Can the Georgia Department of Corrections delegate to the Georgia Correctional Industries Administration (GCIA) the management of the new federally-certified inmate labor program (PIE program), or does Georgia law require the Department to run the program itself?

Plain-English summary

The 2005 General Assembly passed the Working Against Recidivism Act (HB 58, codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-120 through 42-5-125) to bring Georgia into compliance with the federal Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP), authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1761. PIECP allows certified state prison-industry programs to sell inmate-produced goods in interstate commerce, but only under tight federal conditions: voluntary inmate participation, prevailing-wage payment, victim-restitution deductions, and other oversight. The Commissioner of Corrections asked whether his department could delegate program administration to the Georgia Correctional Industries Administration (GCIA), which functions as the state's prison-industries enterprise.

AG Thurbert Baker said no.

Statutory text names only the Department. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-120(a) authorizes the Board of Corrections to issue rules for voluntary inmate labor programs in compliance with PIECP. The same subsection adds: "Such rules and regulations may provide for administration and management of such work programs by the department." (Emphasis added.) The Department, not GCIA. No parallel authorization for GCIA appears anywhere in the Act.

The legislative history confirms the omission was deliberate. Earlier non-adopted versions of HB 58 (the LC 22 5676 draft) specifically authorized GCIA to administer and manage the PIE program. The General Assembly considered that language and chose not to include it in the version it actually passed. Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another), the omission signals legislative intent to exclude GCIA.

State authorities have only their expressly or impliedly conferred powers. GCIA was created by statute (originally as the Georgia Prison Industries Administration in 1960, renamed in 1972). Georgia case law is unanimous that state-created entities can exercise only those powers granted to them, expressly or by clear implication, and any grant of authority must be strictly construed: Bryant v. ERS (1995); Bentley v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1922); Beazley v. DeKalb County (1953); Tippins v. Cobb County Parking Authority (1957). The AG had previously applied this rule to GCIA itself in 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156: GCIA could not develop a service-type industrial program when the statute gave it only manufacturing authority.

The compensation language doesn't help. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-123 ensures compensation for "any administrative costs or other costs incurred by the department or the [GCIA] for the operation of the [PIE] program or programs," and provides for compensation when either entity's employees or facilities are used. The AG read this as a vestige of earlier drafts that did contemplate GCIA management: and as a Gratuities Clause safeguard (Ga. Const. art. III, § VI, ¶ VI). It protects against giving away state resources for free; it does not enable GCIA to administer the program. At most, GCIA could provide some service to the Department in connection with the Department's administration, in return for appropriate compensation.

The 2005 amendment to GCIA's "provision of services" power doesn't help either. Section 5 of the Act amended O.C.G.A. § 42-10-4(4) to give GCIA "the same power and authority possessed by the Department of Corrections in connection with the manufacture and sale of products and provision of services." This expansion overrides 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156 in part. But "provision of services" generally is not the same as authority to administer the PIE program specifically. The General Assembly's choice to grant GCIA the general services authority while omitting PIE administration authority confirms the limit.

No expenditure authority either. Georgia courts require clear, express, or necessarily implied authorization for the expenditure of state funds. Willis v. Price (1987): "Regardless of the worthiness of the cause, absent a clear state constitutional or statutory authority providing for the expenditure of state funds, such funds cannot be disbursed." Without authority to administer the PIE program, GCIA cannot spend its funds publicizing it either.

The opinion also features an unusually detailed historical footnote on Georgia's convict lease system, which is the backdrop to the General Assembly's careful, narrow approach to inmate labor authority generally.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The PIE program authority and its allocation between the Department of Corrections and GCIA may have been adjusted by subsequent legislation, and federal PIECP regulations have been amended as well. Anyone working on inmate-labor program design or compliance should consult the current state and federal authorities.

Common questions

Q: What is PIECP?
A: Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program, established by Congress in 1979 (current authority at 18 U.S.C. § 1761). Federal certification allows participating state prison industries to sell their goods in interstate commerce despite the general federal ban on interstate trade in prison-made goods. Certification requires voluntary inmate participation, payment of prevailing local wages, deductions for taxes, victim restitution, room and board, and family support, and labor consultation with affected private-sector unions.

Q: What is GCIA's normal role?
A: GCIA (originally the Georgia Prison Industries Administration) was created in 1960 as a quasi-public enterprise to operate prison-based manufacturing programs. The Board of Corrections sits ex officio as the GCIA Board (O.C.G.A. § 42-10-3), and the Commissioner of Corrections serves as the executive officer of GCIA. So the same people run both entities, but they are legally distinct.

