If I get a housing code violation ticket in DC, can I skip the hearing examiner and appeal straight to the Board of Appeals and Review?

Plain-English summary

Before 1985, DC enforced its housing code mostly through criminal prosecutions. That was slow, expensive, and produced few results. The Council enacted the DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985 to switch most housing code violations to civil enforcement: an inspector writes a citation, you either pay a pre-set collateral fine or request a hearing within 15 days, a DCRA hearing examiner adjudicates, and the hearing examiner's order becomes the final decision of DCRA. From there, an aggrieved party can appeal to the Board of Appeals and Review (BAR). The whole point was a uniform, fast administrative system.

The 1985 Act made some technical amendments to the existing housing regulations. Among them, § 489(a) amended Housing Regulations § 1302.1 (now codified at 14 DCMR § 107.1) to read that "any owner, licensee, or operator of any premises ... adversely affected by a determination made pursuant to these regulations or titles I-III of the [Civil Infractions Act] may file an appeal in writing with the Board of Appeals and Review." Some property owners spotted that text and argued it gave them a direct right of appeal to BAR, skipping the DCRA hearing examiner.

DCRA Director Donald Murray asked Corporation Counsel Herbert Reid whether the direct-appeal reading was correct. Reid said no.

Reading § 489(a) in isolation might suggest a direct appeal. But reading it together with § 489(b)(1) (which says "Adjudication of any infraction of this Code shall be pursuant to titles I-III" of the Civil Infractions Act), § 101 (uniform administrative adjudication purpose), § 301 (BAR's appellate jurisdiction is over "final orders issued by hearing examiners pursuant to this act"), and the Mayor's transmittal letter (which described the bill's purpose as routing housing-code complaints through hearing examiners), the answer is clear. § 489(a) does not give a direct-appeal shortcut. It refers to the limited class of DCRA determinations where there is no provision for administrative adjudication, like a variance under 14 DCMR § 109.

So the standard DC housing-code path is: citation, then hearing examiner, then BAR (if you appeal), then DC Court of Appeals (if you appeal further). The exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine bars skipping the hearing examiner step.

What this means for you

If you are a DC landlord or property owner who just got a housing code citation

Your path forward is fixed. Within 15 calendar days of the citation, either:

• Pay the pre-set collateral fine. This resolves the matter; you do not have to admit a violation, but the fine is forfeited and the case is closed.
• Request a hearing in writing before a DCRA hearing examiner. You will get a hearing date and the chance to dispute the citation. Bring evidence: photos, repair records, lease provisions, expert testimony if applicable.

If the hearing examiner rules against you, you can appeal that final order to the Board of Appeals and Review. Do not try to file directly with BAR; BAR has no jurisdiction over your case until a hearing examiner issues a final order. Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank (cited in the opinion) and Smith v. Murphy both apply: when a specific statutory scheme exists for review, the doctrine of exhaustion requires you to follow it.

If you are a tenant whose landlord was cited and you want to participate

You are not the cited party, but the citation is intended to address conditions affecting your housing. You can submit information to the hearing examiner about the conditions. The proceeding is between DCRA and the landlord, but tenants' interests are considered.

If you have a request for a variance from the housing code

Variances are different. They are a "determination" by DCRA, not a citation for a violation. Under 14 DCMR § 109, you apply for a variance, DCRA decides, and adverse parties can appeal directly to BAR under § 489(a). This is the limited class of DCRA decisions to which the direct-appeal language refers.

If you are a DCRA hearing examiner

Your final orders are the gateway to BAR review. Make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to support BAR review. Cite the specific Housing Regulations sections involved, the citation language, and the evidence supporting your decision.

If you are a BAR member or staff

Reject any appeal that bypasses the DCRA hearing examiner stage. The Civil Infractions Act § 301 (D.C. Code § 6-2721) gives BAR jurisdiction only over "final orders issued by hearing examiners pursuant to this act." A direct appeal from a citation is jurisdictionally barred.

