If a journalist is investigating how a Delaware city's tow contractor handles impounded cars, can the city deny her FOIA request because a federal civil rights lawsuit on the same topic was filed yesterday?

Official title

21-IB29 11/04/2021 FOIA Opinion Letter to Amanda Fries re: FOIA Complaint Concerning the City of Wilmington

Plain-English summary

Amanda Fries, a journalist for Delaware Online / The News Journal, was investigating how cars impounded by Wilmington's contracted towing vendors get sold or scrapped. The vendor's contract requires it to provide a list of all cars sold or scrapped two weeks before sale to the police department, with identifying information. In May 2021, Fries had received some of these records (covering June through December 2020) under an earlier FOIA.

On September 23, 2021, Fries submitted two new FOIA requests: one for cars impounded and sold by the current contractor from January 1, 2019 through September 24, 2021, and one for cars impounded and sold by First State Towing from September 1, 2016 through December 31, 2018. The City had been served on September 22, 2021 (the day before Fries's requests) with a federal civil-rights lawsuit naming the City and its current and former towing contractors as defendants. The complaint alleged the City and its co-defendants wrongfully towed, impounded, and scrapped vehicles in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

The City denied the FOIA requests on October 1, 2021 under the pending-litigation exemption, 29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9). Fries petitioned, arguing she is a journalist, not a litigant, and that the exemption is meant to prevent litigants from circumventing discovery. She also argued the May 2021 production undermined the City's claim now.

The City's response, through counsel, set out the two-prong test for the exemption. The City argued that litigation was pending and the records pertained to it because the federal complaint concerned its contractors' towing, impoundment, and disposal of vehicles. The City also argued that a third party could share released records with the plaintiffs. The AG's analysis addressed the pending suit and the requested records' relationship to it, without discussing that third-party argument.

The AG found no FOIA violation because a federal suit was pending and the requested impoundment and sale records clearly pertained to it. Fries argued that she was neither a party nor counsel in the suit; the AG did not separately analyze whether requester status affected the exemption. It encouraged the City to consider voluntarily producing records in whole or in part, subject to any necessary redactions or withholdings and its litigation position.

What this means for you

For investigative journalists in Delaware. Fries argued that she was neither a party nor counsel in the federal suit, but the AG decided the petition by finding a pending suit and a connection between it and the requested records. The opinion does not separately decide a general rule about requests from non-litigants. Its encouragement of voluntary production left that choice to the City, subject to its litigation position.

For requesters outside the litigation. The City argued that release to a third party could put the records in the plaintiffs' hands. The AG did not adopt that rationale in its discussion. It found the two stated conditions met: litigation was pending, and the requested records pertained to it.

For Wilmington vehicle owners. The opinion addresses a broad, systemic records request that overlapped with a filed federal suit. It does not decide what happens with any individual owner's request for the disposition of a specific vehicle.

For city attorneys handling concurrent FOIA and civil-rights litigation. The City attached the federal complaint to its response. The AG relied on that record to find a pending suit, then compared the suit's towing, impoundment, and disposal allegations with the requested records of impoundment and sale.

Common questions

What's the two-prong test?
The opinion applies a two-factor test for § 10002(o)(9): (1) whether litigation is pending, and (2) whether the requested records pertain to that litigation. Both must be met. Here the AG found pending litigation (the federal suit) and that records of the impoundment and sale of vehicles by the City's contractors clearly pertained to it.

Why was Fries's prior receipt of some records not dispositive?
The City said its earlier production preceded the federal lawsuit. The AG found the suit pending when it evaluated these later requests and encouraged voluntary production partly because some relevant records had been produced before the litigation.

What's "First State Towing"?
A Wilmington-area towing vendor. The petition references First State Towing as the contractor for the 2016-2018 period; a different vendor was the current contractor as of 2021. The opinion states the federal suit named the City and its current and former towing contractors as defendants.

What does "encourage voluntary production" mean?
The opinion adds that, in the interest of public transparency and consistent with the City's pre-litigation production, the AG encouraged the City to consider voluntarily producing the records in whole or in part, subject to redactions and to the extent it would not adversely affect the City's litigation position. The AG cannot order release; the City denied the requests in full.

