DC DC-OAG-1993-05-06-Opinion-July-2014-Special-Police-Officer 1993-05-06

Can a private security company in DC use one Special Police Officer commission to cover several separately owned buildings, and have that officer walk or drive between them on public sidewalks?

Short answer: Yes. Both armed and unarmed Special Police Officers can patrol several separately owned residential and commercial buildings under one commission, and they can travel across public space between those buildings while on duty. Security officers under 17 DCMR ch. 21 can do the same in their narrower civilian role. MPD's earlier reading that an SPO had to stay on a single contiguous property could not be squared with the regulations.

Disclaimer: This is an official DC Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed DC attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

The D.C. Corporation Counsel (the predecessor to today's Attorney General) was asked whether a Special Police Officer (SPO), or a 17 DCMR security officer, could be commissioned to patrol several separately owned buildings in one neighborhood and walk between them across public sidewalks. MPD had been telling some applicants no, on the theory that an SPO commission could only cover a single property or contiguous campus. The Corporation Counsel rejected that reading.

Section 1101.5 of 6A DCMR, codifying a 1948 Police Manual provision, explicitly authorizes appointment of an SPO to "protect the property of a number of persons or corporations in one general area." Section 1103.4 then says firearms may be carried "while traveling, without deviation, immediately before and immediately after the period of actual duty, between that area and the residence of that special police officer." Read together, the regulations not only allowed multi-property roving patrol, they assumed it. MPD's contrary practice would have rendered the multi-property category a nullity.

For 17 DCMR security officers (the unarmed civilian tier), the same analytic answer followed even though their authority is much narrower. They have only the powers of an ordinary citizen, but nothing in the regulations stopped them from performing those limited duties at properties owned by different clients.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The SPO licensing scheme has been moved and renumbered since 1993 (the substantive regime now sits in 6A DCMR Ch. 11 and the Security Officers Act material has been reorganized), and MPD's licensing practice has evolved.

Historical background and context

The Act of March 3, 1899 gave the Mayor (originally the Commissioners of the District) power to appoint special policemen on application of any corporation or individual, paid by the requesting party, to guard property "of, or under the charge of" that party. The Police Manual implementation of 1948 broke applicants into six categories: SPOs for one property at one location, SPOs for one company's property at multiple locations, SPOs for property of multiple owners "in one general area," money-transport guards, alarm-system guards, and DC government property guards. These categories migrated into 6A DCMR Ch. 11 in slightly garbled form (the AG opinion notes cross-reference errors in the codification). Category (c), the multi-owner roving patrol, sat at §§ 1101.5–1101.7.

By the early 1990s private security companies were increasingly being hired by groups of property owners along a single corridor, much like what would later become Business Improvement Districts. One applicant tried to license an SPO to cover such a cluster, and MPD took the position that the commission was limited to a single owner's contiguous campus. The U.S. Attorney's office ran into the same issue from the opposite direction: it wanted SPO licensure for federal-property contractors so they could move guns lawfully between protected properties under the 1932 Firearms Control Regulations Act. The Corporation Counsel's 1993 opinion cleared up the SPO half. A companion 1995 opinion (1995-03-15) cleared up the federal-property half.

What this meant at the time for private security companies

A company could submit one application to commission an SPO covering several listed addresses in one general area, all within one police district, and the commission would let the officer move between those addresses across public sidewalks while on duty. Firearms could be carried in that same area and on the direct route to and from the officer's home. Outside the listed area, however, the officer had no special police powers. The 1899 Act and § 1100.2 confine SPO authority to the specific premises listed on the face of the commission, except in declared emergency appointments under § 1100.4.

What this meant at the time for property owners and BIDs

Pooling several buildings under one commission was lawful and was the cheaper path than a separate SPO per building. The opinion let owners share a guard's duty hours across a small geographic footprint.

What this meant for civilian security officers under 17 DCMR ch. 21

Security officers had only ordinary citizen powers and could not carry firearms by virtue of licensure alone. But within those narrower limits they could service multiple owners, the same as SPOs.

