Does the DC Council have the legal authority to review and approve large real-estate leases (over one million dollars per year) signed by the District government, the same way it reviews large procurement contracts?

Plain-English summary

Councilmember Kathleen Patterson asked whether the DC Council had legal authority to review and approve large District-government leases (anything over $1 million per 12-month window). The Corporation Counsel said yes, but the path to that yes runs through some constitutional plumbing.

Before 1995 the Council had tried to claim lease-review authority through D.C. Code § 1-336(c), a 1991 Council law. The companion 1991 Council law on procurement contracts (D.C. Code § 1-1181.5a) had been struck down in Wilson v. Kelly, 615 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1992), on separation-of-powers grounds: the Council could not, by ordinary resolution authority under § 412(a) of the Charter, claim approval power over what was traditionally a Mayoral executive function. The same reasoning would have struck down § 1-336(c), since the two Council laws were enacted as part of the same 1990 Act.

But Congress changed the playing field in 1995 by amending the Charter itself. Section 451(b), added by the FRMA Act, requires Council approval for "contracts involving expenditures in excess of $1 million during a 12-month period." A Charter amendment enacted by Congress sits above the Wilson-line separation-of-powers constraint that defeated the Council's earlier law.

Does "contract" in § 451(b) include leases? The Corporation Counsel said yes, for several reasons: black-letter property law treats a lease as a contract; the practical purpose of FRMA (review the financial impact of all government activity) would be defeated by carving out leases; the Mayor and Council had been routinely using § 451(b) for leases in practice; and the Council's published review criteria expressly cover leases. So § 451(b) supplies the legitimate constitutional foundation that § 1-336(c) lacked.

The opinion also addresses Councilmember Patterson's procedural side question. The Council had tried to shorten the standard 45-day review window to 15 days through a § 1-336 amendment. The Corporation Counsel concluded the Council could not do that by act, because § 451(b)'s 45-day cap is a Charter limit. But the Council can effectively shorten review through internal forbearance: nothing prevents unanimous Council agreement to act on a specific lease before 45 days run.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The FRMA control-board regime expired by its own terms, and the Council's contract-and-lease review thresholds and deadline procedures have been amended several times since 1998.

Historical context

This opinion is the second in a sequence with the 1996 Council-Review-of-Independent-Agency-Contracts opinion. Same statutory framework (§ 451(b)), same charter dynamic (federal-amendment-defeats-Wilson), but applied to a different question. The 1996 opinion established that Council review reaches independent-agency contracts. This 1998 opinion establishes that "contract" in § 451(b) reaches leases.

The practical stakes were real estate. The District government leases massive amounts of office space, school space, social-service space, and storage space. Whether the Council had legal authority over those leases (rather than just procurement contracts) determined who held the negotiating use when a private landlord sat down with DC.

What this meant at the time for the Council

Lease review authority was secure. Even if § 1-336(c) was held invalid, § 451(b) covered the same ground.

What this meant for landlords negotiating with DC

A lease of $1 million per year or more had to clear Council review before becoming a binding obligation. The 45-day Council window plus a separate Authority window meant about two months of approval delay on top of any negotiation timeline.

What this meant for the Mayor

The Mayor's office became the transmission point for lease submissions to Council, the same way it was the transmission point for procurement contracts.

Common questions

Q: Why does this matter now?
A: For most current DC procurement and lease practice, the operative source of authority is whichever current PPA and Council rules are in force, not § 451(b) directly. But the underlying separation-of-powers logic (federal Charter amendment overrides traditional executive function) still controls.

Q: What was the 1991 Council Acquisition of Space Needs Act?
A: D.C. Law 8-257, codified at D.C. Code § 1-336(c) and (d). It tried to give the Council approval authority over District leases at $1 million annual gross rental. Per this opinion, that section was probably invalid as enacted but became a moot question once § 451(b) covered the same ground.

Q: Is "lease" a contract under DC law?
A: Yes, both at common law (Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074 (D.C. 1992)) and in standard legal usage (49 Am. Jur. 2d "Landlord and Tenant" § 20).

Q: Could the Council shorten the review window?
A: Not by act, because § 451(b) sets the maximum window. But yes by internal forbearance, especially when no member opposed the lease.

Citations

Statutes
- Self-Government Act §§ 412(a), 451(b)
- FRMA Act § 203(b), D.C. Code § 47-392.3(b)
- D.C. Code § 1-336 (Acquisition of Space Needs Act framework)
- D.C. Procurement Practices Act § 105A, D.C. Code § 1-1181.5a
- D.C. Act 12-214 (Council Contract Review Criteria Emergency Amendment Act of 1997)

Cases
- Wilson v. Kelly, 615 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1992) (separation-of-powers limit on Council resolution authority)
- Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (lease as contract)
- Brown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074 (D.C. 1992) (lease as contract)

Source

• Index page: https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/our-structure-divisions/legal-counsel-division/opinions-attorney-general
• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-Contracts-and-Leases.pdf

Source

• Index page: https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/our-structure-divisions/legal-counsel-division/opinions-attorney-general
• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-Contracts-and-Leases.pdf

License

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attribution.

