After Congress passed and the President signed a late disapproval resolution against DC's 2025 tax-conformity legislation, did DC taxpayers have to refile their 2025 returns under the older, less-favorable rules?

Plain-English summary

In late 2025 the DC Council enacted two tax statutes that "decoupled" parts of DC's tax code from the federal Internal Revenue Code, retroactive to January 1, 2025. The Emergency Conformity Act (D.C. Act 26-214) took effect December 3, 2025, and runs 90 days. The Temporary Conformity Act (D.C. Act 26-217) was enacted December 20, 2025, mirrors the same changes, and runs 225 days after congressional review.

Congress disapproved. The Council Chairman transmitted the Temporary Act to the Speaker and Senate President on December 30, 2025. The 30-day review window for non-criminal-code acts (excluding weekends, holidays, and recess days of more than three days) expired February 11, 2026. The House passed H.J. Res. 142 disapproving the Temporary Act on February 4. The Senate did not pass it until February 12 (one day after the window closed). The resolution went to the President's desk on February 12, and the President signed it on February 18, eight days late.

CFO Glen Lee, in the middle of the 2025 tax-filing season, asked: does HJ 142 require DC taxpayers to refile under the pre-decoupling rules? Is the Temporary Act dead? AG Schwalb said no on both counts.

On retroactive tax liability. The federal saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, provides that the repeal or expiration of a statute does not release or extinguish any liability incurred under that statute unless the repealing act expressly so provides. The DC saving statute, D.C. Code § 45-404, says the same thing. Tax liability accrues at year-end, when the taxable period closes. So DC taxpayers' 2025 liability was fixed on December 31, 2025 (when both the Emergency Act and the Temporary Act applied retroactively to the start of 2025). HJ 142 contains no language extinguishing prior liability, so even if HJ 142 were treated as a valid repeal, 2025 liabilities would survive.

On retroactivity more generally. Under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), a statute is presumed not to alter substantive rights, liabilities, or duties for pre-enactment conduct unless Congress expressly says so. HJ 142 contains no such language. So even setting aside the saving statutes, retroactivity does not attach.

On the validity of the Temporary Act. The Home Rule Act § 602(c)(1) provides that an act takes effect at the end of the 30-day review window unless a joint disapproval resolution is enacted "within such 30-day period." If both houses pass the resolution within the window and transmit it to the President, presidential signature after the window still operates as a "deemed" repeal. Here, the Senate did not pass within the window. The Temporary Act took effect on February 12, 2026, when the window closed.

The harder question was what to make of HJ 142. Was it a stand-alone act of Congress that repealed the Temporary Act (under Congress's plenary District Clause authority)? Or was it just an expression of unfavorable opinion?

The AG concluded the latter, on three grounds. First, the text of HJ 142 says only that Congress "disapproves of" the Council's action; it does not "repeal," "abrogate," "rescind," or "annul." Second, the Home Rule Act's § 602 explicitly distinguishes between disapproval (which repeals only when the resolution clears both houses within the window) and repeal (which Congress can do at any time through ordinary legislation). Reading "disapproves of" as a stand-alone repeal would render parts of § 602 superfluous. Third, congressional practice supports the distinction. When Congress wants to nullify a DC act, it uses words like "strike," "repeal," "annul," or "cancel." It uses "disapprove of" only within the § 602 framework.

So HJ 142 expresses congressional displeasure but does not repeal. The Temporary Conformity Act remains in effect and will expire by its own terms on September 25, 2026, unless the Council acts.

What this means for you

If you are a DC taxpayer filing a 2025 return

File using the rules in the Emergency Conformity Act and the Temporary Conformity Act. HJ 142 does not retroactively change your 2025 liability. You do not need to refile or amend.

If you are a DC tax preparer

Continue applying the December 2025 changes to all 2025 returns. Tell clients who saw news coverage of HJ 142 that the AG has confirmed the changes remain in effect for tax year 2025.

If you are a Council legislative staffer

The Temporary Act expires September 25, 2026. If the Council wants to extend the decoupling beyond that date or make it permanent, ordinary legislation is the path forward. Congress could repeal by ordinary legislation at any time, but has not done so as of this opinion.

If you are the CFO's tax-administration team

Continue administering the 2025 filing season under the changes enacted in the Emergency Act and Temporary Act. Update guidance to reflect that HJ 142 does not change 2025 liabilities or invalidate the Temporary Act.

If you are a federal observer of DC budget and tax law

This opinion is the most thorough public reading of § 602's "disapprove of" language since the original Home Rule Act. The textual distinction between "disapproval" (a § 602 procedure) and "repeal" (an ordinary-legislation power) shapes how Congress can interact with DC law going forward.

Common questions

Q: Why did the Senate miss the deadline?
A: Senate scheduling. The opinion is silent on the political background but the calendar shows the Senate passed February 12, one day after the 30-day window closed when counting working days only.

Q: Does the President's signature matter?
A: Under § 602, presidential signature on a joint disapproval resolution that cleared both houses within the window operates as a deemed repeal. Here, both houses did not clear within the window, so presidential signature was not enough to invoke the § 602 repeal mechanism.