Common questions

Q: What was the difference between a Special Police Officer and a security officer in 1993 DC?
A: An SPO commissioned under D.C. Code § 4-114 had police-style arrest authority on the listed premises, and could carry a firearm there if armed-commissioned. A security officer licensed under 17 DCMR ch. 21 had only the powers of an ordinary citizen and could not carry a deadly weapon merely by virtue of the license. Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d 439, 440 n.3 (D.C. 1986) drew the same line.

Q: Could an SPO chase a suspect onto a public sidewalk?
A: The opinion did not give SPOs general police powers on public space. Footnote 4 of the opinion warned that an SPO's authority is confined to the listed premises (with narrow emergency exceptions under § 1100.4 and the safe-passage carry rule of § 1103.4). Public-space arrests were the job of MPD, not the SPO.

Q: Did the 1993 opinion let one SPO cover all of DC?
A: No. Section 1101.7 limits a multi-owner roving commission to property "within the geographical limits of one police district." The opinion preserved that geographic constraint.

Q: Does an SPO need a separate firearms license to carry on duty?
A: At the time, an armed SPO commission served as the authority to carry on the listed premises and on the direct route to and from the officer's home. Outside that scope the firearm was unauthorized. Today's analysis would need to be checked against current MPD regulations and the post-Heller DC firearms framework.

Citations

Statutes and regulations
- D.C. Code § 4-114 (1981) (Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1057, ch. 422)
- 6A DCMR §§ 1100, 1101.5, 1101.6, 1101.7, 1103.1, 1103.4, 1103.5
- 17 DCMR ch. 21, §§ 2100.1, 2111.1

Cases
- Tuten v. United States, 440 A.2d 1008 (D.C. 1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 660 (1982) (statutes should not be read to render provisions superfluous)
- F.T.C. v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Branch Office, 515 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (presumption against ineffective construction)
- Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d 439 (D.C. 1986) (line between SPO and 17 DCMR security officer)
- United States v. Encourage, 566 F. Supp. 1403 (D.D.C. 1983) (limits of police arrest authority outside jurisdiction)

Source

License

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Original opinion text

<&nutrnmtnt nf iltt ilisirict nf O1nlumbiu
OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
JUDICIARY SQUARE
441 FOURTH ST .. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D. C.

20001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

L&O:RND:rnd
(93-153-L) (LCD-7749)
May ~, 1993

OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL

SUBJECT: May Special Police Officers or security
officers perform their duti.es at multiple
residential or commercial properties?

Vernon S. Gill
General Counsel
Metropolitan Police Department
Municipal Center
Room 4115
Washington, D.C. 20001
Dear Mr. Gill:
This is in reply to your request, received May 3, 1993, for
our expedited views on the following questions:
1. Whether D.C. Code § 4-114 and the implementing
regulations found at 6A DCMR § 1100 et seq. allow
armed or unarmed Special Police Officers to perform
"roving patrols" of residential and commercial
properties?
2. Whether 17 DCMR Chapter 21 allows security officers to
perform "roving patrols" of residential and commercial
properties?
The issue has apparently arisen out of the following
situation. At least one person and, we understand, at least one
other private company have contracted with a number of
residential and business property owners in one area to provide
limited security protection for those properties. In one
instance, the person applied for a commission as a Special Police
Officer under 61\ DCMR § 1105 to "protect the property of a number
of persons or corporations in one general area." You

indicate that members of the Department have advised this person
that the Department has interpreted this regulation as
prohibiting a Special Police Officer from travelling over public
space to patrol separately owned properties. You also note,
however, that the Department has allowed some university or
campus Special Police Officers to patrol buildings that are noncontiguous to main campus areas on the basis that the
regulations provide for the patrolling of multiple buildings
owned by a single person or corporation.
'
For reasons set forth below, the interpretation you describe
does not withstand scrutiny.

The Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1057 ch. 422, as codified
in D.C. Code § ~~}~~!,provides as fo~lows: ,.'
..., ............... - - _.

.. 0- . __ . . _ _ _ _ _... _ ...

