When can DC parking enforcement officers (not police) write tickets, and what kinds of violations can they ticket?

Plain-English summary

In 1978, the DC Council decriminalized routine traffic offenses with the Traffic Adjudication Act, and at the same time created a corps of civilian parking enforcement officers under the Department of Transportation (DDOT) so that police would not have to spend their time writing parking tickets. The Act split traffic offenses into two titles: Title II ("Moving Infractions") for everything covered by general motor vehicle regulations, and Title III ("Parking, Standing, Stopping and Pedestrian Infractions") for parking-style offenses. Police can write tickets for either; DDOT civilian enforcement officers can write tickets only for Title III offenses.

Five years later, DDOT Director Thomas Downs asked the Corporation Counsel (now the Attorney General) for guidance on three specific questions: could DDOT officers ticket for excessive idling, for leaving the motor running unattended, and for failing to display current DC tags? Corporation Counsel Judith Rogers answered yes to all three, with one important qualifier on the DC tag question.

Excessive idling and motor running unattended are classified as non-moving violations in the regulations because they regulate "the parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle." DDOT civilians can write those tickets without limit.

The DC tag question is more nuanced. Driving a vehicle without current DC tags is a moving violation that DDOT officers cannot ticket. But the same regulation also requires that DC tags be displayed on vehicles "left standing upon any public highway," which makes failure to display tags a parking-style offense when the vehicle is parked. So DDOT officers can ticket for missing tags, but only when the vehicle is (1) on a public highway, (2) stationary, and (3) unoccupied.

What this means for you

If you are a DC driver

A few practical consequences flow from this opinion that still matter today (though enforcement is now under the DC Department of Public Works' parking enforcement officers, the legal framework has not materially changed):

• Idling tickets. DC restricts how long you can idle your engine and how long you can leave it running while unattended. Civilian parking enforcement officers can write you a ticket for either, just like they would for a meter violation.
• Out-of-state plates. If you live in DC and park your car on the street with out-of-state plates, a parking enforcement officer can ticket you for failure to display DC tags. The catch is that they can only do it when the car is parked. If the same officer sees you driving with out-of-state plates, they cannot pull you over; that is a moving violation only police can enforce.
• In your driveway or private lot. This opinion's analysis is keyed to vehicles on a public highway. Vehicles parked on private property are generally not subject to DDOT parking enforcement under this framework.

If you are a DC parking enforcement officer

Your authority comes from D.C. Code §§ 40-625(e) and 40-626(c), as construed by this opinion. You can write tickets for any violation that fits the definition of a "parking infraction" in 18 D.C.M.R. § 9901: "a violation of any law, rule or regulation providing for or regulating the parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle." That includes idling violations, unattended-motor violations, and DC tag display failures, in each case where the vehicle is parked. You cannot ticket someone you observe actually driving (with the engine on, ignition on, and someone behind the wheel), even if you can see they are violating the same regulation, because that crosses into moving-violation territory.

If you are a traffic attorney representing a DC ticket recipient

Two challenge angles flow from this opinion. First, jurisdictional: was the violation actually a parking infraction (Title III) under the Traffic Adjudication Act, or was it improperly classified as one to extend DDOT's authority? Second, factual: was the vehicle in fact stationary and unoccupied when the ticket was issued? United States v. Weston, 466 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1972), held that a car parked at the curb is being "operated" if someone is in the driver's seat with the ignition on and the motor running. By analogy, if the driver was in the car when the ticket was written, the failure-to-display tags ticket may have been written by an officer without authority.

If you are an out-of-state visitor parking in DC

The DC tag rule applies to vehicles "left standing upon any public highway." Visitors with out-of-state plates are generally not enforced against in the same way as DC residents, since enforcement targets DC residents who must register their vehicles in the District. But if your vehicle is parked in DC for an extended period and DC believes you are a DC resident, the DDOT enforcement officer can write a no-DC-tags ticket using the parking-infraction framework analyzed here.

Common questions

Q: Can a parking enforcement officer write a ticket if I am sitting in my car at the curb with the engine running?
A: Probably not. The opinion limits DDOT enforcement authority to vehicles that are stationary and unoccupied. Weston says a vehicle is being operated if someone is in the driver's seat with the ignition on and the motor running. That makes it a moving situation, not a parking one.

Q: What if my engine is running but I am asleep in the back seat?
A: That is closer to a non-moving situation under Weston's reasoning, and a parking enforcement officer could ticket for excessive idling or unattended motor. The case turns on whether someone is behind the wheel with the ignition on.

Q: Can a DDOT officer give me a moving violation if they see me run a red light?
A: No. Moving violations are reserved for police officers under D.C. Code § 40-616(c).

