FL INFORMAL 2017-02-03

Could the Florida Legislature give Palm Beach County alone the authority to make texting while driving in a school zone a primary traffic offense?

Short answer: The opinion concluded that special legislation authorizing only Palm Beach County to make texting in a school zone a primary offense would conflict with Chapter 316's uniform statewide traffic regime and likely violate Article III, § 11(b) of the Florida Constitution.
Currency note: this opinion is from 2017
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Florida Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Florida attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

State Representative Emily Slosberg asked the AG whether the Legislature could authorize the Palm Beach County Commission to adopt an ordinance making texting while driving in a school zone a primary offense. At the time, § 316.305 made texting while driving a secondary offense statewide: an officer could only cite a driver for texting after stopping the driver for a separate underlying offense.

The AG flagged two structural problems with the Palm-Beach-only approach:

  1. Uniformity. Chapter 316 is the State Uniform Traffic Law. Section 316.002 declares the legislative purpose: "to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities." Local authorities cannot pass ordinances "in conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Section 316.305(5) prescribes secondary enforcement statewide. A county ordinance making texting in a school zone a primary offense would conflict.

  2. Article III, § 11(b). The Florida Constitution requires that "[i]n the enactment of general laws on other subjects [referring to political subdivisions], they shall be on a basis reasonably related to the subject of the law." A general law that singled out Palm Beach County to apply primary-offense enforcement, where every other county still applied secondary, would face an Article III, § 11(b) challenge unless something distinguished Palm Beach County from other counties on a basis reasonably related to traffic regulation. The opinion noted no such basis was identified.

The opinion then offered a constructive note: several 2017 session bills (SB 144, HB 47, HB 69) would have made texting a primary offense statewide. The representative was encouraged to work with colleagues on that path rather than the county-specific carve-out.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. (Florida did make texting while driving a primary offense in subsequent legislation; verify the current status under § 316.305 before relying on the secondary-enforcement framing here.)

Common questions

Q: Could a county make a state secondary-enforcement offense a primary offense?
A: Not under this opinion's reading of Chapter 316. The State Uniform Traffic Law preempts conflicting local ordinances and prescribes secondary enforcement for texting under § 316.305(5).

Q: What about a uniform statewide change?
A: The opinion approved that path conceptually, noting pending bills in the 2017 session that would have made texting a primary offense statewide. The constitutional issue is with single-county carve-outs, not with statewide changes.

Q: Why does Article III, § 11(b) matter for a state law?
A: Article III, § 11(b) imposes a "reasonably related" test on general laws applying to political subdivisions. A law that singles out one county for different treatment must be justified by something specific to that county. Without that justification, the law is constitutionally suspect even though it is "general" in form.

Q: What is the difference between primary and secondary enforcement?
A: Primary enforcement lets an officer stop and cite a driver solely for the conduct in question. Secondary enforcement requires an underlying stop for a different reason; the officer can then add the secondary citation. Texting under § 316.305 was secondary in 2017.

Q: What does Chapter 316 preempt at the local level?
A: Most traffic regulation. Section 316.007 preempts the field, and § 316.008 lists specific local-authority exceptions (signage, parking, speed in special zones, etc.). Local authorities cannot pass ordinances "in conflict with the provisions of this chapter."

Background and statutory framework

Florida's State Uniform Traffic Law (Chapter 316) was enacted to ensure consistent traffic rules across the state. Section 316.002 spells out that goal. Section 316.007 preempts the field of traffic regulation, with limited carve-outs in § 316.008 for narrow, locally appropriate matters.

Section 316.305 (Florida's "Ban on Texting While Driving Law"), as it stood in 2017, prohibited operating a motor vehicle while manually typing or entering text. Subsection (5) made it secondary: a violation could only be enforced "as a secondary action when an operator of a motor vehicle has been detained for a suspected violation of another provision of this chapter, chapter 320, or chapter 322."

Article III, § 11(a) lists subjects on which the Legislature cannot pass special or local laws. Subsection (b) requires that general laws on political subdivisions be "on a basis reasonably related to the subject of the law." A texting-enforcement carve-out for a single county would have to satisfy that test.

The opinion rests on an earlier maxim: when the controlling law directs how a thing shall be done, that mode is exclusive (Alsop v. Pierce). The State Uniform Traffic Law's prescription of secondary enforcement is exclusive against a conflicting county ordinance.

Citations and references

Statutes / Constitution:
- Chapter 316, Fla. Stat. (State Uniform Traffic Law)
- § 316.305, Fla. Stat. (Ban on Texting While Driving Law)
- Art. III, § 11, Fla. Const.

Pending bills referenced (2017 session):
- SB 144 (Sen. Garcia)
- HB 47
- HB 69

Source

Original opinion text

The Honorable Emily Slosberg
Representative, District 91
7499 West Atlantic Avenue #200
Delray Beach, Florida 33446

Dear Representative Slosberg:

Thank you for your letter requesting assistance in determining whether the Legislature may provide express authority for the Palm Beach County Commission to pass an ordinance making "texting while driving" in a school zone in Palm Beach County a primary offense. Attorney General Bondi has asked that I respond to your inquiry.

As you have noted, Chapter 316, Florida Statutes, operates as the State Uniform Traffic Law primarily intended to "make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities."[1] The chapter recognizes that there are certain areas in which local authorities may control certain traffic movements or enact specified traffic ordinances, but the statute specifically states that "[i]t is unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter."

To enact legislation granting authority to Palm Beach County to solely enact an ordinance making texting while driving in a school zone a primary offense would be contrary to this express legislative intent of a uniform system of traffic regulation and would violate the Florida Constitution. Section 316.305, Florida Statutes, prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle while manually texting, but provides in subsection (5) that the offense may be enforced only as "a secondary action" when the operator of the motor vehicle has been detained for a suspected violation of another provision of Chapter 316, Chapter 320, or Chapter 322. This currently is the uniform method of enforcing the traffic law relating to texting while operating a motor vehicle. An exception to the general prohibition against the enforcement of any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes, would require amendment of the general law, which if specifically crafted to apply to Palm Beach County may run contrary to Article III, section 11(b), Florida Constitution, requiring that a general law on political subdivisions must be on a basis reasonably related to the subject of the law. No argument has been put forth which places Palm Beach County in a position different from other counties in the enforcement of traffic laws relating to texting while driving.

Several bills making it a primary offense to text while operating a motor vehicle are being proposed for consideration during the 2017 Legislative Session.[2] You may wish to work with your colleagues in crafting legislation which will allow your concerns to be addressed throughout the state.

Sincerely,

Lagran Saunders
Director, Opinions Division

ALS/tsh


[1] Section 316.002, Fla. Stat.

[2] See SB 144 by Sen. Garcia, HB 47, and HB 69.