Q: Why does the legal distinction matter if the same people govern both entities?
A: Because Georgia law treats them as separate legal persons with separate statutory authority. The Department draws on appropriated state funds and has police-power-related authority over inmates. GCIA functions more like a state enterprise, generates revenue from product sales, and operates with more market-style autonomy. The General Assembly may want different authorities, oversight mechanisms, and accountability for each. Conflating them would defeat the structural choices the legislature has made.

Q: What was wrong with delegating to GCIA from a policy perspective?
A: The opinion did not address policy, only legal authority. Federal PIECP requires state oversight of inmate-labor terms (wages, deductions, voluntariness, working conditions). Routing this oversight through a quasi-enterprise GCIA rather than the Department might have raised questions about the structural separation between management and oversight that PIECP was designed to require.

Q: Could the General Assembly grant GCIA administration authority later?
A: Yes, by statute. The opinion specifically noted that the legislature had considered and rejected such language, but a future legislature was free to enact it. The opinion just said GCIA could not act on authority that did not exist in 2005.

Q: What's the Gratuities Clause about?
A: Ga. Const. art. III, § VI, ¶ VI generally prohibits the state from giving anything of value to private parties without consideration. The compensation provisions in O.C.G.A. § 42-5-123 ensure that when GCIA's facilities or employees support the PIE program, GCIA gets paid: preventing a structurally objectionable "free transfer" of GCIA resources to PIE program participants.

Q: What's the historical background of Georgia's tight inmate-labor rules?
A: After the Civil War, Georgia adopted a convict lease system in which prisoners were leased to private railroads and mining companies. With no state oversight, conditions were "frightful" (the AG quoted a 1977 history). Reform began in 1897 and the lease system was finally abolished in 1908. The General Assembly's careful, narrow approach to inmate-labor authority ever since reflects that history.

Background and statutory framework

The federal Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP, 18 U.S.C. § 1761) was created in 1979 to encourage states to develop self-sustaining prison-industry programs that produce goods for sale in interstate commerce. Federal certification carries strict requirements: inmate participation must be voluntary; wages must equal local prevailing wages; deductions for taxes, victim restitution, family support, and room and board must be made; affected private-sector unions must be consulted.

Georgia chose to opt into PIECP through House Bill 58 (Working Against Recidivism Act, Act No. 383, 2005 Ga. Laws 1222). The Act created a new Article 6 of Chapter 5 of Title 42 (O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-120 through 42-5-125) authorizing voluntary inmate labor programs in compliance with the federal program.

GCIA had existed since 1960 as Georgia's prison-industries enterprise, originally limited to manufacturing and sale of products. Section 5 of the 2005 Act expanded GCIA's authority to include "provision of services" alongside manufacturing, addressing a limitation that 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156 had identified. But the Act stopped short of giving GCIA authority to administer the PIE program itself.

The opinion's interpretive method was conventional: when the legislature considers and rejects specific language, that omission is meaningful (expressio unius). Combined with the rule that state authorities have only the powers conferred on them by statute, and that grants of authority are strictly construed, the conclusion was clean: GCIA could not administer a program the legislature had specifically given to the Department.

The opinion's most quotable line is the framing of the GCIA's role: "At most, and only consistent with this opinion and in return for appropriate compensation, GCIA might provide some service to the department in connection with the department's administration of the PIE program." That is the ceiling on GCIA's PIE involvement under 2005 law.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-120 through 42-5-125 (Working Against Recidivism Act / PIE program)
- O.C.G.A. § 42-5-60 (permissible inmate labor uses)
- O.C.G.A. §§ 42-10-3 and 42-10-4 (GCIA structure and powers)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (federal PIECP authority)
- Ga. Const. art. III, § VI, ¶ VI (Gratuities Clause)

Acts and laws:
- 2005 Ga. Laws 1222 (Working Against Recidivism Act, HB 58, Act No. 383)
- 1960 Ga. Laws 880 (Georgia Prison Industries Administration)
- 1972 Ga. Laws 572 (renaming to GCIA)
- 1897 Ga. Laws 71, §§ 6714-6738 (convict lease reform)