Q: Could Congress still repeal the Temporary Act?
A: Yes. Congress's District Clause authority under § 601 of the Home Rule Act lets Congress repeal any DC law at any time through ordinary legislation. The § 602 disapproval procedure is an additional, time-limited mechanism, not a substitute for ordinary legislation.

Q: What happens after September 25, 2026?
A: The Temporary Conformity Act expires by its own terms. Absent further legislative action, DC's tax code reverts to the federal provisions from which the December 2025 acts decoupled.

Q: What about the Emergency Conformity Act?
A: It expires on March 3, 2026 (90 days after enactment). Congress took no action against it. Tax liability incurred under the Emergency Act survives expiration under 1 U.S.C. § 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404.

Q: Is the AG's reading of "disapproves of" likely to hold up in court?
A: Strong textual and historical support. The Supreme Court in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025) reaffirmed expressio unius. The Home Rule Act distinguishes between "disapprove of" (within the § 602 procedure) and outright repeal language used elsewhere. Congressional practice in 1871-1874 (when reviewing acts of the DC Legislative Assembly) and post-1973 (when reviewing acts of the home-rule Council) consistently used express repeal language when Congress meant to nullify, and "disapprove of" only within the § 602 framework.

Citations

DC and federal statutes
- D.C. Act 26-214 (Emergency Conformity Act)
- D.C. Act 26-217 (Temporary Conformity Act)
- DC Home Rule Act § 602(c)(1), D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)(1)
- DC Home Rule Act § 604, D.C. Code § 1-206.04
- DC Home Rule Act § 601, D.C. Code § 1-206.01
- 1 U.S.C. § 109 (federal saving statute)
- D.C. Code § 45-404 (DC saving statute)
- House Joint Resolution 142, 119th Cong. (2026), Pub. L. 119-78

Cases
- Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (presumption against retroactivity)
- Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 (1910) (tax liability within saving statute)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (federal saving statute scope)
- United States v. Alston, 580 A.2d 587 (D.C. 1990) (federal saving statute applies to DC emergency acts)
- Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1996) (DC saving statute mirrors federal)
- Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025) (expressio unius)
- Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of Ag., 37 F.4th 667 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (every clause and word)
- Couturier v. Comm'r, 162 T.C. 55 (2024) (presumption against retroactivity in tax)

Source

• Index page: https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/our-structure-divisions/legal-counsel-division/opinions-attorney-general
• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/AG-Opinion-Decoupling-Retroactivity-and-Validity-.pdf

Source

• Index page: https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/our-structure-divisions/legal-counsel-division/opinions-attorney-general
• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/AG-Opinion-Decoupling-Retroactivity-and-Validity-.pdf

License

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Original opinion text

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BRIAN L. SCHWALB
ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 24, 2026
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT:

Impact of House Joint Resolution 142 on the District’s Tax Laws

The Honorable Glen Lee
Chief Financial Officer for the District of Columbia
John A. Wilson Building
1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 203
Washington, D.C. 20004
Dear Chief Financial Officer Lee:
On December 3, 2025, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted an emergency statute—the D.C.
Income and Franchise Tax Conformity and Revision Emergency Amendment Act of 2025 (D.C. Act 26-214)
(the “Emergency Conformity Act”)—that made various changes to the District’s tax laws and provided that
those changes were effective immediately and applied retroactively “as of January 1, 2025.” Approximately
two weeks later, the Council enacted a temporary statute—the D.C. Income and Franchise Tax Conformity
and Revision Temporary Amendment Act of 2025 (D.C. Act 26-217) (the “Temporary Conformity Act”)—
that made the same changes to the District’s tax laws, also applicable retroactively as of “January 1, 2025.”
The Emergency Conformity Act is effective for 90 days (i.e., until March 3, 2026), and the Temporary
Conformity Act is effective for 225 days (i.e., until September 25, 2026). Following these enactments,
Congress passed and the President signed House Joint Resolution 142 (“HJ 142”), which states that
Congress “disapproves of” the Temporary Conformity Act.
By letter dated February 20, you asked whether the Temporary Conformity Act is “valid law.” Letter from
Glen Lee, Chief Financial Officer for the District of Columbia, to Brian Schwalb, Attorney General (Feb.
20, 2026). You also asked whether the Temporary Conformity Act “complete[d] its 30-day period of
Congressional review as required by section 602(c)(1) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act.” Your
letter notes that your Office is in the midst of administering the 2025 tax filing season and that you believe
answers to these questions are important to the “effective administration of the District’s tax laws.”
As discussed more fully below, as it pertains to the 2025 tax filing season, we need not address whether the
Temporary Conformity Act remains “valid law” because, regardless of its ongoing validity, HJ 142 did not
retroactively alter the tax liability imposed by the Emergency Conformity Act and the Temporary
Conformity Act for taxpayers whose tax year ended December 31, 2025. To the extent, however, that your

400 6th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 727-3400

letter’s reference to the “effective administration of the District’s tax laws” reflects concerns beyond the
2025 tax filing season, we conclude that HJ 142 did not repeal the Temporary Conformity Act and that the
latter remains in effect. This also provides an independent reason that HJ 142 does not alter 2025 tax
liabilities.
We note that for the vast majority of taxpayers, who pay taxes based on the calendar year, the continued
validity of the Temporary Conformity Act is not, at present, expected to govern their 2026 tax liabilities.
The Temporary Conformity Act is set to expire on September 25, 2026. At that time, absent further
legislative action, the District’s tax code will revert to following the federal provisions from which the
emergency and temporary acts “decoupled.”
BACKGROUND
I.

