Title companies and real estate data vendors want to buy in bulk all the digital images of recorded real estate documents (deeds, mortgages, etc.) that the Georgia Superior Court Clerks Cooperative Authority makes available through its statewide system. Can the Authority sell those images itself?

Plain-English summary

The Georgia Superior Court Clerks Cooperative Authority (GSCCCA) operates a statewide information system that lets users access and print images of real estate documents recorded in superior court clerks' offices. Individual clerks decide whether to allow their county's images to flow through the GSCCCA system. Where the clerk allows it, GSCCCA charges users a per-page printing fee, and 100% of that fee goes back to the clerk. GSCCCA doesn't keep any of the printing revenue.

Vendors started asking GSCCCA to sell them real estate images in bulk, sometimes for a single county, sometimes for multiple counties. The Executive Director asked whether the Authority had statutory authority to make those bulk sales.

AG Thurbert Baker said no.

The state-authority powers doctrine. Under Bentley v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1922) and a long line of cases, a state authority "has only such powers as the legislature has expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred upon it." 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11 (which addressed a different GSCCCA-vs.-Secretary-of-State authority question) summarized the rule for GSCCCA: "The authority of the Clerks' Authority is limited to the sum of those express powers plus such powers as are necessarily implied from those expressly conferred."

GSCCCA's general contracting authority. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(d)(2) lets the Authority "make and execute contracts, lease agreements, and all other instruments necessary or convenient to exercise the powers of the authority or to further the public purpose for which the authority is created." Specifically for the real and personal property information system, § 15-6-97(a) lets the Authority "contract with the clerks of superior courts and any other parties that the authority deems necessary."

GSCCCA's information-ownership provision. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(a) provides that "[t]he authority shall be the sole owner of its compiled and developed information developed through any function performed or any program or system administered on behalf of the authority. For the purposes of this subsection the authority shall not be considered the sole owner of information developed pursuant to Code Section 15-6-97.1."

The clerk-of-superior-court reservation. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96 provides:

The clerk of the superior court is the custodian of the records of his or her office. Any contract to distribute, sell, or otherwise market records or computer generated data of the office of the clerk of the superior court for profit shall be made by the clerk of the superior court.

This is the load-bearing provision. The bulk-marketing-for-profit power is expressly assigned to the clerks of superior court, not to GSCCCA. Under Powell v. VonCanon (1996), § 15-6-96 even prevails over the Open Records Act to the extent they conflict on bulk-marketing authority.

The application. If GSCCCA were authorized to sell the bulk images, it would conflict with the express grant to clerks under § 15-6-96. GSCCCA's general contracting powers (§§ 15-6-94(d)(2) and 15-6-97(a)) cannot be read to create an authority that the legislature has elsewhere expressly assigned to someone else. The implication of bulk-sale authority on behalf of GSCCCA is "not necessary in light of the clear grant of authority to the clerks of superior court." (Following the same logic as 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11, where notary-public responsibilities were assigned to the Secretary of State and so could not also reside in GSCCCA: at least until a 1997 statute transferred them.)

The narrow scope of the holding. GSCCCA can still operate its system, contract with clerks, charge per-page printing fees, and remit those fees to clerks. What GSCCCA cannot do is contract with third-party vendors to sell the images in bulk. Those bulk-sale contracts must be made directly by the clerks of superior court, preserving the clerk's role as custodian and revenue beneficiary.

The opinion's footnote 3 confirms the practical alignment: the existing arrangement (per-page printing fees flowing back to clerks, with GSCCCA not retaining any of the proceeds) is consistent with the legal framework. Bulk-sale contracts simply belong on a different track: directly between vendors and clerks.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2006. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The GSCCCA system has continued to evolve since 2006, and the legislature has periodically adjusted GSCCCA authority. Anyone considering a bulk-data acquisition from Georgia clerks of superior court should consult the present version of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96 and surrounding statutes, plus any subsequent AG guidance.

Common questions

Q: What is GSCCCA?
A: The Georgia Superior Court Clerks' Cooperative Authority is a state authority created to operate centralized statewide systems for clerks of superior court: including real estate filing systems, UCC filings, civil case information, and notary records. It is funded by user fees and operates as a quasi-governmental cooperative for the clerks.

Q: Why does the clerk control bulk sales but not the per-page fees?
A: The opinion doesn't fully explain, but the structural distinction makes sense: per-page printing fees through the GSCCCA system are essentially incidental to the system's operation, with revenues passed through to clerks. Bulk sales of records are a substantive marketing function: deciding which vendors get bulk access, on what terms, at what price, with what restrictions on resale. The legislature reserved that substantive marketing authority to the clerks, who as constitutionally elected county officers are answerable to their county voters and have constitutional record-custody responsibilities.

Q: Could a vendor sue under the Open Records Act to force bulk delivery?
A: Powell v. VonCanon (1996) said § 15-6-96 prevails over the Open Records Act to the extent of conflict. So a vendor seeking bulk delivery for commercial resale would have a hard time getting it through ORA litigation; the path is to negotiate directly with each clerk.

