Can a full-time county prosecutor in Idaho also contract to serve as the prosecuting attorney for another county?

Plain-English summary

The Latah County prosecuting attorney asked whether he could enter a private contract with the Benewah County commissioners to serve as their acting prosecutor after their elected prosecutor resigned. Latah is one of the eight counties whose prosecutor must "devote full time to the discharge of [his] duties" under Idaho Code § 31-3113. The AG concluded the contract violated that full-time requirement.

The reasoning came down to two points. First, Idaho's full-time statute does not flatly ban outside law practice the way many other states' statutes do, but the AG's office had previously read it as effectively forbidding private practice for prosecutors in those eight counties. The Idaho Supreme Court's discussion in Derting v. Walker reinforced that reading. Second, § 31-3113 contains exactly one express exception (with the unanimous approval of the county commissioners, the prosecutor can take on city misdemeanors). Under "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," the legislature's choice to spell out one narrow exception implied that no other outside legal work was permitted.

Because the Benewah contract paid Mr. Mosman personally as a private attorney for ongoing prosecutorial work, it was the private practice of law in everything but name. The AG declined to reach the second question, whether the arrangement also violated the multiple-office-holding ban in Idaho Code § 31-2601, because the full-time conclusion was enough to dispose of the matter.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Idaho's prosecuting-attorney statutes have always been a patchwork between full-time and part-time service. For most counties, the office is part-time, and prosecutors customarily maintain private law practices on the side. In 1976, Idaho Code § 31-3113 designated eight specific counties (including Latah) where the population and caseload were large enough that the prosecutor was required to devote full time to the office. The statute does not expressly prohibit outside legal work; it only mandates "full time" service.

The historical context matters. The Idaho Legislature considered (and rejected) a 1974 bill that would have explicitly banned private practice for higher-paid prosecutors, so a flat ban on outside law work was not enacted. But the legislature did write into § 31-3113 a single carve-out: with the unanimous consent of the county commissioners, the full-time prosecutor may contract with a city in his own county to prosecute non-conflicting misdemeanors. The AG read that single express exception as carrying with it an implicit prohibition on every other outside legal engagement.

Idaho Code § 59-907, enacted in 1988, separately authorizes county commissioners to contract with an outside attorney to perform prosecuting attorney duties when no resident attorney is available. Benewah used that statute to bring in Mr. Mosman after the elected prosecutor resigned. The opinion treats § 59-907 as a vacancy-filling mechanism that does not override the more specific full-time requirement of § 31-3113 for the eight designated counties.

Common questions

Which counties have full-time prosecutors under § 31-3113?
The opinion does not list all eight, but Latah is one and Benewah is not. The list is set by population thresholds in the statute as it stood in 1992, and has changed over time as Idaho counties have grown.

Could Mr. Mosman have taken a single conflict appointment in Benewah, or did the opinion close that off too?
The AG distinguished ongoing contractual service (what was happening here) from the long-standing practice under § 31-2603 of one prosecutor temporarily assisting another in a specific case as a special prosecutor or special deputy attorney general. Those special appointments are typically per-case, are not paid as private compensation, and reimbursement runs between counties or to the state, not to the attorney personally. That practice was not what was disqualified.

Why didn't the AG reach the multiple-office holding question?
Because the full-time conclusion ended the inquiry. If § 31-3113 already prohibited the arrangement, there was no need to decide whether Mr. Mosman was "holding" the Benewah office in the constitutional sense or merely contracting to perform its functions.

What did "full time" mean here, in practical terms?
The AG's earlier 1989 guideline letter set out the working test: a full-time prosecutor must (1) avoid outside activities that interfere with a roughly 40-hour workweek, plus the additional hours the job requires (investigations, trials, complex matters), and (2) refrain from the private practice of law altogether. Some incidental activity (public speeches, occasional mediations, teaching) was acceptable.

Citations

Idaho statutes: § 31-2601 (multiple-office holding); § 31-2603 (special prosecuting attorney appointments); § 31-3113 (full-time requirement and city-misdemeanor exception); § 59-906 and § 59-907 (filling vacancies in the prosecutor's office).