The Emergency Conformity Act and the Temporary Conformity Act

In December 2025, the Council enacted two statutes that retroactively altered tax liability for individuals
and businesses beginning on January 1, 2025. Specifically, on December 3, 2025, the Council enacted the
Emergency Conformity Act, an emergency statute that made a number of changes to the District’s tax laws.
That statute took effect immediately and stated that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, this act shall apply as
of January 1, 2025.” Emergency Conformity Act §§ 4, 6. As a matter of law, that emergency Act will
remain in effect for 90 days—that is, until March 3, 2026. Congress has not taken any action to repeal or
otherwise modify this Act.
On December 20, 2025, the Council enacted a temporary statute—the Temporary Conformity Act—that
made the same changes to the District’s tax laws that the Emergency Conformity Act had made. As was
the case with the Emergency Act, the Temporary Conformity Act provided that those changes “shall apply
as of January 1, 2025,” except as otherwise provided in the Act. Temporary Conformity Act § 4.1 The
Temporary Conformity Act stated that it would take effect following the period of congressional review
prescribed by the District of Columbia Home Rule Act and that it would then remain in effect for a period
of 225 days. Id. § 6.
II.

Sections 602 and 604 of the Home Rule Act

Section 602(c) of the Home Rule Act2 provides for a period of congressional review before non-emergency
bills that the Council enacts take effect. More specifically, it provides that acts codified in a title other than
the criminal law titles of the D.C. Code “shall take effect upon the expiration of the 30-calendar-day period
. . . beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate . . . unless during such 30-day period, there has been enacted

1

For example, the Act makes the child tax credit provisions applicable for “taxable years beginning after December 31, 2025.”
Temporary Conformity Act § 2(j).
2
Approved Dec. 24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)).

2

into law a joint resolution disapproving such act.”3 D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)(1). The 30-day period
excludes “Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session because of
an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days.” Id. Finally,
“[i]n any case in which any such joint resolution disapproving such an act has, within such 30-day period,
passed both Houses of Congress and has been transmitted to the President, such resolution, upon becoming
law, subsequent to the expiration of such 30-day period, shall be deemed to have repealed such act, as of
the date such resolution becomes law.” Id.
Section 604 of the Home Rule Act, adopted as an exercise of each of the two Houses’ rulemaking power,
see D.C. Code § 1-206.04(a)(1), describes what a disapproval resolution must say and how it must proceed.
It provides that “‘resolution’ means only a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is
as follows: ‘That the . . . . . . . . . . approves/disapproves of the action of the District of Columbia Council
described as follows: . . . . . . . . . .,’ the blank spaces therein being appropriately filled, and either approval
or disapproval being appropriately indicated; but does not include a resolution which specifies more than 1
action.” Id. § 1-206.04(b). The resolution must be referred to the District of Columbia committees in the
House and Senate, debate is limited to 10 hours and not subject to a filibuster, and certain motions related
to the resolution are to be decided without debate. See id. § 1-206.04(c)-(j).
III.

Transmission of the Temporary Conformity Act to Congress and HJ 142

As the Council’s website and the text of HJ 142 both note, the Chairman of the Council transmitted the
Temporary Conformity Act to both houses of Congress on December 30, 2025.4 The 30-day period
prescribed by the Home Rule Act thus began on that date.5 Furthermore, based on the session calendar
available from Congress’s official website,6 the final day of the 30-day period was February 11, 2026.7 The
House passed a resolution “disapproving of” the Temporary Conformity Act on February 4, 2026, and the

3

Measures that, unlike the Temporary Conformity Act, are codified in Title 22, 23, or 24 of the D.C. Code are subject to a 60day review period rather than the 30-day period applicable here. See D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)(2). Likewise, an act of the Council
will go into effect later than the end of the 30-day congressional review period if the act so prescribes (the Conformity Act does
not). Id. § 1-206.02(c)(1).
4
See https://lims.dccouncil.gov/Legislation/B26-0458; H.J. Res. 142, 119th Cong. (2026) (140 Stat. 747; Pub. L. 119-78) (noting
that the Conformity Act was “enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia on December 20, 2025, and transmitted to
Congress pursuant to section 602(c)(1) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act on December 30, 2025”).
5
Under the plain text of the Home Rule Act, the start of the congressional review period does not depend on when either House
of Congress incorporates the transmission into its journal, or when a resolution of disapproval is introduced in either body. It
depends solely on when an “act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate.” D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)(1).
6
https://www.congress.gov/days-in-session/119th-congress.
7
December 30 was day 1; December 31 was day 2 (it was a weekday that was part of a three-day-long adjournment, as opposed
to a more-than-three-day adjournment); January 2 was day 3 (as the other end of the three-day-long adjournment); January 5-9
were days 4-8 (during those days, both House were never in adjournment simultaneously for more than three days); January 1216 were days 9-13; January 20-23 were days 14-17 (during those days, both Houses were never in recess simultaneously for
more than three days); January 26-30 were days 18-22 (during those days, both Houses were never in adjournment simultaneously
for more than three days); February 2-6 were days 23-27 (during those days, both Houses were never in adjournment
simultaneously for more than three days); and February 9-11 were days 28-30.