If you are a housing-code attorney

This opinion is your authority for the exhaustion argument when a client wants to skip the hearing examiner. The textual reading of § 489(a) standing alone is plausible, but the harmonious-whole canon (Matter of T.L.J.) and the specific-scheme rule (Whitney Bank) close the door.

Common questions

Q: How long do I have to request a hearing?
A: Fifteen calendar days from receipt of the citation. Miss the deadline and the citation becomes a final default order, with the corresponding fines and obligations.

Q: What does the hearing examiner do?
A: Considers the citation, hears your defense and any evidence, and issues an order finding either a violation occurred or it did not. The order is the final decision of DCRA on the citation.

Q: How long do I have to appeal to BAR?
A: BAR's rules set the appeal period (typically 15 days from receipt of the hearing examiner's order, but check current rules). The appeal must be timely or BAR loses jurisdiction.

Q: What if I think the citation is just plain wrong?
A: Tell the hearing examiner. Bring evidence. The hearing examiner can dismiss the citation if it is unfounded.

Q: Can I take it to court?
A: After BAR rules, you can petition the DC Court of Appeals for review. The court reviews for substantial-evidence and legal error.

Q: Does this still apply in 2026?
A: Yes. The Civil Infractions Act framework remains in force. The administrative path remains: citation, hearing examiner, BAR, DC Court of Appeals. The Office of Administrative Hearings has taken on hearing-examiner functions for many DC agencies, including some DCRA matters; check current DCRA / OAH allocations.

Background and statutory framework

Before 1985, DC's housing code violations were prosecuted criminally in DC Superior Court. The system was administratively heavy, prosecutorial resources were stretched thin, and code enforcement was uneven. Council Chairman David Clarke introduced Bill 6-187 at Mayor Marion Barry's request in 1985 to switch most housing code enforcement to civil administrative adjudication. The Mayor's transmittal letter identified housing code enforcement as one of the major problems the bill was designed to address.

The bill became the DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985 (D.C. Law 6-42, effective October 5, 1985, codified at D.C. Code § 6-2701 et seq.). Section 101 (D.C. Code § 6-2701) declared the Act's purpose to be establishing "a uniform . . . system of administrative adjudication with respect to the infractions" for which civil sanctions could be imposed.

Section 301 (D.C. Code § 6-2721) defined the Board of Appeals and Review's appellate jurisdiction in civil infractions cases as jurisdiction to "entertain and determine appeals timely filed by persons aggrieved by final orders issued by hearing examiners pursuant to this act."

Section 489 of the Act made conforming amendments to the Housing Regulations. Subsection (a) amended Housing Regulations § 1302.1 (now 14 DCMR § 107.1). Subsection (b)(1) amended Housing Regulations § 2104 (now 14 DCMR § 102.4) to require: "Adjudication of any infraction of this Code shall be pursuant to titles I-III of the [Civil Infractions Act]."

The interpretive question came from § 489(a)'s text: "Any owner, licensee, or operator . . . adversely affected by a determination made pursuant to these regulations or titles I-III of the [Civil Infractions Act] may file an appeal in writing with the Board of Appeals and Review." Read literally, this seemed to give a direct appeal to BAR for any adverse housing-code determination, including a citation.

The Corporation Counsel resolved the ambiguity using:

1. The harmonious-whole canon. Under Matter of T.L.J., 413 A.2d 154, 158 (D.C. 1980), and United States v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.D.C. 1978), "whenever possible, a statute should be interpreted as a harmonious whole." Reading § 489(a) to allow direct BAR appeal would conflict with § 489(b)(1)'s mandatory adjudication-by-Civil-Infractions-Act language. Avoiding the conflict requires reading § 489(a)'s "determination made pursuant to these regulations" as the limited class of DCRA decisions outside the civil-infraction adjudication framework, like variance determinations under 14 DCMR § 109.