Out-of-state statutes the AG surveyed for comparison: Ala. Code § 12-17-184; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-301; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 51-278; Ind. Code § 33-14-7-19.5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22a-106; Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, § 15; Miss. Code Ann. § 25-31-37; N.Y. County Law § 700(8); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-61; Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 215.28; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 1401; Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-201; Wyo. Stat. § 9-1-802; W. Va. Code § 7-7-4. Each of those states expressly prohibits private practice by prosecutors; Idaho does not.

Cases: Derting v. Walker, 112 Idaho 1055, 739 P.2d 354 (1987) (Idaho Supreme Court, taking judicial notice that prosecutors historically maintained private practices and contrasting that with the full-time counties); Harrison v. Lustra Corporation, 84 Idaho 320, 372 P.2d 397 (1962) (Idaho Supreme Court interpretation of "full time" in an employment-contract context); Johnson v. Stoughton Wagon Co., 95 N.W. 294 (Wis. 1903); Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1943); Transamerica Insurance v. Frost National Bank, 501 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Commission v. Allamong, 252 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1979).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
• Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/OP92-02.pdf

Original opinion text

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 92-2
TO:

Craig Mosman
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

Per Request for Attorney General's Opinion
QUESTION PRESENTED
You are currently the elected prosecuting attorney for Latah County. In addition,
you have entered into a contract with the Board of County Commissioners for Benewah
County to perform the duties of prosecuting attorney for that county. Two questions
arise as a result of this contract:
1.

Is your performance of the duties of prosecuting attorney for Benewah County
consistent with the requirement of Idaho Code § 31-3113 that you devote full time
to the discharge of your duties as prosecuting attorney for Latah County?

2.

Is your performance of the duties of prosecuting attorney for Benewah County
consistent with Idaho Code § 31-2601, which states that, with certain exceptions,
"[n]o prosecuting attorney shall hold any other county or state office during his
term of office as prosecuting attorney . . . ."?
CONCLUSION

1.

Your contract to perform the duties of prosecuting attorney for Benewah County
does violate the provision of Idaho Code § 31-3113 requiring you to devote "full
time" to your duties as prosecuting attorney for Latah County because it represents
the private practice of law.

2.

In light of our answer to Question 1 above, we do not address the question
whether your contract with Benewah County to perform the duties of prosecuting
attorney violates the multiple-office holding prohibition of Idaho Code § 31-2601.
BACKGROUND

The contract at issue here was entered into under Idaho Code § 59-907, enacted in
1988. The statute provides as follows:

In the event a vacancy exists and there is no resident attorney in the county who is
willing or qualified to perform the functions of prosecuting attorney as set forth in
chapter 26, title 31, Idaho Code, the board of county commissioners may appoint and/or
contract with an attorney from outside the county to perform the duties of prosecuting
attorney for the balance of the unexpired term or such shorter period as the board of
county commissioners shall determine. (Emphasis added.)
The contract recites that Jack B. Britton, the elected prosecuting attorney for
Benewah County, submitted his resignation on or about June 1, 1992, with an effective
date of June 30, 1992. The commissioners then notified the Republican Central
Committee of the resignation. The committee later notified the commissioners that it was
unable to locate any interested candidates for appointment "and had no nominations to
submit to the Commissioners for consideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 59-906." It
appeared to the commissioners that "no resident attorney was interested, willing or
available to perform the functions of Prosecuting Attorney in and for Benewah County."
Therefore, under the provisions of Idaho Code § 59-907, the commissioners
entered into a contract with Craig Mosman and Roy Mosman "to perform the duties of
Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney." The contract requires "Craig Mosman to serve
in the capacity of Prosecuting Attorney . . . ." It provides for compensation to be paid
jointly to Craig Mosman and Roy Mosman on a monthly basis. The contract runs
through the second Monday of January, 1993, Mr. Britton's unexpired term, "unless
earlier terminated by mutual agreement of all parties."
ANALYSIS
1.