3

Senate passed the resolution on February 12, 2026. HJ 142. The resolution was presented to the President
that same day, and the President signed it on February 18, 2026.8
Because HJ 142 was not enacted into law by February 11, it did not, under section 602 of the Home Rule
Act, prevent the Temporary Conformity Act from taking effect. As a result, the Temporary Conformity
Act took effect on February 12.
Against the backdrop of these factual circumstances, we address two questions: (1) what effect, if any, HJ
142 has on District of Columbia taxpayers’ liabilities for tax year 2025, and (2) whether the Temporary
Conformity Act is in effect and valid, absent further legislative action, until September 25, 2026.
ANALYSIS
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that, even if one were to assume that HJ 142 repealed the
Temporary Conformity Act, it would not alter the 2025 tax liability of District taxpayers under the
Emergency Conformity Act or the Temporary Conformity Act.
First, the Emergency Conformity Act changed the tax liability of District taxpayers “as of January 1, 2025,”
and remained in effect at the end of calendar year 2025. Congress took no action to repeal or nullify the
Emergency Conformity Act, and under 1 U.S.C. § 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404, the expiration of that
Emergency Act on March 3 “shall not” have the effect of releasing or extinguishing any tax liability incurred
under that Act.
Second, the Temporary Conformity Act enacted the same changes to the District’s tax code as the
Emergency Conformity Act, also retroactive to January 1, 2025, and extended those changes through
September 25, 2026. Even assuming HJ 142, after being signed by the President, repealed the Temporary
Conformity Act, 1 U.S.C. § 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404 expressly provide that any such repeal “shall not”
release or extinguish any liability previously incurred under the Temporary Conformity Act, unless the
repealing statute expressly provides otherwise. HJ 142 does not expressly state that it applies retroactively
to alter any tax liability incurred under the Temporary Conformity Act; as a result, all tax liabilities incurred
under that Act would survive a repeal.
Third, under the general presumption against retroactivity, HJ 142 cannot be construed to retroactively alter
2025 tax liabilities absent a clear statement that it applies retroactively. Again, HJ 142 contains no such
statement.
Fourth and finally, we conclude that HJ 142 did not, in any event, have the effect of repealing the Temporary
Conformity Act, because HJ 142 was not enacted into law or passed by both houses of Congress within the
Home Rule Act’s 30-day congressional review period, and it did not otherwise repeal the Temporary
Conformity Act. Accordingly, the Temporary Conformity Act remains in effect and, absent further

8

See https://www.congress.gov/index.php/bill/119th-congress/house-joint-resolution/142/all-actions.

4

legislative action, will expire on September 25, 2026. For this reason, too, HJ 142 does not alter District
taxpayers’ 2025 tax liabilities.
I.

Under 1 U.S.C. § 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404, the Emergency Conformity Act and the
Temporary Conformity Act continue to govern tax liability for taxpayers whose tax year
ended December 31, 2025.

The starting point for our analysis is 1 U.S.C. § 109 and its District-law counterpart, D.C. Code § 45-404.
Section 109, which is known as the “federal saving statute,” explains how the repeal or expiration of a
statute affects liabilities that were incurred under the repealed or expired statute. Dorsey v. United States,
567 U.S. 260, 272 (2012). Section 109 establishes that the repeal of a statute does not release or extinguish
any liability incurred under that statute, unless the repealing statute expressly provides otherwise:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty,
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly
provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of
sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture,
or liability.
1 U.S.C. § 109. In addition, section 109 provides that the expiration of a temporary statute also does not
release or extinguish liability that was incurred under that statute:
The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty,
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly
provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any
proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
Id.
In plain terms, then, when a law imposing liability expires or is repealed, individuals remain subject to any
statutory liability incurred while the statute was in effect unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. An
individual who committed a crime while a temporary statute was in effect, for instance, can still be punished
for that crime after the statute expires, and an individual who accrues civil liability under a subsequently
repealed statute can still be subject to an enforcement action for violating that statute after the law is
repealed. See, e.g., Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. AvilaAnguiano, 609 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010).
These rules apply to laws enacted by the Council as well as by Congress. The D.C. Court of Appeals has
held that section 109 applies, of its own force, to District laws. See United States v. Alston, 580 A.2d 587,
600 (D.C. 1990) (“[W]e hold that the federal savings provision of 1 U.S. Code § 109 applies to emergency

