Can a Florida city buy equipment for an employee to test private technology the employee owns?

Plain-English summary

The City of Mount Dora asked the Attorney General's office to comment on whether it could buy equipment for a city employee to use during working hours to test a bio-waste disposal technology the employee personally owned. The city would have no ownership or license interest in the technology, but it would be allowed to use the technology at no charge.

In an informal opinion, Assistant Attorney General Lagran Saunders declined to answer the question directly. He laid out the governing constitutional rule (Article VII, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, which bars using public funds or credit to aid a private venture unless the spending serves a paramount public purpose) and then explained that whether this particular expenditure meets that standard is a factual determination for the city commission. The office cannot make that determination for the city, and the city cannot delegate it to the Attorney General.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the Attorney General say the city could buy the equipment?
A: No. The office gave informal comments on the legal framework but explicitly declined to decide whether this specific purchase was lawful, calling it a determination for the city commission.

Q: What does Article VII, section 10 of the Florida Constitution say?
A: It bars the state and local governments from becoming a joint owner with, or lending or using their taxing power or credit to aid, any private corporation, association, partnership, or person. The opinion noted that an incidental private benefit is acceptable as long as the spending's paramount purpose is public.

Q: Who decides whether a spending serves a public purpose?
A: The opinion said it is a factual determination for the local legislative and governing body, here the city commission, made after appropriate legislative findings on the facts presented. The Attorney General does not make those findings for the city.

Q: What is the difference between pledging public credit and just spending public money?
A: The opinion explained that when a project pledges the public's credit or taxing power, it must serve a paramount public purpose; when there is no such pledge, it is enough to show that a public purpose is served at all.

Background and statutory framework

Article VII, section 10 of the Florida Constitution protects public funds from being used to assist or promote private ventures where the public would be only incidentally benefited. Florida courts have read it to permit expenditures that serve a public purpose even if a private party is the primary beneficiary, so long as the public interest, though indirect, is present and sufficiently strong (State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979); Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority, 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983)).

The opinion rested on the settled principle that municipal funds may be used only for a municipal purpose, and that what counts as a valid municipal purpose is a factual question for the governing body to resolve through legislative findings, not a question the Attorney General can answer in the body's place. Because of that, the office offered only informal comments on the framework and left the decision to the Mount Dora City Commission.

Citations and references

Constitution:

• Art. VII, § 10, Fla. Const. (Pledging credit)

Cases:

• State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979), public purpose may be served even where a private party is the primary beneficiary
• Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority, 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983), paramount-public-purpose test where public credit is pledged
• Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach District, 246 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1971)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/municipal-purchase-of-test-equipment-for-employee
• Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/8115

Original opinion text

Mr. Clifford B. Shepard
City Attorney
City of Mount Dora
2300 Maitland Center Parkway
Suite 100
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear Mr. Shepard:

On behalf of the City of Mount Dora, you have asked this office to comment on the authority of the city to purchase equipment for use by a city employee during working hours to test bio-waste disposal technology owned by the employee and for which the city has no proprietary ownership or licensure interest, but would have the right to use the technology at no charge.

Section 10, Article VII, Florida Constitution,[1] generally protects public funds and resources from being exploited in assisting or promoting private ventures when the public would at most be incidentally benefitted.[2] Should the paramount purpose of an expenditure be a public one, however, an incidental benefit to private entities or individuals does not violate Article VII, section 10, Florida Constitution.

The test for public financing of a capital project when a pledge of public credit or taxing power is involved is that it must serve a paramount public purpose; but, where there is no pledge of the public's credit, it is enough to show only that a public purpose is served.[3] Thus, "it is immaterial that the primary beneficiary of a project be a private party, if the public interest, even though indirect, is present and sufficiently strong."[4]

It is a basic premise that municipal funds may be used only for a municipal purpose.[5] The determination of what constitutes a valid municipal purpose for the expenditure of public funds, however, is a factual determination for the legislative and governing body involved.[6] Such a determination must be based upon appropriate legislative findings after consideration of the facts presented. It must be made by the city commission and cannot be delegated to this office.[7]

I trust that these informal comments will be of assistance to you in considering this matter.

Sincerely,

Lagran Saunders
Assistant Attorney General

ALS/tsrh

[1] Section 10, Art. VII, Fla. Const., in pertinent part, states: "Neither the state nor any county, school district, municipality, special district, or agency of any of them, shall become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person[.]"

[2] See Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach District, 246 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1971).

[3] Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority, 443 So. 2d 97, 101 (Fla. 1983).

[4] State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1979), citing State v. Putnam County Development Authority, 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971).

[5] See Ops. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-06 (1983) and 72-198 (1972).

[6] See, e.g., State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1979).

[7] See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-05 (1983), stating that the legislative determination and findings as to the purpose of the ordinance and the benefits accruing to the county from the program could not be delegated to the Attorney General, nor could the Attorney General undertake to make such legislative findings on behalf of the county.