Can a Georgia driver's-license applicant with a valid license from a U.S. territory qualify for the road and knowledge test exemption?

Plain-English summary

Georgia's driver's license statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A), provides an exemption from the on-the-road driving test and the knowledge test for an applicant 18 or older with a valid and current license issued by another state of the United States or the District of Columbia. The Department of Driver Services asked whether this exemption also covers otherwise qualified applicants licensed by U.S. territories.

AG Chris Carr said yes. Title 40 has its own definition section, and O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) defines "state" for purposes of Title 40 to mean "a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of Canada." Because § 40-5-27 sits in Title 40, that definition controls.

The opinion acknowledged a textual quirk that might have created doubt. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) refers separately to "another state of the United States or the District of Columbia," even though "state" already includes the District of Columbia under § 40-1-1(61). The redundant mention of D.C. could be read to suggest that the drafters were not relying on § 40-1-1(61). But the opinion concluded that this single redundancy was not enough to override the explicit Title 40 definition.

The Georgia Supreme Court's reading of § 40-1-1 in Braley v. City of Forest Park helped: that court held § 40-1-1(57) (defining "sidewalk") was not a definition of general application but defined the term "in the context of Title 40 of the Code." The same logic applied to § 40-1-1(61): it controls within Title 40 but might not apply outside. Within § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A), territories were included.

The AG concluded that "state" in this particular exemption includes U.S. territories. An otherwise qualified territorial license holder with a valid and current license may be exempt from the road and knowledge tests under the statute.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2020. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the territorial license have to be unrestricted to qualify?
A: The quoted provision requires a valid and current license. The opinion does not address how restrictions on a territorial license would affect the exemption.

Q: What about applicants from Canadian provinces?
A: The opinion quotes a Title 40 definition of "state" that includes "a province of Canada," but the question presented and the AG's conclusion concern only U.S. territories. The opinion does not decide whether a Canadian provincial license qualifies for this exemption.

Q: What about Mexico, the EU, or other foreign licenses?
A: The opinion does not address licenses from Mexico, European countries, or other foreign jurisdictions, or decide what tests their holders must take.

Q: Why did the AG cite Braley v. City of Forest Park?
A: Braley held that the Title 40 definition of "sidewalk" controlled within Title 40 but might not apply elsewhere in the Code. By analogy, the Title 40 definition of "state" controls within Title 40 but does not necessarily import "territory" into the term "state" in other Georgia statutes outside Title 40.

Q: Could DDS still require some verification of the territorial license?
A: The opinion addresses only exemption from the road and knowledge tests for an otherwise qualified applicant with a valid and current territorial license. It does not discuss specific verification procedures.

Q: What about a Puerto Rico license that has been expired for more than a year?
A: The provision quoted in the opinion requires a "valid and current" license. The opinion does not discuss how long a license may have been expired or any reinstatement process.

Background and statutory framework

O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1 supplies definitions for Title 40. The opinion cites Braley v. City of Forest Park for the point that one of those definitions applies in the context of Title 40 rather than generally throughout the Code.

O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) defines "state" for Title 40 to include a U.S. territory or possession, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and a province of Canada. The opinion decides the question presented about U.S. territories.

The opinion applies the Title 40 definition to the driver's-license examination provision in the same title. Its conclusion is limited to licenses from U.S. territories.

The opinion notes that the examination provision mentions the District of Columbia separately even though the Title 40 definition of "state" already includes it. The AG found that repetition insufficient to displace the statutory definition.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1 (Title 40 definitions)
• O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27 (driver's license examination requirements)

Cases:

• Braley v. City of Forest Park, 286 Ga. 760 (2010) (Title 40 definitions are context-specific)
• Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838 (2013) (common usage important but so is context)
• Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127 (2013) (in pari materia construction)

Source

• Landing page: https://law.georgia.gov/opinions/2020-2

Original opinion text

This letter is in response to your request for advice as to whether the exemption of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes applicants with valid and current licenses from territories of the United States. Based upon its inclusion in Title 40, pertaining specifically to "Motor Vehicles and Traffic," and the specific statutory definition of "state" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) of that Title, the answer to this question is yes. Official Code of Georgia Annotated 40-5-27 sets forth the Department of Driver Services' examination requirements for persons applying for a driver's license. Under that statute, an applicant for a driver's license is exempted from the "on-the-road driving test" and "the knowledge test" if the applicant is "18 years of age and older with a valid and current license . . . issued by another state of the United States or the District of Columbia." O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27 (emphasis supplied). Your question is whether this exemption is also applicable to an otherwise qualified applicant whose valid, current license is from one of the United States territories. This exemption provision is part of Title 40 of the Code, specifically directed to "Motor Vehicles and Traffic." The title has a specific definitional section, codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1. As used in Title 40, "state" is defined to mean: a state, territory , or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of Canada. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61)(emphasis supplied). By the specific terms of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1, paragraph 61 is the manner in which the term "state" is to be used in the context of Title 40 of the Code, albeit that it may not be the manner by which the term is otherwise defined outside that context. See Braley v. City of Forest Park , 286 Ga. 760, 765 (2010)("[B]y its express terms, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(57) is not intended to be a definition of general application, but defines the term 'sidewalk' in the context of Title 40 of the Code . . ..") Notably, the exemption also makes reference to the "District of Columbia" in conjunction with "another state of the United States" despite the fact that the District of Columbia is also included with the definition of "state" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61). However, that repetition, by itself, is not enough to suggest that the definition of "state" as found otherwise in the statute is not applicable in this one section. "The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context." Chan v. Ellis , 296 Ga. 838, 839 (2013). "A statute must be construed in relation to the other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes in pari materia , are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto." Tew v. State , 320 Ga. App. 127, 130 (2013). See also Thornton v. Clarke County School Dist ., 270 Ga. 633, 634 (1999)("The construction of statues must square with common sense and sound reasoning.") Considering those principles, viewing the statute as a whole, and considering the express language of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(61) which provides a clear definition of the term "[a]s used in . . . [T]itle {40],"the term "state" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes territories of the United States. Therefore, it is my official opinion that the term "state" as used specifically in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-27(a)(3)(A) includes territories of the United States such that persons from the territories who are applying for a driver's license and who otherwise satisfy the conditions of the statute may be exempted from the on-the-road driving test and the knowledge test. Prepared by: Susan L. Rutherford Senior Assistant Attorney General