Can a Georgia state law enforcement officer like a state trooper carry their service weapon into a Georgia courthouse, and what about into the actual courtrooms?

Plain-English summary

The 2017 General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 16-11-130 in HB 292 to broaden the exception that allowed active law enforcement officers (including state troopers and other Department of Public Safety officers) to carry their service weapons into any courthouse. The amendment was clear that the carrying authority applied "[n]otwithstanding a security plan implemented by law enforcement personnel," meaning the local sheriff's security plan could not bar a uniformed-or-credentialed active law enforcement officer from bringing a service weapon into the courthouse during the performance of official duties.

The DPS Commissioner asked whether this also meant his officers could carry into the courtrooms themselves. The Glynn County Sheriff had issued a memo saying outside law enforcement personnel could not enter Glynn County courtrooms armed. The Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Glynn County had also issued an order prohibiting all persons other than the Sheriff and his deputies from possessing firearms in the actual courtrooms unless authorized in writing by a judge.

AG Chris Carr's answer split the question. Yes, the statute let active DPS officers (and other active law enforcement officers as defined in § 16-11-130(c)) into the courthouse building (defined as "a building or annex occupied by judicial courts and containing rooms in which judicial proceedings are held") without restriction. The "notwithstanding the security plan" language was unambiguous.

But that was not the end of the analysis. Inside the actual courtrooms, the judge retained constitutional, statutory, and inherent authority to control firearms. Three sources of judicial authority converged. The statutory grant in O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3 gave every court the power to preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence and to control the conduct of all persons connected with a judicial proceeding. The constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine in Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III protected the judiciary's ability to administer justice without legislative interference. And the inherent authority of courts to control conduct in their proceedings, recognized in Weldon v. State, In re JQC Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, and other cases, included the power to set security rules.

So the bottom line was that HB 292 cleared the way for active law enforcement officers to carry into courthouse buildings notwithstanding any sheriff's security plan, but the judge of any specific courtroom retained authority to set firearm policies inside that courtroom.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a sheriff use the security plan to keep state troopers out of the building?
A: No. The 2017 amendment in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-130(c.1)(3) said active law enforcement officers were "authorized to carry their service handguns and weapons in any courthouse" notwithstanding any security plan. The sheriff's plan could not override that statutory grant for the building.

Q: Could a judge keep state troopers out of the courtroom?
A: Yes, in the courtroom itself. The courtroom is under the judge's control. The opinion read § 15-1-3, separation of powers, and the inherent-authority cases as preserving the judge's ability to set firearm rules in the courtroom.

Q: What's the difference between "courthouse" and "courtroom"?
A: O.C.G.A. § 16-11-130(c.1)(1)(B) defined "courthouse" as "a building or annex occupied by judicial courts and containing rooms in which judicial proceedings are held." A courtroom is the actual room where proceedings take place. The opinion treated the legislative authority as covering the building and the judicial authority as covering each individual courtroom.

Q: What did an active law enforcement officer have to do to qualify for the courthouse-carry exception?
A: Either wear the assigned uniform of the law enforcement office, or have the official badge and identification credentials displayed and plainly visible, while performing official duties. Plainclothes officers without visible credentials would not qualify.

Q: Who else qualified as an "active law enforcement officer"?
A: The list in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-130(c) covered officers of various state and local agencies. DPS officers were specifically included by § 16-11-130(c)(2)(B). Local sheriffs and police officers were also typically covered.

Q: What about retired law enforcement officers?
A: Retired officers were not covered by this provision. Federal law (the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act) gives retired officers some carry rights, but Georgia's courthouse exception in HB 292 was for active law enforcement officers only.

Background and statutory framework

Georgia's general rule against carrying weapons into a courthouse sits in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127. HB 292 (2017 Ga. Laws 555) added the broad exception in § 16-11-130(c.1) that authorized active law enforcement officers to carry into courthouses notwithstanding any sheriff's security plan, as long as they were in uniform or had visible badge and credentials.

The legislative intent was to address a specific friction. Sheriffs traditionally operate the courthouse security checkpoint; their plans often required outside officers to surrender weapons at the entrance. State and federal officers, who needed their service weapons available throughout their working day, found this disruptive. HB 292 resolved the conflict in favor of access.

The constitutional layer the AG identified was a separate matter. Inside the courtroom, the judge has authority that does not depend on legislative grant. This authority comes from three sources: the statutory grant in O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3, the constitutional separation-of-powers principle, and the common-law inherent authority of courts. Even if the legislature had wanted to take this away, separation-of-powers doctrine likely would have prevented it.

The 1973 AG opinion (1973 Op. Att'y Gen. 73-57) established the framework for courtroom security: power lies with the court, implemented through the sheriff and bailiffs. The 2017 opinion preserved that framework while honoring the newly expanded statutory access to the broader courthouse building.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3 (court's power to preserve order)
- O.C.G.A. § 15-16-10 (sheriff's security plan with chief-judge approval)
- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 (general courthouse weapons prohibition)
- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-130 (exemptions including active law enforcement officers)
- 2017 Ga. Laws 555 (HB 292)
- Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (separation of powers)

Cases:
- Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408 (2017) (court's inherent authority to resolve constitutional-statutory conflicts)
- Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238 (1945) (separation of powers preserves judicial efficiency)
- Weldon v. State, 297 Ga. 537 (2015) (court authority to implement security measures)

