Can a Florida city use city employees and equipment during business hours to help a private citizen run a fundraiser for restoring a city-owned building?
Plain-English summary
The City of DeFuniak Springs faced a small but legally significant question: a private citizen wanted to throw a ticketed fundraising event to raise money for restoring a city-owned building. She would pay all event expenses and turn over all ticket proceeds to the city. She asked the city to provide tables, chairs, platforms, and city employees during regular working hours to set up and break down the event.
The AG's letter is short. It does not approve or disapprove. It maps the legal framework the city has to apply for itself.
Article VII, § 10, Florida Constitution, generally prohibits a state, county, school district, municipality, special district, or agency of any of them from becoming "a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or [from] giv[ing], lend[ing] or us[ing] its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person." Florida courts have built a doctrinal exception around it: incidental private benefit does not violate the prohibition if the paramount or sufficient purpose of the public expenditure is itself public. The standard of review depends on whether the public credit or taxing power is pledged. When credit is pledged, the project must serve a "paramount public purpose." When no public credit is pledged, the test is the looser "public purpose served," even if a private party is the primary direct beneficiary (Linscott v. Orange County IDA).
The opinion also reiterates the bedrock municipal-funds rule: municipal funds may be used only for a municipal purpose. The determination of whether a particular expenditure satisfies that test is a factual determination for the city's legislative body, made on findings about the facts presented. The AG cannot make that finding for the city.
Practically, that means the city commission would have to consider whether having city employees set up and tear down a private fundraiser, with the proceeds returned to the city for restoration of a city-owned building, served a paramount or sufficient public purpose. If the commission can make supportable findings (the public benefit of restoring the building, the absence of disproportionate private benefit, the limited scope of the in-kind support), the AG's letter does not foreclose the action. If it cannot, the constitutional prohibition is the obstacle.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Q: Was the city flat-out forbidden from helping the private fundraiser?
A: No. The AG did not say no. The decision belonged to the city commission once it made findings about whether the in-kind help served a paramount or sufficient public purpose under Article VII, § 10.
Q: What if all proceeds went to the city?
A: That fact is what supports a public-purpose argument. The opinion did not assess strength, but the proceeds-to-the-city structure is exactly the kind of fact that lets a city commission find that the paramount purpose is public.
Q: What is the difference between "paramount public purpose" and "sufficient public purpose"?
A: It depends on whether public credit or the taxing power is pledged. If yes, the test is paramount public purpose. If no (a typical in-kind expenditure), the test is the looser sufficient-public-purpose standard. Linscott and Housing Finance Authority of Polk County draw the distinction.
Q: Why won't the AG just say yes or no?
A: The AG repeatedly declines to make legislative findings on behalf of a local body. Section 16.01 routes formal opinions to the public officer with the duty at issue. Whether a particular expenditure is for a municipal purpose is a finding only the city commission can make.
Q: Does the city need to adopt a resolution?
A: The opinion does not require a specific form. It does say the determination must be "based upon appropriate legislative findings after consideration of the facts presented." A resolution that records those findings is the standard documentary mechanism.
Background and statutory framework
Article VII, § 10, Florida Constitution, sits at the center of every Florida municipal-funds analysis involving any benefit to a private party. The constitutional prohibition is broad and the doctrinal exception (incidental-private-benefit / paramount-public-purpose) is built almost entirely from case law.
The key cases trace a steady arc:
- Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach District (1971): public funds and resources cannot be exploited to assist or promote private ventures when the public is at most incidentally benefitted.
- State v. Putnam County Development Authority (1971): incidental benefit to private entities does not defeat a primarily public expenditure.
- State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County (1979): "it is immaterial that the primary beneficiary of a project be a private party, if the public interest, even though indirect, is present and sufficiently strong."
- Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority (1983): the test is paramount public purpose when public credit is pledged; otherwise, sufficient public purpose suffices.
Earlier AG opinions (Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-06, 72-198) established the parallel municipal-purpose rule for funds expenditure. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-05 reinforced the doctrine that the AG cannot make the public-purpose finding for a local body.
Citations and references
Constitution:
- Art. VII, § 10, Fla. Const.
Cases:
- Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach District, 246 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1971)
- Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority, 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983)
- State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979)
- State v. Putnam County Development Authority, 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971)
Prior AG opinions:
- Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-06 (1983)
- Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 72-198 (1972)
- Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-05 (1983)
Source
- Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/municipal-funds
- Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/8037
Original opinion text
June 16, 2017
Mr. Clayton J.M. Adkinson
Attorney for the City of DeFuniak Springs
Post Office Box 1207
DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32435
Dear Mr. Adkinson:
On behalf of the City of DeFuniak Springs, you have asked whether the city may use city-owned equipment and materials, as well as city employees during regular hours of employment, to assist a private citizen in her efforts to raise money for the restoration of a city-owned building located within the city. The citizen wishes to sell tickets to an event for which she will pay all expenses. All proceeds from the sale of the tickets will be turned over to the city. She has asked the city for assistance in allowing city employees to set up and break down city-owned tables, chairs, and platforms for the event. The city questions whether it is appropriate to use city resources in this manner.
Section 10, Article VII, Florida Constitution,[1] generally protects public funds and resources from being exploited in assisting or promoting private ventures when the public would at most be incidentally benefitted.[2] Should the paramount purpose of an expenditure be a public one, however, an incidental benefit to private entities or individuals does not violate Article VII, section 10, Florida Constitution.
The test for public financing of a capital project when a pledge of public credit or taxing power is involved is that it must serve a paramount public purpose; but, where there is no pledge of the public's credit, it is enough to show only that a public purpose is served.[3] Thus, "it is immaterial that the primary beneficiary of a project be a private party, if the public interest, even though indirect, is present and sufficiently strong."[4]
It is a basic premise that municipal funds may be used only for a municipal purpose.[5] The determination of what constitutes a valid municipal purpose for the expenditure of public funds, however, is a factual determination for the legislative and governing body involved.[6] Such a determination must be based upon appropriate legislative findings after consideration of the facts presented. It must be made by the city commission and cannot be delegated to this office.[7]
I trust that these informal comments will be of assistance to you in considering the appropriateness of the expenditure of city resources for raising funds to restore a city-owned building.
Sincerely,
Lagran Saunders
Director
Opinions Division
ALS/tsh
[1] Section 10, Art. VII, Fla. Const., in pertinent part, states: "Neither the state nor any county, school district, municipality, special district, or agency of any of them, shall become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person[.]"
[2] See Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach District, 246 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1971).
[3] Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority, 443 So. 2d 97, 101 (Fla. 1983).
[4] State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1979), citing State v. Putnam County Development Authority, 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971).
[5] See Ops. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-06 (1983) and 72-198 (1972).
[6] See, e.g., State v. Housing Finance Authority of Polk County, 376 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1979).
[7] See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 83-05 (1983), stating that the legislative determination and findings as to the purpose of the ordinance and the benefits accruing to the county from the program could not be delegated to the Attorney General, nor could the Attorney General undertake to make such legislative findings on behalf of the county.