language was the only safety valve, and the federal precedents (especially Justice Kennedy's Akron II opinion and Justice Stevens's separate opinion) suggested the Court was leaning toward requiring a formal bypass for mature minors or for cases where notice would not serve the minor's best interest.

Did § 18-609 carry criminal penalties?
The AG read it as a civil-immunity statute only. The "no abortion shall be performed unless" language sounds prohibitory, but the legislative history of the 1983 amendments showed no clear legislative intent to add criminal penalties beyond those already in §§ 18-605 and 18-606. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed; the AG resolved the ambiguity against criminal liability under § 18-609.

Who enforces violations?
Idaho Code § 31-2227 makes prosecuting attorneys and county sheriffs the primary enforcers of penal statutes. § 31-2604 makes the prosecuting attorney responsible for felony prosecutions and for state-misdemeanor prosecutions where the charging officer is a state or county employee. § 50-208A makes city attorneys responsible for state-misdemeanor prosecutions within municipal limits.

Could the Idaho Constitution be read as more protective than the federal one?
The AG saw no support for that reading. Abortion was a crime in Idaho when the state constitution was adopted in 1890, and an early Idaho Supreme Court opinion (State v. Alcorn, 1901) characterized abortion as illegal and immoral. The AG acknowledged that Idaho courts could read the state constitution more broadly than the federal one, but concluded there was no Idaho-history basis for doing so on this issue.

Citations

U.S. Supreme Court cases: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. and Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).

Federal court of appeals: Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting "rural state" attack on 24-hour waiting period).

State court cases (other jurisdictions): Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. App. 1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).

Idaho cases: Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 586, 682 P.2d 539 (1984); Murphy v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971); Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991); Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990); State v. Long, 91 Idaho 436, 423 P.2d 858 (1967); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980); State v. Hahn, 92 Idaho 265, 441 P.2d 714 (1968); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984); Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979); Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 797 P.2d 135 (1990); George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983); Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 747 P.2d 18 (1987).

Idaho Constitution: art. 1, sec. 1 and sec. 21. Idaho Code: title 18, chapter 6; § 31-2227; § 31-2604; § 50-208A. Other: Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. 218 (1983); Idaho Crimes & Punishment, 1864, § 42.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
• Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/OP93-01.pdf

Original opinion text

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 93-1
To:

Mr. Richard H. Schultz, Administrator
Division of Health
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
450 W. State Street
STATEHOUSE MAIL
Boise, ID 83720

Per Request for Attorney General's Opinion
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

As the United States Supreme Court has now rejected the trimester approach of
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), are the provisions of Idaho Code § 18-608
(which track the Roe v. Wade trimester approach in determining which abortions
are permitted in Idaho) valid and enforceable?

2.

What are the Department of Health and Welfare's responsibilities under the
requirements of Idaho Code § 18-609?

3.

Does the parental notification provision contained in Idaho Code § 18-609(6) meet
federal constitutional requirements?

4.

Does Idaho Code § 18-609 contemplate criminal sanctions if its requirements are
violated or does it merely provide civil immunity to medical practitioners who
comply with its terms?

5.

What agency or entity has the enforcement responsibility for violations of Idaho
Code, title 18, chapter 6?

6.

Do Idaho's abortion regulations violate a state constitutional right to privacy?
CONCLUSION

1.

The United States Supreme Court's rejection of Roe v. Wade's trimester approach
to abortion has little bearing on the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-608.
Most of this section is constitutional. However, regardless of whether a trimester
or viability approach is used, the requirement of Idaho Code § 18-608(2), that
second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, continues to be
unconstitutional under established law.

2.

Under Idaho Code § 18-609, the Department of Health and Welfare must publish
and make available to abortion providers printed materials containing information
about fetal development, abortion procedures and risks, and services available to
assist a woman through pregnancy, at childbirth and while the child is dependent.
The department must also annually compile and report to the public the number of
abortions performed in which materials containing the information described
above were not provided to the pregnant patient.

3.

While precedent on this point is not entirely clear, the parental notification
provision contained in Idaho Code § 18-609(6) would survive a facial challenge
but is potentially vulnerable to a constitutional challenge under certain factual
circumstances as it does not contain any bypass procedure, judicial or otherwise.

