Georgia added a 5% surcharge on top of any fine for a 'traffic law' violation. Does that surcharge apply only to the 'rules of the road' violations in Title 40 Chapter 6 (speeding, running stop signs), or does it also apply to other traffic-related offenses like driving with an expired tag or an unsafe vehicle?

Plain-English summary

In 2005, the General Assembly added a 5% surcharge on top of every fine for a traffic-law violation. The money went through the Georgia Superior Court Clerks Cooperative Authority (GSCCCA) and into the state general fund. The Executive Director of GSCCCA needed to know how broadly to interpret "traffic laws" so the clerks could implement the surcharge correctly.

AG Thurbert Baker said "traffic laws" sweeps broadly, beyond just the Uniform Rules of the Road in Title 40 Chapter 6.

Statutory text. O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179(a) (Senate Bill 226 of 2005) provides that "[i]n every case in which any court in this state shall impose a fine or bond payment, which shall be construed to include costs, for any violation of the traffic laws of this state or for violations of ordinances of political subdivisions which have adopted by reference the traffic laws of this state, there shall be imposed as an additional penalty a sum equal to 5 percent of the original fine." The phrase "any violation of the traffic laws of this state" has no limiting language. Compare this to the license point system in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57(b), which expressly limits its scope to "convictions of violations of the provisions of Chapter 6 of . . . [T]itle [40]." When the General Assembly wants to confine a provision to Chapter 6, it says so.

Case law treats "traffic laws" broadly.

• Tukes v. State (1999): the Court of Appeals upheld a stop based on safety belt non-use (O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1, in Chapter 8 of Title 40), an obscured county decal (O.C.G.A. § 40-2-31(e), Chapter 2), and an improper lane change. The court called these "traffic violations."
• Smith v. State (1999): the court upheld a stop based on driving with an expired tag, calling it "even a relatively minor traffic law" violation.
• Clark v. State (2000): an expired dealer drive-out tag was a traffic-law violation supporting a stop.

Prior AG opinions agree. A 1973 opinion concluded that a municipal court with jurisdiction over "traffic laws" had jurisdiction over annual motor vehicle inspection violations. A 1969 opinion treated licensing and size-and-weight requirements as traffic laws within sheriffs' enforcement authority. A 1997 opinion (U97-28) concluded that an additional penalty under O.C.G.A. § 13-12-131 applied to traffic offenses generally and was not limited to Chapter 6.

Limitations period. O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33's 180-day period for challenging "misdemeanor conviction[s] of any of the traffic laws of this state" has been broadly construed by the Georgia Supreme Court in Brown v. Earp (1991) as applying to "all challenges to final convictions" of misdemeanor traffic offenses. The same broad reading naturally applies to the surcharge statute.

Specific exemptions still apply. Some traffic offenses have their own no-extra-fee carve-outs. The most notable: O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(e)(2) explicitly provides that the safety belt fine ($15 maximum) is not subject to "any additional penalty, fee, or surcharge." So no 5% surcharge there. The opinion also says the civil monetary penalty under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(f)(3)(A) does not trigger this surcharge because no fine is imposed.

Sunset clause. The statute quoted in the opinion provided for repeal on June 30, 2008, unless the General Assembly extended it. Check the current law before applying this 2005 opinion to a present-day fine.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

As quoted in the opinion, O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179 was scheduled for repeal on June 30, 2008, unless extended. Court clerks and prosecutors should check the current statute for any assessment on a present-day case.

Common questions

Q: What was the money used for?
A: Under § 15-21-180, the clerk collected the surcharge, sent it to the Georgia Superior Court Clerks Cooperative Authority by the last day of the following month, and from there it flowed to the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services for deposit into the state general fund. The 2005 statute did not earmark it for a specific purpose.

Q: What if the driver's fine is reduced or the case is dismissed?
A: The statute quoted in the opinion triggers the additional penalty when a court imposes a fine or bond payment. The opinion specifically says a civil monetary penalty under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(f)(3)(A) does not trigger it because no fine is imposed. It does not address reduced fines or dismissed cases.

Q: What if a court imposes a "bond payment"?
A: The quoted statute expressly covers a "fine or bond payment, which shall be construed to include costs." The opinion does not separately analyze bond forfeiture procedure.

Q: Does the surcharge apply to an expired-tag violation?
A: The opinion cites Georgia cases treating an expired tag as a traffic-law violation outside Chapter 6. A fine for that violation falls within the opinion's broad reading of the surcharge statute unless a specific exception applies.

