Can DC's consumer protection agency write tickets and impose fines on other DC government agencies (or their contractors) when those agencies break DC regulations?
Plain-English summary
In 1987, the DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) had a practical question. The DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985 gave DCRA broad authority to issue notices of infraction and impose fines for violations of various consumer-protection and licensing laws. Could DCRA use that authority to fine other DC government agencies (and contractors working for them) when those agencies violated the same laws DCRA enforces against private actors?
Director Murray asked the Corporation Counsel for an opinion. After an initial May 1987 response saying no, he asked for reconsideration in light of language in a separate 1983 health care licensure statute that he thought might support a broader DCRA reach. The Corporation Counsel reaffirmed the original answer: no, DCRA cannot fine other DC agencies.
The reasoning is structural and quietly important. DC's executive power runs from the Mayor to the agency heads. When an agency violates the law, the Mayor (as chief executive) directs the agency to comply. The Mayor does not need the threat of fines from a sibling agency to make that happen. DC's budget framework tightly controls money transfers between agencies (the Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980 governs how funds can move between agencies after a budget is adopted), so a fine paid by one agency to another would be a budget-rule problem.
Beyond DC's specific structure, the opinion rests on a general principle of administrative law: one agency of government cannot compel another absent express statutory authority. The Civil Infractions Act says nothing about inter-agency enforcement. Its silence is not an oversight; it reflects the structural reality that inter-agency compliance is the executive's job, not a regulatory peer's.
The contractor question is a corollary. Contractors of one DC agency are working for that agency. Fines against contractors would be effectively borne by the contracting agency (through pass-through cost or contract amendment) and would similarly violate the no-inter-agency-compulsion principle.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Q: Can any DC agency ever fine another DC agency?
A: Only if a specific statute expressly authorizes inter-agency enforcement. The Civil Infractions Act does not. A few targeted statutes might, but you have to find the express grant.
Q: What if a DC agency is genuinely violating consumer-protection rules? Is there no recourse?
A: There is recourse, just not through DCRA fines. The Mayor (and the agency's own internal controls) is responsible for compliance. The Council can investigate; the Inspector General can audit; constituents can complain.
Q: What about DC contractors who work for non-DC clients on the same project? Can DCRA enforce against them?
A: Yes, when the work for the non-DC client is the basis for enforcement. The opinion is about DC contractors performing work for DC agencies under their DC contracts.
Q: Has DCRA's structure changed since 1987?
A: DCRA was reorganized in 2022, with consumer-protection and licensing functions transferred to the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection (DLCP). The structural principle of this opinion (one DC agency cannot fine another absent express authority) carries over to the new agency framework.
Q: Could the Council pass a law authorizing DCRA (or DLCP) to fine other DC agencies?
A: Yes. The principle is that express statutory authority is needed; if the Council passed it, the authority would exist. But the structural concerns from this opinion (interference with the Mayor's executive coordination, evasion of budget rules) would still be relevant policy considerations.
Q: What is the Reprogramming Policy Act referenced in the opinion?
A: D.C. Law 3-100 (1980), codified at D.C. Code § 47-361 et seq. It governs how appropriated funds can be moved between line items, programs, or agencies after the DC budget is adopted, requiring Council notice or approval depending on the size and nature of the change. A fine paid by one agency to another would be a de facto reprogramming outside this framework.
Background and statutory framework
DC's governance structure under the 1973 Home Rule Act (the Self-Government Act) places executive authority in the elected Mayor, with subordinate agencies (departments, offices, commissions) reporting to the Mayor. The Mayor's authority over those subordinates is direct and continuous; the Mayor can direct an agency head to comply with the law without needing any external enforcement mechanism. This is a fundamental feature of executive government and informs why inter-agency civil enforcement is structurally unnecessary.
The DC budget process layers on additional discipline. The Mayor proposes a budget; the Council adopts it; Congress reviews it. Once adopted, agency budgets are largely fixed for the fiscal year, with the Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980 governing any movement of money between agencies, programs, or line items. The framework is designed to ensure that the policy choices embedded in the budget remain stable through the year.
The DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985 (D.C. Law 6-42) was a major piece of consumer-protection legislation. It authorized DCRA (then primarily a regulatory agency for licensing, consumer protection, and building/construction matters) to issue notices of infraction and impose civil fines for a wide range of violations of DC laws and regulations. The mechanism was designed to give DCRA an administrative enforcement tool short of criminal prosecution, with fines being adjudicated through DC's administrative hearing process.