5

acts of the D.C. Council”). And the Council has enacted a virtually identical provision, D.C. Code § 45404, that bears the same meaning as its federal counterpart. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 75
(D.C. 1996) (explaining that the language is “essentially the same” and finding “no material difference”
between the statutes).9
Furthermore, it is well established that the liability to pay taxes is a type of “liability” encompassed by both
section 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404. The Supreme Court held more than a century ago that the “liability
or obligation to pay a tax imposed under a repealed statute is not only within the letter, but the spirit and
purpose, of” section 109. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 218 (1910). And courts have repeatedly applied
section 109 to tax laws. See D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Pearson, 149 F. Supp. 18, 23 (D.D.C. 1957) (“This
provision is applicable to tax laws.”); see also, e.g., Korshin v. Comm’r, 91 F.3d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1996);
Widdis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D. Alaska 1974); Johnson v. City of Fairfax, 394 F. Supp.
387, 390 (E.D. Va. 1972); Ewbank v. United States, 50 F.2d 409, 409 (7th Cir. 1931). Accordingly, the
expiration or repeal of a District act imposing taxes does not “release or extinguish” the obligation to pay
taxes incurred under that act, unless Congress or the Council specifically provides otherwise. 1 U.S.C.
§ 109; D.C. Code § 45-404(a)-(b).
The Emergency Conformity Act plainly imposes tax liability for calendar year 2025. The Act, which took
effect on December 3, 2025, and which will remain in effect until March 3, 2026, makes numerous changes
to the District’s tax laws and expressly states that those changes apply retroactively “as of January 1, 2025.”
Emergency Conformity Act § 4. Accordingly, the Emergency Conformity Act was the law of the District
as of January 1, 2025, and established the laws governing District tax liability for taxpayers whose filing
year ended December 31, 2025. As scores of District Code provisions make clear, a taxpayer’s liability is
assessed for a particular taxable year based on that taxpayer’s conduct during that year, and accrues when
that taxable year ends, regardless of when a tax return is filed or payment is due. See generally D.C. Code
§ 47-1801.01 et seq.; see, e.g., id. § 47-1801.04(51) (“‘Taxable year’ means the calendar year or the fiscal
year, whichever is the basis upon which the net income of the taxpayer is computed under this section . . .
.”); id. § 47-1801.04(3A)(A), (44) (imposing standard deduction “for the taxable year”); id. § 47-1805.03
(setting income tax rate for income earned during the taxable year); cf. Hatcher v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1244 (T.C. 1983) (explaining that, under federal law, “[t]ax liabilities accrue when the taxable period
ends, not when the tax is due and payable. . . . Thus, the liability of [a taxpayer] for his taxable year . . .
accrued on December 31 [of that year], when his taxable year ended.” (citing Leach v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 70
(1953))). Accordingly, the expiration of the Emergency Conformity Act on March 3, 2026, will not “release
9

D.C. Code § 45-404 provides:
(a) The repeal of any act of the Council shall not release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred
pursuant to the act, and the act shall be treated as remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of any penalty, forfeiture, or liability, unless the repealing act expressly provides for
the release or extinguishment of any penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
(b) The expiration of any act of the Council shall not release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred
pursuant to the act, and the act shall be treated as remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of any penalty, forfeiture, or liability, unless the expiring act expressly provides for the
release or extinguishment of any penalty, forfeiture, or liability.

6

or extinguish” any tax liability for calendar year 2025, taxpayers will continue to have an obligation to pay
their 2025 taxes in accordance with the Emergency Conformity Act, and those liabilities will remain
enforceable and collectible following the expiration of the Emergency Conformity Act. See 1 U.S.C. § 109;
D.C. Code § 45-404(b).
For similar reasons, taxpayers will also have a continuing obligation to pay the (identical) taxes imposed
by the Temporary Conformity Act for calendar year 2025. As noted above, the Temporary Conformity Act
took effect on February 12, 2026, and expressly stated that its changes to tax liability were effective “as of
January 1, 2025.” Temporary Conformity Act § 4. Even if one were to assume that HJ 142 repealed the
Temporary Conformity Act, it would not “release or extinguish” any tax liabilities incurred under that Act
for calendar year 2025. Again, section 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404(a) explicitly state that the repeal of a
statute “shall not” be construed to “release or extinguish . . . liability incurred” under that statute unless the
repealing statute “expressly so provides.” 1 U.S.C. § 109; D.C. Code § 45-404(a). HJ 142, which was not
enacted until February 18, 2026, does not expressly state—or in any way suggest—that it releases or
extinguishes pre-enactment tax liability. Its text simply states:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That the Congress disapproves of the action of the District of Columbia Council
described as follows: The D.C. Income and Franchise Tax Conformity and Revision Temporary
Amendment Act of 2025 (D.C. Act 26–217), enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia on
December 20, 2025, and transmitted to Congress pursuant to section 602(c)(1) of the District of
Columbia Home Rule Act on December 30, 2025.
Given the plain language of section 109 and D.C. Code § 45-404, and the absence of any congressional
language in HJ 142 providing for retroactive effect, District taxpayers whose taxable year ended December
31, 2025, are liable for taxes for 2025 in accordance with both the Emergency Conformity Act and the
Temporary Conformity Act.
II.

