Can the Idaho Senate originate a bill that creates or raises a fee, or must fee bills start in the House under the Origination Clause?
Plain-English summary
Senate President Pro Tem Brent Hill asked Attorney General Lawrence Wasden whether the Idaho Senate could originate fee legislation despite Article III, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution (the Origination Clause), which says "bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives." The opinion built on a 1999 AG opinion (No. 99-2) by Ted Spangler.
The conclusion was nuanced. The Origination Clause has historically been applied to bills involving an increase or decrease in a tax. Idaho courts had not yet decided whether it also reaches fees. Drawing on case law from other jurisdictions interpreting parallel constitutional provisions, the AG concluded a reasonable legal defense could be made for either chamber to originate a true fee bill. But the analysis would turn on whether the levy was "truly a fee, or a tax disguised as a fee." The opinion advised caution: when in doubt about the fee/tax line, the bill should originate in the House.
Wasden also flagged the practical risk of getting it wrong. If the Idaho Supreme Court read "revenue bills" to include fee bills and struck down a Senate-originated fee statute, the state could face large refund liability. Ware v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423 (1977), illustrated the magnitude: a class-action refund case can multiply small individual refunds into a meaningful budget hit. Justice Harlan's caution in Twin City National Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897), about declining to draw bright lines around what counts as a revenue bill informed the same conservative posture.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2012. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Background and statutory framework
Idaho's Origination Clause echoes the federal constitution's Article I, section 7, clause 1, which requires bills "for raising revenue" to originate in the House of Representatives. The reasoning behind both clauses traces to colonial-era resistance to taxation by upper chambers seen as less accountable to the population at large.
The fee/tax distinction matters because an enormous share of state revenue comes from fees: licensing fees, permit fees, regulatory fees, user fees for state services. If every fee bill had to start in the House, Senate budget work would be sharply constrained. Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922), the leading Idaho case on the Origination Clause, focused on tax bills and left the fee question open.
Other jurisdictions had drawn the line based on whether the levy primarily funded the regulatory program imposing it (fee) or fed the general fund (tax). Application required a fact-specific look at the levy's structure, amount, payer base, and use of proceeds.
Common questions
Q: What's the practical fee-versus-tax test the AG suggested?
A: A levy is more likely a fee if it (1) is paid by a defined class of regulated parties, (2) is roughly proportionate to the cost of regulating or serving that class, and (3) funds the program that regulates them. A levy is more likely a tax if it (1) is broad-based, (2) generates revenue beyond program costs, or (3) flows to general state funds.
Q: Why couldn't the Senate just originate every fee and let the courts sort it out?
A: Because if a court later found the levy was actually a tax, every payer who had paid under the statute would be entitled to a refund. The AG advised that the conservative path was to originate doubtful cases in the House.
Q: Did this opinion bind future legislatures?
A: No. AG opinions are advisory; they bind no one. Legislative leadership can disregard them, though doing so creates litigation risk.
Q: Does this affect every fee, or only new fees?
A: The analysis applies most clearly to bills that create a new fee or raise an existing one. Bills that lower fees or repeal them generally are not "raising" revenue and would face less Origination Clause scrutiny.
Citations and references
Constitution:
- Idaho Constitution, Article III, section 14 (Origination Clause)
Cases:
- Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) (U.S. Supreme Court)
- Ware v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423 (1977) (Idaho Supreme Court)
- Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922) (Idaho Supreme Court)
Other:
- 1999 Idaho Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-2 (Spangler)
Source
- Landing page: https://www.ag.idaho.gov/office-resources/opinions/
- Original PDF: https://ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/Opinion12-1.pdf
Original opinion text
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION 12-01
The Honorable Brent Hill
President Pro Tempore
Idaho State Senate
Statehouse
Boise, Idaho 83720
Dear Pro Tem Hill:
You requested an Attorney General Opinion regarding article III, section 14 of the
Idaho Constitution (Origination Clause). The section requires that "bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the house of representatives." This responds to your request.
This opinion relies significantly on an earlier opinion (1999-2) authored by Ted
Spangler.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Is the initiation of fee legislation by the Idaho Senate defensible under article III,
section 14 of the Idaho Constitution?
CONCLUSION
Article III, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution requires all revenue raising bills to
originate in the Idaho House of Representatives. Application of this provision has
generally been to legislation involving an increase or decrease involving a tax or taxing
measure. It has not been traditionally applied to legislation involving fees. A challenge
to a fee measure would be a case of first impression for Idaho Courts. Based upon
case law from other jurisdictions, a reasonable legal defense can be advanced to
support the origination of fee legislation in either chamber of the legislature. As
reflected in greater detail below, this defense is likely to become factually specific and
require a determination as to whether the fee is truly a fee, or a tax disguised as a fee.
