Are Idaho's residency-waiting-period rules for veterans' emergency relief and admission to the state veterans' home (three years for relief, two years for admission) constitutional?
Plain-English summary
The Division of Veterans Services asked whether Idaho could constitutionally make a veteran wait three years (for emergency relief and public assistance under Idaho Code § 65-203) or two years (for admission to an Idaho state veterans' home under Idaho Code § 66-901) after establishing Idaho residency before becoming eligible for those benefits. Veterans who were Idaho residents at the time they entered the armed forces are exempt from the waiting period; the rules apply only to veterans who came to Idaho after their military service.
The AG concluded both requirements are unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court's line of cases starting with Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) and running through Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974), Zobel v. Williams (1982), and Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez (1986) consistently strikes down state laws that distribute important rights or benefits unequally based on how long a person has lived in the state. The right to migrate is fundamental, and a durational residency rule that delays "very important" benefits triggers strict scrutiny. The state must show a compelling interest. Idaho cannot meet that bar for these particular waiting periods.
Public assistance and medical care are "necessities of life" under Shapiro and Memorial Hospital. Veterans' relief and veterans' home services are sufficiently similar to qualify as "important" benefits. The compelling-interest justifications that states have offered (fiscal integrity, planning, objective residency tests) have all been rejected by the Supreme Court. Soto-Lopez added a particular twist for veterans: the Court emphasized that veterans serve "the nation as a whole" and that states benefit from the contributions of all veterans, not just their own residents. New York's similar rule (preference points on a civil service exam tied to in-state residency at time of enlistment) was struck down on that basis.
The AG noted in passing that the Supreme Court has upheld durational residency rules for divorce-court access (Sosna v. Iowa) and for in-state college tuition (Starns v. Malkerson), but those involved less compelling benefits and shorter delays.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1991. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Background and statutory framework
Idaho Code § 65-203 defines "veteran" for the purposes of the chapter on emergency relief and public assistance to veterans. To qualify, an honorably discharged person must have been an Idaho resident for at least three months before entry into the armed forces, or for three consecutive years immediately preceding application for relief. § 66-901 governs admission to Idaho state veterans' homes; it requires two years of bona fide Idaho residency before application unless the veteran was an Idaho resident at the time of enlistment or induction.
The constitutional framework comes from the right to migrate, which the Supreme Court has located in the equal protection clause (Fourteenth Amendment) and in the Privileges and Immunities clause. The lead modern cases are Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits struck down); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one-year residency for non-emergency hospitalization for the indigent struck down); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Alaska's tiered dividend distribution based on length of residency struck down); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (New York's preference points for veterans who were New York residents at time of enlistment struck down).
Under the Supreme Court's framework, the analysis works in two steps. First, has the durational residency rule "burdened" the right to migrate? It has if it delays a "very important" right or permanently deprives someone of a substantial right. Second, if there's a burden, can the state justify it with a compelling interest? Almost no states have managed to clear the second step.
The two cases on the other side (Sosna v. Iowa, upholding a one-year residency for filing a divorce action; Starns v. Malkerson, upholding a one-year requirement for in-state tuition) are narrow exceptions where the Court found the affected benefits less central or the duration less burdensome.
Common questions
Why was Idaho still enforcing rules that the Supreme Court would strike down?
The opinion does not explain. Often these statutes survive on the books simply because no one has brought a challenge, and the state continues administering them. The AG's opinion is the AG telling the agency that the rules are unconstitutional and should not be enforced.
What about veterans who were Idaho residents at enlistment?
They are exempt from the waiting periods. The constitutional problem is the disparate treatment between two classes of bona fide Idaho resident veterans, those who lived here at enlistment and those who came later.
Could Idaho still verify that an applicant is actually an Idaho resident?
Yes. The constitutional rule is against requiring extra time as a resident, not against confirming current residency. Idaho can ask for evidence that the veteran lives in Idaho today.
Could the legislature redesign the rules to satisfy the Constitution?
The opinion suggests not, at least not by way of a residency-period rule. The Supreme Court has rejected the standard rationales (fiscal integrity, planning, objective residency tests). A different approach (means-testing, a needs-based system, federal-state coordination on veterans' benefits) might survive but would be a different statute, not a fix to § 65-203 or § 66-901.
Citations
U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment.
Idaho Code: § 65-203 (definition of "veteran" for emergency relief and public assistance, including the three-year residency requirement); § 66-901 (eligibility for admission to Idaho state veterans' homes, including the two-year residency requirement).
U.S. Supreme Court cases: Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), summarily aff'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
Source
- Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
- Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/OP91-10.pdf
Original opinion text
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 91-10
TO:
Mr. Gary Bermeosolo, Administrator
Division of Veterans Services
Department of Health and Welfare
Idaho Veterans Home
Statehouse Mail
Per Request for Attorney General's Opinion
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Are the durational residency requirements which Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 place on Idaho veterans to determine eligibility for emergency relief assistance and admission to a state veterans' home constitutional?