The "Full Time" Provision of Idaho Code § 31-3113

Idaho Code § 31-3113 requires the prosecuting attorneys of certain counties,
including Latah County, but not including Benewah County, "to devote full time to the
discharge of their duties." The first question to be addressed is whether the contract to
perform the duties of prosecuting attorney for Benewah County violates the statute's
requirement that you devote full time to the discharge of your duties as Latah County
prosecuting attorney.
At the outset, we note that reasonable minds can differ on the answer to this
question. The Idaho Legislature has not seen fit to couple the "full time" requirement of
Idaho Code § 31-3113 with a clear prohibition against the outside practice of law by
prosecutors. Idaho Code § 31-3113 is silent on the question of the outside or private
practice of law. As the statutory provisions from other states amply illustrate, it is a
simple matter for a legislature to state, expressly and clearly, that a prosecutor shall not
engage in the private practice of law. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-17-184; Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 20-1-301; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 51-278; Ind. Code § 33-14-7-19.5; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 22a-106; Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, § 15; Miss. Code Ann. § 25-31-37; N.Y. County Law
§ 700(8); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-61; Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 215.28; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16,
§ 1401; Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-201; Wyo. Stat. § 9-1-802; see also, W. Va. Code § 7-7-4
(requiring prosecutor to devote "full time to his public duties to the exclusion of any
other employment").
We note in this regard that two years before the adoption of the full-time
requirement in 1976, the legislature had considered a bill providing that prosecuting
attorneys making at least $18,500 per year "shall devote their entire time to the
performance of their official duties, and shall be prohibited from the private practice of
law during their term of office as prosecuting attorney." (Emphasis added.) The bill
passed in the house of representatives, but was never brought to a vote in the senate.
1974 Idaho House Journal, 104, 235; 1974 Idaho Senate Journal, 206.
We are also aware that at least one case supports the proposition that a "full time"
requirement may be met while at the same time engaging in the outside practice of law.
In West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Commission v. Allamong, 252 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va.
1979), it was alleged that a magistrate had engaged in misconduct by practicing law. It
was asserted that such practice was prohibited by a statute that required the magistrate to
"devote full time to his public duties." The court contrasted this language with the clear
statutory requirement that the prosecuting attorney in certain West Virginia counties must
"devote full time to his public duties to the exclusion of any other employment." W. Va.
Code § 7-7-4. In that statute, according to the West Virginia court, the legislature had
"expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal language . . . ." 252 S.E.2d at 163, n.7.
The court refused to read a similar limitation on outside activity, including the private
practice of law, into the general "full time" requirement for magistrates.
Despite this authority to the contrary, we continue to adhere to the principles
enunciated in previous opinions of this Office regarding the "full time" requirement of
Idaho Code § 31-3113. In particular we draw upon an informal guideline letter of April
18, 1989. Idaho Attorney General's Annual Report, pp. 144-49 (1989). While your
situation is different in significant respects, much of the analysis contained in that letter is
applicable here.
The guideline noted that cases dealing with the outside practice of law by
prosecutors have focused exclusively on statutory provisions expressly prohibiting the
outside practice of law, not provisions dealing with "full time" performance of one's
duties as a prosecutor. See, Annot., Constitutionality and Construction of Statute
Prohibiting a Prosecuting Attorney from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, 6
A.L.R.3d 562 (1966). We therefore find it necessary to turn to cases interpreting a "full
time" requirement in employment contracts.

In Harrison v. Lustra Corporation, 84 Idaho 320, 372 P.2d 397 (1962), the
appellant was a traveling salesman who was seeking worker's compensation for injuries
received in a fall in a motel bathroom. He relied in part on a clause in his employment
contract that stated that he "shall devote his full time and efforts to the sale of the
products of the company." The court affirmed the denial of compensation. In
interpreting the contested clause, the Idaho Supreme Court said:
Such provision is in its nature somewhat ambiguous, however it
does not require the employee to devote 24 hours a day nor every minute of
his waking hours to his employment. On the other hand, it undoubtedly
does require that the employee shall make that employment his business to
the exclusion of the conduct of other business such as usually calls for the
substantial part of one's time or attention.
84 Idaho at 325.
Other courts have interpreted "full time" provisions in cases where it was alleged
that an employee had violated the provision by engaging in outside activities. The
language cited above from the Harrison case was drawn from the most often cited of
these cases, Johnson v. Stoughton Wagon Co., 95 N.W. 394 (Wis. 1903). There the court
held that the plaintiff had not violated his contract by acting as vice president of a bank,
or by taking care of his mother's investments and the finances of another company. The
court observed that "[i]t would be unfortunate indeed for the community if a line must be
drawn so strictly that only people whose services were not needed in the conduct of
important business could occupy such positions." 95 N.W. at 397. It went on to note that
the plaintiff had "devoted more than ordinary business hours" to his employment,
working nine hour days and about half of his evenings. Id.
Similarly, in Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1943), the court stated, "The
cases seem to hold that full-time employment does not mean that the employee may not
have some time that he may use in his personal affairs, or in other business, without
breach of the employment contract." 136 P.2d at 246. And in Transamerica Insurance v.
Frost National Bank, 501 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), the court approved a jury
instruction which stated that "a party may substantially devote 'full time' to the
performance of a given task without devoting literally all of his time to such work; but
should he undertake other duties, of such a nature and to such an extent that such other
duties interfere to any significant extent with such party's performance of the given task,
he is no longer substantially devoting his full time to its performance." 501 S.W.2d at
423, n.1.