Q: What if a city has adopted state traffic laws by reference?
A: The statute quoted in the opinion expressly includes violations of local ordinances that adopt the state traffic laws by reference. Check the particular ordinance and any specific exception.

Q: Could a defendant challenge the surcharge as not authorized by their fine schedule?
A: The opinion does not decide a defendant's challenge to a fine schedule. It interprets the 2005 statute as imposing an additional penalty when a court imposes a fine for a traffic-law violation, subject to a specific exception.

Q: How did clerks handle the multiple add-ons that traffic fines had at the time?
A: The quoted statute said this 5% assessment was in addition to amounts due under Title 47 or other law. The opinion does not provide a schedule for calculating every assessment on a ticket.

Background and statutory framework

Senate Bill 226 (2005) added a 5% penalty when a court imposed a fine or bond payment for a traffic-law violation. The quoted collection provision directed court officers to remit collected sums through the Georgia Superior Court Clerks Cooperative Authority to the state general fund.

The interpretive question came up because Title 40 of the Georgia Code is divided into multiple chapters with overlapping but distinct subject matter: Chapter 2 covers vehicle registration and license plates, Chapter 5 covers driver licenses and the point system, Chapter 6 is the Uniform Rules of the Road (the "moving violations" chapter), and Chapter 8 covers vehicle equipment. A reader could plausibly think "traffic laws" meant only Chapter 6 because that's the chapter literally titled "Uniform Rules of the Road." The AG rejected that narrow reading.

The AG's reasoning rested on three pillars: (1) statutes that mean to limit themselves to Chapter 6 say so explicitly (point system, certain training requirements); (2) Georgia case law and prior AG opinions consistently treat "traffic laws" as a broad category; (3) the surcharge statute itself uses the unqualified phrase "any violation of the traffic laws of this state."

The opinion also identified specific exemptions in individual traffic statutes. The seat-belt fine carve-out in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(e)(2) was the most prominent: the General Assembly capped the seat-belt fine at $15 and explicitly exempted it from any add-on. Similar carve-outs existed for child-restraint violations under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76(b)(2). The opinion distinguished the civil monetary penalty under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(f)(3)(A): because no fine is imposed in that case, the § 15-21-179 assessment does not apply.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179 (5% surcharge on traffic-law fines; sunset June 30, 2008)
• O.C.G.A. § 15-21-180 (collection mechanism)
• O.C.G.A. § 15-21-73(a) (analogous earlier surcharge)
• O.C.G.A. § 13-12-131 (criminal-offense surcharge)
• O.C.G.A. §§ 40-2-8, 40-2-31(e) (registration and decal violations)
• O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 (license point system, expressly limited to Chapter 6)
• O.C.G.A. § 40-5-159, 40-6-427 (civil penalties)
• O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(f)(3)(A) (civil monetary penalty)
• O.C.G.A. §§ 40-8-7(a), 40-8-76(b)(2), 40-8-76.1, 40-8-79 (equipment, safety belt, child restraint, truck-bed)
• O.C.G.A. §§ 40-13-21, 40-13-22, 40-13-33 (traffic court jurisdiction; 180-day limitations)

Cases:

• Tukes v. State, 236 Ga. App. 77 (1999) (broad reading of "traffic violations")
• Smith v. State, 240 Ga. App. 150 (1999) (expired tag = traffic law)
• Clark v. State, 243 Ga. App. 362 (2000) (expired dealer drive-out tag)
• Lenhardt v. State, 271 Ga. App. 453 (2005); Maxwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 747 (2001) (expired plate stops)
• Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522 (1991) (broad reading of "traffic laws" in 180-day limitations statute)
• Bowman v. Parrott, 200 Ga. App. 405 (1991); Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 303 (1990) (moving vs. non-moving traffic offenses)
• Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360 (1980) (history of Uniform Rules of the Road)

Prior AG opinions cited:

• 2005 Op. Att'y Gen. U05-4 (civil monetary penalty under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(f)(3)(A) does not trigger surcharge)
• 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. U97-28 (§ 13-12-131 surcharge applies to traffic offenses, not just Chapter 6)
• 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. 73-29 (annual inspection violations within "traffic laws")
• 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. U69-385 (licensing and size/weight requirements as traffic laws)
• Earlier opinions to the contrary (1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. 67; 1965 Op. Att'y Gen. U65-18) are no longer valid.