What about the federal constitutional claim itself?
The opinion describes the federal suit as alleging the City and its contractors wrongfully towed, impounded, and scrapped vehicles in violation of the United States Constitution, with the complaint asserting that towing and retention of more than thirty-eight percent of those cars created a "fundamentally unconstitutional" system. The AG opinion does not address the merits of those claims.

Background and statutory framework

29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9) exempts records that "pertain to pending or potential litigation which are not records of any court." The opinion applies a two-factor test: whether litigation is pending, and whether the requested records pertain to it.

The opinion states the public body has the burden of proof to justify its denial, and that the representations of the public body's legal counsel may satisfy that burden.

Fries argued that the exemption should not apply to her because she was not a litigant. The City disagreed and raised the possibility that a third party could pass released records to litigants. The AG's discussion did not decide that argument expressly; it found the pending-suit and records-relationship conditions satisfied.

Citations

• 29 Del. C. §§ 10001-10007: Delaware FOIA chapter
• 29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9): pending or potential litigation
• 29 Del. C. § 10005: petition procedure

Source

• Landing page: https://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/2021/11/04/21-ib29-11-04-2021-foia-opinion-letter-to-amanda-fries-re-foia-complaint-concerning-the-city-of-wilmington/
• Original PDF: https://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/50/2021/11/Attorney-General-Opinion-No.-21-IB29.pdf

Original opinion text

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

KATHLEEN JENNINGS
ATTORNEY GENERAL

NEW CASTLE COUNTY
820 NORTH FRENCH STREET
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801

CIVIL DIVISION (302) 577-8400
FAX: (302) 577-6630
CRIMINAL DIVISION (302) 577-8500
FAX: (302) 577-2496
FRAUD DIVISION (302) 577-8600
FAX: (302) 577-6499

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Attorney General Opinion No. 21-IB29
November 4, 2021

VIA EMAIL
Amanda Fries
Delaware Online/The News Journal
[email protected]

RE: FOIA Petition Regarding the City of Wilmington

Dear Ms. Fries:
We write in response to your correspondence alleging that the City of Wilmington violated Delaware's Freedom of Information Act, 29 Del. C. §§ 10001-10007 ("FOIA") in connection with your requests for records. We treat your correspondence as a Petition for a determination pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 10005 regarding whether a violation of FOIA has occurred or is about to occur. As discussed herein, we determine that the City has not violated FOIA by denying access to the requested records under 29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9).

BACKGROUND
You submitted two FOIA requests on September 23, 2021 a few minutes apart. In the first request, you sought public records of "all cars impounded by the city's preferred contracted vendor and then sold by said contractor from Jan. 1, 2019 to . . . Friday, Sept. 24, 2021." You noted per its contract, the vendor must provide a list of all cars sold or scrapped two weeks prior to the sale to the police department, including various identifying information about these cars. In the second request, you sought public records of "all cars impounded by First State Towing and ultimately sold by said contractor from Sept. 1, 2016 through Dec. 31, 2018." You again noted per its contract, this vendor must provide a list of all cars sold or scrapped two weeks prior to the sale to the police department, including various identifying information about these cars. The City responded on October 1, 2021, stating that the City had already provided some records in response to your May FOIA request and denying the balance of your request pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9) which exempts records pertaining to pending or potential litigation which are not records of any court.

This Petition followed. You allege that the City improperly denied your requests for records because you believe the pending or potential litigation exemption is intended to ensure parties to pending litigation do not circumvent the rules of discovery, and you are "neither a party to the pending lawsuit the city cites nor . . . an attorney representing said parties in the lawsuit." Although the City noted that some records had already been provided in response to your May request, you claim that those records "only provide a glimpse into the cars towed and ultimately scrapped as the records encompass June 2020 through December 2020 only." You argue that these records indicate upwards of forty percent of towed cars in the City are sold or scrapped, and as a member of the media, you are investigating the timeframe in which these practices occurred and how much money is being made by the towing companies' sales of City residents' cars. Further, you state that you believe the City's claim of the pending litigation exemption is suspect, as these records are requirements in the vendor's contract and a subset of these records was previously released to you in May.