If there is doubt as to whether the legislation creates a fee or a tax, it is recommended
that such legislation originate in the House.
P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-8071
Located at 700 W. Jefferson Street, Suit 210
The Honorable Brent Hill
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ANALYSIS
A. Reasons for Caution in the Analysis
The cautious approach to the initiation of fee legislation noted above is based on
a number of considerations. The first cause for a conservative approach is reflected in
Justice Harlan's statement concerning the Origination Clause of the federal constitution.
"What bills belong to that class [of bills raising revenue] is a question of such magnitude
and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to
cover every possible phase of the subject." Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U.S.
196,202,17 S. Ct. 766, 769, 42 L. Ed. 134 (1897).
The next consideration counseling a conservative approach to the question is
that if the Idaho Supreme Court rejects the interpretation that "revenue bills" are only
those that levy taxes, the cost to the state could be high. Any controversy heard in a
court will involve the payment of money to the state. To justify litigation, the amounts in
question are likely to be high. If the law was initiated in the senate, and this is found
unlawful, then the law is void. This means that those who paid money under that law
will be due refunds. If the case is a class action, the resulting refunds could be large.
See, e.g., Ware v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 98 Idaho 477,483,567 P.2d 423, 429
(1977) (Grocery credit case upholding a refund of only $90.00 established that a class
of an additional 27,980 plaintiffs might also be entitled to relief).
Third, the leading case on Idaho's Origination Clause is Dumas v. Bryan, 35
Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922). This case is 90 years old and subject to conflicting
interpretations.
A fourth consideration suggesting caution where fee legislation is initiated is
whether the fee enacted is a fee or a tax. Simply labeling a tax a fee will not protect it
on judicial review. See, e.g., V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund,
128 Idaho 890, 920 P.2d 909 (1996) (One cent per gallon petroleum transfer fee used
to fund the clean water trust fund held a tax, not a fee). If it is really a tax, not a fee,
then the common rule is that initiation in the senate is fatal and the statute is void. The
exception to this rule is if the revenue-raising portion of the enactment is merely
incidental to the main purpose of the statute. If it is, then origination of the bill in the
senate is permitted. Dumas, however, may indicate that Idaho does not recognize this
general exception. This is discussed below.
The fifth point counseling caution in where fee bills originate is simply that all
these uncertainties are avoided if fee bills originate in the house. This removes any
possibility of violating the Origination Clause.
B. The General Rule
The general rule is that origination clauses apply only to bills to levy taxes in the
strict sense of the word.
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At the federal level, this rule was laid down in United States v. Mayo, 1 Gall. 396,
26 F. Cas. 1230 (1813). Holding that laws creating fines and forfeitures are not
"revenue laws" under the Origination Clause, Circuit Justice Story wrote:
The true meaning of 'revenue laws' in this clause is, such laws as are
made for the direct and avowed purpose for creating and securing
revenue or public funds for the service of the government. No laws,
whose collateral and indirect operation might possibly conduce to the
public or fiscal wealth, are within the scope of the provision.
Mayo, 26 F. Cas. at 1231.
Judge Story later authored a treatise on the Constitution in which he expounded on this
statement.
[T]he history of the origin of the power already suggested abundantly
proves that it has been confined to 'bills to levy taxes' in the strict sense of
the words, and has not been understood to extend to bills for other
purposes, which may incidentally create revenue.
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 880, 5th Ed.
(1891). Quoted in Morgan v. Murray, 328 P.2d 644, 648 (Mont. 1958).
In United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 1 Otto 566, 23 L. Ed. 454 (1875), the
United States Supreme Court held that an act to create a postal money order system
and to provide criminal penalties for embezzlement was not a "revenue bill" within the
meaning of the Origination Clause. The Court adopted Judge Story's view of the
matter, specifically referring to Mayo and the Commentaries.
It quoted the
Commentaries language noted above in its holding.
Another federal case from 1875 sheds more light on the proper interpretation of
the federal Origination Clause. In United States ex. reI. Michels v. James, 13 Blatchf.
207,26 F. Cas. 577 (1875), Circuit Judge Johnson held that a postage fee increase was
not a "revenue bilL" He wrote:
Certain legislative measures are unmistakably bills for raising revenue.
