GA 2020-2 July 14, 2020

Does someone moving to Georgia from Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or another U.S. territory get the same driving-test waiver as someone moving from another U.S. state?

Short answer: Yes. The term 'state' in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes territories of the United States, because Title 40's own definition section, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61), defines 'state' for that title to include 'a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of Canada.' So an applicant 18 or older with a valid current license from a U.S. territory who otherwise satisfies the statute can be exempted from the on-the-road driving test and the knowledge test.
Currency note: this opinion is from 2020
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Georgia Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Georgia attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Georgia's driver's license statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A), waives the on-the-road driving test and the knowledge test for an applicant 18 or older who has "a valid and current license . . . issued by another state of the United States or the District of Columbia." The Department of Driver Services Commissioner asked whether that waiver also applied to applicants holding licenses from U.S. territories like Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, or the Northern Mariana Islands.

AG Chris Carr said yes. Title 40 has its own definition section, and O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) defines "state" for purposes of Title 40 to mean "a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of Canada." Because § 40-5-27 sits in Title 40, that definition controls.

The opinion acknowledged a textual quirk that might have created doubt. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) refers separately to "another state of the United States or the District of Columbia," even though "state" already includes the District of Columbia under § 40-1-1(61). The redundant mention of D.C. could be read to suggest that the drafters were not relying on § 40-1-1(61). But the opinion concluded that this single redundancy was not enough to override the explicit Title 40 definition.

The Georgia Supreme Court's reading of § 40-1-1 in Braley v. City of Forest Park helped: that court held § 40-1-1(57) (defining "sidewalk") was not a definition of general application but defined the term "in the context of Title 40 of the Code." The same logic applied to § 40-1-1(61): it controls within Title 40 but might not apply outside. Within § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A), territories were included.

So an applicant moving to Georgia from Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or any other territory of the United States, holding a valid current license, could obtain a Georgia license without taking the road test or the knowledge test, just like an applicant from another state.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2020. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the territorial license have to be unrestricted to qualify?
A: § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) just required a "valid and current license." The opinion did not address restricted-license cases (e.g., a license restricted to daylight driving). DDS would presumably apply its standard practice for restricted licenses from any state, including territorial ones.

Q: What about applicants from Canadian provinces?
A: § 40-1-1(61) includes "a province of Canada" within the Title 40 definition of "state." So applicants from Canadian provinces who hold valid licenses are also covered by § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) on the same logic, subject to whatever additional federal compatibility requirements apply.

Q: What about Mexico, the EU, or other foreign licenses?
A: Foreign licenses outside the listed jurisdictions are not covered by the § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) exemption. An applicant from those jurisdictions would have to take the on-the-road test and knowledge test.

Q: Why did the AG cite Braley v. City of Forest Park?
A: Braley held that the Title 40 definition of "sidewalk" controlled within Title 40 but might not apply elsewhere in the Code. By analogy, the Title 40 definition of "state" controls within Title 40 but does not necessarily import "territory" into the term "state" in other Georgia statutes outside Title 40.

Q: Could DDS still require some verification of the territorial license?
A: The waiver is for the on-the-road test and the knowledge test. It does not waive identity verification, residency proof, or other administrative requirements. DDS could still apply its standard procedures for verifying that the territorial license was valid and current.

Q: What about a Puerto Rico license that has been expired for more than a year?
A: § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) requires a "valid and current" license. An expired license would not qualify. The exemption is for active license holders relocating, not for previously-licensed drivers seeking reinstatement after a long lapse.

Background and statutory framework

Title 40 of the Georgia Code (Motor Vehicles and Traffic) has a comprehensive definition section in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1. Many of the definitions in § 40-1-1 are unusual compared to ordinary English usage; the Georgia Supreme Court in Braley v. City of Forest Park recognized that these are context-specific Title 40 definitions, not general definitions.

§ 40-1-1(61) is the operative definition for "state": "a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of Canada." This is broader than the ordinary meaning, which usually refers only to the 50 states.

The definition's breadth reflects the practical realities of driver licensing. Reciprocity arrangements between Georgia and other jurisdictions need to capture the full range of places that issue valid driver's licenses to U.S. residents, including territories and Canadian provinces.

The redundant separate mention of D.C. in § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) may simply be belt-and-suspenders drafting, the kind of statutory redundancy that occurs when multiple legislative session amendments accumulate. The opinion treated it as not enough to override the clear definition.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1 (Title 40 definitions)
- O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27 (driver's license examination requirements)

Cases:
- Braley v. City of Forest Park, 286 Ga. 760 (2010) (Title 40 definitions are context-specific)
- Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838 (2013) (common usage important but so is context)
- Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127 (2013) (in pari materia construction)

Source

Original opinion text

This letter is in response to your request for advice as to whether the exemption of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes applicants with valid and current licenses from territories of the United States. Based upon its inclusion in Title 40, pertaining specifically to "Motor Vehicles and Traffic," and the specific statutory definition of "state" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) of that Title, the answer to this question is yes. Official Code of Georgia Annotated 40-5-27 sets forth the Department of Driver Services' examination requirements for persons applying for a driver's license. Under that statute, an applicant for a driver's license is exempted from the "on-the-road driving test" and "the knowledge test" if the applicant is "18 years of age and older with a valid and current license . . . issued by another state of the United States or the District of Columbia." O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27 (emphasis supplied). Your question is whether this exemption is also applicable to an otherwise qualified applicant whose valid, current license is from one of the United States territories. This exemption provision is part of Title 40 of the Code, specifically directed to "Motor Vehicles and Traffic." The title has a specific definitional section, codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1. As used in Title 40, "state" is defined to mean: a state, territory , or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of Canada. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61)(emphasis supplied). By the specific terms of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1, paragraph 61 is the manner in which the term "state" is to be used in the context of Title 40 of the Code, albeit that it may not be the manner by which the term is otherwise defined outside that context. See Braley v. City of Forest Park , 286 Ga. 760, 765 (2010)("[B]y its express terms, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(57) is not intended to be a definition of general application, but defines the term 'sidewalk' in the context of Title 40 of the Code . . ..") Notably, the exemption also makes reference to the "District of Columbia" in conjunction with "another state of the United States" despite the fact that the District of Columbia is also included with the definition of "state" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61). However, that repetition, by itself, is not enough to suggest that the definition of "state" as found otherwise in the statute is not applicable in this one section. "The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context." Chan v. Ellis , 296 Ga. 838, 839 (2013). "A statute must be construed in relation to the other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes in pari materia , are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto." Tew v. State , 320 Ga. App. 127, 130 (2013). See also Thornton v. Clarke County School Dist ., 270 Ga. 633, 634 (1999)("The construction of statues must square with common sense and sound reasoning.") Considering those principles, viewing the statute as a whole, and considering the express language of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) which provides a clear definition of the term "[a]s used in . . . [T]itle {40],"the term "state" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes territories of the United States. Therefore, it is my official opinion that the term "state" as used specifically in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes territories of the United States such that persons from the territories who are applying for a driver's license and who otherwise satisfy the conditions of the statute may be exempted from the on-the-road driving test and the knowledge test. Prepared by: Susan L. Rutherford Senior Assistant Attorney General