Q: Could a clerk delegate bulk-sale authority to GSCCCA?
A: The opinion doesn't directly address this. As a general matter, contracting authority can sometimes be delegated, but a delegation that effectively shifts the clerk's statutory authority to GSCCCA might be challenged as an end-run around § 15-6-96. A safer approach would be for vendors to contract directly with each clerk (perhaps through a uniform contract form developed by GSCCCA) but with each clerk as the actual contracting party.

Q: Why does the GSCCCA opinion specifically carve out § 15-6-97.1?
A: § 15-6-97.1 deals with the civil case information system. § 15-6-94(a) explicitly says GSCCCA is not considered the sole owner of information developed under § 15-6-97.1. The footnote suggests an inverse implication argument: GSCCCA might be considered the sole owner of all other information it develops. The opinion declines to push this argument too far, noting that the real estate images are made available "at the option of the clerks of superior court" with printing fees going back to clerks, facts that align with clerk ownership rather than GSCCCA ownership.

Q: What about civil cases: could GSCCCA sell those records in bulk?
A: The opinion is specifically about real estate images. The civil case information system has its own statutory framework under § 15-6-97.1, with explicit non-ownership language. The same § 15-6-96 reservation to clerks would presumably apply to bulk sales of civil case records as well, though the opinion doesn't reach that question.

Q: How is this different from the 1996 opinion?
A: 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11 addressed whether GSCCCA could take on certain notary-public responsibilities that were statutorily assigned to the Secretary of State. The AG said no. The 2006 opinion follows the same logic: when the legislature has expressly assigned a function to a specific officer, GSCCCA cannot exercise that function under its general contracting powers. The 1997 General Assembly later transferred some notary functions from the Secretary of State to GSCCCA by statute (1997 Ga. Laws 673), so the legislature can always change the allocation, but GSCCCA cannot self-grant authority by contract or by inference.

Background and statutory framework

Georgia's superior court clerks are constitutionally elected county officers with statutory authority over the recording and custody of various categories of public records: real estate documents (deeds, mortgages, plats), UCC filings, civil case files, criminal indictments, marriage licenses, and many others. The clerk's office is one of the foundational record-keeping institutions of state and local government.

GSCCCA was created to address the inefficiency of having 159 separate clerk-of-superior-court offices each operating its own real estate recording system, UCC system, etc. By centralizing the technical infrastructure, GSCCCA provides economies of scale and statewide search capability. It does not replace the clerks; it supplements their record-keeping with a statewide layer.

The statutory framework reflects this structural choice. § 15-6-94 establishes GSCCCA's general powers, including ownership of "compiled and developed information." § 15-6-97 establishes the real and personal property information system specifically. § 15-6-96 preserves the clerk's role as custodian and reserves bulk-marketing authority to the clerks. The framework lets GSCCCA build the statewide system while keeping the clerks economically and structurally in charge of their own records.

The 2006 opinion's holding is narrow but operationally important: it tells GSCCCA that the bulk-data-sale market needs to be channeled through 159 separate clerk contracts (or, more practically, through a uniform contracting framework developed by clerks collectively), not consolidated into a single GSCCCA-vendor contract. The friction this creates is intentional: it preserves clerk-by-clerk decision-making about whether and how to market their records for profit.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(a) (GSCCCA ownership of compiled information)
- O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(d)(2) (general contracting power)
- O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96 (clerk as custodian; bulk-sale authority reserved to clerks)
- O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97 (real and personal property information system)
- O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97.1 (civil case information system)
- O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 (Open Records Act)
- 1997 Ga. Laws 673 (notary functions transferred to GSCCCA)

Cases:
- Bentley v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 152 Ga. 836 (1922) (state authorities have only conferred powers)
- Floyd County Board of Commissioners v. Floyd County Merit System Board, 246 Ga. 44 (1980) (same)
- Bryant v. Employees Retirement System of Georgia, 216 Ga. App. 737 (1995) (same)
- Powell v. VonCanon, 219 Ga. App. 840 (1996) (§ 15-6-96 prevails over Open Records Act on bulk-marketing authority)

Prior AG opinions cited:
- 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11 (GSCCCA could not assume notary-public responsibilities statutorily assigned to Secretary of State)

Source

• Landing page: https://law.georgia.gov/opinions/2006-5
• Original PDF: not linked from landing page