Cases:
- Bryant v. Employee Ret. Sys. of Ga., 216 Ga. App. 737 (1995) (state agencies have only conferred powers; strict construction)
- Bentley v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of Ga., 152 Ga. 836 (1922) (foundational rule on agency authority)
- Beazley v. DeKalb County, 210 Ga. 41 (1953) (necessarily implied powers)
- Tippins v. Cobb County Parking Auth., 213 Ga. 685 (1957) (same)
- Willis v. Price, 256 Ga. 767 (1987) (no expenditure of state funds without clear authority)

Prior AG opinions cited:
- 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. 99-12; 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. 80-44 (permissible inmate labor)
- 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. 89-56; 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156 (GCIA may engage only in authorized activities)
- 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. 66-89; 2002 Op. Att'y Gen. U02-8; 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. 95-29; 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. 93-21 (state agency authority limits)
- 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. 87-15 (expenditure of state funds requires authorization)

Historical sources cited:
- A History of Georgia 246 (Kenneth Coleman ed., University of Georgia Press 1977)
- Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia 409-11 (American Historical Society 1938)
- E. Merton Coulter, A Short History of Georgia (UNC Press 1933)
- Lawrence R. Hepburn, The Georgia History Book (University of Georgia 1982)

Source

• Landing page: https://law.georgia.gov/opinions/2005-5
• Original PDF: not linked from landing page