4.

It is not clear whether Idaho Code § 18-609 carries with it criminal penalties.
Reasonable arguments can be raised on both sides of this issue. It is the opinion of
this office, however, that the argument against criminal penalties is more
persuasive.

5.

The county prosecutor is responsible for enforcing the criminal provisions of
Idaho Code, title 18, chapter 6.

6.

While some state supreme courts have found a right of privacy in their state
constitutions broader than that contained in the United States Constitution, there is
nothing in Idaho history to indicate the Idaho Supreme Court would do likewise.

ANALYSIS

Question No. 1:
You have asked whether the United States Supreme Court's recent rejection of
Roe v. Wade's trimester approach to abortion issues affects the constitutionality of Idaho
Code § 18-608. Our opinion is that it does not. However, regardless of whether a
trimester or viability approach is used, Idaho Code § 18-608(2), which requires that
second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, is unconstitutional.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman has a fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy and established what has been characterized as a "trimester
approach" to govern abortion regulations. Almost no regulation was permitted during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Regulations designed to protect the woman's health, but not
to further the state's interest in potential life, were permitted during the second trimester.
Finally, during the third trimester, when the fetus was viable, prohibitions were permitted
so long as they did not jeopardize the life or health of the mother. Roe at 163-66.
Last term, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Court, in its 5 to 4 ruling, reaffirmed a woman's constitutional
right to have an abortion before the fetus reaches viability. However, the Court rejected
Roe's trimester construct, reasoning that its "rigid prohibition on all pre-viability
regulations aimed at the protection of fetal life . . . undervalue[d] the State's interest in
potential life." Casey at 2818. The Court adopted a new "undue burden" test. Under this
test, a state may regulate abortion to further its interest in potential life or to foster the
health of the mother so long as the "purpose or effect" of the regulation is not to place "a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability." Id. at 2821. Once the fetus is viable, the state may proscribe abortion "except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother." Id. at 2821.
Idaho Code § 18-608 outlines when abortions are permitted in Idaho. Because this
statute was authored prior to the Casey opinion, it is largely based upon the trimester
construct. Thus, Idaho Code § 18-608(1) addresses first-trimester abortions, § 18-608(2)
second-trimester abortions and § 18-608(3) third-trimester abortions. The Casey opinion,
with its new "undue burden" test, does not render this scheme unconstitutional. Casey's
"undue burden" test allows even more state regulation in the first two trimesters than did
Roe. Therefore, regulations contained in Idaho Code § 18-608 which were constitutional
under Roe remain so today, regardless of any references to "trimesters" in the Idaho
statute. Moreover, Idaho Code § 18-604 defines the second and third "trimesters" in
terms of "viability" rather than weeks of pregnancy. The trimester framework of Idaho
Code § 18-608 can thus be harmonized with Casey's viability approach.

It must be noted, however, that regardless of whether a trimester or viability test is
used, Idaho Code § 18-608(2) does raise constitutional concerns. It states that an
abortion is not unlawful when performed upon a woman who is in the second trimester of
pregnancy, the same is performed in a hospital and is, in the judgment of
the attending physician, in the best medical interest of such pregnant woman.

As this office noted in a 1983 guideline, the Supreme Court, in Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron I), concluded that
medical science had advanced so that some second-trimester abortions can be safely
performed without hospitalization. Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. 218 (1983). Therefore,
requiring hospitalization for all second-trimester abortions is unreasonable and
unconstitutional. Idaho Code § 18-608(2) conflicts with this precedent and is,
therefore, unconstitutional.

In sum, the Supreme Court's rejection of Roe's trimester framework in the Casey
opinion does not affect the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-608. However, the
hospitalization requirement of Idaho Code § 18-608(2) continues to be unconstitutional
just as it was prior to the Casey decision.