Original opinion text

This responds to your request for my official opinion on whether the Georgia Superior Court Clerks' Cooperative Authority (the "Authority") is empowered to contract to sell real estate images that are in its possession that are records of the clerks of superior court. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97, the Authority operates an information system for real and personal property records (the "system"). The Authority has indicated that the system primarily includes information regarding real property records filed with the clerks of superior court in Georgia. The system is accessible through the Authority's website. One of the enhancements provided to the system is the availability of images of real property records from the offices of many of the clerks of superior court in Georgia. Individual clerks of superior court determine whether to make images of instruments available through the system. Where a clerk determines to allow the Authority to make images available through the system, users of the system that choose to print images are charged a per page fee. The fees collected by the Authority for printed images are then paid to the appropriate clerks of superior court. The Authority does not retain any of the fees related to printed images. The Authority has indicated that clerks of superior court have allowed the Authority to make images available in exchange for the revenues from printing. The Authority does not generally have formal written agreements with clerks of superior court regarding making images available through the system. The Authority has indicated that, from time to time, parties have requested that the Authority contract to sell in bulk the images of real property instruments that are accessible by users of the system. In some cases, these requests relate to the records of one county and in others they relate to multiple counties. The Authority "has only such powers as the legislature has expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred upon it." Bentley v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 152 Ga. 836, 838 (1922); Floyd County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Floyd County Merit Sys. Bd., 246 Ga. 44 (1980); Bryant v. Employees Ret. Sys. of Georgia, 216 Ga. App. 737 (1995). "The authority of the Clerks' Authority is limited to the sum of those express powers plus such powers as are necessarily implied from those expressly conferred." 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11 (citing Bentley, 152 Ga. at 838). 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11 concludes that the Authority is not empowered to undertake certain responsibilities regarding notaries public where those responsibilities were statutorily conferred on the Secretary of State. In doing so, the opinion analyzes the issue as follows: The enabling legislation for the Clerks' Authority does not expressly authorize it to assume the responsibilities for maintaining records pertaining to notaries public. While it may be possible to infer such authority based upon the language of O.C.G.A. § 15 6 94(a)(3), an implication of this nature would not be necessary in light of the fact that the General Assembly has already vested such responsibilities upon the Secretary of State.1 O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(d)(2) empowers the Authority "[t]o make and execute contracts, lease agreements, and all other instruments necessary or convenient to exercise the powers of the authority or to further the public purpose for which the authority is created." Specifically related to the system for real and personal property information, the Authority is expressly empowered to "contract with the clerks of superior courts and any other parties that the authority deems necessary." O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97(a). O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(a) provides in relevant part that [t]he authority shall be the sole owner of its compiled and developed information developed through any function performed or any program or system administered on behalf of the authority. For the purposes of this subsection the authority shall not be considered the sole owner of information developed pursuant to Code Section 15-6-97.1 . . . .2 O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96 provides in relevant part as follows: The clerk of the superior court is the custodian of the records of his or her office. Any contract to distribute, sell, or otherwise market records or computer generated data of the office of the clerk of the superior court for profit shall be made by the clerk of the superior court. (Emphasis added.) In Powell v. VonCanon, 219 Ga. App. 840 (1996), the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that "O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96 prevails over O.C.G.A. § 50 18 71 and any other part of the Open Records Act to the extent they conflict with the ability of superior court clerks to contract to market records of their offices for profit." 219 Ga. App. at 842. If the Authority were empowered to sell the real estate instrument images in its possession, it seems that it would conflict with the power granted to the clerks of superior court "to distribute, sell or otherwise market records . . . for profit" in O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96. While the Authority has two statutory powers to contract, including one specifically related to the real and personal property information system, the Authority does not have a specific express statutory power to contract to sell the images that are in its possession. Further, O.C.G.A. § 15 6 96 specifically provides that "[a]ny contract to distribute, sell, or otherwise market records or computer generated data of the office of the clerk of superior court for profit shall be made by the clerk of the superior court." (Emphasis added.) Thus, as in the scenario addressed by 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11, the Authority does not have the power to contract to sell the images made available to it by the clerks of superior court. The implication of such a power on behalf of the Authority is not necessary in light of the clear grant of authority to the clerks of superior court.3 In summary, it is my official opinion that the Georgia Superior Court Clerks' Cooperative Authority is not empowered to contract to sell real estate instrument images that are in its possession that are records of the clerks of superior court. Prepared by: W. Wright Banks, Jr. Senior Assistant Attorney General 1 After 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. 96-11 was issued, the General Assembly transferred certain powers related to notary publics from the Secretary of State to the Authority. 1997 Ga. Laws 673. 2 O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97.1 relates to the development and operation of the civil case information system. One could argue that the express statement in O.C.G.A. § 15-6-94(a) indicating that the Authority does not own the information compiled pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97.1 necessarily means that the Authority owns all other information that it compiles. In this regard, it is relevant to consider that the instrument images that the Authority makes available related to the real and personal property system are made available at the option of the clerks of superior court and the Authority with the printing fees being paid to the appropriate clerk of superior court. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-97(a) does not expressly require that images be made available as part of the "uniform automated information system for real and personal property records" and they are not made available for all counties or for all time periods for which information is included in the system. 3 This conclusion is consistent with the arrangement described by the Authority pursuant to which the Authority and the clerks of superior court have the understanding that images made available to the Authority would be offered for viewing and printing on the Authority's system and that the proceeds from the printing charges would be made available to the clerks of superior court without any amounts being retained by the Authority.