Does Florida's special court-funding approval process apply to a county's $30 traffic surcharge for court facilities, or only to 'local requirements'?

Subject

County Surcharge -- Court Facilities

Plain-English summary

Jackson County asked a narrow drafting question about two overlapping court-funding statutes. Section 318.18(13) lets a county commission add a surcharge (up to $30) on traffic infractions and certain violations to fund state court facilities, with up to a quarter of the money usable for local law libraries. Separately, counties must pay for various court-related costs under section 29.008. Section 29.008(2)(c) sets up a special process in which the chief judge, the state attorney, the public defender, and regional counsel identify a circuit's "local requirements" and the salaries and costs needed to meet them. The county wanted to know whether that special process applied only to the "local requirements under subparagraph (a)2," and, because section 29.008 has two subparagraphs labeled "(a)2," which one was meant.

A Senior Assistant Attorney General concluded the process is limited by its own terms to the local requirements set out in section 29.008(2)(a)2. Both the process in subparagraph (2)(c) and the definition of local requirements in subparagraph (2)(a)2 sit inside subsection (2) and deal with the same subject, so they should be read together (in pari materia). The statute does not extend the special identification process to other budget items, and under the canon that expressing one thing implies excluding others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius), the AG read the process as confined to what the statute expressly named.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What does the section 318.18(13) surcharge pay for?
The opinion describes it as an optional county surcharge of up to $30 on noncriminal traffic infractions and certain criminal violations, imposed by ordinance, to fund state court facilities. The opinion notes the court cannot waive the surcharge and that up to 25 percent of the revenue may support local law libraries if the county keeps library service at its pre-July-1-2004 level.

Which "(a)2" did the special process refer to?
The opinion explains that section 29.008 contains two subparagraphs numbered (a)2: one in subsection (1) dealing with equipment and furnishings within the definition of "facility," and one in subsection (2) defining "local requirements." The AG concluded the reference in subparagraph (2)(c) points to section 29.008(2)(a)2, the "local requirements" provision, because both sit in subsection (2) and address the same subject.

Does the special expenditure-approval process apply to the surcharge funds themselves?
The opinion treats the process as limited to identifying "local requirements" and the costs to meet them, not as a general approval gate over every court-related budget item. The AG declined to read the process as reaching beyond what the statute expressly provided.

What are "local requirements" under section 29.008?
Section 29.008(2)(a) defines them as specialized programs, nonjudicial staff, and other expenses tied to specialized court programs, specialized prosecution or defense needs, or resources a local jurisdiction needs because of special factors. They arise either by express legislative directive or, under subparagraph (a)2, when a county has enacted an ordinance or funded activities affecting the circuit, or when local circumstances necessitate specialized programs or resources.

Background and statutory framework

Article V, section 14 of the Florida Constitution assigns counties the duty to fund certain court-related functions, and section 29.008 implements that duty. Section 29.008(1) lists county-funded items, including the cost of constructing, leasing, maintaining, and securing facilities for the circuit and county courts, the public defender, the state attorney, guardian ad litem offices, and the clerks performing court-related functions. Section 29.008(2) requires counties to pay reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses to meet "local requirements," which subsection (2)(a) defines and subparagraph (2)(c) operationalizes through the chief-judge-led identification process.

Section 318.18(13) is the revenue side: it authorizes the optional court-facility surcharge. The opinion's task was purely interpretive, fitting the special process of (2)(c) to the right "local requirements" definition. The AG resolved it with two standard tools of statutory construction: reading related provisions in the same subsection together (in pari materia), and treating an express list as excluding what it omits (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).

Citations

• section 318.18(13)(a)1, Florida Statutes (optional county court-facility surcharge)
• section 318.17 (criminal violations subject to penalties)
• section 14, Article V of the Florida Constitution (county duty to fund court-related functions)
• section 29.008, Florida Statutes, incl. (1), (2)(a), (2)(a)2, and (2)(c) (county court funding and local requirements)
• Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981); Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971) (in pari materia)
• Young v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company, 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952) (expressio unius)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/county-surcharge-court-facilities
• Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/8109

Original opinion text

Mr. Frank A. Baker

4431 Lafayette Street

Marianna, Florida 32446

Dear Mr. Baker:

On behalf of the Board of County Commissioners of Jackson County, Florida, you have asked whether, with respect to the funds generated under section 318.18(13)(a)1, Florida Statutes, the special expenditure approval process set forth in section 29.008(2)(c), Florida Statutes, applies solely to the "local requirements under subparagraph (a)2" and, if so, which subparagraph (a)2 is the subject of that process.