Original opinion text

~aUtt11mtnt af tbt II istrid of CltaJumbiu
OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
JUDICIARY SQUARE

441 FOURTH ST .. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D. C.

20001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

LCD:WCW:
(AL-98-301)

July 8, 1998

The Honorable Kathleen Patterson
Council of the District of Columbia
441 - 4th Street, N.W., Room 709
Washington, D.C. 20001

.

Re: Contracts and Leases (Your letter of July 6, 1998)
Dear Kathy:
To get to the heart of the matter, I believe that subsection (c) of D.C. Code §
1-336, which the Council enacted in 1991 before FRMAA added subsection (b) to
section 451 of the Home Rule Charter, is invalid. I also conclude, however, that
section 451 (b) of the Charter applies to leases. Thus, even without D.C. Code § 1336(c), the Council now has the authority -- under section 451 (b) -- to review and
approve proposed leases involving expenditures in excess of $1 million during a 12month period.
More specifically, Wilson v. Kelly, 615 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1992), is controlling
here. Applying separation of powers doctrine, Wilson stands for the proposition that
there are certain executive prerogatives of the Mayor which the Council cannot limit.
On the other hand, there are various Mayoral actions that traditionally are subject to
Council approval or disapproval. Wilson held that the Council did not have approval
authority over contracts entered into by the Mayor, because contracts traditionally are
exclusively a Mayoral function. Accordingly, the statutory provision at issue in Wilson,
D.C. Code § 1-1181.5a, "exceeded the Council's resolution authority under section
412(a) of the [Home Rule] Charter, D.C. Code § 1-229 (1992)." Wilson, 615 A.2d
at 231.

The Honorable Kathleen Patterson
Page 2
July 8, 1998

Similarly, if we apply the analysis in Wilson, the Council had no authority to
adopt D.C. Code § 1-336(c) (1998 Supp.), which was part of the same act, D.C. Code
§ 1-1181.5a, that the Wilson court nullified. 1 Like D.C. Code § 1-118.5a, D.C. Code
§ 1-336(c) was unlawful because it was not similar to those provisions identified in
Wilson as coming within the Council's resolution approval authority.

/
.\

FRMAA, however, in 1995 amended the Charter to add a new subsection (b)
to section 451, D.C. Code § 1-1130(b) (1998 Supp.). That Charter amendment
required the Council's approval of contracts "involving expenditures in excess of $1
million dollars during a 12-month period" pursuant to particular procedures. If we call
a lease a contract -- which I conclude we necessarily should here, see, e.g., Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Brown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1078 (D.C. 1992); 49 Am Jur. 2d "Landlord and
Tenant", § 20 (2nd ed. 1995); Black's LawDictionary (6th ed. 1990), p.889 -- we can
see that this Charter amendment gave the Council authority to review and approve
large leases that it previously lacked. In my view, the Council had no authority to
require approval of large leases until FRMAA granted the Council power in this regard .
In short, § 1-336(c), even though it preceded the Charter amendment; cannot stand
on its own because, as elaborated in Wilson, the Court exceeded its powers in
enacting § 1-336(c). Put another way, § 1-336(c) did not -- under the required
separation of powers -- reflect the kind of Council approval that traditionally had been
permitted, and thus continued to be permitted under Wilson.

tThe Acquisition of Space Needs For District Government Officers and Employees Act
of 1990 ("1990 Act"), effective March 8, 1991, D.C. Law 8-257, established for the first time a
role for the Council in approving both procurements and leases. Section 2(b) of the 1990 Act
amended section 705 of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1970 ("1970 Act"), approved
January 5, 1971, Pub. L. 91-650, 84 Stat. 1939, D.C. Code § 1-336, to add current subsections (c)
through (i). (The 1970 Act as adopted by Congress, currently codified at D.C. Code § 1-336(a)
and (b), did not authorize the Council to review or approve leases.) In addition, section 3 of the
Council's 1990 Act amended the District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1985
("PPA") to add section 105A, D.C. Code § 1-1181.5a, which was at issue in Wilson. Just as D.C.
Code § 1-336(c) requires Council approval ofleases with "an average annual gross rental in
excess of $1,000,000 over the lease period, II D.C. Code § 1-1181.5a as enacted in 1991 required
Council approval of II [a]ny contract for goods or services worth over $1,000,000" -- albeit the
latter provision contained no annual or other temporal limit of the kind in D.C. Code.§ 1-336(b).

