If a DC police officer or firefighter is hurt in a crash while driving a District vehicle on duty, can they collect no-fault PIP benefits from DC on top of their regular disability and salary benefits?

Plain-English summary

DC police officers and firefighters are covered by a long-standing system of disability benefits and salary continuation when they are hurt on duty. The Policemen and Firemen's Retirement and Disability Act of 1935 covered them for decades, and in 1979 the DC Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) added a parallel disability compensation system for newer hires. Both systems are exclusive remedies. They are the only thing DC owes an injured officer or firefighter for an on-duty injury.

In 1982, DC enacted the Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. After it took effect, lawyers representing DC police officers and firefighters injured in on-duty crashes started writing letters demanding no-fault PIP benefits from DC, on top of the disability and salary benefits already paid. Fire Chief Theodore Coleman asked Corporation Counsel Inez Reid whether the No-Fault Law gave officers and firefighters a new claim against the District. Reid said no.

The reason is the exclusivity rule of workers' compensation, which applies to the CMPA in DC. CMPA Section 1-624.16(c) is virtually identical to the federal FECA exclusivity clause. It says the District's liability under the CMPA scheme is "exclusive and instead of all other liability" of the District government to the employee for the same injury. Federal courts and DC courts have repeatedly enforced exclusivity clauses, including for police and firefighter injuries (Brown v. Jefferson; Tredway v. District of Columbia; Anthony v. Norfleet).

The No-Fault Law itself does not change that. Sections 8(a)(1), 11(b)(2), and 11(b)(4) of the Act all preserve existing employer compensation duties; nothing in the legislative history shows the Council intended to repeal CMPA exclusivity. Implied repeals are disfavored (Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.; Morton v. Mancari).

The 1984 opinion concluded that an on-duty DC officer or firefighter injured in a DC vehicle could not obtain additional no-fault benefits from the District. It said excess no-fault benefits could be recovered from an insurer other than the District.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can I collect both disability benefits and a no-fault claim against the at-fault civilian driver's insurance? A: Yes. CMPA exclusivity bars claims against DC as your employer, but it does not affect third-party liability. The civilian driver's no-fault insurer and any tort claim you have against that driver are not barred. Your disability benefits may be subject to subrogation if you recover from the third party.

Q: What if I am injured off-duty in my own vehicle? A: Then CMPA exclusivity does not apply because you were not in the scope of your employment. You collect under your own private no-fault insurance like any other DC driver.

Q: What about a hit-and-run while on duty in a DC vehicle? A: The 1984 opinion addressed additional no-fault benefits sought from the District for on-duty injuries. It did not determine coverage under a particular uninsured-motorist policy.

Q: Can the Council change this?
A: Yes. The Council could amend either the No-Fault Law or the CMPA to expressly authorize stacking. As of the date of the opinion, neither had been amended. Watch for legislative changes; if the Council adds an express authorization, the exclusivity argument collapses.

Q: Does this opinion establish the law for an injury today? A: No. It addressed the disability-compensation and no-fault statutes as they stood in 1984. It does not establish whether those statutes or later interpretations have changed.

Q: What is the practical difference between the 1935 Act and the CMPA? A: The opinion described the 1935 Act's benefits for police and firefighters and said CMPA Title XXIII replaced FECA for DC employees. It discussed CMPA coverage for police and firefighters appointed on or after January 1, 1980. Its account does not establish current coverage.

Background and statutory framework

DC's police and firefighter disability framework has three layers, and getting the right layer is essential to understanding this opinion.

Layer 1: The 1935 Act. The Policemen and Firemen's Retirement and Disability Act, 49 Stat. 358, ch. 241 (1935), codified at D.C. Code §§ 4-601 et seq., has provided medical, surgical, and hospital benefits and salary continuation for DC police and firefighters injured in the line of duty since 1935. Congress amended the Act in 1957 to bar double recovery between it and FECA. Federal courts have read the Act as displacing common-law tort claims against the government for line-of-duty injuries (Anthony v. Norfleet, 330 F. Supp. 1211 (D.D.C. 1971)).

Layer 2: FECA. Until 1979, work-related injuries to DC employees (other than those covered by the 1935 Act) were handled under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. FECA's exclusivity clause, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c), bars all other claims against the United States or its agencies for the same injury. The exclusivity provision was added in 1949 to prevent multiple recoveries after the FTCA created new tort exposures. Courts have applied FECA exclusivity strictly to DC employees (Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978); Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1979)).

Layer 3: The CMPA. In 1979, DC enacted the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (D.C. Law 2-139), which created Title XXIII to replace FECA for DC employees. The CMPA disability provisions (D.C. Code § 1-624.1 et seq.) covered most DC employees and, for police and firefighters appointed on or after January 1, 1980, covered them too (D.C. Code §§ 1-633.2(a)(B), 1-633.3(1)(p), 1-637.1(m)(4); Brown v. Jefferson, 451 A.2d 74 (D.C. 1982)).

The CMPA's exclusivity clause (D.C. Code § 1-624.16(c)) tracks 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) almost word for word, with "District" substituted for "United States." It bars all other liability, in any forum, for the same injury.