The presumption against retroactivity separately dictates that HJ 142 does not alter tax
liability for calendar year 2025.

There is an additional, independent reason why, even if one were to assume that HJ 142 repealed the
Temporary Conformity Act, HJ 142 would not alter tax liabilities for calendar year 2025: the presumption
against retroactivity. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994), the Supreme Court held
that a statute should not be construed to alter substantive rights, liabilities, or duties related to conduct
arising before the statute’s enactment unless Congress expressly says so. The Supreme Court has
interpreted statutes to retroactively alter substantive rights, duties, and liabilities only where the language
authorizing such retroactive application is so clear that it “could sustain only one interpretation.” Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997). The presumption has been applied to prevent retroactive alteration
of liabilities of both private parties and the government. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 271 n.25; Martin v.
Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999); St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Becerra, 28 F.4th 119, 131 (10th Cir. 2022);

7

Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71, 87 n.16 (2d Cir. 2006); Zarcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 578 F.3d 892,
895-896 (8th Cir. 2009); Harrod v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 783, 791 (8th Cir. 2000). And it has been applied
specifically in the tax context. See Couturier v. Comm’r, 162 T.C. 55, 67-68 (2024); Richardson v. Dir.,
Div. of Tax’n, 14 N.J. Tax 356, 368 (1994) (refusing to retroactively apply law that created a right to full
abatement of interest if state’s return instructions were erroneous since that “would change the rules and
expectations under which both state employees and taxpayers operated”); United States v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928) (applying presumption against retroactivity to intervening law
that established more favorable rule for calculating refund).
As discussed above, Congress provided no indication—let alone one that “could sustain only one
interpretation”—that HJ 142 should be applied to retroactively alter District taxpayers’ liabilities for tax
year 2025. Unlike the Temporary Conformity Act, HJ 142 does not state that it “applies as of January 1,
2025.” Nor does it contain any other sort of language that courts have previously found sufficient to
establish a statute’s retroactive temporal reach. See, e.g., Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 418
(1931) (holding that tax provision “was manifestly intended to operate retroactively according to its terms”
where it “expressly applied to internal revenue taxes which had been assessed prior to June 2, 1924, and
within the period of limitation applicable to the assessment”); United States v. Farfield Co., 5 F.4th 315,
330 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that statute included “an ‘express command’ to apply it retroactively” where
statute designated a pre-enactment effective date by specifying “all claims under the False Claims Act . . .
that are pending on or after [June 7, 2008]”).
Accordingly, Landgraf’s presumption against retroactivity dictates that HJ 142 does not retroactively undo
the changes that the Emergency Conformity Act and the Temporary Conformity Act made to the District’s
tax laws for calendar year 2025. As a result, the changes to the tax laws made by the Emergency Conformity
Act and the Temporary Conformity Act continue to govern tax liabilities for taxpayers whose tax year ended
December 31, 2025.
III.

The Temporary Conformity Act is in effect and valid notwithstanding the enactment of
HJ 142.

To the extent your letter’s reference to the “effective administration of the District’s tax laws” reflects
concerns beyond the 2025 tax filing season, we address the broader question whether the Temporary
Conformity Act remains valid law. We conclude that it does. This also provides a fourth independent
reason that HJ 142 does not alter taxpayer liabilities for tax year 2025.
As a threshold matter, for the reasons set out above, HJ 142 was not enacted into law within the 30-day
period provided for in the Home Rule Act. As of the end of the 30-day period on February 11, only the
House of Representatives had passed HJ 142. Both Houses of Congress thus did not pass the disapproval
resolution within that 30-day period. As a result, the disapproval resolution did not prevent the Temporary
Conformity Act from taking effect, nor did the subsequent signature of the President cause the disapproval
resolution to be “deemed” a repeal of the Temporary Conformity Act within the meaning of the Home Rule
Act. D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)(1).
8