Section 318.18, Florida Statutes, authorizes the imposition of penalties for noncriminal traffic infractions or certain criminal violations. Subparagraph (13) provides additional authority for a county commission to impose a surcharge on infractions or violations to fund court facilities. The statute provides that

"[i]n addition to any penalties imposed for noncriminal traffic infractions pursuant to this chapter or imposed for criminal violations listed in s. 318.17, a board of county commissioners or any unit of local government that is consolidated as provided by s. 9, Art. VIII of the State Constitution of 1885, as preserved by s. 6(e), Art. VIII of the Constitution of 1968:

1. May impose by ordinance a surcharge of up to $30 for any infraction or violation to fund state court facilities. The court shall not waive this surcharge. Up to 25 percent of the revenue from such surcharge may be used to support local law libraries provided that the county or unit of local government provides a level of service equal to that provided prior to July 1, 2004, which shall include the continuation of library facilities located in or near the county courthouse or any annex to the courthouse." (e.s.)

Counties are required to fund the cost of certain aspects of court-related functions which include

"the cost of communications services, existing radio systems, existing multiagency criminal justice information systems, and the cost of construction or lease, maintenance, utilities, and security of facilities for the circuit and county courts, public defenders' offices, state attorneys' offices, guardian ad litem offices, and the offices of the clerks of the circuit and county courts performing court-related functions."[1]

Because of the county's role in funding state court facilities, you have asked whether the special expenditure approval process described in section 29.008(2)(c), Florida Statutes, applies only to those "local requirements under subparagraph (a)2" and if that is the case, you request assistance in identifying the subparagraph to which the reference is related (section 29.008, Florida Statutes, contains two subparagraphs [a]2.)."[2]

Section 29.008, Florida Statutes, provides for county funding of court-related functions as required by section 14, Article V of the Florida Constitution. As required in section 29.008(2), Florida Statutes, counties must pay the reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses of the state courts system, which includes associated staff and expenses, to meet local requirements. The statute relates what may constitute a "local requirement:"

"Local requirements are those specialized programs, nonjudicial staff, and other expenses associated with specialized court programs, specialized prosecution needs, specialized defense needs, or resources required of a local jurisdiction as a result of special factors or circumstances."[3]

Local requirements exist within the scope of section 29.008(2), Florida Statutes, when the Legislature imposes them by express statutory directive or, as provided in subparagraph (a)2., when:

"a. The county has enacted an ordinance, adopted a local program, or funded activities with a financial or operational impact on the circuit or a county within the circuit; or

b. Circumstances in a given circuit or county result in or necessitate implementation of specialized programs, the provision of nonjudicial staff and expenses to specialized court programs, special prosecution needs, specialized defense needs, or the commitment of resources to the court(s jurisdiction."

This is the subparagraph (a)2., to which subparagraph (2)(c) appears to relate. Both provisions are contained within subsection (2) of section 29.008, Florida Statutes, and both relate to "local requirements." It is my conclusion that, as related provisions within subsection (2), these two related statutory provisions should be read in pari materia because they govern different facets of the same subject matter.[4]

Subparagraph (2)(c) provides a method for determining "local requirements under subparagraph (a)2." and requires the chief judge of the circuit, in conjunction with the state attorney, the public defender, and, on matters impacting their offices criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, to identify the local requirements within the circuit or within each county in the circuit and to identify the reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses needed to meet these "local requirements." The statute does not extend this requirement to other budgetary items. In the absence of any legislative expression of an expansion to other budgetary requests, it would appear that the terms of the statute are limited to those expressly provided.[5]

Thus, it appears that the process set forth in section 29.008(2)(c), Florida Statutes, for determining "local requirements" is, by its terms, limited in application to those requirements set forth in "subparagraph (a)2." The reference to subparagraph (a)2. appears to relate to section 29.008(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes, which addresses "local requirements."

Sincerely,

Gerry Hammond

Senior Assistant Attorney General

GH/tsh

[1] Section 29.008(1), Fla. Stat.

[2] Section 29.008(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat., relates to equipment and furnishings within the definition of "[f]acility."

[3] Section 29.008(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

[4] See Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981); Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971) (a law should be construed together with any other law relating to the same purpose, such that they are in harmony). And see 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes s. 175 (statutes should be read in pari materia when they govern different facets of the same subject matter) and cf. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 80-60 (1980).

[5] When a law mentions the things upon which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily construed as excluding from its operation all things not expressly mentioned ( the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another – expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Young v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company, 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000); Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Alsop v. Pierce, 19 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1994).