Q: Why do excessive idling and motor-running-unattended count as "parking" infractions?
A: Because the underlying regulations (18 D.C.M.R. §§ 2415.1, 2415.3) explicitly regulate parking, stopping, or standing of a vehicle. The categorization tracks the substance of the regulation, not the colloquial meaning of "parking."

Q: Has this opinion been overruled or superseded?
A: The Corporation Counsel's office became the Attorney General's office, and parking enforcement was later transferred from DDOT to the Department of Public Works. The substantive analysis of the Traffic Adjudication Act remains the operative framework.

Q: Can I appeal a parking ticket on the ground that the officer lacked authority?
A: You can argue lack of authority before the Department of Motor Vehicles' Adjudication Services. The strongest version of the argument requires showing the violation was actually a moving infraction (Title II), or that the vehicle was occupied or being operated when the ticket was written.

Background and statutory framework

Before 1978, traffic offenses in the District of Columbia were criminal matters and police officers handled all enforcement. The Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978 (D.C. Law 2-104) made two big structural changes: it decriminalized routine traffic violations (turning them into civil infractions adjudicated administratively rather than criminally), and it created a civilian enforcement corps to take parking enforcement off the police. The civilian officers were placed under the Department of Transportation, which at the time housed the District's traffic and parking functions.

The Act split offenses into two categories. Title II (Moving Infractions) covers "all violations of statutes, regulations, executive orders or rules relating to the operating of any vehicle in the District," with limited exceptions. Tickets for Title II violations are issued by police officers (D.C. Code § 40-616(c)). Title III (Parking, Standing, Stopping and Pedestrian Infractions) covers "all violations of statutes, regulations, executive orders or rules relating to parking, standing, stopping or pedestrian offenses." Tickets for Title III violations may be issued by either police officers or Department of Transportation employees (D.C. Code §§ 40-625(e), 40-626(c)).

The Director of the Department of Transportation issued implementing rules in November 1978 (25 D.C.R. 4917), defining a moving violation as "a violation of any law, rule or regulation which regulates the movement of vehicles," and a parking violation as "a violation of any law, rule or regulation providing for or regulating the parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle." Final rules later assigned fine schedules in two separate sections (18 D.C.M.R. § 2600 for moving; 18 D.C.M.R. § 2601 for parking and other non-moving). The agency interpretation is entitled to interpretive weight under L'Enfant Plaza Properties, 564 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

The 1983 Corporation Counsel opinion applied this framework to three close cases. Excessive idling (18 D.C.M.R. § 2415.1) and unattended motor (18 D.C.M.R. § 2415.3) are squarely parking infractions, classified under § 2601 and concerning vehicles stopped on the highway. DDOT can ticket. Failure to display DC tags is more complicated. The general rule (under 50 Stat. 682, ch. 690, § 4 (1937)) is that operating a vehicle without DC tags is a moving violation that police enforce. But the implementing regulation (18 D.C.M.R. § 424.1) requires DC tags on vehicles "left standing upon any public highway," which makes the same offense a parking infraction when the vehicle is parked. The Corporation Counsel's resolution: DDOT can write the ticket if the vehicle is on a public highway, stationary, and unoccupied. United States v. Weston draws the line: a car parked at the curb with someone in the driver's seat, the ignition on, and the motor running is being "operated" within the meaning of the moving-violation statute.

The framework has held up well. The categorization matters not just for officer authority but for due process: criminal moving violations come with different procedural protections than civil parking infractions, and the DC Council was careful in 1978 to preserve criminal status for the more serious moving offenses (operating without tags, reckless driving, DUI) while decriminalizing the routine ones.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- D.C. Law 2-104 (Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978)
- D.C. Code §§ 40-601 et seq. (Traffic Adjudication Act, 1981 codification)
- D.C. Code §§ 40-611, 40-616(c) (Title II Moving Infractions)
- D.C. Code §§ 40-621, 40-625(e), 40-626(c) (Title III Parking Infractions)
- 50 Stat. 682, ch. 690, § 4 (1937) (operating without DC tags)

Regulations:
- 18 D.C.M.R. § 424.1 (DC tag display)
- 18 D.C.M.R. § 2415.1, 2415.3 (idling, unattended motor)
- 18 D.C.M.R. § 2600 (moving infraction fines)
- 18 D.C.M.R. § 2601 (parking infraction fines)
- 18 D.C.M.R. § 9901 (definitions)

Cases:
- L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 564 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1977), agency interpretation of statute it implements is entitled to interpretive weight
- United States v. Weston, 466 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1972), vehicle is being "operated" if someone is in driver's seat with ignition on and motor running, even if at curb

License

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Source

• Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-Tickets-Non-Moving-Violations.pdf

Original opinion text

Government of the District of Columbia
OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
District Building
Washington, D.C. 20004

In Reply Refer to: LCD:L&O:TB:pm (82-647)

March 3, 1983

OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL

Subject: Authority of Department of Transportation Enforcement Personnel to Issue Tickets for Non-Moving Violations

Thomas M. Downs, Director
Department of Transportation
415 12th Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Downs:

This is in reply to your request dated September 14, 1982, for an opinion regarding the authority of Department of Transportation (DOT) enforcement personnel to issue tickets for non-moving violations under the District of Columbia Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978. Among the violations to which you referred are: excessive idling; motor running unattended; and failure to secure D.C. tags. In my opinion, Department of Transportation enforcement personnel may issue citations for such violations.