In short, the term "full time" results in a rule of reasonableness, not a bright line
test. As applied to the requirement in Idaho Code § 31-3113 that the prosecutors in the
eight counties so identified must "devote full time to the discharge of their duties," it
obviously does not mean that they must devote every waking minute to their job or that
they are forbidden to devote some time to their personal affairs, community service or
outside business interests.
On the other hand, the "full time" requirement of Idaho Code § 31-3113 does
mean that the prosecuting attorney must make that job his business to the exclusion of
any other business that would call for a substantial part of his time or attention, and must
avoid any other duties that would interfere to any significant extent with the discharge of
his duties as an elected prosecutor.
As noted earlier, this Office has construed the "full time" language of Idaho Code
§ 31-3113 on two previous occasions. In Attorney General Opinion No. 86-6, we
addressed the question whether a prosecuting attorney could serve as a member of the
Idaho Legislature. The question was answered by Idaho Code § 31-2601, which
expressly forbids a prosecutor from holding any state office during his term of office as a
prosecuting attorney. We went further, however, and took the additional step of stating
that even if Idaho Code § 31-2601 had not been dispositive of the question:
It is our opinion that a prosecutor required to devote full time to the
position of prosecuting attorney pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3113 could
not serve as a legislator. That statute mandates that the Bannock County
Prosecutor devote full time to the performance of his official duties. We do
not believe that a "full time" prosecutor could also serve as a "part-time"
legislator given the time requirements imposed upon an Idaho legislator.
Attorney General Opinion No. 86-6, 1986 Annual Report at 39.
The Office of the Attorney General again had occasion to construe the "full time"
language of Idaho Code § 31-3113 in the guideline letter mentioned earlier. By the time
that letter was issued on April 18, 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court had construed the same
language in Derting v. Walker, 112 Idaho 1055, 739 P.2d 354 (1987). The issue in that
case was whether the prosecutor could retain part of the money generated by his contract
work in prosecuting city misdemeanors. The court, in passing, noted:
Until relatively recent times the office of county prosecutor has been
part-time in nature. It is common knowledge, and we take judicial notice of
the fact, that county prosecutors maintain private law practices in addition
to their duties in prosecuting criminal offenses. When the legislature
provided for "full time" prosecutors in certain counties, it made clear that in