Question No. 2:
Your second question concerns the Department of Health and Welfare's
responsibilities under Idaho Code § 18-609, which contains Idaho's informed consent
provisions. The statute requires the director of the department of health and welfare to
publish, after consultation with interested parties, easily comprehended printed material
to be made available at the expense of the physician, hospital or other facility providing
the abortion, containing: (a) descriptions of services available to assist a woman through
pregnancy, at childbirth and while the child is dependent, including adoption services;
(b) descriptions of the physical characteristics of a normal fetus, described at two-week
intervals from the fourth to the twenty-fourth week of development, accompanied by
scientifically verified photographs; and (c) descriptions of the abortion procedures used in
current medical practices and any reasonably foreseeable complications and risks to the
mother.

The statute also requires that no abortion shall be performed unless, prior to the
abortion, the attending physician confirms a positive pregnancy test and certifies in
writing that the materials provided by the director have been provided to the pregnant
patient at least 24 hours before the performance of the abortion. If the attending
physician reasonably determines that disclosure of the material is likely to cause a severe
and long lasting detrimental effect on the patient's health, disclosure is excused, and the
physician must report the circumstances to the director within 30 days. The director
must compile this information annually and report to the public the total number of
abortions performed where delivery of the materials was excused.

This office had previously questioned the constitutionality of Idaho's informed
consent and 24-hour waiting period provisions, relying on Akron I and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obst. and Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986). The legal landscape changed
significantly with Casey, which upheld an informed consent provision and a 24-hour
waiting period enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature, expressly departing from Akron I
and Thornburgh on those points.

Given Casey, our office now believes that Idaho's informed consent provision in
Idaho Code § 18-609 does not violate the United States Constitution. The information
provided to the pregnant woman in Idaho is more comprehensive and detailed than that
contained in the Pennsylvania statute upheld in Casey, but under the Casey analysis, it is
accurate and furthers the state's legitimate interest in potential life and does not impose
an undue burden. The 24-hour waiting period is also valid, particularly given Idaho's
"reasonably possible" flexibility built into the statute.

Question No. 3:
Your third question concerns Idaho Code § 18-609(6), the parental notification
provision, which contains no judicial bypass procedure. The precedent on this point is
murky and the outcome is unclear.

Idaho Code § 18-609(6) requires that, in addition to the requirements of subsection
(1), if the pregnant patient is unmarried and under eighteen years of age or
unemancipated, the physician shall provide notice, "if possible," of the pending abortion
to the parents or legal guardian at least 24 hours prior to the performance of the abortion.

In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld an almost
identical Utah statute against a facial challenge by a minor who had failed to offer
evidence that she was a "mature minor." The Court stressed that, as applied to immature
and dependent minors, the Utah statute served important state interests, and that the
statute might be construed by the state judiciary to excuse mature minors.

Matheson indicates that Idaho's parental notification provision could withstand a
facial challenge. Whether the statute would survive an as-applied challenge by a minor
who could prove that she has adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent
could depend on the court construing the "if possible" language so as to exempt
demonstrably mature minors.

Since Matheson, the Supreme Court has twice more examined parental
notification statutes without clearly resolving whether all such statutes need a bypass
procedure. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), the Court held that a
two-parent notification provision without a bypass procedure was unconstitutional, but
distinguished statutes that refer simply to "the parents" rather than to "two parents." In
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (Akron II),
Justice Kennedy explicitly noted that the Court had "not decided whether parental notice
statutes must contain [bypass] procedures" and would "leave the question open."

While Idaho Code § 18-609(6) could perhaps survive a pure facial challenge, if a
challenger demonstrated she had adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent
or that notification was not in her best interests, it is our opinion that the statute would be
vulnerable to attack unless a court were to find that the safety valve language ("if
possible") is flexible enough to provide an outlet for such a challenge.

Question No. 4:
You have also asked whether the informed consent provisions in Idaho Code
§ 18-609 carry criminal penalties. Responding to your question requires interpretation of
the language in subsection (3): "[n]o abortion shall be performed unless . . . ."

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give force and effect to
legislative intent and purpose. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991).
The "no abortion shall be performed unless" language is prohibitory on its face and is the
foundation for the argument that the legislature intended to impose criminal sanctions.
However, the statute contains no express criminal sanction. Because the language is
ambiguous, a court would apply rules of statutory construction to ascertain legislative
intent and purpose, including examination of the legislative history (Leliefeld v. Johnson,
104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983)) and application of the principle that related statutes
be construed in pari materia (George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,
797 P.2d 1385 (1990)).