CONCLUSION:
The durational residency requirements contained in Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 are unconstitutional because they impinge on the fundamental right to migrate and because they deny newcomer resident veterans equal protection of the law.
ANALYSIS:
Idaho Code § 65-203 defines "veteran" for the purposes of providing emergency relief and public assistance. It requires that a person be honorably discharged and be an Idaho resident for at least three months before entry into the armed forces, or three consecutive years immediately preceding application for relief.
Idaho Code § 66-901 provides the eligibility requirements for admission to an Idaho state veterans' home. It requires bona fide Idaho residency for at least two years prior to application, unless the person was an Idaho resident at the time of enlistment or induction.
Together, these two statutes govern eligibility for emergency relief, public assistance and admission to medical and nursing home care in an Idaho state veterans' home. Under their terms, unless a veteran was an Idaho resident at the time of entry into the armed services, he is denied emergency relief and public assistance if he has not been an Idaho resident for three years, and he is denied admission to a veterans' home if he has not been an Idaho resident for two years. This is so even if he is a bona fide resident at the time he applies for the services at issue. By placing these durational residency requirements upon veterans, Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 unconstitutionally burden the right to migrate and constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed state laws that, by classifying residents according to the time they establish residence, result in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents. See, e.g., Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In analyzing these durational residency statutes, the Court has relied upon both the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to migrate. See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 901-904. However, as the Court has noted, regardless of the label it places upon its analysis, right to migrate or equal protection, the standard of review is the same. Because the right to migrate is fundamental, if a durational residency requirement burdens that right, the requirement will be strictly scrutinized and must be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 904, n. 4.
While the criteria used to determine whether the right to migrate has been burdened are not entirely clear, it appears the Supreme Court will find the right has been burdened if a durational residency requirement results in either a delay of "a very important" right or benefit or a permanent deprivation of a substantial right or benefit. Id. at 907-908. The Supreme Court has characterized important benefits and rights as those encompassing the "necessities of life." Thus, in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, durational residency requirements affecting welfare assistance were struck down. Likewise, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra, a one-year residency requirement affecting nonemergency hospitalization and medical care for the indigent was held unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has not defined a substantial right. However, the term appears to be broad, as both points on a civil service exam and dividends derived from a state's natural resources have been held to fall within its scope. See Soto-Lopez, supra, and Zobel v. Williams, supra.
In our case, Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 cause newcomer veteran residents up to three years' delay in receiving emergency relief and public assistance and up to two years' delay in gaining admission to an Idaho veterans' home. The Supreme Court has already held that medical care and assistance to the financially needy are necessities of life and therefore important benefits. Shapiro, supra, and Memorial Hospital, supra. The benefits affected by Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 are sufficiently akin to those at issue in Shapiro and Memorial Hospital that they, too, qualify as "important." Therefore, Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 should be strictly scrutinized to determine if they are constitutional.
In order to withstand this level of scrutiny, the statutes must be justified by a compelling state interest. Soto-Lopez, supra, at 904. It is unlikely this can be demonstrated. In Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, the Supreme Court rejected numerous arguments supporting durational residency requirements affecting welfare assistance and medical care for the poor, including the fiscal integrity of state welfare programs, facilitating planning of a welfare budget, and the provision of an objective test of residency.
Added to this is the Court's analysis in Soto-Lopez, supra, where it addressed a durational residency requirement which permanently deprived newcomer New York veterans of a substantial right, points on a civil service exam. There, the Court remarked that veterans serve the "nation as a whole" and that states benefit from the contributions of all service personnel. Id. at 911. The Court went on to reject every argument offered by New York to support the durational residency requirement and declared the requirement unconstitutional. Id. In short, it is our opinion that a court is unlikely to find that applying additional residency requirements to distinguish between different groups of bona fide resident veterans in allocating emergency relief, public assistance and veterans' home services furthers any compelling state interest.
SUMMARY:
The durational residency requirements contained in Idaho Code §§ 65-203 and 66-901 temporarily deny some bona fide resident veterans important benefits. In so doing, the statutes burden the fundamental right to migrate. Consequently, if challenged, they would be strictly scrutinized by a court and would only be found constitutional if they were justified by a compelling state interest. It is our opinion that these statutes could not be found to further a compelling state interest. Therefore, they violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutionally impinge on the fundamental right to migrate.
AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED:
-
Constitutions
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. -
Statutes
Idaho Code § 65-203.
Idaho Code § 66-901. -
Cases
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
DATED this 19th day of December, 1991.
LARRY ECHOHAWK
Attorney General
State of Idaho
ANALYSIS BY:
MICHAEL DEANGELO
MARGARET R. HUGHES
Deputy Attorneys General