Source

• Landing page: https://law.georgia.gov/opinions/2017-5

Original opinion text

You have asked whether Department of Public Safety ("DPS") law enforcement officers may, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1)(1), carry their service weapons and handguns into courtrooms while performing their official duties.[1] For the reasons that follow, I conclude that this statute, as amended by the General Assembly during the 2017 session, permits DPS officers to carry their service weapons and handguns into courthouses, but does not authorize their entry into courtrooms where the courthouse's security plan and/or judges of that court have directed otherwise. See 2017 Ga. Laws 555, 560-63 (H.B. 292, Sec. 7). Generally, under Georgia law, a person may not carry a weapon or a long gun as defined by statute into a courthouse unless they fall within certain statutorily created exceptions. See O.C.G.A. §§ 16‑11‑127(b)(2), 16‑11‑127(d) and (e). A "courthouse" is defined as "a building or annex occupied by judicial courts and containing rooms in which judicial proceedings are held." O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1)(1)(B). In relation to courthouses, however, the General Assembly in the aforementioned legislation created a specific exception permitting a number of statutorily-defined persons to carry firearms into courthouses, including "active law enforcement officers." In doing so, the law now provides: Notwithstanding a security plan implemented by law enforcement personnel . . . active law enforcement officers referred to in subsection (c) of this Code section shall be authorized to carry their service handguns and weapons in any courthouse if they are wearing the assigned uniform of their law enforcement office or have the official badge and identification credentials issued to them by their law enforcement office displayed and plainly visible on their person while in the performance of their official duties. O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1)(3). DPS officers are "active law enforcement officers" as defined and included in this statute. O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c)(2)(B). Officers falling outside this exception may instead be required to place their weapons into holding upon entry into restricted or screened areas of a courthouse. O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1)(2). Under Georgia law: [T]he cardinal rule of statutory construction "look[s] diligently for the intention of the General Assembly," Judicial Council v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294, 296-97 (2010), and "the 'golden rule' of statutory construction . . . requires us to follow the literal language of the statute 'unless it produces contradiction, absurdity, or such an inconvenience as to insure that the legislature meant something else.'" Telecom*USA v. Collins, 260 Ga. 362, 363 (1990) (quoting Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 137 (1985) (Clarke, J., concurring specially)). 2016 Op. Att'y Gen. 2016‑5. The plain language of O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1)(3) authorizes active DPS officers, among others, to carry service weapons and handguns into courthouses without the requirement that their service weapons and handguns be placed into holding upon entry into the restricted or screened area of the courthouse. See O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1). While the law does not require that DPS officers be permitted to carry service weapons and handguns into any specific, named areas of the courthouse, the language of the statute and the authority provided in the statute is broad and there is no basis to read into the statute restrictions on particular areas of a courthouse. The law grants that broad access "[n]otwithstanding a security plan implemented by law enforcement personnel." O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1)(3). However, that conclusion does not end the inquiry. A courthouse building may contain any number of county offices, but the actual courtrooms are governed by different standards than other locations within a courthouse. Under Georgia law, "Every court has power to . . . preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence and, as near thereto as is necessary, to prevent interruption, disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings [and] . . . control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of its officers and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto." O.C.G.A. § 15‑1‑3(1), (4). In 1973, this office addressed the meaning of these provisions under the previous Georgia Code of 1933, concluding that: The above quoted law clearly illuminates the fact that the power to provide security of the courtroom has been granted to the court. Code 24-2813 and 24-3351 (the last section unofficially codified as Ga. Code Ann. 24-3379) provide the "tools" which allow the court to implement its authority . . . From the law discussed above, the following may be gleaned. The power to control the courtroom is granted to the court. This power may be implemented, if necessary, by use of the sheriff, his deputies, or bailiffs appointed either by the court or by the sheriff. It is, therefore, my official opinion that the court, assisted by the sheriff of the county, is responsible for undertaking measures necessary to insure the safety of the court during a [court] proceeding. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. 73-57 (1973 Ga. AG LEXIS 57.) This interpretation of Georgia law is consistent with the concept that the judiciary has inherent authority to control conduct in courtrooms, including security. A court has the inherent authority to resolve conflicts between the Constitution and statutory law. Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 432 (2017). In doing so, it must be recognized that the powers of the legislative and judicial branches are separate and distinct. Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. This doctrine of separation of powers "invests those officials charged with the duty of administering justice according to law with all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts." Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238, 239-240 (1945). It is also well‑established that courts have the power to control conduct in their proceedings, which includes security. See generally O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3; see also In re Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. 291, 302 (2016) (providing that courts are "charged with adopting and maintaining reasonable measures to provide security…") (quotations and citations omitted); Weldon v. State, 297 Ga. 537, 540-41 (2015) (recognizing court's authority to implement security measures); O.C.G.A. § 15-16-10(a)(10) (requiring the sheriff with jurisdiction over the courthouse to create a comprehensive security plan, but maintaining that the plan must be approved by the chief judge). See also State v. LaFrance, 471 A.2d 340, 344-346 (N.H. 1983) ("[I]t is clear that trial judges, subject to [appellate] review, have authority under the judicial power of the constitution to control the wearing of firearms in the courtroom."). Given the above provisions, I conclude that the General Assembly in the exercise of its legislative authority has authorized active law enforcement officers under the circumstances prescribed in O.C.G.A. § 16‑11‑130(c.1) to carry weapons into a courthouse building without restriction in the areas within the building that this may be done. However, a judge of the court may, in the exercise of his or her constitutional, statutory and inherent authority, determine whether those same law enforcement officers may carry their weapons into a courtroom. Prepared by: Meghan Davidson Assistant Attorney General [1] Your request attaches a memorandum from the Sheriff of Glynn County stating that outside law enforcement personnel are not authorized to enter any Glynn County courtroom, court clerk's office, or other designated areas of the Glynn County courthouse while armed. Your request also attaches an Order from the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Glynn County prohibiting all persons other than the Sheriff and his deputies from possessing firearms in the actual courtrooms unless authorized in writing by a judge of the court.