such counties the prosecutors were permitted to enter into contracts with
municipalities for the prosecution of city misdemeanors.
112 Idaho at 1058.
The court thus stopped short of expressly stating that the position of "full time"
prosecutor completely forbade the private practice of law. But there would have been
little reason for the court to take judicial notice of the fact that until relatively recent
times the office of county prosecutor had been part-time in nature, with prosecutors
maintaining private law practices on the side, if it did not intend to contrast that situation
with the one now in place once the Idaho Legislature saw fit to designate certain counties
as requiring the services of "full time" prosecutors.
We therefore concluded that, "[i]mplicit in this language [of the Idaho Supreme
Court in Derting v. Walker] appears to be an assumption that the 'full time' requirement
of Idaho Code § 31-3113 ended the ability of the prosecuting attorneys in the designated
counties to engage in private practice." 1989 Annual Report at 147.
The guideline letter noted yet a second basis for this conclusion. Idaho Code § 313113 contains one and only one exception to the requirement that the designated
prosecutors devote full time to the discharge of their duties:
With the unanimous approval of the board of county commissioners, and
with the consent of the prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney may
contract with any city within the county to prosecute nonconflicting
misdemeanors . . . .
We noted that under the ordinary principles of statutory construction, the legislature's
decision to expressly provide for only one such exception to the "full time" requirement
implies a legislative intent to exclude all others, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
See, 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 (4th ed. 1984). We therefore
concluded:
The provision that a prosecuting attorney may agree to prosecute city
misdemeanors with the unanimous approval of the county commissioners
may be viewed as excluding entirely any other outside practice of law.
Although the statute is unclear in this regard, it is the better practice for
full-time prosecutors to avoid the private practice of law.
1989 Annual Report at 148.
Any other interpretation would lead to odd results. The full time county
prosecuting attorney would have to gain unanimous approval of the county
commissioners to prosecute misdemeanors for cities in his or her own county, but would
need no approval at all to engage in potentially far more demanding, time-consuming and
conflicting duties as a private practitioner, as a prosecutor in another county or as a
prosecutor of misdemeanors in cities in another county. We do not believe the Idaho
Legislature could have intended this result when it created the narrow exception of city
misdemeanor practice to the otherwise "full time" requirement for prosecutors in those
counties designated in Idaho Code § 31-3113.
We note further that the legislature has seen fit to limit a full-time prosecuting
attorney's city practice to city misdemeanors. We find it significant that this exception is
in the criminal, not the civil arena, where conflicts between a city and a county might
more easily arise.
Finally, we note that the majority opinion in Derting v. Walker took pains to point
out that the prosecutor in that case had reimbursed the county for the inevitable use of
county facilities in prosecuting city misdemeanors, had reimbursed his own deputies for
the inevitable workload increase they sustained as a result of the city misdemeanor
practice, and had turned over to the county general fund a percentage of the contract
monies received. Id., 112 Idaho at 1058. Again, it would be odd to allow county
commissioners to impose such tight controls on the case of city misdemeanor practice
within the prosecutor's own county and to allow them no voice whatsoever if the
prosecutor chooses to prosecute misdemeanors in another county or to perform the duties
of prosecuting attorney in another county.
Our 1989 guideline letter concluded that the prosecutor could engage in
occasional public speeches, mediations and instruction without impinging on the
requirement that he devote full time to the discharge of his duties as a prosecuting
attorney. We cautioned, however, that even a commitment that he work a minimum of

40 hours per week would not always suffice to fulfill the "full time" requirement as a
prosecutor:
And as I am sure you know only too well, investigations and trials will
sometimes require much more than 40 hours in a given week; it should not
be assumed that the performance of a specified number of hours of work
will always constitute compliance. A full-time prosecutor should avoid
activities that would interfere with his devoting a normal work week of
approximately 40 hours to his job, or such additional hours as may be
necessary to the performance of his duties.
We concluded the guideline letter with the following summary:
A prosecuting attorney who is required to devote full time to the discharge
of his duties under Idaho Code § 31-3113 may safely comply with the
statute by (1) avoiding outside activities that would interfere with his
working a full workweek of approximately 40 hours, and such additional
hours as his duties may require, and (2) refraining from the private practice
of law.
We do not have sufficient information to determine "in fact" whether the
performance of your duties for Benewah County will interfere with your full-time
responsibilities as Latah County Prosecuting Attorney. Benewah County is not among
the largest counties in Idaho; neither is it among the smallest. The county seat in
Benewah County is not the most far flung from the Latah County Seat; neither is it the
most conveniently located. The criminal responsibilities of a prosecuting attorney are
relatively unpredictable since it is not possible to determine the occurrence of the next
murder case, or the number and complexity of other criminal cases that may demand
prosecution in either Benewah or Latah County. Although normally more predictable,
even the time commitment to fulfill the civil responsibilities of the county prosecuting
attorney's office can vary substantially.
Therefore, we cannot state with factual certainty that your contractual duties for
Benewah County will or will not interfere with your full-time responsibilities with Latah
County. However, we do believe there is a strong likelihood that the duties in Benewah
County would interfere with your ability to provide full-time service in Latah County.
The second admonition contained in the 1989 guideline is that a full-time
prosecuting attorney should refrain from the private practice of law. This second
admonition is more troublesome in your context. Although we do not have the factual
information to determine whether your contract with Benewah County will interfere with
your full-time duties as Latah County Prosecutor, it is clear that your agreement with