Source

• Landing page: https://law.georgia.gov/opinions/2005-4
• Original PDF: not linked from landing page

Original opinion text

You have asked whether the additional penalty imposed by O.C.G.A. § 15 21 179 applies only where a court imposes a fine for a violation of those laws set forth in Chapter 6 of Title 40 or whether the additional penalty also applies where a court imposes a fine for a violation of other traffic laws. During its 2005 session, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 226. As relevant to your request, Senate Bill 226 enacted O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179 which provides as follows: (a) In every case in which any court in this state shall impose a fine or bond payment, which shall be construed to include costs, for any violation of the traffic laws of this state or for violations of ordinances of political subdivisions which have adopted by reference the traffic laws of this state, there shall be imposed as an additional penalty a sum equal to 5 percent of the original fine. (b) Such sums shall be in addition to any amount required to be paid into any pension, annuity, or retirement fund under Title 47 or any other law and in addition to any other amounts provided for in this article. (c) This Code section shall be repealed in its entirety on June 30, 2008, unless extended by an Act of the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).1 Senate Bill 226 also enacted O.C.G.A. § 15-21-180, which provides: (a) The sums provided for in Code Section 15-21-179 shall be assessed and collected by the clerk or other court officer charged with the duty of collecting moneys from fines and shall be paid over by the last day of the following month to the Georgia Superior Court Clerks' Cooperative Authority for remittance to the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services to be deposited into the general fund of the state treasury. (b) Any person whose duty it is to collect and remit the sums provided for in this article who refuses to so remit shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Your request focuses on Chapter 6 of Title 40, the "Uniform Rules of the Road," which was enacted in part "to revise, classify, consolidate, and modernize present laws relating to the rules of the road for traffic and to establish new laws relating thereto . . . ." Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 362 (1980) (quoting 1974 Ga. Laws 633). In particular, you want to know whether the use of the term "traffic laws" in O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179 is intended to limit its application to the laws contained in Chapter 6 of Title 40 or whether it has a broader meaning. There are a number of authorities that provide guidance regarding the meaning of the phrase "traffic laws" in O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179. In the context of traffic stops by law enforcement, the Georgia Court of Appeals has not construed "traffic laws" to be only those set forth in Chapter 6 of Title 40. In Tukes v. State, 236 Ga. App. 77 (1999), the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a search conducted incident to a traffic stop based on an officer's observation that the driver failed to wear a safety belt, had an obscured county license plate decal, and made an improper lane change. In doing so, the Court indicated that "any one of the traffic violations observed by the officer would have provided probable cause to effectuate a stop of Tukes' car." Id. at 77 (emphasis added). As noted by the Court in Tukes, the violation for failure to wear a safety belt is set forth in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1 and the violation for an obscured county decal is set forth in O.C.G.A. § 40-2-31(e). 236 Ga. App. at 77 n.1.2 In Smith v. State, 240 Ga. App. 150 (1999), the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that a traffic stop was not illegal where the person stopped had been observed to have been driving with an expired tag. In doing so, the Court stated as follows: . . . if the driver of a stopped car has broken even a relatively minor traffic law, a motion to suppress arguing that the stop was pretextual must fail. In this case, Owens was driving with an expired tag. Therefore, the officer's stop was not illegal. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).3 In Clark v. State, 243 Ga. App. 362 (2000), the Court of Appeals, relying on the Smith decision, indicated that operating a vehicle with an expired automobile dealer drive-out tag was a traffic violation justifying a traffic stop.4 Id. at 365. In reviewing the jurisdiction of a municipal court and that of sheriffs, prior opinions of the Attorney General have not limited or narrowly construed the phrase "traffic laws." A 1973 opinion concludes that a municipal court with jurisdiction over violations of "traffic laws" has jurisdiction over offenses relating to laws requiring annual motor vehicle inspections. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. 73-29.5 A 1969 opinion addressing the powers of sheriffs to enforce traffic laws includes statutes concerning licensing and size and weight requirements for motor vehicles within the scope of traffic laws. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. U69-385.6 In 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. U97 28 this office concluded that the additional penalty added to fines imposed for criminal offenses by O.C.G.A. § 13-12-131 applies to traffic offenses. That opinion makes specific reference to the fact that violations of Chapter 6 of Title 40 are chargeable as misdemeanors, but does not limit its conclusion only to those traffic laws that are set forth in Chapter 6 of Title 40.7 O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33 sets forth a 180-day period of limitation for "[a]ny challenge to a misdemeanor conviction of any of the traffic laws of this state, or the traffic laws of any county or municipal government . . . ." In part because there is no limiting language in the quoted phrase, Georgia courts have broadly construed this period of limitation as applying to "'all challenges to final convictions' of misdemeanor traffic offenses." Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522, 524 (1991). Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179(a) does not include any limiting language in the phrase "for any violation of the traffic laws of this state . . . ." Clearly, where the General Assembly has determined to do so, it has included limiting language related to traffic violations. For example, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 provides for a point system pursuant to which driver's licenses are subject to suspension. The point system applies "for convictions of violations of the provisions of Chapter 6 of . . . [T]itle [40], of violations of lawful ordinances adopted by local authorities regulating the operation of motor vehicles, and of offenses committed in other states which if committed in this state would be grounds for such assessment." O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57(b). The point system does not apply "for violating a provision of state law or municipal ordinance regulating standing, parking, equipment, size, and weight." O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57(b).8 The phrase "traffic laws" has not been interpreted as being limited to those laws set forth in Chapter 6 of Title 40, and the express language of O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179 does not provide any limitation. Therefore, based on the foregoing, it is my official opinion that the additional penalty imposed by O.C.G.A. § 15-21-179 applies, unless there is a specific exception, where a court imposes a fine for a violation of any traffic law and is not limited to violations of those laws that are set forth in Chapter 6 of Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia.9 Prepared by: W. Wright Banks, Jr. Senior Assistant Attorney General 1 The additional penalty imposed by O.C.G.A. § 15 21 179 is triggered by the imposition of a fine or bond payment. This is quite similar to the manner in which the additional penalties mandated by O.C.G.A. § 15 21 73(a) are imposed. 2005 Op. Att'y Gen. U05-4 concludes that because no fine is imposed in cases involving the civil monetary penalty under O.C.G.A. § 40 6 20(f)(3)(A), no additional penalties pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15 21 73(a) are authorized to be imposed in those cases. In the same manner, where a civil monetary penalty is imposed under O.C.G.A. § 40 6 20(f)(3)(A), the additional penalty pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15 21 179 would not apply. There are other civil penalties in Title 40. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 40 5 159 and 40 6 427. 2 It should be noted that O.C.G.A. § 40 8 76.1(e)(2) expressly provides that the fine for failing to wear a seat safety belt is not more than $15.00 and is not subject to "any additional penalty, fee, or surcharge." 3 The offense of operating a motor vehicle with an expired license plate is set forth at O.C.G.A. § 40 2 8. Other cases have also indicated that operating a vehicle with an expired license plate is a violation of a traffic law justifying a traffic stop. Lenhardt v. State, 271 Ga. App. 453, 454 (2005); Maxwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 747, 748 (2001). 4 Operating a motor vehicle with an expired dealer drive-out plate is a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40 2 8. 5 Georgia no longer has the motor vehicle mechanical inspections that were in place at the time of 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. 73-29. See 1982 Ga. Laws 165. 6 Two unofficial opinions addressing the jurisdiction of courts of ordinary reach a different result. A 1958 unofficial opinion concludes that the offense of operating a motor vehicle with an expired license tag is not an offense involving the traffic laws of the state and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of the courts of ordinary. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. 67. A 1965 unofficial opinion, also dealing with courts of ordinary, concludes that offenses involving improper tag registration, improper tags, and lack of tags are not violations of "traffic laws." 1965 Op. Att'y Gen. U65-18. The conclusions of these opinions are no longer valid in light of the authorities cited herein. 7 Criminal violations are provided for in numerous places in Title 40 other than Chapter 6. For example, O.C.G.A. § 40 2 8(c) provides that it is a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle without a valid county decal unless the decal is not required. O.C.G.A. § 40 8 7(a) provides that it is a misdemeanor to operate an unsafe motor vehicle on the highways of the state. O.C.G.A. § 40 8 79 makes it a misdemeanor for the driver of a vehicle to permit a person under the age of 18 years to ride as a passenger in the uncovered bed of a truck. 8 The point system has been described as applying to "moving violations of traffic regulations governing motor vehicles." Bowman v. Parrott, 200 Ga. App. 405, 405 (1991) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals has referred to a violation of Chapter 2 of Title 40 as a "non-moving traffic offense." Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 303, 303 (1990). This distinction may explain the separate grant of jurisdiction to municipal courts in O.C.G.A. § 40 13 22 for offenses under O.C.G.A. § 40 2 8. This grant of jurisdiction is in addition to that granted by O.C.G.A. § 40 13 21 to municipal courts regarding "all criminal laws of this state relating to traffic upon the public roads, streets, and highways of this state where the penalty for the offense does not exceed that of the grade of misdemeanor." 9 As previously noted, there is a specific exception from "any additional penalty, fee, or surcharge" in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(e)(2). See supra note 2. There are other specific exceptions. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76(b)(2).