These impose taxes upon the people, either directly or indirectly, or lay
duties, imposts or excises, for the use of the government, and give to the
persons from whom the money is exacted no equivalent in return, unless
in the enjoyment, in common with the rest of the citizens of the benefit of
good government. It is this feature which characterizes bills for raising
revenue. They draw money from the citizen; they give no direct equivalent
in return.
James, 26 F. Cas. at 578.
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The general rule, that origination clauses apply only to bills to levy taxes in the
strict sense of the word, is widely adopted in several states. In Ennis v. State Highway
Commission, 108 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. 1952), the Indiana Supreme Court looked into the
constitutionality of an act establishing a toll road and toll road commission. One of the
challenges to the act was that it had originated in the senate and that it was therefore
invalid because it was a revenue-raising measure that was required to originate in the
house. The Court did not agree.
This court has held that the term 'raising revenue' is confined to acts that
levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and does not apply to other
purposes which may incidentally create revenue.
Ennis, 108 N.E.2d at 692.
The Supreme Court of Montana was faced with deciding whether a statute
prohibiting sale of liquor by private individuals and providing for sale through a system
of state liquor stores was void as a revenue-raising bill that originated in the senate.
The Court held it was not. In deciding the point, it discussed approvingly Judge Story's
Mayo opinion and his treatise on the federal constitution discussed above. The Court
held that, despite jts revenue-raising features, the purpose of the act was to regulate
and limit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor. State v. Driscoll, 54 P.2d 571
(Mont. 1936).
In Northern Counties Investment Trustv. Sears, 41 P. 931 (Or. 1895), the
Oregon Supreme Court set forth the general origination clause test. It paraphrased the
sentiments expressed in the federal James case noted above:
A law which requires a fee to be paid to an officer, and finally covered into
the treasury, of a county, for which the party paying the fee receives some
equivalent in return, other than the benefit of good government which is
enjoyed by the whole community, and which the party may pay and obtain
the benefits under the law, or let it alone, as he chooses, does not come
within the category of an act for raising revenue ....
Northern Counties, 41 P. at 936.
In Yourison v. State, 140 A. 691 (Del. Super. 1928), two individuals were found
guilty of having operated a fishing boat carrying passengers for hire without the required
license. The defendants appealed seeking to overturn the statute on the grounds that it
was a bill for raising revenue that improperly originated in the state senate. After
reviewing the statute at issue, the Delaware court concluded that the statute was not a
revenue bill as it was not designed to raise revenue for the general expenses of the
government.
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A Texas case held that an act that originated in the senate conferring the vote on
women who met certain qualifications, and imposing on them a poll tax, was not a
revenue act and hence not violative of the Texas constitution's origination clause even
though the tax was imposed on women whether they intended to vote or not. The
Texas court found that the object of the bill was to confer the franchise on qualified
women, not to raise revenue. As such, it did not violate the Texas constitution's
origination clause. Stuard v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, quoting the federal Mayo and James opinions
noted previously, held that a bill imposing license taxes on blended spirits and providing
penalties for nonpayment violated the state constitution's origination clause. The
Commonwealth of Kentucky argued that the bill only incidentally raised revenue. The
main purpose of the statute was to regulate the industry. The court disagreed. It found
that the statute required nothing of the manufacturer but payment of the tax. As such, it
was clearly a revenue act that the Kentucky constitution required originate in the house.
The statute was declared void. H.A. Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth, 97 S.W. 366 (Ky.
App. 1906).
In Opinion of the Justices, 150 A.2d 813 (N.H. 1959), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that a bill making nominal increases in licensing fees and permits
for pharmacies and pharmacists was not a "money bill" and did not violate the
origination clause. In Opinion of the Justices, 152 N.E. 2d 90 (Mass. 1958), the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a bill was not a "money bill" when it
expended state money on an option to purchase a rail line and contained provisions for
repayment to the state by imposition of a tax on people served by that line. The court
found that the chief purpose of the bill, which originated in the senate, was to avoid
economic harm through the preservation of existing rail service. Repayment of the
money used was incidental to the chief purpose of the bill. As such, it did not violate the
origination clause.
These cases show the rule to be that origination clauses generally pertain strictly
to taxes used for general government purposes, and for which the people who pay the
tax receive no equivalent return other than the provision of good government. If the
exaction is merely incidental to the main purpose of the bill, the origination clause is
generally not violated. The question is whether Idaho subscribes to the general rule.
C. Idaho Cases
There are four reported Idaho cases on the state's origination clause.
directly address whether bills implementing fees must originate in the house.
