DC DC-OAG-1995-03-15-Opinion-July-2014-DC-License-Special-Pol 1995-03-15

Can a private company that contracts with the federal government to guard federal buildings in DC license its guards as DC Special Police Officers, so they can lawfully carry firearms while moving between protected federal sites?

Short answer: Yes. The DC Special Police Officer statute lets any 'corporation or individual' apply, and a private contractor responsible for guarding federal property qualifies. Earlier Corporation Counsel opinions (1948 and 1975) had said no, reasoning that the statute did not reach federal agencies as applicants and so by extension did not reach contractors guarding federal property. The 1995 opinion reversed that extension: the federal-agency limit applies to the United States itself, not to private contractors that happen to work for the United States.

Disclaimer: This is an official DC Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed DC attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

For decades the Corporation Counsel had taken the position that DC could not license a Special Police Officer to guard federal property. The reasoning, dating to a 1948 opinion about the Library of Congress and reaffirmed in 1975, was that the SPO statute lets "any corporation or individual" apply, but the United States is not a "corporation or individual," so a federal-property guard could not be SPO-commissioned through DC.

That reading produced a real problem for federal contractors. The 1932 DC firearms statute (D.C. Code § 22-3201 et seq.) banned carrying weapons in public except in narrow circumstances, and the U.S. Attorney's office took the position that federal-property contract guards were exempt only if they held SPO commissions. With no SPO route available, contract guards could not lawfully move firearms between protected federal sites in DC.

The 1995 Corporation Counsel opinion narrowed the prior doctrine. The 1948 statutory point about "corporation or individual" not reaching the federal government remained correct as far as it went. But the older opinions had stretched that point too far when they used it to deny licenses to private companies that contracted with the federal government. A private company is plainly a "corporation," and the SPO statute contains no carve-out for companies that work for federal customers. Provided the private contractor and its employees satisfied the usual SPO qualifications, the District could and would issue commissions.

The opinion also distinguished the Universal Interpretive Shuttle line of preemption cases. There, the District (through WMATC) was trying to impose its own regulatory scheme on a federal-mall concessionaire. Here, the federal government was actively asking the District to license its contractors, so there was no federal-deference concern.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. After District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and the comprehensive DC firearms-licensing rewrite, the carry-authority analysis for SPOs and contract guards has changed substantially.

Historical context

The 1948 Library of Congress opinion was issued just after the Truman administration started consolidating federal-building security under contract. The Corporation Counsel was asked whether DC could SPO-commission Library of Congress guards paid solely by the United States. The answer was no, on the simple ground that the United States was not a "corporation or individual" within § 4-114. A 1975 successor opinion took that further: not only could the United States itself not apply, but the District could not commission private contractors guarding federal property either. The reasoning was a policy one (deference to federal authority over federal facilities), not a textual one.

By 1994 the federal contract-guard model had grown substantially, and the 1932 DC firearms statute had not. The U.S. Attorney's office, prosecuting some carry violations, ran into the structural impossibility: contractors had no lawful way to qualify for the SPO exception, even though MPD had no objection in principle to commissioning them. AUSA Terence Keeney asked the Corporation Counsel to revisit. The 1995 opinion preserves the textual conclusion of 1948 (the federal sovereign is not an applicant) but discards the policy extension of 1975.

What this meant at the time for federal-facility contractors

A private security firm with a federal contract could now apply for SPO commissions for its guards, provided it (the contractor) satisfied the usual § 4-114 standards. Once commissioned, those guards could lawfully carry firearms between the listed federal-property sites under the 1932 Act's exemption framework.

What this meant for the U.S. Attorney's office

The carry-authority puzzle was solved without amending federal law. AUSAs could prosecute unlicensed carry without facing the structural problem that no licensing route was actually open.

What this meant for federal preemption doctrine in DC

The opinion reads Universal Interpretive Shuttle narrowly: a DC license is not preempted simply because the licensee works for the federal government, especially when federal officials want the licensure.

Common questions

Q: Could the federal government itself ever apply for SPO licenses for its guards?
A: No. The opinion does not disturb that part of the 1948 ruling. The statutory text "corporation or individual" does not reach the United States or its agencies as applicants.

Q: What about employees who are direct federal hires, not contractor employees?
A: They would not be SPO-commissioned through DC. They are federal officers under federal law and operate under federal carry authority (Federal Protective Service, Capitol Police, etc.), not under DC's § 4-114.

Q: Why did the U.S. Attorney's office care about this in 1994?
A: Because federal-property contract guards moving between sites were technically exposed to DC firearms charges if they could not establish an SPO exemption. With no licensing path, carry authority depended entirely on the federal government's choice to defend the practice case-by-case.

Q: Did this open up DC SPO licensing to any contractor working with the federal government on anything?
A: No. The applicant still has to qualify under § 4-114 and the 6A DCMR Ch. 11 implementing regulations, and the SPO commission's authority is still limited to the listed protected premises.

Citations

Statutes and regulations
- D.C. Code § 4-114 (1994) (SPO commissioning authority)
- 6A DCMR § 1100.1
- Firearms Control Regulations Act, D.C. Law 1-85, D.C. Code § 6-2301 et seq.
- Act of July 8, 1932, 47 Stat. 650, ch. 465, D.C. Code § 22-3201 et seq.

Cases
- Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 393 U.S. 186 (1968)

Source

License

This opinion is published by the Office of the Attorney General for the
District of Columbia. Per the DC.gov terms of use, content is licensed
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which permits commercial use, redistribution, and modification with
attribution.