Solid arguments can be made on both sides. The "no abortion shall be performed
unless" language, the legislative history of contemporary newspaper coverage in 1982,
and the surplusage rule support criminal liability. On the other hand, Idaho Code § 18608's "shall not be deemed to make unlawful" language, the contrast with the express
criminal references in § 18-608, the absence of any title or fiscal-note signal in 1983, and
the strict-construction rule for criminal statutes (State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614
P.2d 970 (1980)) all weigh against criminal liability.

After careful legal analysis and full consideration of both viewpoints, it is the
opinion of this office that the argument against criminal sanctions is more persuasive.
The legislative intent behind Idaho Code § 18-609 was to provide legal protection from
civil liability for physicians performing abortions in compliance with both Idaho Code
§§ 18-608 and 18-609, not to impose criminal sanctions for non-compliance with § 18-609.

Question No. 5:
You have also asked what agency or entity has the enforcement responsibility for
violations of the provisions of title 18, chapter 6, Idaho Code. Idaho Code § 31-2227
declares it is the policy of the state of Idaho that the primary duty of enforcing all the
penal provisions of any and all statutes of this state, in any court, is vested in the sheriff
and prosecuting attorney of each county.

Under Idaho Code § 31-2604, it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to
prosecute all felony criminal actions within his or her county, and all misdemeanor
actions involving violations of state laws where the arresting or charging officer is a state
or county employee. The city attorney has responsibility for prosecuting state
misdemeanors committed within municipal limits. Idaho Code § 50-208A. These
provisions are fully applicable to the criminal provisions in §§ 18-605, 18-606 and 18-607.
Thus, prosecutions for unlawful abortions under §§ 18-605 and 18-606 (felonies) would
be the responsibility of the prosecuting attorney.

Question No. 6:
Your final inquiry concerns the Idaho Constitution. You asked whether article 1,
sections 1 and 21, contain a right of privacy which might be violated by title 18, chapter 6,
Idaho Code, even if federal constitutional mandates are met.

A state supreme court may construe its own state constitution more broadly than
the United States Constitution, and a number of state courts that have considered the
abortion issue have done so. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,
625 P.2d 779 (Cal. App. 1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it may afford greater protection under the Idaho
Constitution. See Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 586, 682 P.2d 539 (1984). In Murphy
v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971), the court appeared
to recognize a right of privacy in the state constitution.

Despite these holdings, it is our opinion that it would be premature and speculative
to assume the Idaho Supreme Court would be willing to go beyond Casey and other
federal precedent. Until 1973, when Roe v. Wade was decided, abortion was
criminalized in Idaho and was a crime when our constitution was adopted. See Idaho
Crimes & Punishment, 1864, § 42. State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901), an
early Idaho Supreme Court opinion, characterized abortion as both illegal and immoral.
There is little in the history or tradition of this state to indicate that the framers of our
constitution intended to protect a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.

AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED
1.

Idaho Constitution:
Art. 1, sec. 1.
Art. 1, sec. 21.

2.

Idaho Code:
Title 18, chapter 6.
§ 31-2227.
§ 31-2604.
§ 50-208A.

3.

Idaho Cases:
Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 797 P.2d 135 (1990).
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990).
Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984).
Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 586, 682 P.2d 539 (1984).
Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979).
Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983).
Murphy v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971).
Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 747 P.2d 18 (1987).
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991).
State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901).
State v. Guzman, slip op. no. 126, Nov. 5, 1992.
State v. Hahn, 92 Idaho 265, 441 P.2d 714 (1968).
State v. Long, 91 Idaho 436, 423 P.2d 858 (1967).
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980).
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990).

4.

Other Cases:
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. App. 1981).
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. and Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986).

5.

Other Authorities:
Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. 218 (1983).
Idaho Crimes & Punishment, 1864, § 42.

DATED this 10th day of February, 1993.
LARRY ECHOHAWK
Attorney General

Analysis by:
MARGARET R. HUGHES
STEVE TOBIASON
Deputy Attorneys General