The Mayor':: [originally t'Commissioners"] of· the
District·, t>f- Columbia;-:-:6h: application-of any
corporation or individual, or,in his own
discretion, may appoint special policemen for
duty in connection with the property of, or under
the' charge of, such corporation or individual;
'said special policemen to be.paid wholly by the
- -- '.corporation,or:person on whose account the~r
appointments are made, and to be subject to such
, " general regulations as the Council of the
District of Columbia [originally Commissioners]l
_m~y prescribe.
Pursuant to this law, the Board of Commissioners approved
chapter. 32' of: the:'Police Manual"-of-:-Rules;.' and Regulations: of the
Polic~:'-Department"on':, August, 19" 1948,: as· amended on March 8,
1949 (enclosure A). These regulations later were codified into
chapter 11 of Title 6A of the DCMR (enclosure B). 2

1 Section 402(91) of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967
transferred this rulemaking authority to the appointed District
of Columbia Council. Section 711 of the Self-Government Act,
D.C. Code § 1-211, transferred it to the elected Council of the
District of Columbia.
2
rrv~!noranda

The origin of these regulations is discussed in
from our 0::ficc dated September 14, 1990 and ;'ugusL 11,

The codification in chapter 11, 6A DCMR, contains crossreference errors and is organized differently than the original,
as codified in chapter 32 of the Police Manual. We have marked
corrected references on chapter 11, 6A DCMR, enclosure B.
2

-_.Section 10010f 6A DCMR, which is a codification of chapter
32, sec. 6, of the Police Manual, sets forth six categories of
special police officers who may be appointed under the provisions
of D.C. Code § 4-114. These are listed as subsections (a)
through (f) of the old section 6 of the Manual and we have marked
on enclosure B the corresponding sections in the DCMR.
_These categories are special police officers to:
."

(a) Protect the property of one person or
. ___ .

~c0rporation_at_one~location._.

.;..--

(b) Protect the property of one person or corporation
located in various sections of the' city.
- .. _.- .
'"

....

(d) Work for one person or corporation to provide
pr0tec~ion io_the_transport:ofmoney, securities
etc-. : -; . < ~:::
~:.. '.::

. -":

(.e) Work_for one person or corporation whose
business it is to protect property of others
principally. by electrical alarm systems.
! : . _.

.:: :; f . _ :'". . .

.'.'

.':

.tfJ Protect property .or.- interests of ,the District of
C9lumbia. _ . ;.. ;- ___ <
,_ _
.,.
-.

In each case, the, specific premises involved are to be listed on
the face of: the:: commission issued to the special police officer.
Wii:h\,4r~spect·;,j;.o· category~ (p) # _ 6A. DCMR __§§.:: 1101 •.5

through.

1101·~i:; when~: prppe:rly; group~d,.tog¢the.r~: and properly cross~ .
referenoe~:, :. rea¢i-; as~· follows: :

.. _

~ <

.;.

•..

1101.5

. Special police officers may be appointed under the
provisions of D.C. Code § 4-114 (1981) to protect
the property of a number of persons or
... ---··--·-----··· ..·corporations in one general area •
. ";

1101.6

The duties of the special police
officers appointed pursuant to
[§ 1101.5] shall consist largely of
periodically checking doors, windows,
etc., in the nature of a "watchman."
The names and addresses of the persons
and the location of the property under
the charge .of each to be protected shall

Compare with section 6(c) of ch. 30 of the Police Manual.
3

•

be' specified upon the face of the
commission issued to that special police
officer.
1101.7

The property which any special police
officer shall be appointed to protect
pursuant to [§ 1101.5] shall be located
- wi thin the geographical limits of one
police district.

As can ~:Oe :seenfrom the above, these regulations explicitly
authorize special police officers to be appointed under the
provisions .0fD.C.. ::: Code'§4-114 to protect.the property of a
number of p"ersonsor corporations in one general area.
Other sections of these regulations expressly recognize that
special police:officers may travel between sites owned by
different people. Section 8 of chapter 32, 6A DCMR § 1103.4,
specifically provides as follows:
-.
Firearms or other dangerous weapons carried by
special police officers whose commissions extend
to more than one person's or corporation's
property, or more than one premises owned by one
person or corporat'ion, may be carried only when
that special police officer is on actual dutY'In
the area thereof or while traveling, without"
deviation, immediately before and immediately
after the period of actual duty, between that area
" and the residence .of that special police officer.
..
..
See also § 1103.1 ("or, in the case of a special police officer
whose. :commission. ex.tendsc :to..more than ,one pers.on' s or .,
-. - t~on
· ' $~ .pJ::Op.eJ::.ty:.r:
. "__
) .-': : '. -. .
.cor.pora
..
:-. -:.; !..~~r~ ',=, '.. .-.-: ,::.' ~.':': .- ~ . .;.
Given the language of section 1101.5 to the effect that
special police officers may be appointed to "protect the
property of a number. of persons or corporations in one general
area," and of section 1103.4 that such officers may carry
firearms "when on actual duty in the area" of such property, an
interpretation that such officers may not travel over public
space to patrol separately owned properties is without any legal
foundation.
'.'