The City's counsel provided a response on the City's behalf on October 15, 2021 ("Response"). On September 22, 2021, the City states it was served with a lawsuit in federal district court naming the City and its current and former towing contractors as defendants. The City represents that this suit alleges that the City and its co-defendants wrongfully towed, impounded, and scrapped vehicles in violation of the United States Constitution. The City asserts that your two requests that are the subject of this Petition were delivered the day after the City was served with this complaint, and its response providing some records to you pre-dated the current pending litigation. The City explains the two-part test used for potential litigation and contends that both parts are met here. The City represents that the discovery phase of the lawsuit has not begun, but the requested records here are clearly pertinent, as the complaint alleges that the City and its contractors' towing and retention of more than thirty-eight percent of those cars has resulted in a system that is fundamentally unconstitutional. Noting that this case involves the public body from whom the records are sought, the City maintains that it has met the test for this exemption. The City argues that your contention that your status as a non-litigant should disqualify this exemption in this case is flawed, because the plain language of this exemption is not limited to litigants and your interpretation "ignores the fact that once the requested records are provided, there is nothing to prevent a third party from disclosing the records to the opposing party involved in the litigation." Although both the courts and the Attorney General Opinions emphasize that FOIA may not be used as a means to avoid the rules of discovery, the City argues that they have also acknowledged that the FOIA process is not intended to aid litigants in advancing their litigation. In this case, if the records were released to you or any outside party, the City contends it "would be tantamount to providing [the] [p]laintiffs the same records outside the protection afforded under the rules of discovery." The City notes that before litigation was initiated, it provided you and the litigants with some relevant records and those records were used to prepare the instant litigation, and now the case has been filed, the City and its co-defendants "should not be placed at a disadvantage simply because it is a governmental litigant." The City contends, once released, it has no control over who may ultimately receive the records, including the opposing party, and such a result would render this exemption meaningless. Moreover, the City argues that the court process will provide all citizens an opportunity to review the relevant legal and factual questions that "form the basis of the [p]laintiff's claims without stripping the City of the protections afforded by the rules of discovery and forcing it (and the taxpayers it represents) to litigate on an unlevel playing field." The City maintains that "[t]his examination by the Court is the ultimate assessment of transparency and accountability for the City."

DISCUSSION
FOIA mandates that a public body provide citizens with reasonable access to its public records for inspection and copying. However, "records that pertain to pending or potential litigation which are not records of any court" are exempt from the definition of "public record." The public body has the burden of proof to justify its denial of access to records. The representations of the public body's legal counsel may satisfy this burden.

The City alleges that the records you seek are exempt pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9). To determine if this exemption applies, we must consider the following two factors: 1) whether litigation is pending; and 2) whether the records that the requesting party seeks pertain to that pending litigation. The City's counsel represents that a suit is pending in federal district court against the City and two other defendants regarding the constitutionality of the towing, impounding, and disposal of vehicles in Wilmington. The City attached a copy of this complaint to its Response. Based on this record, we find that this first prong is met.

For the second prong, we must determine whether the requested records pertain to this litigation. These requests for records showing the impoundment and sale of the vehicles by the City's contractors clearly pertain to the pending litigation described herein. Based on the foregoing, we determine that the requested records are exempt under 29 Del. C. § 10002(o)(9). However, in the interest of public transparency and consistent with its pre-litigation production of some relevant records, we encourage the City to consider voluntarily producing the requested records to you in whole or in part, subject to any necessary redactions or withholdings, to the extent it does not adversely affect the City's litigation position.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the City has not violated FOIA as alleged.

Very truly yours,
/s/ Dorey L. Cole
Dorey L. Cole
Deputy Attorney General

Approved:
/s/ Aaron R. Goldstein
Aaron R. Goldstein
State Solicitor

cc: John D. Hawley, Assistant City Solicitor, City of Wilmington (via email)