Original opinion text

You have requested my opinion whether the Georgia Department of Corrections ("the department") may delegate to the Georgia Correctional Industries Administration ("GCIA") the administration and management of responsibilities imposed by law upon the Board of Corrections and the department by the Working Against Recidivism Act, enacted during the 2005 session of the General Assembly at 2005 Ga. Laws 1222.1 The plain language of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-120 authorizes the board "to issue and promulgate rules and regulations for programs of voluntary labor by inmates" in compliance with "the published requirements of the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1761." It further provides that "[s]uch rules and regulations may provide for administration and management of such work programs by the department." Id. (emphasis supplied). Neither that Act nor any other provision of law provides specific authorization for GCIA to administer the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification ("PIE") Program. The predecessor of GCIA was created by act of the General Assembly in 1960 as the Georgia Prison Industries Administration, and renamed in 1972 the Georgia Correctional Industries Administration. See 1960 Ga. Laws 880; 1972 Ga. Laws 572. The Georgia Board of Corrections serves ex officio as the Georgia Correctional Industries Administration, and the commissioner of corrections serves as the executive officer of GCIA. O.C.G.A. § 42-10-3. The department and the GCIA, however, are separate entities with different duties imposed by law. In response to many abuses,2 the General Assembly has narrowly prescribed the permissible use of inmate labor. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 42-5-60. The Attorney General has opined on numerous occasions on the permissible use of inmate labor. See, e.g., 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. 99-12; 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. 80-44. Likewise, federal law also carefully circumscribes the permissible use of the fruits of inmate labor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1761. It is against this backdrop that I address your question. The GCIA is a creation of state law and may only exercise those powers conferred upon it by law, either expressly or by clear implication; any grant of authority to it must be strictly construed. Bryant v. Employee Ret. Sys. of Ga., 216 Ga. App. 737 (1995); Bentley v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of Ga., 152 Ga. 836 (1922); 2002 Op. Att'y Gen. U02-8; 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. 95-29; 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. 93-21. For example, in 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156, the Attorney General determined that the Board of Corrections, but not GCIA (then Georgia Prison Industries Administration), had the authority to develop a service type of industrial program because the statutory language empowering GCIA was more restrictive.3 The Attorney General has consistently opined that GCIA may only engage in and expend its funds upon those activities that are authorized by law. See, e.g., 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. 89-56; 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156; 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. 66-89. Moreover, only those powers that are necessarily implied from the express powers are available to be exercised by entities created by state law. Beazley v. DeKalb County, 210 Ga. 41 (1953); Tippins v. Cobb County Parking Auth., 213 Ga. 685 (1957). Although O.C.G.A. § 42-5-120(a) does authorize the Board of Corrections to promulgate and adopt rules and regulations that "may provide for the administration and management of [the PIE program] by the department," there is no such concurrent authorization for GCIA to administer and manage the PIE program. Id. In fact, it is plain from early non-adopted versions of House Bill 58 that the General Assembly considered but did not adopt language that would have specifically authorized GCIA to administer and manage the PIE program. See HB 58, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005) (version LC 22 5676); available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/ legis/2005_06/ versions/hb58_LC_22_5676_a_2.htm. Language in O.C.G.A. § 42-5-123 ensuring compensation for "any administrative costs or other costs incurred by the department or the [GCIA] for the operation of the [PIE] program or programs" and compensation for both the department and GCIA for the use of their employees or facilities does not compel a contrary result. Such language appears to be a vestige of earlier drafts of HB 58 that permitted GCIA to manage and administer the PIE program. It is not enabling language; it essentially protects against a violation of the Gratuities Clause of the Georgia Constitution. GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, VI. Language requiring that any use of the personnel, space, and other facilities of either the department or GCIA be compensated does not necessarily imply, and certainly does not expressly provide, that GCIA may manage and administer the PIE program. At most, and only consistent with this opinion and in return for appropriate compensation, GCIA might provide some service to the department in connection with the department's administration of the PIE program. The amendment to O.C.G.A. § 42-10-4 authorizing GCIA to have the same power and authority as the department in connection with the "provision of services" provides no basis for a contrary conclusion.4 As discussed above, the Attorney General has previously opined under prior law that GCIA could not engage in programs to provide services because it lacked statutory authority.5 While the addition of that language permits GCIA to engage in such activities, it does not provide the necessary legal authority for GCIA to manage and administer the PIE program. Regarding the proper expenditure of funds, it is necessary to have clear, express, or necessarily implied authorization. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. 87-15, at 37. "Regardless of the worthiness of the cause, absent a clear state constitutional or statutory authority providing for the expenditure of state funds, such funds cannot be disbursed." Willis v. Price, 256 Ga. 767 (1987). As discussed at some length in this opinion, I do not find an express or necessarily implied grant of authority for GCIA to administer the PIE program. Therefore, it is my official opinion that state law does not permit the Georgia Department of Corrections to delegate to the Georgia Correctional Industries Administration the administration and management of the voluntary inmate labor program authorized pursuant to the Working Against Recidivism Act under O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-120 through 125 (Supp. 2005), nor is GCIA authorized to expend funds or efforts in publicizing the program. Prepared by: CHRISTOPHER S. BRASHER Senior Assistant Attorney General 1 Introduced as House Bill 58 and signed into law by the Governor May 10, 2005, as Act No. 383, the Working Against Recidivism Act amended several sections of Title 42 of the Code and created a new Article 6 of Chapter 5, O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-120 through 125, authorizing a voluntary inmate labor program in compliance with the federal Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1761. 2 The misuse of inmate labor in Georgia has a long and notorious history. During Reconstruction, Georgia set up the convict lease system in response to the growing number of persons convicted of serious crimes, the lack of money to spend on the care of prisoners, and the destruction of the state penitentiary during the just-ended war. Under this system, convicts were leased to private entities such as railroads and mining companies. With no state oversight or supervision, treatment of the prisoners and their living and working conditions was "frightful." A HISTORY OF GEORGIA 246 (Kenneth Coleman ed., University of Georgia Press 1977). Public outcry led to the first efforts at legislative reform in 1897 when the General Assembly passed a law amending the convict lease system. 1897 Ga. Laws 71, §§ 6714 6738. It was not until 1908, however, in a special session called by the governor to avoid the renewal of convict leases that were set to expire before the regular session, that the convict lease system was abolished. 3 WALTER G. COOPER, THE STORY OF GEORGIA 409-11 (The American Historical Society, Inc. 1938). See also E. MERTON COULTER, A SHORT HISTORY OF GEORGIA (The University of North Carolina Press 1933); LAWRENCE R. HEPBURN, THE GEORGIA HISTORY BOOK (The Institute of Government, University of Georgia 1982). 3 Section 5 of Act No. 383, the Working Against Recidivism Act, specifically amended O.C.G.A. § 42-10-4(4) to permit GCIA "[t]o have the same power and authority possessed by the Department of Corrections in connection with the manufacture and sale of products and provision of services." 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156 was rendered under prior law that did not permit GCIA to engage in the provision of services. Thus, to the extent that the statute on which the opinion relied has been amended 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156 is superseded. 4 Indeed, because the General Assembly specifically included a reference to GCIA in § 5 of the Act and failed to include that language in any other provision dealing with the same subject matter, it is assumed that the exclusion is intentional. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Hutchinson, 217 Ga. App. 70, 72 (1995) ("The omission of [specific statutory language] 'invites the application of the venerable principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; or the similar maxim more usually applied to statutes, expressum facit cessare tacitum, which means that if some things (of many) are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those omitted are intended to be excluded than if none at all had been mentioned.'"). 5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.