Can Idaho's parole commission schedule a parole hearing before an inmate's fixed minimum term has expired so the inmate can actually be paroled the day eligibility kicks in?

Plain-English summary

The Executive Director of the Commission for Pardons and Parole asked a narrow but practically important question. Under Idaho's Unified Sentencing Act (Idaho Code § 19-2513), an inmate becomes "eligible" for parole the moment the determinate (fixed) portion of the sentence ends and the indeterminate portion begins. But if the Commission can only "consider" the inmate for parole at or after that eligibility date, then in practice the actual release will be delayed by however long it takes to schedule the hearing, gather records, and reach a decision. That can stretch the inmate's confinement well past the fixed-minimum date.

The AG concluded that the Commission may schedule the initial parole hearing before the determinate sentence has run out, so that if parole is granted, release can happen on the eligibility date itself. The reasoning rests on liberal construction of remedial statutes and on giving effect to the legislature's intent. The statute makes the inmate "eligible" on a date certain; reading it to forbid pre-eligibility hearings would, in the AG's words, tack on "an additional month or two" of confinement past the fixed-minimum sentence. That is contrary both to the concept of a fixed-minimum sentence and to the policy of avoiding penitentiary overcrowding.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1991. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Idaho's Unified Sentencing Act (codified at Idaho Code § 19-2513) replaced the older indeterminate-sentence model with a hybrid: a fixed minimum term followed by an indeterminate term. During the minimum, the inmate "shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct except for meritorious service." Once the indeterminate period begins, the offender "may be considered for parole or discharge at any time."

The statute creates an apparent gap. If "eligibility" begins on the day after the minimum term ends, but "consideration" can also only begin then, the inmate cannot actually be released on the eligibility date because the Commission needs time to hold a hearing. The AG resolved the gap by reading "eligibility" and "consideration" as separate concepts. The Commission can begin gathering information, scheduling the hearing, and even holding the hearing during the determinate phase. Only the actual release must wait until the inmate becomes eligible.

The interpretive principle the AG cited is from Kennan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423 (1948), and Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1989): statutes should be liberally construed to accomplish their aims, and courts may look behind the literal letter to determine purpose. The legislature's purpose in establishing fixed-minimum sentences was to put a floor on confinement and provide truth in sentencing, not to push every inmate's release weeks or months past the floor.

Common questions

Doesn't this contradict the statute's text?
The text says the inmate "shall not be eligible" during the minimum and "may be considered" during the indeterminate term. The AG read those as compatible: the Commission may consider the inmate (in the sense of holding a hearing) before eligibility, but cannot release the inmate before eligibility. The hearing is a procedural act; the release is the substantive act that the statute regulates.

What's the practical effect for inmates?
An inmate whose minimum term ends on January 1 can be released on January 1 (if the Commission grants parole), instead of waiting until late January or February for a post-eligibility hearing. For inmates serving short fixed terms followed by long indeterminate terms, the savings can be material.

Does the Commission have to hold a pre-eligibility hearing?
The opinion says it may, not that it must. The Commission retains its discretion over the timing and conduct of parole hearings.

Citations

Idaho statutes: Idaho Code § 19-2513 (Unified Sentencing Act, including the language on parole eligibility during the determinate and indeterminate portions of a sentence).

Idaho cases: Kennan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948) (Idaho Supreme Court; liberal construction of statutes to give effect to legislative intent); Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 588, 790 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied 1989.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
• Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/OP91-08.pdf

Original opinion text

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 91-8

TO:
Olivia Craven West
Executive Director
Commission for Pardons and Parole
1075 Park Blvd.
STATEHOUSE MAIL

Per Request for Attorney General's Opinion

QUESTION PRESENTED:
May a person be "eligible" for parole on a certain date (the first day of the indeterminate portion of the sentence), while at the same time not being capable of being released on parole because the board did not have the power to "consider" him for parole prior to the same date?

CONCLUSION:
The Commission for Pardons and Parole may schedule an initial parole hearing prior to the expiration of an inmate's determinate sentence so that the inmate may be paroled on the date he becomes eligible for parole.

ANALYSIS:
The relevant statute, Idaho Code § 19-2513, the Unified Sentencing Act, reads, in pertinent part:

During the minimum term of confinement, the offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct except for meritorious service. The offender may be considered for parole or discharge at any time during the indeterminate period of the sentence.

Statutes must be liberally construed with a view toward accomplishing their aims and purposes and attaining substantial justice. Courts are not usually limited to the mere letter of the law, but may look behind the letter to determine the purpose and effect of the law, the object being to determine what the legislature intended and to give effect to that intent. Kennan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948); Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 588, 790 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied 1989. Given this principle, it is my opinion that the legislature did not intend to make a person eligible for parole while at the same time denying that person parole status by denying the Commission for Pardons and Parole the opportunity to examine the person prior to the expiration of his determinate sentence. Not only would such an interpretation be in conflict with the very concept of being "parole eligible," it would have the undesirable effect of tacking on an additional month or two to the date of the fixed portion of the sentence. This clearly is not in keeping with the notion of a fixed minimum sentence and the policy of avoiding overcrowding in the penitentiary.

Therefore, it is my opinion that the Commission may examine a prisoner by scheduling an initial parole hearing prior to the expiration of the determinate sentence, so that the person may indeed be paroled when he becomes eligible for parole.

AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED:
1. Statutes
Idaho Code § 19-2513.

2. Cases
   Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 588, 790 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied 1989.
   Kennan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

Dated this 20th day of September, 1991.
LARRY ECHOHAWK
Attorney General
State of Idaho

Analysis by:
MICHAEL KANE
Deputy Attorney General