What was wrong with the longer 'Tax Accountability' property tax initiative filed in August 2005, the second '1%' tax cap proposal of that year?
Plain-English summary
This was the more ambitious of two property-tax-cap initiatives the AG reviewed in fall 2005 (a separate, narrower proposal from Fritz Dixon was reviewed two weeks later, on September 27). This one, sponsored by Charles "Chuck" Cline, was filed August 18, 2005, and ran to over 6,500 lines of text amending, repealing, or adding several dozen sections of the Idaho Code.
Wasden organized his review into "overarching issues" (constitutional defects or things that would make the initiative inoperable) and "general comments" (drafting and operational concerns).
Overarching issues:
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One percent limitation. The initiative imposed a one-percent cap in three different proposed sections (§§ 63-801, 63-802, 63-1313). All three used different definitions of "market value." Section 63-801 set a fixed cap; § 63-802 allowed override by 66 2/3% election; § 63-1313 allowed property to increase up to 0.8% annually but was unclear about what triggers the increase. As with the 1991 and 1996 versions, the AG concluded the cap was inoperable because no entity was given authority or a procedural mechanism to adjust tax levies down to 1%. A reviewing court would more likely strike the cap than build a new tax-apportionment system from whole cloth.
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Limitations on value. The proposal froze "market value" at the 2004-2005 assessment for property already on the rolls, with new construction and post-2002 sales valued at "true market value" (a defined term). Tied to Merris v. Ada County (1979) and Idaho Telephone Co. v. Baird (1967), the AG concluded the value freeze violated Idaho Const. art. 7, § 5 (uniform taxation): two valuation regimes for similar property is impermissible discrimination. The AG noted that this kind of value freeze requires a constitutional amendment, not a statute. The AG also flagged that the freeze would systemically overvalue property over time because it ignored depreciation, obsolescence, and damage.
The AG addressed (and rejected) the petitioners' argument that "the Constitution does not define 'value'." The Idaho Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional terms, and the Court has repeatedly defined "value" as fair market value.
General comments (eleven enumerated points), including:
- The petition's text-listing format may not satisfy Idaho Code § 34-1801A (text must be set out in the body of the petition, not just listed).
- Some amendments use 2004 statutory text, ignoring 2005 amendments (especially Title 63, Chapter 17 timberland taxation per 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 73).
- The initiative needs an effective date.
- An election requirement could trigger a budget vote in each of Idaho's 800+ taxing districts every year.
- The proposal eliminates the constitutionally established State Tax Commission's role as "state board of equalization" and the county "boards of equalization" (Idaho Const. art. 7, § 12), substituting "boards of valuation" with limited duties. The AG cited Williams v. State Legislature, 111 Idaho 156 (1986): the legislature (or initiative) cannot strip a constitutional officer of constitutional duties.
- Repealing § 63-301 leaves no official with authority to create the annual property roll.
- Repealing § 63-315 (annual ratio study) breaks the school-funding equalization mechanism in Idaho Code § 33-802 without a corresponding amendment.
- Most taxing districts' levy authority is granted in their organic statutes, not Title 63. The initiative's limited "market value" definition applies only to Title 63, Chapters 1-23, leaving cities' levy authority effectively undeterminable.
- A criminal-penalty drafting error: § 63-1313(c) read literally meant only failure to file a false report would be a felony.
- Petitioner Charles (Chuck) Cline was advised to use an independent proofreader.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
The constitutional analysis (uniformity under art. 7 § 5; the role of constitutional boards of equalization under art. 7 § 12) reflects long-standing Idaho doctrine. Specific Idaho Code sections cited (§§ 50-235, 63-201, 63-301, 63-315, 63-801, 63-1313, Title 63 Chapter 17) have all been amended since 2005. Anyone drafting or analyzing a similar initiative today should pull current statutes and check for newer Idaho Supreme Court decisions.
Common questions
Q: Did this initiative make the ballot?
A: This certificate addressed only the legal form of the proposal. Whether the petitioner gathered enough signatures to qualify for the November 2006 general election is a separate question. The Idaho Legislature passed property-tax-relief legislation during a special session in 2006, which may have reduced demand for an initiative.
Q: Was this related to the September 27, 2005 certificate on a separate property-tax initiative?
A: Yes, the two are related but distinct. This 6,500-line proposal was sponsored by Charles "Chuck" Cline and filed August 18; it addressed dozens of code sections. The September 27 certificate addressed Fritz Dixon's narrower proposal, filed August 30, which only added subsections to Idaho Code § 63-205. Both were Idaho versions of California-style "Proposition 13"-type initiatives. Both received negative reviews on essentially the same constitutional grounds.