When DC enacted the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act in 1982, the question was whether it implicitly repealed the CMPA's exclusivity for on-duty motor vehicle injuries. The Corporation Counsel said no for three reasons:

1. No legislative history. The "voluminous" legislative history of the No-Fault Law contains no indication that the Council ever considered amending or repealing the workers' compensation system's exclusivity for on-duty injuries.

2. The No-Fault Law preserves employer compensation duties. Sections 8(a)(1), 11(b)(2), and 11(b)(4) of the No-Fault Law expressly leave intact the existing duties of employers (including the District as employer) to pay compensation under existing statutes.

3. Implied repeals are disfavored. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), both say the implied repeal of an existing statute requires clear legislative intent. Mere overlap is not enough.

Reading the No-Fault Law and the pre-existing workers' compensation statutes in pari materia, the Corporation Counsel concluded that DC employees may recover no-fault benefits in excess of workers' compensation, but only from insurers other than the District government itself. Several other jurisdictions had reached similar conclusions (Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 422 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 1980); Mailhut v. Travelers Insurance Co., 377 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1978); IML Freight v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975)).

The Corporation Counsel acknowledged that some jurisdictions had gone the other way (notably Michigan, New York, Maryland), but DC followed the exclusivity-strict majority view.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• DC Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, D.C. Law 4-155, D.C. Code §§ 35-2101 et seq.
• Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; § 8116(c) (exclusivity)
• Policemen and Firemen's Retirement and Disability Act, 49 Stat. 358 (1935), D.C. Code §§ 4-601 et seq.
• DC Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, D.C. Law 2-139, D.C. Code §§ 1-624.1 et seq.; § 1-624.16(c) (exclusivity)

Cases:

• Brown v. Jefferson, 451 A.2d 74 (D.C. 1982), police and firefighters appointed after Jan. 1, 1980 are CMPA-covered
• Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978), FECA exclusivity strictly applied to DC employees
• Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1979), exclusivity even when no compensation payable
• Anthony v. Norfleet, 330 F. Supp. 1211 (D.D.C. 1971), comprehensive scheme presumed exclusive
• United States v. Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. 167 (1984), FECA exclusivity scope
• Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), implied repeals disfavored
• Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), same
• Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 422 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 1980), workers' comp exclusivity defeats no-fault PIP
• Mailhut v. Travelers Insurance Co., 377 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1978), same

License

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Source

• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-No-Fault-Law.pdf

Original opinion text

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~ntttrumtttt nf tift iistrirt nf <ttnlumbia OF.FICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL DISTRICT BUILDING WASHINGTON.

D. C.

20004

IN REPLY REFER TO:

LCD:L&O:RND:gbt
(84-60)
December 20. 1984

OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Application of No-Fault Law to On-Duty Police and Fire Fighters.

Theodore Coleman, Chief
District of Columbia Fire Department
1923 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
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Dear Chief Coleman:
This will reply to your request dated February 22, 1984, with respect to the application to on-duty police and firefighters of the Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, D.C. Law 4-155, effective September 18, 1982, D.C. Code SS35-2101 et seq. (1981) (hereinafter the No-Fault Law). It appears from your memorandum and the attachments, as well as from information received June 25, 1984, from the Metropolitan Police Department, that the following situation prompts your inquiry. Firefighters and police officers who have been involved in on-duty motor vehicle accidents while operating vehicles owned by the District Government have through their attorney written their departments claiming to be entitled to benefits under the No-Fault Law, in addition to benefits already available to them under special statutory provisions for District police and firefighters. I have concluded that such employees are not entitled to additional benefits from the District government. This conclusion has a complex statutory background.

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For many years, work-related injuries to Federal and District employees were covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. S8101 et seq. FECA is by its terms an exclusive remedy. See, ~., Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1983); Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399, 402 (D.C. 1978). That is to say, an employee who

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suffers an injury resulting in death or disability in ,the scope of his employment is limited to the remedies under FECA. See united States v. Lorenzetti, u.S.
, 104 S.Ct. 2284 (1984); 5
U.S.C. §8116(c).
This exclusivity:provision was enacted in 1949 to avoid multiple recoveries by injured employees and excessive costs to the United States due to the passage of several acts, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, waiving sovereign immunity of the United States in certain damage actions. Mason v. District of Columbia, supra, 395 A.2d at 402. Thus it was held that, where FECA applies, that remedy is exclusive for a District of Columbia employee, even though under the facts of a particular case no compensation is payable, or the Act fails to provide for the full extent of the employee's damages. Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734-735 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 u.S. 867 (1979). However, District of Columbia police and firefighters have long had a separate system to pay for medical and surgical services and hospital treatment and for the continuation of salary benefits for injuries incurred in the line of duty. Policemen and Firemen's Retirement and Disability Act, 49 Stat. 358, ch. 241 (1935), as amended, D.C. Code §§4-601 et seq. (1981) (the Act). In 1957, Congress amended that Act to prevent double recoveries under it and under FECA. See Brown v. Jefferson, 451 A.2d 74 (D.C. 1982). It has been held that the Act precludes the Government's common-law tort liability to District police and firefighters for injuries incurred in the line of duty: Where Congress has established a comprehensive system to compensate injured employees, that scheme should be presumed to be the exclusive remedy against the Government. Anthony v. Norfleet, 330 F. Supp. 1211, 1213 (D.D.C. 1971). The District of Columbia is no longer under the FECA system because it set up its own disability compensation system in Title XXIII of the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, D. C. Law 2-139, effective March 3, 1979, (D.C. Code, §1-624.1 et seq.) (CMPA). Police and firefighters appointed after January 1, 1980, come under the disability compensation provisions of CMPA. See D. C. Code, §§1-633.2 (a)(B), 1-633.3(1) (p), 1-637.1(m)(4). Brown v. Jefferson, supra, 451 A.2d at 74,