None
In Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 525 P.2d 957 (1974), a bill amending the
Idaho Income Tax Act originated in the house. The senate, however, added two
significant amendments. The issue was whether the senate had the power to amend a
revenue bill initiated in the house. The question arose because of differences between
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the origination clauses in the federal and Idaho constitutions. Article 1, Section 7 of the
federal Constitution provides:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives;
but the senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
In contrast, article III, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
Bills may originate in either house, but may be amended or rejected in the
other, except that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of
representatives.
Notwithstanding the absence in the Idaho Constitution of language expressly
authorizing the senate to amend revenue bills, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
senate could do so. The court stated that to prohibit the senate from amending houseoriginated revenue bills would be an obstruction of the legislative process. Article III,
section 14 must be read to mean that revenue bills must originate in the house, but the
senate is permitted to amend such bills.
The Worthen holding was upheld in Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 115 P.3d
756 (2005). A bill to temporarily increase the sales tax from 5% to 5.5% was introduced
in the house. The senate amended the bill significantly, raising the increase to 6% and
lengthening the period of time the temporary increase would be in effect. The house
concurred in the amendments. The bill was passed and signed into law. Gallagher
argued that the senate amendments raised significantly more money than the house
version. The amendments, therefore, constituted a revenue bill unconstitutionally
initiated in the senate. The Idaho Supreme Court, relying on Worthen, rejected
Gallagher's arguments and upheld the statute.
State ex. reI. Parsons v. Workmen's Compensation Exchange, 59 Idaho 256, 81
P.2d 1101 (1938), involved worker's compensation benefits payable as a result of the
work-related death of an employee. A bill initiated in the senate and subsequently
enacted provided that in the event the deceased worker left no dependents, the death
benefit was payable to the state treasury. The surety liable to pay the death benefit
sued, contending that this was a revenue law that should have originated in the house.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, in part reasoning that the provision objected to
is analogous to a person dying intestate and without heirs. In such a case, the
decedent's property escheats to the state.
Idaho's most important origination clause case is Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557,
207 P. 720 (1922). Unfortunately, as well as being 90 years old, it is the most confusing
of the cases. It also concerned a tax, not a fee, and so is not directly on point. It does,
however, provide some insights into the issue at hand.
In 1921, the Legislature enacted a bill that originated in the senate. It provided
for the transfer of the Albion Normal School from Albion to Burley. The first four
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sections of the bill authorized the move and directed how it was to be accomplished.
The fifth section levied a statewide property tax to fund the move. Opponents of the
move challenged the entire statute on Origination Clause grounds. The Idaho Supreme
Court agreed the Origination Clause was violated.
The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed case law from other states with similar
origination clauses. The Court's attention was directed to:
[M]any cases holding that where the revenue part of an act is merely an
incident and not the principal purpose for which it was enacted, the fact
that it contains a provision for raising revenue as an incident to such
purpose does not make it a revenue law within the meaning of this
constitutional provision.
35 Idaho at 564,207 P. at 722.
In particular, in Dumas the court noted Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. School District No.1,
165 P. 260 (Colo. 1917), and Evers v. Hudson, 92 P. 462 (Mont. 1907). In School
District No.1, an act amended a statute establishing a system of public schools.
Incident to the amendment was a provision for raising revenue to meet the requirements
of the statute as amended. This was held not to violate the Colorado Constitution's
origination clause. In Evers, an act providing for the establishment of county free high
schools also provided for a property tax to provide funds for the current expenses of
those schools. It also provided authority for bond issues. This was held not to violate
the origination clause of the Montana Constitution.
Despite these and other state and federal cases with similar holdings, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the Albion statute violated the origination clause of the Idaho
Constitution. In doing so, it enforced a stricter view of the origination clause than was
current in other jurisdictions. Whether the court adopted this stricter view because it
rejected the majority rule that revenue measures which are merely incidental to the
main purpose of a statute do not run afoul of the origination clause, or because it took a
harder line on what qualified as "incidental" is not clear. Whatever the analysis, the
court adopted a more conservative approach to the origination clause than was current.
The Dumas court's conservative approach counsels caution on the issue of whether
fees are "revenue" under Idaho's origination clause.
On the other hand, the Dumas court noted with approval a definition from
Bouvier's Law Dictionary that defined "revenue" as "the income of the government
arising from taxation." It also cited Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S. Ct. 674, 50 L.
Ed. 1090 (1906) which held that bills for other than tax purposes, but which may
incidentally create revenue, are not revenue bills under the federal origination clause.
The court noted that this decision approves Story on constitutional law when he lays
down the rule that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word.