-~--.,

Moreover, if a person could not travel between one site and
another, §§ 1101.5 through 1101.7 would be a nullity; no one
would be able to do that which is authorized therein. Generally,
courts viII not interpret a lav or regulation in a way that

renders a provision useless. See,~, Tuten v. United States,
4~0 A.2d 1008, 1010 (1982), affirmed 460 U.S. 660 (1982) ("A
statute should not be construed in such a way as to render
certain provisions superfluous or insignificant."); F.T.C. v.
4

•

Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Branch Office, 169 u.s. App.
D.C. 271, 515 F.2d 988, 993-995 (1975) ("The presumption against
interpreting a statute in a way which renders it ineffective is
hornbook law."). And courts would be particularly loath to do so
.
here as the authorizing language is very specific. Id. 4
With respect to that portion of your inquiry related to
security officers, my conclusions are similar. However, we
should first point out that security officers licensed under 17
DCMR ch. 21 (1990) have far less authority than special police
office.rs~~:.:~ Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d.439, 440 n.3.c:P·~~~:.:l~~6l:.U,.D:o.footnote 3:,:.: the:. Court describes:: the two types of
o~tig~~§l:l~ =Wh;i.le.seC\lri~y.officers licensed. under 17 DCMR may be
priy~~e;'y ~.I!lployed: ~o~: inter·.glia, prevent theft from and damage
to real or personal property, they are no~ police officers and
have Ol1-~y. the- pow~rs of·. ordinary citizens.
Thus they have no
au~119~'! ty L §.Q.l.ely: l>~cause' of:.licensure under _ 17 DCMR ch. 21, to
c~~~y.~:de~9.ly_weapon in. the course of employment.
17 DCMR §
21~Q!.!~Jg'-;·· H9weye~:, I:see_nothing in the regulations which
would prevent security officers from performing the more limited
functions ~b~y:.~re authorized' to perform' at the property of a
number of 4iff~rent.Qwners.
. . . -... ---........
.. .,...

---.---.~--

., .. : -;

Conclusion ._____ ------.---.

In suni~·.p~~iai...:.:~Ofrce officers or security officers, who
otherwise comply with applicable regulations~ may perform their
. '.

-- .. - - .......
.......... - --. .- --.

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_ _ _ _ .........0.-:.. _ _ _
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. . - --'-4 'Notli'ing :-discussed above,

however, should be interpreted
as au~~oriz~ng ~.$pecial.police officer to exercise his or her
au~~q~ity on·public ~pace.
Except for special appointments in
emerg~ncy circumstances which are not at issue here (see
§ 1100.4), a'special police officer's authority is confined to
t~~ .:p~rticular places Or: property which he or she is commissioned
to .proteqt •. See.§§ 1100.2 and 1103.1. Thus, except as provided
in § .1103.5, special police officers have no special police
powers on public space. See,~, United States v. Foster, 566
F. Supp. 1403 (D.D.C. 1983) (Metro police have no authority to
arrest outside the scope of their authority); United States v.
O'Brien, 116 WLR 2117 (D.C. Sup. ct. 1988) (Capitol Police have
no authority to arrest for a crime committed outside their
jurisdiction).
5 See 17 DCMR § 2100.1.
6 Id. § 2111.1.
5

aut.nori.z~q9~ti~s at s~~arat~~y.o~ned properties, and they may

travel over public space to do so.

Sincerely,

..:.=;~:.:..:. =~J_ ~unsel
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