Q: Why does the AG keep saying these one-percent initiatives are "inoperable"?
A: Because none of them specifies how the cap actually gets implemented. Idaho property tax is levied by counties, cities, school districts, and dozens of types of special districts, each with its own statutory levy authority. To bring the total down to 1% of market value, someone has to decide how to allocate the reduction among those independent entities. The initiatives don't say who. Without an explicit allocation rule (or authority for a single body to issue one), the cap is just a target with no implementation path.
Q: Why are the boards of equalization important?
A: Because Idaho Const. art. 7, § 12 establishes both the State Tax Commission (acting as the state board of equalization) and the county boards of equalization (the county commissioners) as constitutional bodies with the duty to "equalize the valuation of the taxable property." Equalization is the process that ensures property is assessed uniformly across districts so the tax burden is fairly distributed and school funding is correctly equalized. Substituting limited "boards of valuation" for these constitutional bodies is a constitutional change that requires a constitutional amendment, not a statutory initiative.
Q: What is the railroad-tax issue the AG mentioned?
A: Operating property of railroads is valued by the State Tax Commission, not by county commissioners, under Title 63, Chapter 4. The initiative's definition of "market value" tied to county-commissioner valuation appears to exclude operating property. Either operating property is then exempt (which would slash a major revenue source) or it is valued at current market value (which, in the case of railroads, would likely violate 49 U.S.C. § 11501, the federal "4-R Act" prohibition on tax discrimination against rail transportation property). Neither outcome is workable.
Background and statutory framework
Idaho's initiative power (Idaho Const. art. III, § 1) lets voters propose statutes; Idaho Code § 34-1809 requires the AG to issue a Certificate of Review on every petition. Initiative legislation has the same legal force as statutes passed by the Legislature (Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401 (1988)) and is subject to the same constitutional constraints.
Idaho property tax is governed by Title 63 of the Idaho Code, with hundreds of provisions covering valuation, assessment, equalization, levy, and collection. Most taxing districts' levy authority is in the organic statute creating the type of district (cities under Idaho Code § 50-235; school districts under Title 33, Chapter 8; etc.), not in Title 63. This makes it especially hard for any single initiative to impose a uniform cap without inadvertently leaving gaps in unrelated chapters.
Citations and references
Statutes and constitutional provisions: see the list at the top of the file.
Cases:
- Idaho Telephone Co. v. Baird, 91 Idaho 425 (1967)
- Merris v. Ada County, 100 Idaho 59 (1979)
- State, Dept. of Parks v. IDWA, 96 Idaho 440 (1974)
- Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401 (1988)
- Williams v. State Legislature, 111 Idaho 156 (1986)
Prior AG opinions on similar proposals: Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 78-37, 91-9, 95-3, 96-3.
Source
- Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
- Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/C091405.pdf
Original opinion text
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
September 14, 2005
VIA HAND DELIVERY
The Honorable Ben Ysursa
Idaho Secretary of State
Statehouse
Re: Certificate of Review
Proposed Initiative to Amend Provisions Relating to Property Tax (Idaho Code Title 63, various Chapters 1 through 40)
Dear Secretary of State Ysursa:
An initiative petition was filed with your office on August 18, 2005. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 34-1809, this office has reviewed the petition and prepared the following advisory comments. It must be stressed that, given the strict statutory time frame in which this office must respond and the complexity of the legal issues raised in this petition, this office's review can only isolate areas of concern and cannot provide in-depth analysis of each issue that may present problems. Further, under the review statute, the Attorney General's recommendations are "advisory only." The petitioners are free to "accept or reject them in whole or in part." The opinions expressed in this review are only those that may affect the legality of the initiative. This office offers no opinion with regard to the policy issues raised by this proposed initiative.
[The certificate then walks through, in order: Ballot Title; Matters of Substantive Import organized into "Overarching Issues" (One percent limitation; Limitations on value, with discussion of the petitioners' counter-argument) and "General Comments" (eleven enumerated points covering the petition form, statutory currency, effective date, election requirements, boards of equalization, repealed assessor duties, school equalization, levy authority across statute titles, drafting errors, and the recommendation for proofreading); and Conclusion. The full text runs approximately 13 pages and is available in the linked PDF.]
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the enclosed measure has been reviewed for form, style, and matters of substantive import and that the recommendations set forth above have been communicated to the petitioner, Charles (Chuck) Cline, by deposit in the U.S. Mail of a copy of this certificate of review.
Sincerely,
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
Analysis by:
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General