These comments indicate that the court may view fees as outside the requirements of
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Idaho's origination clause. This is only dicta, however, as the fee issue was not before
the court.
Dumas can be read either as a rejection of the general rule discussed above, or
as merely a stricter interpretation of what revenue-raising measures qualify as
"incidental. "
The Idaho cases establish a number of points. Dumas teaches that originating a
revenue bill in the senate is a fatal flaw that can result in the enacted statute being
declared void. Worthen and Gallagher teach that the senate can amend a revenue bill.
Parsons stands for the proposition that not every bill that results in money flowing to the
state treasury is a revenue bill. None of these cases addresses whether a bill imposing
a fee is "a bill for raising revenue."
Historically, many fee bills originated in the senate. The period 2006 through
2010 provides several examples of fee bills enacted into law after originating in the
senate. These include: 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 881 (S.B. 1350aa) (providing for fees
charged by county recorder for electronic duplication of records); 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws 828 (S.B. 1409aa) (increase in court filing fees); 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 873 (S.B.
1343) (setting licensing fees for dental health professions); 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws 196
(S.B. 1086) (providing for wolf tag hunting fee); 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws 361 (S.B. 1118)
(increasing snowmobile registration fees); 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 424 (S.B. 1257)
(application fees for certification of real estate education providers); 2008 Idaho Sess.
Laws 433 (S.B. 1352) (revising fees for filing notice of water claims); 2008 Idaho Sess.
Laws 924 (S.B. 1460) (increasing temporary motor vehicle permit fees); and, 2010
Idaho Sess. Laws 70 (S.B. 1267) (increasing licensing fees for attorneys). All of these
bills originated in the senate, were passed by the house and became law.
If faced with the question whether bills creating fees fall under the limitation ofthe
origination clause of the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court will likely find that
fees are not so constrained. There are several reasons for this. First, Dumas is
ambiguous and does not specifically address fees. Second, there are a number of postDumas cases from other jurisdictions adhering to the rule that only bills for taxes, strictly
construed, are subject to the origination clauses in their jurisdictions. Third, the practice
of introducing in the Idaho Senate bills establishing fees is one of long standing with
which the Idaho House has traditionally concurred.
AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED
1. United States Constitution:
Art. I, § 7.
2. Idaho Constitution:
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Art. III, § 14.
-
Idaho Session Laws:
2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 828 (S.B. 1409aa).
2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 873 (S.B. 1343).
2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 881 (S.B. 1350aa).
2007 Idaho Sess. Laws 196 (S.B. 1086).
2007 Idaho Sess. Laws 361 (S.B. 1118).
2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 424 (S.B. 1257).
2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 433 (S.B. 1352).
2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 924 (S.B. 1460).
2010 Idaho Sess. Laws 70 (S.B. 1267). -
United States Supreme Court Cases:
Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S. Ct. 674,50 L. Ed. 1090 (1906).
Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 17 S. Ct. 766, 42 L. Ed.134
(1897).
United States ex. reI. Michels v. James, 13 Blatchf. 207, 26 F. Cas. 577 (1875).
United States v. Mayo, 1 Gall. 396, 26 F. Cas. 1230 (1813).
United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 1 Otto 566, 23 L. Ed. 454 (1875). -
Idaho Cases:
Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557,207 P. 720 (1922).
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 115 P.3d 756 (2005).
State ex. reI. Parsons v. Workmen's Compensation Exchange, 59 Idaho 256,81
P.2d 1101 (1938).
V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund, 128 Idaho 890,920
P.2d 909 (1996).
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Ware v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 98 Idaho 477,567 P.2d 423 (1977).
Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 525 P.2d 957 (1974).
-
Other Cases:
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. School District No.1, 165 P. 260 (Colo. 1917).
Ennis v. State Highway Commission, 108 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. 1952).
Evers v. Hudson, 92 P. 462 (Mont. 1907).
H.A. Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth, 97 S.W. 366 (Ky. App. 1906).
Morgan v. Murray, 328 P.2d 644 (Mont. 1958).
Northern Counties Investment Trust v. Sears, 41 P. 931 (Or. 1895).
Opinion of the Justices, 150 A.2d 813 (N.H. 1959).
Opinion of the Justices, 152 N. E. 2d 90 (Mass. 1958)
State v. Driscoll, 54 P.2d 571 (Mont. 1936).
Stuard v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
Yourison v. State, 140 A. 691 (Del. Super. 1928). -
Other Authorities:
th
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 880, 5
Ed. (1891).
Dated this 24th day of May 2012.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
Analysis by:
CARL E. OLSSON
Deputy Attorney General