Could DC's Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs fine another District agency under the 1985 Civil Infractions Act?

Plain-English summary

In 1987, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) asked whether the Civil Infractions Act of 1985 authorized notices of infraction and fines against other District agencies and their contractors. The available official PDF ends on page 2 in the middle of the Corporation Counsel's analysis. It supports an answer about other District agencies, but does not contain the full discussion of contractors.

Director Murray requested reconsideration of a May 1987 memorandum in light of language in D.C. Law 5-48, a health care licensure statute. The available text does not quote that language or analyze its effect. On the agency question, the Corporation Counsel reaffirmed the prior conclusion that the Civil Infractions Act did not empower DCRA to issue notices to or collect fines from other District agencies.

The quoted May memorandum reasoned that the Mayor already had authority to direct subordinate agencies to obey the law. It also noted statutory budget and fund-transfer procedures. It found no indication that the Civil Infractions Act was meant to create an interagency compliance mechanism or change those fund-transfer procedures.

On reconsideration, the Corporation Counsel said that the earlier memorandum correctly applied the principle that one government agency cannot compel another without express statutory authority. The official PDF ends immediately after that statement begins its supporting citation.

The question presented included contractors, but the available pages give no answer or reasoning on contractor enforcement. The missing portion may address it; this page does not infer the answer.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can any DC agency ever fine another DC agency? A: The available text said one government agency cannot compel another without express statutory authority. It found no authority for DCRA to issue notices of infraction or collect fines from other District agencies under the Civil Infractions Act.

Q: What if a DC agency is genuinely violating consumer-protection rules? Is there no recourse? A: The quoted May memorandum said the Mayor could direct subordinate District agencies to comply with applicable laws and regulations. The available pages did not analyze other oversight or complaint routes.

Q: Did the opinion decide whether DCRA could fine District contractors? A: The request asked about contractors, but the official PDF ends before any contractor-specific analysis or conclusion. The available text does not answer that question.

Q: Does the opinion establish the enforcement powers of current DC agencies? A: No. It discussed DCRA's authority under the 1985 Civil Infractions Act as understood in 1987. It does not address later agency reorganizations or amendments.

Q: Could the Council pass a law authorizing DCRA (or DLCP) to fine other DC agencies? A: The available text states the principle that express statutory authority is needed for one agency to compel another. It does not analyze a proposed amendment or its consequences.

Q: What is the Reprogramming Policy Act referenced in the opinion? A: The quoted May memorandum cited that Act for the point that a statutory procedure governs transfers of money from one District agency's adopted budget to another agency. The available text did not describe specific approval thresholds or decide that a fine would itself be an unlawful reprogramming.

Background and statutory framework

The December 1987 request asked whether the Civil Infractions Act of 1985, D.C. Law 6-42, authorized DCRA to issue notices of infraction and impose fines against District agencies and their contractors. It also requested reconsideration of a May 1987 memorandum in view of language in the D.C. Law 5-48 (1983 health care licensure law), D.C. Law 5-48. The available PDF does not provide that language or the Corporation Counsel’s analysis of it.

The December opinion quoted the May memorandum on District agencies. That memorandum said the Civil Infractions Act authorized monetary fines as an alternative way of compelling compliance with enumerated District laws, while the Mayor already had Charter authority to direct subordinate agencies to comply. It cited the statutory budget process and the Reprogramming Policy Act's procedures for transferring funds between agencies. It found no indication that the Civil Infractions Act was meant to alter either arrangement, and concluded that DCRA could not issue notices of infraction to or collect fines from other District agencies under that Act.

The December opinion then reaffirmed the quoted reasoning, invoking the principle that one government agency cannot compel another without express statutory authority. The official PDF ends mid-sentence at that point. It does not supply the rest of the opinion's analysis or a contractor-specific answer.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• DCRA Civil Infractions Act of 1985, D.C. Law 6-42, D.C. Code § 6-2701 et seq.
• Self-Government Act § 422, D.C. Code § 1-242 (Mayor's authority)
• Self-Government Act §§ 442-452, D.C. Code § 47-301 et seq. (budget process)
• Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980, D.C. Law 3-100, D.C. Code § 47-361 et seq.
• D.C. Law 5-48 (1983 health care licensure law), D.C. Law 5-48

License

This opinion is published by the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia. Per the DC.gov terms of use, content is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0, which permits commercial use, redistribution, and modification with attribution.

Source

• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-Infractions-Fines.pdf

Original opinion text

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

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(87-106)(LCD 3018)
December ~4. 1987

OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Whether the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs may issue notices of infractions and impose fines against
District government agencies and their contractors pursuant to the DCRA Civil
Infractions Act of 1985.

Donald G. Murray
Director
Department of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs
614 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Mr. Murray:

This in reply to your December 1, 1987 memorandum requesting a formal opinion regarding whether the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of 1985, effective October 5, 1985, D.C. Law 6-42, D.C. Code § 6- 2701 et seg. (1987 Supp.) (Civil Infractions Act), authorizes the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) to issue notices of infractions and impose fines against District government agencies and their contractors.

As noted in your December 1, 1987 memorandum, you addressed similar questions to this Office by memorandum dated May 1, 1987. By memorandum dated May 28, 1987, this Office, through Deputy Corporation Counsel Margaret L. Hines, responded to these questions. You now request reconsideration of that May 28, 1987 response in view of certain 1angauge contained in D.C. ' Law 5-48, the Health-Care and Community Residence Facility, Hospice and Horne Care Licensure Act of 1983.

In regard to whether the Civil Infractions Act authorizes DCRA to issue notices of infractions to and impose fines on District government agencies, our May 28, 1987 memorandum stated:

The Civil Infractions Act authorizes the Mayor to impose monetary fines as an alternative method of compelling compliance with enumerated District laws. The Mayor does not need such authority in order to compel agencies of the District government to comply with the law. As chief executive of the District government, the Mayor already has authority under the Charter to direct his subordinates to comply with applicable laws and regulations. See generally sec. 422 of the Self-Government Act, D.C. Code § 1-242 (1981). The Charter also sets forth an elaborate procedure by which the Mayor, the Council and ultimately, the Congress determine the budget of each agency. See sees. 442-452 of the Self-Government Act, D.C. Code
§ 47-301 et seg. (1981). Once an agency's budget has been adopted, a similarly elaborate procedure is required to transfer money from it to another agency. See the Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980, D.C. Law 3-100, D.C. Code § 47-361 et~. (1981).
There is no indication in the Civil
Infractions Act or its legislative history that the act was intended to enable the
Mayor to compel District government agencies to comply with the law. Nor is there any indication that the Civil
Infractions Act was intended to amend established procedures for transferring funds from one agency to another.
Therefore, the Civil Infractions Act does not empower the Department to issue notices of infraction to and collect fines from other agencies of the District government.
Upon reconsideration, I find that the quoted language correctly applies the well-established principle that one agency of government does not have the authority to compel another, absent some express statutory authority to do so. See, ~.,

• 2 -

[The official two-page PDF ends here mid-sentence; later pages are absent.]