FL INFORMAL 2017-02-24

When a Florida city commission also serves as the CRA board, can the mayor veto CRA actions or pick the CRA's executive director under city-charter veto and appointment powers?

Short answer: The opinion concluded the mayor's veto over city legislation did not reach CRA actions because the CRA is a separate legal entity, and the CRA executive director is selected under CRA bylaws and § 163.356(3)(c), not under the mayor's city-charter appointment authority.
Currency note: this opinion is from 2017
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Florida Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Florida attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Under Florida's Community Redevelopment Act, when a city commission designates itself as the governing board of a CRA, those same commissioners "constitute the head of a legal entity, separate, distinct, and independent from the governing body" of the city (§ 163.357(1)(b)). They wear two hats: city commissioner when acting on city legislation, CRA board member when acting on CRA matters.

The West Palm Beach City Attorney asked two questions about how that affected the mayor:

  1. Did the mayor's charter-based veto power over city legislation extend to CRA board actions? No. The mayor's veto applies to city commission "legislative action," but the CRA's actions are taken by a separate legal entity, not as city legislation. The veto cannot follow commissioners across the legal-entity boundary.

  2. Could the mayor, by virtue of city-charter authority to select department heads, pick the CRA's executive director? No. Section 163.356(3)(c) authorizes the CRA itself to "employ an executive director, technical experts, and such other agents and employees" and to set their qualifications, duties, and compensation. The selection mechanism is the CRA's own (governed by its bylaws), not the city's.

The opinion's anchor is § 163.357(1)(a)'s declaration that "all the rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities vested by this part in an agency will be vested in the governing body of the county or municipality," and (1)(b)'s parallel directive that those members "constitute the head of a legal entity, separate, distinct, and independent" from the city. That separation matters: it carries CRA decisions out of the procedural rules of the municipal charter and into the procedural rules of the Community Redevelopment Act.

The opinion is informal (a letter from the Opinions Division Director) and does not interpret the West Palm Beach charter itself. It addresses only the AG's view of the state-law boundary between CRA and city authority.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the mayor's veto stop CRA decisions in West Palm Beach?
A: Not according to this opinion. The CRA is a separate legal entity under § 163.357(1)(b). The mayor's veto reaches city legislation, not CRA action.

Q: Could the city change CRA voting procedures by ordinance?
A: The opinion noted § 163.356(3)(b) requires a majority of CRA commissioners present to act, "unless in any case the bylaws require a larger number." The CRA's bylaws (or the statute) governed; city ordinances did not.

Q: Who picked the CRA's executive director?
A: The CRA itself, per § 163.356(3)(c). The CRA's bylaws or board action determined how. The mayor's city-charter authority to appoint department heads did not transfer.

Q: Did the city's ability to declare itself the CRA board mean the mayor was a member, too?
A: That depended on whether the city charter made the mayor a voting member of the city commission for general purposes. In West Palm Beach, the mayor was a voting member only to break ties, so the mayor's role on the CRA board reflected that limited city-commission status.

Q: What happens if the CRA bylaws and the city charter conflict?
A: The Community Redevelopment Act controls the CRA's powers. Bylaws and city charter provisions cannot expand or restrict statutory CRA authority. The maxim from Alsop v. Pierce (when controlling law directs how something must be done, that mode is exclusive) appears in the opinion as the doctrinal anchor.

Background and statutory framework

Florida's Community Redevelopment Act (Part III, Chapter 163) lets local governments establish a CRA to plan and finance redevelopment within a designated slum or blighted area. The Act gives a county or municipality two structural options. It can appoint a separate board of commissioners under § 163.356(2), or it can declare its own governing body to be the CRA under § 163.357(1)(a). Either way, when the governing body chooses the dual role, the statute treats the CRA as a "separate, distinct, and independent" legal entity.

That separation has practical consequences:

  • CRA commissioners act under § 163.356(3)(b)'s majority-of-present rule, modifiable only by the CRA's own bylaws.
  • The CRA controls its own staffing under § 163.356(3)(c).
  • CRA decisions are not city legislation; they cannot be vetoed by a mayor whose charter veto reaches only city legislative action.

