Are a Florida water control district's recreational powers limited to its water-control purpose?

Plain-English summary

This is a short follow-up letter to AGO 2009-13, which had told the Spring Lake Improvement District it could not buy a commercial multi-use golf course. The district's attorney sent more material and asked the Attorney General's office to reconsider. Senior Assistant Attorney General Gerry Hammond, writing for the office, declined to change the result.

The office reaffirmed the core point: a water control district is a special-purpose district with limited powers tied to adopting and carrying out a water control plan. Unlike counties and cities, it has no home-rule or inherent powers; it can do only what the Legislature authorized. So even though the district's charter listed recreational facilities among its powers, the office read those powers in context, the recreational facilities it may own and maintain must be directly related to the district's water-control purposes. The letter closed by noting that AG opinions are advisory, not binding, and that if the district wanted a binding determination of its powers it could bring a declaratory judgment action under Chapter 86.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2009. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the extra information change the AG's mind about the golf course?
A: No. After reviewing the additional material, the office wrote that it continued to support the analysis and conclusions of AGO 2009-13.

Q: The district's charter lists broad powers, including recreation. Why are they read narrowly?
A: Because a water control district has no home-rule powers. The office applied the rule that words in a statute take meaning from their context, so the recreational-facility power is read in light of the district's water-control purpose, not as a free-standing authority to run any recreation business.

Q: How can the district get a binding answer instead of an advisory opinion?
A: The letter pointed to a declaratory judgment action under Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, which lets a trial court determine the rights, status, and legal relations of the district under its charter and Florida law.

Background and statutory framework

This letter rests on the same foundation as AGO 2009-13: water control districts are statutory entities with only the powers the Legislature delegates. Florida courts have long held that such a district's powers are restricted to those the Legislature deemed essential to its purpose, a line running through cases like State ex rel. Vans Agnew v. Johnson and Roach v. Loxahatchee Groves Water Control District. The office layered a familiar canon of statutory construction on top: a term's meaning is informed by the words around it, so a recreational-facility power sitting among water-control powers is construed to serve water-control ends.

The letter also marks the limits of an AG opinion. By statute these opinions are advisory and bind no one; they represent the office's best legal advice on the facts presented. For a party that wants certainty about a special district's authority, the letter identifies the declaratory judgment route under Chapter 86 as the path to a binding judicial answer.

Citations and references

Statutes and session laws:

• s. 10, Chapter 2005-342, Laws of Florida (district charter powers)
• Chapter 86, Florida Statutes (declaratory judgments)

Cases:

• State ex rel. Vans Agnew v. Johnson, 150 So. 111 (Fla. 1933)
• State ex rel. Davis v. Jumper Creek Drainage District, 14 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1943)
• Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955)
• Roach v. Loxahatchee Groves Water Control District, 417 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
• Turnberry Isle Resort and Club v. Fernandez, 666 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)

Also referenced: AGO 2009-13 (the underlying opinion this letter reaffirms) and a 2001 informal opinion to the Sun n' Lake Improvement District.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/special-improvement-district-recreational-facilities
• Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/8219

Original opinion text

Mr. Terry E. Lewis

Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A.

1700 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard

Suite 1000

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

Dear Mr. Lewis:

Thank you for providing this office with an opportunity to review the analysis in Attorney General Opinion 2009-13 which was issued to the Spring Lake Improvement District last month. While we appreciate you contacting us with additional information, after review of the material you have forwarded, this office continues to support the analysis and conclusions contained in the opinion.

As you have pointed out in your letter, the Spring Lake Improvement District has been authorized to exercise a broad range of powers.[1] However, the district is a special purpose district with limited powers and duties related to the adoption of a water control plan and its implementation. The Spring Lake Improvement District's powers are limited to those determined to be essential to accomplishing the purposes of the district.[2]

As this office suggested in an Informal Attorney General Opinion to the Sun n' Lake Improvement District in 2001, as a statutorily created entity, the district may only exercise such powers as have been expressly granted by statute or ordinance or must necessarily be exercised in order to carry out an express power. Unlike counties and municipalities, which have been granted home rule powers, water control districts possess no inherent or home rule powers. Created by statute for specific limited purposes, such districts may exercise only those powers and authority as have been granted by law.[3]

With regard to the grant of authority to the Spring Lake Improvement District relating to recreational facilities, it is a general rule of statutory construction that words take on meaning from their context or the association with other words in a statute. The meaning of statutory terms, and the legislative intent behind them, may be discovered by referring to words associated with them in a statute.[4] Thus, as the district's powers are limited to accomplishing water control district purposes, the recreational facilities which the district is authorized to own, acquire, and maintain should be directly related to these purposes as well.

Attorney General Opinions are, by statute, advisory and are not binding on the requesting party or others. These opinions constitute the best legal advice of this office on the specific information and facts provided and questions raised. If the Sun n' Lake Improvement District is seeking a legally binding determination of its powers and duties pursuant to its charter and the Florida Statutes, a judicial resolution of this matter is always an option. A declaratory judgment action under Chapter 86 of the Florida Statutes would allow a trial court to determine the rights, status, and "other equitable or legal relations" of the Sun n' Lake Improvement District under Florida Law.

Thank you for contacting this office to request our assistance. I trust that these informal comments will be helpful.

Sincerely,

Gerry Hammond

Senior Assistant Attorney General

GH/tsh

[1] See s. 10, Ch. 2005-342, Laws of Fla.

[2] See generally 28 C.J.S. Drains s. 12. And see State ex rel. Vans Agnew v. Johnson, 150 So. 111 (Fla. 1933), for the proposition that the powers of a water control district are restricted to those deemed essential by the Legislature to effect its purpose; State ex rel. Davis v. Jumper Creek Drainage District, 14 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1943), affirmed, 21 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1945); Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 958 (1956); Roach v. Loxahatchee Groves Water Control District, 417 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), affirmed, 421 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), indicating that a water control district has only those powers which the Legislature has delegated to it by statute. Cf. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 04-48 (2004), 83-44 (1983) (concluding that the Florida Inland Navigation District does not have statutory authority to expend district monies to fund a special marine patrol troop, to provide funds on a matching basis and as outright grants for public information and education programs).

[3] See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 90-63 (1990) (in the absence of a statute authorizing the recall of a supervisor of a water control district, the landowners of such a district are not authorized to establish procedures for the recall of a supervisor); and Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 81-17 (1981). And see Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage District, 82 So. 346 (Fla. 1919).

[4] See Turnberry Isle Resort and Club v. Fernandez, 666 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996; Ops. Att'y Gen. Fla. 00-07 (2000) (while staff analysis refers to "invoices," that term should be construed in light of the other types of information referenced), 94-12 (1994), 90-55 (1990) (terms of section should be construed in connection with, and their meaning ascertained by reference to, the other words and phrases of the section with which they are associated).