Original opinion text

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<6nuunmtnl nf tltt II i5trict nf <!rnlumbia
OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
JUDICIARY SQUARE
441 FOURTH S-;WASHINGTON. 0

N.W.
20001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

March 15. 1995

L&O:RND:TFB: If
(AL-94-454) (x-ref:93-153;
89-211; 83-371)

Terence J. Keeney, Deputy Chief
superior Court Division
u.s. Attorney's Office
555 4th street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
Re:

May the District grant licenses as special police
officers to the employees of a private company that
guards Federal property?

Dear Mr. Keeney:
This is in reply to the request of your Office, dated
September 12, 1994, that this Office reconsider its prior
opinions on the issuance of special police officer licenses for
contract security guards of the Federal government.
§

The Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1057, ch. 422, D.C. Code
4-114 (1994), provides:
The Mayor of the District of Columbia, on
application of any corporation or individual,
or in his own discretion, may appoint special
policemen for duty in connection with the
property of, or under the charge of, such
corporation or individual; said special
policemen to be paid wholly by the
corporation or person on whose account their
appointments are made, and to be subject to
such general regulations as the Council of
the District of Columbia oay prescribe.

In an opinion dated July 2, 1948, the Corporation Counsel
concluded that this statute did not authorize the District to
issue commissions to security guards employed by the united
States government to guard the Library of Congress. He noted

that the phrase "any corporation or individual" did not appear
intended to include the United states government or its agencies.
He went on to say:
It is, accordingly, the opinion of this
office that the Commissioners do not have
authority to appoint special policemen to
guard the Library of Congress or any other
government building containing property
belonging to the united states Government or
in the custody of the united states
Government, and no authority to appoint
special policemen who are to be paid solely
by the united states.
On May 28, 1975, the Corporation Counsel issued an opinion
dealing specifically with the application of this statute and its
implementing regulationl to contract security guards on Federal
property. He concluded:
The regulation, read as a whole, was not in
my view intended to cover security matters of
the Federal Government, or those security
officers who are charged with the
responsibility of protecting Federal
property. Such officers may not obtain
special police commissions under Section 4115, D.C. Code, since that statute would not
authorize the issuance of commissions to
individuals protecting Federal property. Cf.
Opinion of Corporation Counsel of July 2,
1948 (Library of Congress).
The position of the District toward security guards assigned
to protect Federal property has continued to be one of complete
non-interference with the performance of Federal functions: the
District does not license such personnel, nor does it require
them to be licensed in order to carry firearms in the performance
of their duties, under the District's Firearms Control
Regulations Act, D.C. Law 1-85, D.C. Code § 6-2301 et seq. See,
~, memorandum of this Office, dated September 26, 1983.
However, while such security guards have no problem with
this Office or with the District government, they do have a
problem with the Office of the united States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, which enforces the firearms prohibitions of
the Act of July 8, 1932, 47 Stat. 650, ch. 465, D.C. Code § 223201 et seq. Your Office is of the view that such security
The implementing regulation simply repeats the relevant
words of the statute. See 6A DCMR § 1100.1.
2

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guards are not exempt from those prohibitions when carrying
weapons between protected properties, but that they would be
exempt if they were licensed as special police officers. Hence,
the request of your Office that we reconsider our prior opinions.
It is my opinion that the prior opinions of this Office were
over-broad, and that a company (whether a corporation or an
individual sole proprietorship) with a contract to guard Federal
property may, if it chooses, apply to the District to appoint
persons in its employ as special police officers. The only
statutory interpretation in our prior opinions was to the effect
that the language allowing a "corporation or individual" to apply
for licenses was not broad enough to cover the United states
government or its agencies; such a statutory interpretation is
wholly consistent with allowing a private company which happens
to have charge of protecting Federal property to apply for
licenses. There is certainly no explicit prohibition in the
statute or its implementing regulation against the District
granting licenses to the employees of such companies that
otherwise fall squarely within the wording of the statute.
In these circumstances the District cannot justify denying
licenses on the policy grounds of deferral to Federal authority,
since the Federal government has asked that the District grant
licenses, and the District has never asserted that such licenses
are necessary in order to protect Federal property. These
circumstances distinguish such cases as Universal Interpretive
Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,
393 U.S. 186 (1968), and its progeny. In that case, WMATC sued
to enjoin a concessionaire, acting under contract with the
Secretary of the Interior, from conducting tours of the Mall
without a certificate of convenience and necessity from WMATC.
The Supreme Court ruled:
Congress ••• established the WMATC to
regulate the mass transit of commuters and
workers. A system of minibuses, proceeding
in a circular route around the Mall at less
than 10 miles per hour, and stopping from
time to time to describe the sights before
disgorging most passengers where it picked
them up, serves quite a different
function •••• The Secretary has long had
exclusive control of the Mall and ample power
to develop it for these purposes. We hold
that the WMATC has not been empowered to
impose its own regulatory requirements on the
same subject matter. 393 U.S. 193-194.
In the present circumstances, the statute clearly allows
corporations and individuals who have charge of property to apply
to the District to have their employees appointed as special
3

police officers. And the District is not attempting to impose
regulatory requirements on contractors that protect Federal
property; it is only allowing contractors who protect Federal
property to apply for appointment of their employees where both
the contractors and their employees qualify.
Accordingly, the District may grant special police officer
licenses to the employees of a company which has charge of
protecting Federal property, where the company chooses to apply
for such licenses.
By copy of this letter, I am informing the General Counsel
of the Metropolitan Police Department of this opinion.

cc:

Vernon Gill, Esquire
General Counsel
Metropolitan Police Department