Benewah County represents the private practice of law. Your contract with Benewah
County is in your capacity as a private attorney and has no relationship to your position
as the elected prosecutor for Latah County. The compensation you receive from
Benewah County is paid to you as a private individual and does not constitute payment or
reimbursement to Latah County. Based upon our analysis, it is our opinion that the
legislature intended to prohibit the private practice of law on the part of those prosecutors
who are required by Idaho Code § 31-3113 to devote their full time to their elected
office.
We therefore conclude that your contract to perform the duties of the Benewah
County Prosecuting Attorney does violate the requirement of Idaho Code § 31-3113 that
you devote full time to the discharge of your duties as the elected prosecuting attorney of
Latah County because it represents the private practice of law.
2.

The Prohibition of Multiple-Office Holding of Idaho Code § 31-2601

The second question asks whether your contract to perform the duties of
prosecuting attorney in Benewah County would violate the provision of Idaho Code § 312601, which states: "No prosecuting attorney shall hold any other county or state office
during his term of office as prosecuting attorney . . . ." A resolution to this question
would require a determination of whether you are now holding office as prosecuting
attorney of Benewah County or are merely contracting to perform the duties of
prosecuting attorney for that county.
In light of our answer to the first question regarding the "full time" requirement of
Idaho Code § 31-3113, we do not reach this question. Suffice it to say that we are aware
of Idaho Code § 59-907 and its provision that upon a vacancy in the office of the
prosecuting attorney, where no resident attorney is willing to "perform the functions of
prosecuting attorney . . . the board of county commissioners may appoint and/or contract
with an attorney from outside the county . . . ." (Emphasis added.) We read that statute
as providing the general mechanisms whereby county commissioners may fill a vacancy,
not as overriding the specific requirement of Idaho Code § 31-3113 that certain
designated prosecutors must devote full time to their duties as county prosecutors.
SUMMARY
In sum, it is our conclusion that the "full time" requirement of Idaho Code § 313113 prevents a full-time prosecuting attorney to contract as a private attorney to perform
the ongoing statutory duties of prosecuting attorney in a second county.
AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED
1.

State Statutes:
Ala. Code § 12-17-184
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-301
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 51-278
Idaho Code ch. 26, tit. 31
Idaho Code § 31-2601
Idaho Code § 31-2603
Idaho Code § 31-3113
Idaho Code § 59-906
Idaho Code § 59-907
Ind. Code § 33-14-7-19.5
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22a-106
Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, § 15
Miss. Code Ann. § 25-31-37

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-61
N.Y. County Law § 700(8)
Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 215.28
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 1401
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-201
W. Va. Code § 7-7-4
Wyo. Stat. § 9-1-802
2.

Idaho Cases:
Derting v. Walker, 112 Idaho 1055, 739 P.2d 354 (1987)
Harrison v. Lustra Corporation, 84 Idaho 320, 372 P.2d 397 (1962)

3.

Other Cases:
Johnson v. Stoughton Wagon Co., 95 N.W. 294 (Wis. 1903)
Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1943)
Transamerica Insurance v. Frost National Bank, 501 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973)
West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Commission v. Allamong, 252 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va.
1979)

4.

Other Authorities:
Informal Guideline Letter (April 18, 1989), 1989 Annual Report at 147-148
Attorney General Opinion No. 86-6, 1986 Annual Report at 39
Constitutionality and Construction of Statute Prohibiting a Prosecuting Attorney
from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, 6 A.L.R. 3d 562 (1966)
1974 Idaho House Journal, 104, 235

1974 Idaho Senate Journal, 206
2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 47.23 (4th ed. 1984)
DATED this 14th day of October, 1992.
LARRY ECHOHAWK
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Analysis by:
JOHN J. MCMAHON
Chief Deputy Attorney General
MICHAEL HENDERSON
Deputy Attorney General