After the 2012 amendment adding 'sworn or civilian' to Florida's public-records exemption for law enforcement personal information, does the older AGO 07-21 limitation on civilian support personnel still control?

Plain-English summary

A long-running interpretive question in Florida public-records law was whether civilian "support personnel" at a sheriff's office or police department fell within the public-records exemption that lets law enforcement personnel keep their home addresses, phone numbers, and photographs confidential. From the 1980s through the 2007 AG opinion AGO 07-21, the AG's office repeatedly declined to set a definitive answer, instead urging the Legislature to clarify what "law enforcement personnel" meant.

In Chapter 2012-149, Laws of Florida, the Legislature did clarify, by adding the words "sworn or civilian" to the relevant exemption (now in section 119.071(4)(d)2.a.). That amendment expanded the scope beyond what AGO 07-21 had read.

The Brevard County Clerk of the Circuit Court (Scott Ellis) and the Brevard County Sheriff's Office General Counsel (Charles Ian Nash) had a disagreement: the Clerk had been relying on the pre-amendment AGO 07-21 (which said "support personnel" did not qualify) to deny exemption requests by Sheriff's Office staff who the Sheriff considered "civilian law enforcement personnel" under the post-amendment text. They asked the AG whether AGO 07-21 still controlled.

Special Counsel for Open Government Patricia R. Gleason and Senior Assistant AG Ellen Gwynn answered, in informal comments, that AGO 07-21 was no longer controlling because it interpreted a different version of the statute. The 2012 addition of "sworn or civilian" was a deliberate legislative response to the gap. The Brevard County agencies needed to apply the post-2012 statute on its own terms, not the pre-2012 AG opinion.

The opinion is short and consultative. It does not draw new lines about which civilian personnel qualify under the amended statute. That fact-specific judgment was left to the agencies and, ultimately, to the courts.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2018. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Florida's public-records exemption for law enforcement personal information sits in section 119.071(4)(d). Subparagraph 2.a. exempts the home addresses, telephone numbers, and photographs (and certain related information) of various categories of personnel, on the theory that disclosure could expose them and their families to retaliation. Subparagraph 3 establishes the procedure by which a covered employee submits a written request for the exemption to apply.

Before 2012, the statute referred only to "law enforcement personnel," with no further definition. The AG's office issued a string of opinions interpreting that term:

• February 18, 1980 (AG Smith to Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis): noted no statutory definition existed, said the gap could only be filled by the Legislature.
• September 28, 1992 (informal opinion to the Honorable Mary Morgan): declined to set a definitive answer, recommended agencies use the section 784.07(1) law enforcement officer definition pending legislative clarification.
• AGO 07-21 (AG McCollum, 2007): repeated the call for clarification, recommended agencies use section 784.07(1)(a), and added the more definitive sentence that "support personnel . . . would not appear to be included."

Chapter 2012-149, Laws of Florida, added "sworn or civilian" to the exemption, which is now codified in section 119.071(4)(d)2.a. The amendment's plain effect was to broaden the personnel covered. AGO 07-21 had interpreted the pre-amendment statute, so it was no longer controlling on the question of civilian support personnel.

The 2018 opinion stops short of saying who is now covered. The decision whether a particular agency employee falls within the post-2012 "sworn or civilian" category is a fact-specific judgment that depends on the employee's job duties, the agency's classification practices, and Florida public-records jurisprudence.

Common questions

Q: Does this opinion mean every civilian Sheriff's Office employee can now claim the exemption?
A: Not categorically. The opinion says only that AGO 07-21's narrower reading is no longer controlling. The post-2012 statute uses the phrase "sworn or civilian," but agencies still have to apply that phrase to their actual employees. A clerk-typist with no operational connection to law enforcement may or may not qualify; an evidence technician who works alongside detectives more likely does. The agency makes the initial call.

Q: Why does this matter for ordinary citizens?
A: The exemption removes home addresses, phone numbers, and photographs of covered personnel from the public records the agency must produce on request. Ordinary citizens trying to identify or contact specific law enforcement employees may find their requests partially denied if the employee falls within the exemption.

Q: What if a Clerk of Court denies an exemption request that the Sheriff approved?
A: That is essentially the dispute that triggered this 2018 opinion. The Clerk, who serves as a custodian of records in some contexts, took a different reading from the Sheriff. The opinion's effect is to push the parties to apply the current statute, not the pre-2012 AG opinion. If they still disagree, a declaratory action in Florida circuit court is the standard path.