Nevertheless, we have carefully considered what legal effect, if any, HJ 142 has, notwithstanding that
Congress acted outside of the time limits expressly set forth in the Home Rule Act. For the reasons below,
we conclude that HJ 142 must be interpreted as an expression of Congress’s unfavorable view of the
Temporary Conformity Act, but not as a repeal.
We begin with the text of HJ 142, which says only that Congress “disapproves of” the Council’s action; it
does not contain any language that purports to repeal or nullify a law that has already taken effect. Generally
speaking, to “disapprove” something could mean to “pass unfavorable judgment” on it, “reject” it, or
“think” “unfavorably” of it. Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). To “disapprove of” an action
ordinarily means “to hold an unfavorable opinion of” or “to feel that someone or something is bad” or
“wrong.” Merriam Webster Online Thesaurus (last visited February 22, 2026). “To repeal,” in contrast,
means “[t]o authoritatively abrogate, rescind, or annul (a statute, ordinance, or other legal instrument); to
effectively render invalid.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). By its plain terms, HJ 142 expresses
an unfavorable opinion of the Conformity Act but does not abrogate, rescind, annual, or invalidate it.
Because “[w]e generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the
legislation it enacts,” Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 176 (1988), we look to the Home
Rule Act to further understand the meaning of “disapprove of” in HJ 142. See also United States v. Wilson,
290 F.3d 347, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Congress is presumed to preserve, not abrogate, the background
understandings against which it legislates.”). Section 602 of the Home Rule Act specifies two
circumstances in which Congress’s “disapproval of” a District enactment results in a rejection or repeal. In
these two circumstances, both of which are strictly time limited, Section 602 essentially transforms an
ordinary sense resolution, expressing Congress’s opinion, into something with legal effect.
The first circumstance is when both Houses of Congress pass a resolution disapproving of a Council act
and the President signs it within the 30-day period. When that happens, the Council act is prevented from
ever taking effect. D.C. Code § 1-206.02(c)(1).
Section 602 then provides for one, and only one, situation in which a resolution “disapprov[ing] of” a
District enactment will result in a “repeal.” If a disapproval resolution has, “within such 30-day period,
passed both Houses of Congress and has been transmitted to the President [within the 30 day period],” and
if the President subsequently signs the resolution after the 30-day period has elapsed, the resolution “shall
be deemed to have repealed” the Council’s act, as of the date the President signs the resolution. Id. The
express language Congress used in this clause is significant for several reasons.
First, if a disapproval resolution passed at any time repealed a law that was already in effect in the District,
then there would be no need for the Home Rule Act to specify that a disapproval resolution passed by both
houses of Congress before expiration of the 30-day review period but signed by the President afterward
“shall be deemed” a repeal. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Ag., 37 F.4th 667, 672 (D.C. Cir.
2022) (“It is a familiar canon of statutory construction that, ‘if possible,’ we are to construe a statute so as
to give effect to ‘every clause and word.’”) (internal citation omitted).

9

Second, the Home Rule Act specifies that a resolution passed within the review period but signed afterward
should be “deemed” to have repealed the District’s law. The primary meaning of “deem” is “[t]o treat
(something) as if (1) it were really something else, or (2) it has qualities that it does not have.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Congress’s use of that word thus suggests that it did not view joint resolutions
“disapproving of” Council actions as something that would ordinarily “repeal” a District law. Rather,
Congress saw repeal as an action different from, and one that would not ordinarily be a consequence of,
mere disapproval.
Third, that the Home Rule Act provides for only one specific scenario in which a disapproval resolution
should be “deemed” a repeal implies that Congress did not intend for disapproval resolutions to repeal
District laws apart from that specific scenario. That conclusion follows naturally from the “well-established
canon of statutory interpretation: ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius.’” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S.
185, 195 (2025); see Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. 269, 270 (1871) (“When a statute limits a thing
to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.”). The Home Rule Act is clear
that a disapproval resolution signed after the congressional review period repeals a District law only where
both houses of Congress have passed the resolution within 30 days of transmittal. The Home Rule Act does
not provide the same for disapproval resolutions passed outside of that window.
Because Congress acted outside the Home Rule Act’s procedures that give legal effect to “disapproval of”
the Council’s act, HJ 142 operates to express Congress’s unfavorable view of the Temporary Conformity
Act and not to repeal it.
This reading of HJ 142 is consistent with congressional practice in reviewing District laws both prior to and
since home rule. Since its enactment of the Home Rule Act, Congress has taken various approaches to
nullify acts of the Council without relying on the disapproval procedure in section 602. It has directly
eliminated Council-enacted provisions of law using the express language of “strike” or “repeal,” sometimes
retroactively.10 It also has used the appropriations process to prevent the District from using funds to

10

See, e.g., District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority Independence Act, § 4, approved July 15, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110273; 122 Stat. 2492) (“Section 213 of D.C. Act 17-172 is repealed, and each provision of law amended by such section is restored
as if such section had not been enacted into law. . . . [This subsection] (b) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of D.C.
Act 17-172.”); National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, § 11702, approved August 5,
1997 (Pub. L. No. 105-33; 111 Stat. 781) (“Effective March 21, 1995, the Clean Air Compliance Fee Act of 1994 is hereby
repealed . . . .”); District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1996, § 135(2), approved April 26, 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-134; 110
Stat. 1321-92) (“Section 413(c) (D.C. Code, sec. 47-815(c)) is repealed”); An Act To amend the District of Columbia Spouse
Equity Act of 1988 to provide for coverage of the former spouses of judges of the District of Columbia courts, approved June
28, 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-268; 108 Stat. 730) (“Section 2 of the District of Columbia Spouse Equity Act of 1988 (sec. 1-3001,
D.C. Code) is amended by striking ‘(A) and (C)’.”); District of Columbia Appropriations Act 1994, § 139, approved October 29,
1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-127; 107 Stat. 1349) (“Title IV of the District of Columbia Omnibus Budget Support Act of 1992 (D.C.
Law 9-145) is hereby repealed, and any provision of the District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act amended by such title is
restored as if such title had not been enacted into law.”).