2. The exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine. Under Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U.S. 411, 422 (1965), when Congress (or a legislature) has "enacted a specific statutory scheme for obtaining review. . . the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies comes into play and requires that the statutory mode of review be adhered to notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory command of exclusiveness." DC adopted the same rule in Smith v. Murphy, 294 A.2d 357, 359 (D.C. 1972).

3. The legislative history. The Mayor's transmittal letter explicitly described the hearing-examiner process: "designated personnel to issue 'citations' to violators who must either forfeit a pre-determined collateral fine or appear before a hearing examiner within fifteen (15) calendar days. After consideration of the evidence and arguments, the hearing examiner would determine whether or not a violation has occurred and enter an appropriate order. The order is considered the 'final decision' of the Director, DCRA."

The conclusion: housing-code citations must go through the DCRA hearing examiner first. BAR has no jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a citation. The 14 DCMR § 107.1 language refers only to the limited class of DCRA non-citation determinations.

Citations and references

Statutes and regulations:
- DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985, D.C. Law 6-42, D.C. Code § 6-2701 et seq.
- Civil Infractions Act §§ 101 (D.C. Code § 6-2701), 301 (D.C. Code § 6-2721), 489
- 14 DCMR §§ 107.1 (housing regulations appeal), 102.4 (alternative civil sanctions), 109 (variance procedures), 1302.1 (housing regulations appeal)

Cases:
- Matter of T.L.J., 413 A.2d 154 (D.C. 1980), harmonious-whole canon
- United States v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1978), same
- Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U.S. 411 (1965), specific statutory scheme triggers exhaustion
- Smith v. Murphy, 294 A.2d 357 (D.C. 1972), DC adoption of same exhaustion rule

License

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Source

• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-Housing-Regulations-Violation-Appeal.pdf

Original opinion text

,.
<&nn~ruttt~nt nf t4~ mtntrtrt nf illnlumhta
OF:FICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
DISTRICT BUILDING
WASHINGTON.

D. C.

20004

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Iro:Im:lng
(90-87) (UD-S019)
May 31, 1990

OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Maya person who is cited for
violating the Housing Regulations appeal
that citation directly to the Board of
Appeals and Review?

Donald G. Murray
Director
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs
614 H street. N.W. Suite 1120
Washington. D.C. 20001
Dear Mr. Murray:
This is in response to your May 24. 1990 request for an
opinion concerning whether a person who receives a Housing
Regulations violation citation may appeal that citation directly
to the Board of Appeals and Review ("BAR") under 14 DCMR § 107.1.
For the following reasons. it is my opinion that 14 DCMR § 107.1
does not confer such a right.
Title 14 DCMR § 107.1 is the DCMR codification of § 489(a)
of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Civil
Infractions Act of 1985. effective October 5, 1985, D.C. Law 642, D.C. Code § 6-2701 et seq. (l989) ("Civil Infractions Act").
Section 489(a) amended the first sentence of § 1302.1 of the
Housing Regulations to read as follows:
Any owner, licensee, or operator of any premises
subject to the provisions of these regulations adversely affected by a determination made pursuant to these
regulations or titles I-III of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of
1985 may file an appeal in writing with the Board of
Appeals and Review.

2

Section 489(b)(1) of the Civil Infractions Act amended
§ 2104 of the Housing Regulations by adding the following
language (codified at 14 DCMR § 102.4):