Earlier AGO 2015-05 had reached a related conclusion: once a city commission appoints itself as the CRA board, the city has no authority to change the composition of that board. The 2017 informal opinion extends the same logic to CRA procedure: the city cannot graft city-charter rules (mayoral veto, mayoral appointment) onto CRA action.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Part III, Chapter 163, Fla. Stat. (Community Redevelopment)
- § 163.356, Fla. Stat. (creation of CRAs)
- § 163.357, Fla. Stat. (governing body as the agency)

Cases:
- Alsop v. Pierce, 19 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1944)

Prior AG opinions:
- Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 2015-05 (board composition cannot be changed once governing body declares itself CRA)

Source

Original opinion text

February 24, 2017

Ms. Kimberly L. Rothenburg
City Attorney
City of West Palm Beach
Post Office Box 3366
West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-3366

Dear Ms. Rothenburg:

On behalf of the West Palm Beach Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), you ask for assistance in determining the mayor's role as a member of the agency's governing board. Your question arises when considering that the city's charter authorizes the mayor to veto legislative actions of the city commission and as the executive head of the city to select designated department heads.

In sum, the mayor's veto authority is a substantive power granted by the city charter affecting legislative action taken by the city commission and is not applicable to actions taken by the governing board of the community redevelopment agency, a separate and distinct governing entity. The ability of the mayor, as a member of the CRA board, to select the executive director for the agency would require an interpretation of the agency's bylaws or other actions taken by the CRA board and is not dependent upon or directed by the mayor's authority under the city charter.

As discussed by this office in Attorney General Opinion 2015-05, a city's governing board, having exercised its authority to appoint itself as the governing board of the city's community redevelopment agency, has no authority to change the composition of the board. The opinion contains a detailed discussion of the Community Redevelopment Act, part III, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, specifically highlighting section 163.357(1)(b), Florida Statutes:

"The members of the governing body shall be the members of the agency, but such members constitute the head of a legal entity, separate, distinct, and independent from the governing body of the county or municipality. If the governing body declares itself to be an agency which already exists, the new agency is subject to all of the responsibilities and liabilities imposed or incurred by the existing agency." (e.s.)

Moreover, section 163.357(1)(a), Florida Statutes, states that when the governing body of the city declares itself to be the CRA board, "all the rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities vested by this part in an agency will be vested in the governing body of the county or municipality[.]" (e.s.) Thus, the powers of a CRA governing board and any limitations thereon are prescribed by the statute and do not arise from the city's charter.

In the present situation, you relate that the city commission of West Palm Beach has appointed itself as the governing board of the CRA. While this office does not interpret the charter provisions of a city, under the charter, the mayor is recognized as a voting member of the city commission only for the purpose of breaking a tie vote.[1] The mayor is also given "power to veto legislation within forty-eight (48) hours after the adjournment of any city commission meeting."[2]

As noted above, however, the members of the city commission are not functioning in their role as city commissioners or passing legislation subject to veto when performing duties as members of the CRA – a legal entity, separate, distinct, and independent from the governing body of the municipality. The statute prescribes that "[a]ction may be taken by the agency upon a vote of a majority of the commissioners present, unless in any case the bylaws require a larger number."[3] Much like the inability of the city to change the composition of the governing board of the CRA prescribed by the Community Redevelopment Act, it would be beyond the authority of the city to alter the powers and duties of the CRA members or to allow the mayor's veto power over city legislation to be insinuated into the mayor's role as a member of the governing board of the CRA.

Where the Legislature has prescribed the manner in which something is to be done, it by implication prohibits its being accomplished in another manner.[4] Moreover, while you indicate that the bylaws of the CRA provide for the agency to operate under the Rules of Procedure of the city commission, the mayor's veto power over city legislation is a substantive power arising from a specific grant of authority in the city's charter and would not alter the substantive powers granted to the governing board in the Community Redevelopment Act.

Section 163.356(3)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that the governing body of a county or municipality designate a chair and vice chair from among the commissioners of a CRA. The statute further authorizes the CRA to "employ an executive director, technical experts, and such other agents and employees, permanent and temporary, as it requires, and determine their qualifications, duties, and compensation." While you have posited that the mayor's authority under the city charter to hire or appoint departmental heads provides the authority for the appointment of the CRA's executive director, as discussed above, the city's charter does not control the actions of the CRA.

I trust these informal comments will be of assistance to you in the resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,

Lagran Saunders
Director
Opinions Division

ALS/tsh


[1] Section 3.01. – Mayor, West Palm Beach, FL Code of Ordinances.

[2] Section 3.02. – Mayor's veto power, West Palm Beach, FL Code of Ordinances.

[3] Section 163.356(3)(b), Fla. Stat.

[4] See Alsop v. Pierce, 19 So. 2d 799, 805 (Fla. 1944) (where Legislature prescribes the mode, that mode must be observed; express statutory direction as to how a thing is to be done is implied prohibition of its being done in any contrary manner).