75. The compensation program is similar to the federal program
    it superseded, providing for medical and related services in case of injury in the performance of duty. CMPA also contains an exclusivity clause much like its federal counterpart. Compare 5 U.S.C. §8116(c) with D.C. Code, §1-624.16(c). In most respects, it is virtually identical to the federal statute save for the substitution of the "District" for "United States". The CMPA exclusivity clause reads as follows:

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The liability of the District of Columbia government or an instrumentality thereof, under this subchapter or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death

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of an employee, is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the District of Columbia government or the instrumentality to the employee, his or her legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the District of Columbia or the instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative, or judicial proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a federal tort liability statute. This subchapter does not apply to a master or a member of a crew of a vessel. Thus, prior to the enactment of the No-Fault law, all compensation systems established by statute provided exclusive remedies for District employees, including police and firefighters, who suffered work-related injuries. Furthermore, courts had uniformly held that such statutes precluded further Government liability for work-related injuries.

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The voluminous legislative history of the No-Fault law contains no indication that the Council of the District of Columbia ever considered amending or repealing the exclusivity of the compensation system already established for work-related injuries to District employees. Normally, repeals by implication are disfavored. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 u.S. 461, 468 (1982); 1A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§23.09, '23.10 (4th ed. 1972); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-551 (1974). It is clear from sections 8(a)(1) and 11(b)(2) of the NoFault Law, D.C. Code §35-2107(a)(1) and 35-2110(b)(2), that enactment of the No-Fault law in no way lessens the duty of employers in general to pay compensation to their workers under existing statutes. Similarly, the No-Fault law has left intact the existing statutory duties of the District as an employer. See section 11(b)(4), D.C. Code §35-2110(b)(4). Thus, it appears from a reading of these sections of the No-Fault Law and preexisting compensation statutes in pari materia that District employees may recover benefits Tn excess of the benefits provided from compensation statutes, but they can only recover from insurers other than the District Government. Cf. Freeman v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 259 S.E. 2d 36 (Ga. 1979); Boothman v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 450 A.2d 139 (Pa. Sup. 1982); Augostine v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 437 A.2d 985 (Pa. Sup. 1981).

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The conclusion reached herein, maintaining the exclusivity of workmen's compensation remedies against the District under the No-Fault law, is in accord with the best reasoned decisions interpreting the no-fault laws of other states. See Wagner v.

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National Indemnity Co., 422 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 1980); Mailhut v. Travelers Insurance Co., 377 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1978) (persons entitled to workmen's compensation from any state or federal service are excluded from PIP berie~its); Swafford v. Transit Casualty Co., 486 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1980); IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975); cf., Demetriadis v. United states Postal Service, 465 F. Supp. 59~(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (FECA is exclusive remedy); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Griffin v. United States, 703 F. 2 d 32 1 ( 8 th Ci r. 1 983 ) * / Sincerely,

h~c:..~1
Inez Smith Reid
Corporation Counsel, D.C •

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*/ But see Brown v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Co., 275 S.E. 2d 651 (Ga. 1981)(statute had been amended since Freeman, supra); Mathis v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 289 N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 1980) (both insurers and sel'f-insurers required to pay under Michigan No-Fault statute); Record v. Metropolitan Transit Commission, 284 N.W.2d 542 (Minn. 1979); Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 641 S.W.2d 49,51 (Ky. App. 1982) citing United States Fidelit & Guarant Co. v. Smith, 580 S.W. 2d 216 (Ky. 1979 (by implication; Ryder Truck Lines Inc. v. Maiorano, 44 N.Y. 2d 364, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 66, 376 N.E. 2d 1311 (1978); Carriers Insurance Company v. Burakowski, 93 Misc. 2d 100, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 383 (1978); Cady v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 113 Misc. 2d 1080, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 679 (1980); Mayor and Cit~ Council of Baltimore v. Rose, 47 Md. App. 481, 424 A.2d 16 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1981) (fireman entitled to recover from city under uninsured motorist coverage notwithstanding payment of disability benefits under the fire and police employees retirement system); Wellington v. City of New York, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 329, 101 Misc. 2d 970 (Cir.Ct.Bronx 1979) (police could recover sick leave and no-fault before statute was amended to preclude such double recovery).