10

implement Council-passed acts or to compel the Council to repeal its acts. 11 But it has not, outside of the
procedures of section 602, nullified a law simply by “disapproving of” it.12
Likewise, from 1871 to 1874, when reviewing acts of the Legislative Assembly (the District’s last local
legislature prior to home rule), every time Congress passed a law to authoritatively rescind a District act
that had already taken effect, the federal law specified that the District act was “repealed,” 13 “annulled,”14
“disapproved and repealed,”15 “disapproved, cancelled, and declared void,”16 or “disapproved and declared
null and void.”17 Thus, even before home rule, when Congress intended to repeal a District law, it expressly
said as much. And by pairing the terms “repealed” or “canceled[] and declared void” with “disapproved,”
it made clear that it did not understand the word “disapproved,” of its own force, to effectuate a repeal.
Finally, this reading of HJ 142 is consistent with Congress’s express intent in the Home Rule Act to “grant
to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers of local self-government.” D.C. Code § 1-201.02(a).
By giving legal effect to the words “disapprove of” in only two strictly time-limited circumstances, Section
602 provides District law a vital measure of finality and certainty that enables the District to effectively
order and administer its local affairs, including its local taxing responsibilities, which require planning,
investment, and certainty. The District has relied on this measure of finality for more than 50 years to
realize the self-governance purposes of the Home Rule Act.
11

See, e.g., District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1996, § 132, approved April 26, 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104-134; 110 Stat.
1321-91) (providing that “nor shall any funds made available pursuant to any provision of this Act otherwise be used to
implement or enforce D.C. Act 9-188, signed by the Mayor of the District of Columbia on April 15, 1992); District of Columbia
Appropriations Act, 1989, § 143, approved October 1, 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-462; 102 Stat. 2269-13) (“None of the Federal
funds appropriated by this Act shall be obligated or expended after December 31, 1988, if on that date the District of Columbia
has not repealed District of Columbia Law 6-170, the Prohibition of Discrimination in the Provision of Insurance Act of 1986
(D.C. Law 6-170), amended the law to allow testing for the human immunodeficiency virus as a condition for acquiring all
health, life and disability insurance without regard to the face value of such policies.”); id. § 145 (102 Stat. 2269-14) (“None of
the funds appropriated by this Act shall be obligated or expended after December 31, 1988, if on that date the District of Columbia
has not adopted subsection (c) of this section [amending section 241 of the Human Rights Act of 1977 (D.C. Official Code § 21402.41)].”).
12
Moreover, Congress has previously enacted a law solely to express its favorable view of a Council act. An Act Making
consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes, § 201, approved November
29, 1999 (Pub. L. No. 113; 113 Stat. 1535) (“The Congress commends the District of Columbia for its action to reduce taxes,
and ratifies D.C. Act 13-110 (commonly known as the Service Improvement and Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Support Act of
1999.”)).
13
See An Act to approve an act of the legislative assembly of the District of Columbia relating to parishes of the Protestant
Episcopal Church, approved Mar. 28, 1874 (18 Stat. 25) (“[T]he act of the legislative assembly . . . be, and the same is hereby,
approved; and that all acts now in force in the District of Columbia, inconsistent therewith, be, and the same are hereby repealed”);
An Act Authorizing the laying of water mains and service sewers in the District of Columbia, the levying of assessments therefor,
and for other purposes, § 10, approved Apr. 22, 1904 (33 Stat. 244) (“all Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed”).
14
See An Act For the government of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, § 8, approved June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. 116)
(“the authority conferred on the board of public works to issue additional certificates of indebtedness by section four of the act
of the legislative assembly approved on the twenty-ninth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, is hereby annulled”).
15
See An Act prohibiting Gift Enterprises in the District of Columbia, approved Feb. 17, 1873 (17 Stat. 464) (cited in In re
Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 216 (1911)).
16
See An Act To fund certain liabilities of the City of Washington, existing June first, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, and to
limit the debt of and taxation in the District of Columbia, § 5, approved May 8, 1872 (17 Stat. 87).
17
See id. § 6.

11

To be sure, Congress has authority to repeal an act of the Council at any time. Id. § 1-206.01. Congress
could still repeal the Emergency Conformity Act or the Temporary Conformity Act. But, in our view,
Congress did not do so here. Outside the contours of section 602, HJ 142 operates as an expression of
Congress’s unfavorable opinion of the Temporary Conformity Act but not as a repeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, notwithstanding the enactment of HJ 142, the changes to the tax laws made by the
Emergency Conformity Act and the Temporary Conformity Act continue to govern tax liabilities for
taxpayers whose tax year ended December 31, 2025, and the Temporary Conformity Act remains in effect
and, absent further legislative action, will expire on September 25, 2026.
Sincerely,

Brian L. Schwalb
Attorney General for the District of Columbia

12