The structural question of whether the Civil Infractions Act reached DC government agencies and their contractors had not been squarely addressed in the original 1985 enactment. DCRA had concluded internally that it might extend; the Corporation Counsel rejected that reading both in the May 1987 memorandum and in this December 1987 reconsideration.
The reconsideration request was based on language in the 1983 Health-Care and Community Residence Facility, Hospice and Home Care Licensure Act (D.C. Law 5-48). DCRA appears to have argued that this separate licensure statute brought certain DC-operated facilities within DCRA's regulatory ambit and, by extension, expanded DCRA's authority generally. The Corporation Counsel rejected the inference: the 1983 statute might apply to particular government-operated facilities under its specific terms, but it did not amend the Civil Infractions Act or change the general principle that one agency cannot compel another absent express statutory authority.
The opinion remains the authoritative DC interpretation. Its structural logic has held up well through subsequent reorganizations of DCRA into DLCP and other agencies. The general principle (express statutory authority required for inter-agency compulsion) has been applied in subsequent DC opinions on related questions of regulatory reach.
Citations and references
Statutes:
- DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985, D.C. Law 6-42, D.C. Code § 6-2701 et seq.
- D.C. Self-Government Act § 422, D.C. Code § 1-242 (Mayor's authority)
- D.C. Self-Government Act §§ 442-452, D.C. Code § 47-301 et seq. (budget process)
- Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980, D.C. Law 3-100, D.C. Code § 47-361 et seq.
- Health-Care and Community Residence Facility, Hospice and Home Care Licensure Act of 1983, D.C. Law 5-48
License
This opinion is published by the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia. Per the DC.gov terms of use, content is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0, which permits commercial use, redistribution, and modification with attribution.
Source
- Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-Infractions-Fines.pdf
Original opinion text
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OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
DISTRICT BUILDING
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20004
IN REPLY REFER TO:
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(87-106)(LCD 3018)
December ~4. 1987
OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Whether the Department of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs may issue notices
of infractions and impose fines against
District government agencies and their
contractors pursuant to the DCRA Civil
Infractions Act of 1985.
Donald G. Murray
Director
Department of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs
614 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Dear Mr. Murray:
This in reply to your December 1, 1987 memorandum
requesting a formal opinion regarding whether the Department
of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of
1985, effective October 5, 1985, D.C. Law 6-42, D.C. Code § 6-
2701 et seg. (1987 Supp.) (Civil Infractions Act), authorizes
the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) to issue
notices of infractions and impose fines against District
government agencies and their contractors.
As noted in your December 1, 1987 memorandum, you
addressed similar questions to this Office by memorandum dated
May 1, 1987. By memorandum dated May 28, 1987, this Office,
through Deputy Corporation Counsel Margaret L. Hines, responded
to these questions. You now request reconsideration of that May
28, 1987 response in view of certain 1angauge contained in D.C. '
Law 5-48, the Health-Care and Community Residence Facility,
Hospice and Horne Care Licensure Act of 1983.
In regard to whether the Civil Infractions Act
authorizes DCRA to issue notices of infractions to and impose
fines on District government agencies, our May 28, 1987
memorandum stated:
The Civil Infractions Act authorizes
the Mayor to impose monetary fines as an
alternative method of compelling compliance
with enumerated District laws. The Mayor
does not need such authority in order to
compel agencies of the District government
to comply with the law. As chief executive
of the District government, the Mayor
already has authority under the Charter to
direct his subordinates to comply with
applicable laws and regulations. See
generally sec. 422 of the Self-Government
Act, D.C. Code § 1-242 (1981). The Charter
also sets forth an elaborate procedure
by which the Mayor, the Council and
ultimately, the Congress determine the
budget of each agency. See sees. 442-452
of the Self-Government Act, D.C. Code
§ 47-301 et seg. (1981). Once an agency's
budget has been adopted, a similarly
elaborate procedure is required to transfer
money from it to another agency. See the
Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980, D.C. Law
3-100, D.C. Code § 47-361 et~. (1981).
There is no indication in the Civil
Infractions Act or its legislative history
that the act was intended to enable the
Mayor to compel District government
agencies to comply with the law. Nor is
there any indication that the Civil
Infractions Act was intended to amend
established procedures for transferring
funds from one agency to another.
Therefore, the Civil Infractions Act does
not empower the Department to issue notices
of infraction to and collect fines from
other agencies of the District government.
Upon reconsideration, I find that the quoted language
correctly applies the well-established principle that one agency
of government does not have the authority to compel another,
absent some express statutory authority to do so. See, ~.,
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