The Honorable Kathleen Patterson
Page 3
July 8, 1998

In addition to the law's customary use of "contract" to include a lease, there are
several other factors that weigh in favor of construing the word "contract" in section
451 (b) of th"Charter to include a lease. First, there is little doubt that, in adopting
this provision, Congress probably was aware of the Council's 1990 Act that included
§ 1-336(c). See supra note 1. But even if Congress was not in fact aware of § 1336(c), courts likely would presume such awareness, because section 451 (b) and the
1990 Act relate to the same subject matter. See, e.g., 2B Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 51.04 (5th ed. 1992). Furthermore, although only part of the 1990
Act was at issue in Wilson, there is no reason to believe -- given the applicability of
the ruling in Wilson to all parts of the 1990 Act -- that Congress intended to grant the
authority sought by the Council with respect to procurements but no"t" with respect to
leases. Absent written legislative history to the contrary, the better view is that
Congress intended to grant all the authority sought in the 1 990 Act, including review
of proposed leases. This interpretation is supported by the" 12-month" criterion in
section 451 (b)' which mirrors the "annual" criterion contained in D.C. Code § 1336(c).
Second, the conclusion that Congress intended section 451 (b) to cover leases
is reinforced by the rule of statutory construction described in 2B Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 49.05 (5th ed. 1992), which requires that deference be given to the
consistent and reasonable interpretation of a statute by the instrumentality charged
with its administration. Cf. Stevenson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and
Ethics, 683 A.2d 1371, 1378 (D.C. 1996) (applying this rule to an administrative
board and citing Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). Here, Council legislation adopting criteria for the Council's
review of contracts "[p]ursuant to" section 451(b) has expressly provided that these
criteria also apply to the review of proposed leases. See, e.g., section 2 of the
Establishment of Council Contract Review Criteria Emergency Amendment Act of
1997, effective December 16,1997, D.C. Act 12-214, amending section 105a(a) and
(d) of the PPA. In addition, I understand that, since FRMAA, the Mayor routinely has
submitted large leases to the Council for its approval, and the Council has approved
the leases, pursuant to resolutions that have cited as underlying legal authority section
451 (b) as well as D.C. Code § 1-336.2 Therefore, the courts would give deference to

2IfD.C. Code § 1-336(c) is void based on Wilson, the only lawful predicate for these
resolutions is section 451 (b). The apparent practice of the Mayor and the Council to cite the two
provisions, coupled with the fact that each provision purports to grant the full power required,
evidences a practical interpretation that either provision authorizes the Council to review and

The Honorable Kathleen Patterson
Page 4
July 8, 1998

the reasonable interpretation by the Council and the Mayor -- the instrumentalities
charged with the administration of section 451 (b) -- that section 451 (b) covers leases.
Third, the purposes of FRMAA show that section 451 (b) encompasses
eliminating the District government's budget deficit and providing for review of the
financial impact of activities of the government. See FRMAA, section 2(b). It cannot
fairly be argued that these purposes would be fully served by excluding proposed large
leases from Council review under section 451 (b) even as other kinds of proposed large
contracts were subject to such review. Accordingly, this reasoning buttresses my
belief that Congress intended that proposed large leases be subject to Council review.
'.

This is not to say that there are no reasonable arguments going the other way.
For example, in section 203(b) of FRMAA, D.C. Code § 47-392.3(b) (1997)' Congress
clearly specified that "contracts and leases" are subject to the review and approval of
the Financial Authority; therefore, a reasonable argument can be made that Congress
also would have used the phrase "contract or lease" in section 451 (b) of the Charter
if it had, in fact, intended to authorize the Council to review and approve leases. Other
arguments of this kind may be available. However, I believe that, while the matter is
not entirely free from doubt, the more persuasive position is that leases are covered
by section 451 (b). This position also has the virtue, incidentally, of being the most
prudent, given that Council review and approval of proposed large leases will avoid any
possible doubt concerning their validity under section 451 (b).
Finally, to address the point in your July 6, 1998 letter to me, I doubt that the
Council could, by act, substitute a 1 5 calendar day review for the 45 day review
period in section 451 (b), as the Council attempted to do by adding subsection (d-1)
to D.C. Code § 1-336 last year. This is so even though, when subsection (d-1) was
passed, the Council lawfully could enact legislation to implement its lease-approval
power under section 451 (b). I note, however, that section 451 (b) does not in all cases
mandate a 45-day approval period. Under subsection (b)(2)(A) approval is deemed to
take effect within 10 days of the Mayor's submission if "no member of the Council
introduces a resolution " of approval or disapproval.

I

approve large leases.

The Honorable Kathleen Patterson
Page 5
July 8, 1998

Furthermore, the Council can, by amendment of internal rules -- even for
particular leases -- reduce the review period to fewer than 45 days. While the Council
cannot create a legislative limitation on the 45-day review power Congress granted
under section \4.51 (b), there is no reason why the Council cannot, by unanimous
agreement, forbear from using that full period.
Sincerely,

. Ferren

•