Civil fines, penalties, and fees may be imposed as
alternative sanctions for any infraction of the
provisions of this Code, or any rules or regulations
issued under the authority of this Code, pursuant to
titles I-III of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of 1985. Adjudication of any infraction of this Code shall be
pursuant to titles I-III of the Department of Consumer
and Regulatory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of 1985.
[Emphasis added.]
If § 489(a) were interpreted to confer upon a person cited
for a violation of the Housing Regulations the right to bypass
the hearing procedures established by the Civil Infractions Act
and appeal that citation directly to the BAR, such an interpretation of § 489(a) would contradict the underscored language of
§ 489(b)(I).
Such an interpretation of § 489(a) should be
avoided because it would be contrary to the principle of statutory interpretation that "whenever possible, a statute should be
interpreted as a harmonious whole." Matter of T.L.J., 413 A.2d
154. 158 (D.C. 1980), quoting United states v. Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.D.C. 1978). See
generally. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 46.05 (4th ed.
1984). Sections 489(a) and 489(b)(1) are in harmony if the
phrase "determination made pursuant to these regulations" in
§ 489(a) is interpreted to refer to that limited class of
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs ("DCRA") final
determinations in matters where there is not provision for
administrative adjudication of the imposition of civil fines.
penalties, and fees for violations of the Housing Regulations.
An example of such a OCRA determination is a determination on a
request for a variance from the strict application of the Housing
Regulations. See 14 DCMR § 109.
Moreover. the conclusion that § 489(a) of the Civil
Infractions Act was not intended to give a person the right to
appeal directly to the BAR from a Housing Regulations violation
citation is strongly buttressed by other provisions of the Civil
Infractions Act and by its legislative history.
The language of § 489(a) is based on § 517 of Bill 6-187.
the bill which became the Civil Infractions Act. Bill 6-187 was
introduced by Council Chairman Clarke at the request of the
Mayor. At page 2 of his transmittal letter, the Mayor stated
that one of the major problems that Bill 6-187 was intended to
address was the problem of "[hlousing code enforcement." The
Mayor went on to state in his transmittal letter (at p. 2):

"

,
3

As a partial solution, I am proposing adoption of this
bill.
If adopted. the act would authorize designated
personnel to issue "citations" to violators who must
either forfeit a pre-determined collateral fine or
appear before a hearing examiner within fifteen (15)
calendar days. After consideration of the evidence
and arguments. the hearing examiner would determine
whether or not a violation has occurred and enter an
appropriate order. The order is considered the "final
decision" of the Director, DCRA.
[Emphasis added.]
Further. as is stated in § 101 of the Civil Infractions Act.
D.C. Code § 6-2701 (1989). one of the primary purposes of the
Civil Infractions Act was to provide for "a uniform ... system of
administrative adjudication with respect to the infractions" for
which civil sanctions could be imposed.
(Emphasis added.) Thus.
an interpretation of § 489(a) that would give an alleged Housing
Regulations violator the choice of either requesting a hearing
before a DCRA hearing examiner or bypassing that remedy and
appealing directly to the BAR would be at odds with the Council's
pUrpose of establishing a "uniform" system of administrative
adjudication of civil infractions. such as violations of the
Housing Regulations.
Most importantly. § 301 of the Civil Infractions Act. D.C.
Code § 6-2721 (1989), provides that the civil infractions appeal
jurisdiction of the BAR is jurisdiction to "entertain and determine appeals timely filed by persons aggrieved by final orders
issued by hearing examiners pursuant to this act .... "
(Emphasis
added. )
Based on the foregoing, I am of the opinion that § 489(a) of
the Civil Infractions Act, 14 DCMR § 107~1. can not reasonably be
interpreted to confer upon a person cited for a violation of the
Housing Regulations the right to appeal that citation directly to
the BAR.
Such person must first exhaust his right to a hearing
before
a
DCRA
hearing examiner pursuant to the Civil Infractions
1
Act.
Stated otherwise, the BAR has no jurisdiction to entertain
and determine an appeal taken directly from a citation for a violation of the Housing RegUlations. The BAR's review jurisdiction
in this regard is limited to reviewing final orders of DCRA
1
Compare Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank. 379 U.S. 411.
422 (1965) (where Congress "has enacted a specific statuto~y
scheme for obtaining review •... the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies comes into play and requires that the
statutory mode of review be adhered to notWithstanding the
absence of an express statutory command of exclusiveness").
Accord: Smith v. Murphy, 294 A.2d 357, 359 (D.C. 1972).

..
4

hearing examiners issued pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Infractions Act.
Sincerely,

d~~~C

Herbert o. Reid, Sr.
Corporation Counsel, D.C.

cc:

Irena I. Karpinski, Esq.
Chairperson
Board of Appeals and Review