Q: Where does section 784.07 fit in?
A: Section 784.07 defines "law enforcement officer" for purposes of enhanced penalties when an officer is assaulted on duty. The 1992 informal opinion and AGO 07-21 had recommended agencies use that definition as a practical proxy when interpreting "law enforcement personnel" in the public-records exemption. The 2012 amendment changed the playing field by introducing "sworn or civilian," which goes beyond the section 784.07 sworn-officer definition.

Q: Has the AG issued more guidance since 2018?
A: This is a 2018 informal opinion. Florida agencies and courts have continued to refine the post-2012 framework. Anyone applying the exemption today should pull the current section 119.071(4)(d) and any subsequent case law, not rely on this opinion alone.

Citations

Statutes:

• §§ 119.071(4)(d)2.a., 119.071(4)(d)3., Fla. Stat.
• § 784.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1992); § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
• Ch. 2012-149, Laws of Fla.

Prior AG opinions:

• February 18, 1980 letter to Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis
• September 28, 1992 informal opinion to the Honorable Mary Morgan
• Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 07-21 (2007)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/records-sworn-or-civilian-law-enforcement-personnel
• Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/1485

Original opinion text

The Honorable Scott Ellis Mr. Charles Ian Nash

Clerk of the Circuit Court General Counsel

Brevard County Brevard County Sheriff’s Office

Post Office Box 999 440 South Babcock Street

Titusville, Florida 32781-0999 Melbourne, Florida 32901

Dear Mr. Ellis and Mr. Nash:

Thank you for considering the Attorney General’s Office as a source for assistance in determining the continued validity of the conclusions reached in AGO 07-21 regarding the scope of the public records exemption for specified personal information pertaining to sworn or civilian law enforcement personnel now codified in s. 119.071(4)(d)2.a., F.S. Mr. Ellis states that he is relying on AGO 07-21 to deny the request by certain personnel employed by the sheriff’s office for exempt status of their personal information as authorized by s. 119.071(4)(d)3., F.S., even though the sheriff’s office has taken the position that these individuals are “civilian law enforcement personnel” for purposes of the exemption in that statute.
Prior to its amendment by Chapter 2012-149, Laws of Florida, several Attorney General Opinions had reviewed the scope of the prior legislative exemption for the home addresses, telephone numbers, and photographs of “law enforcement personnel.” These opinions noted that the term “law enforcement personnel” was not defined in the exemption and strongly urged the Legislature to clarify the meaning of this term.
For example, in an opinion dated February 18, 1980, and issued to Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis, Attorney General Jim Smith observed that there was no definition of “law enforcement personnel” elsewhere in the statutes. The opinion went on to note that “this is one of those occasions, arising from time to time, when the statutory gaps are such as can be filled only be the exercise of lawmaking authority, which I do not possess.”
Several years later, the Attorney General’s Office was asked “what public officers or employees are included within the class ‘law enforcement personnel’ for purposes of the exemption.” In an informal opinion to the Honorable Mary Morgan, issued September 28, 1992, the Attorney General’s Office declined to provide a definitive answer to this question, in the absence of any statutory or commonly accepted definition of the term “law enforcement personnel” and strongly urged the Legislature to clarify the statute. The informal opinion recommended that agencies faced with implementing the provisions of the exemption could consider using the definition of “law enforcement officer” found in s. 784.07(1), F.S. (1992).
With the issuance of Attorney General Opinion 07-21, Attorney General McCollum addressed this issue and once again noted that the Legislature had not defined the term “law enforcement personnel.” The opinion recommended that “in the absence of legislative clarification, an agency should consider utilizing the definition in section 784.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes.” However, while the 1992 opinion characterized the response as “informal advisory comments,” AGO 07-21 also offered the more definitive finding that “support personnel . . . would not appear to be included.”
Accordingly, the question presented here is whether this conclusion remains valid in light of the fact that the Legislature amended the statute to add the terms “sworn or civilian” to the exemption. Because AGO 07-21 interpreted a different version of the statute, it is not controlling on this issue.
I hope that these informal comments have been helpful to you.
Sincerely,

Patricia R. Gleason Ellen Gwynn

Special Counsel for Open Government Senior Assistant Attorney General

Attorney General Pam Bondi Opinions Division