The Council of the District of Columbia adopted the District of Columbia Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978, D.C. Law 2-104, effective September 12, 1978, D.C. Code, secs. 40-601 et seq. (1981), to decriminalize certain violations of the Motor Vehicle Regulations and "to provide for the civilian enforcement of parking infractions." Sec. 101, D.C. Code, sec. 40-601. In adopting this act, the Council did not explicitly define "parking infractions." However, the scheme of the act implicitly defines the term.

Title II of the Traffic Adjudication Act, "Moving Infractions," applies to "all violations of statutes, regulations, executive orders or rules relating to the operating of any vehicle in the District, except those violations covered by Title III" and certain enumerated violations. Sec. 201, D.C. Code, sec. 40-611. Notices of infraction for violations of Title II are to be issued by police officers. Sec. 206(c), D.C. Code, sec. 40-616(c). Title III, "Parking, Standing, Stopping and Pedestrian Infractions," applies to "all violations of statutes, regulations, executive orders or rules relating to parking, standing, stopping or pedestrian offenses." Sec. 301, D.C. Code, sec. 40-621. Notices of infraction for such violations are to be issued by police officers or Department of Transportation employees. Sec. 305(e) and 306(c), D.C. Code, secs. 40-625(e) and 40-626(c). Accord, Report of the Council Committee on the Judiciary on Bill 2-195, May 24, 1978, pp. 12 and 19.

The interpretation of the agency primarily concerned with implementing a statute is relevant to proper construction of the statute. See L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 564 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1977). When the Director of the Department of Transportation proposed rules to implement the Traffic Adjudication Act, those rules provided that police officers could issue tickets for moving and parking violations, but the Department of Transportation personnel could issue tickets "only for parking violations." 25 D.C.R. 4917 (November 24, 1978) sec. 2.07. 18 D.C.M.R. secs. 3002 and 3003. The proposed rules assessed civil fines by listing all traffic violations (and the relevant fines) under a single heading: "Violations." 25 D.C.R. 4923, sec. 3.03(b). The rules defined a moving violation as "a violation of any law, rule or regulation which regulates the movement of vehicles"; and a parking violation as "a violation of any law, rule or regulation providing for or regulating the parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle." 25 D.C.R. 4912-4913, secs. 1.12 and 1.16, 18 D.C.M.R. sec. 9901. These definitions were, on their face, consistent with the scheme of the Traffic Adjudication Act.

The Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles later adopted final rules which repeat the proposed rules with only one relevant change: the rules impose fines by listing traffic violations in sections separating moving infractions (18 D.C.M.R. sec. 2600) from parking and other non-moving infractions (18 D.C.M.R. sec. 2601).

"Excessive idling" and "Motor running unattended" are both classified as non-moving violations in sec. 2601.1. This classification is consistent with the regulations creating each infraction, which explicitly "regulate the parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle." 18 D.C.M.R. secs. 2415.1 and 2415.3.

[Footnote: "Notice of infraction" is defined by regulations as synonymous with "ticket." 18 D.C.M.R. sec. 9901.]

"Failure to secure D.C. tags" is classified as a moving violation in sec. 2600. However, this infraction also satisfies the Director's definition of a parking violation, since the regulation creating this infraction explicitly requires the display of current D.C. tags on motor vehicles "left standing upon any public highway." 18 D.C.M.R. sec. 424.1. However, it is important to note that the authority of DOT enforcement personnel to issue tickets for this infraction extends only to vehicles left standing on a public highway. Thus, DOT enforcement personnel have clear authority to issue such tickets only if a vehicle is: (1) on a public highway, (2) stationary, and (3) unoccupied. The Traffic Adjudication Act specifically does not decriminalize the offense of operating a vehicle without current D.C. tags. See sec. 202(g); 50 Stat. 682, ch. 690, sec. 4 (1937). It has been held that a vehicle is being operated within the meaning of this provision if someone is seated behind the steering wheel with the ignition switch on and the motor running, even if the vehicle is standing at the curb. United States v. Weston, 466 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

In conclusion, it is my opinion that Department of Transportation enforcement personnel have authority under the Traffic Adjudication Act to issue tickets for any violations which meet the definition of a "parking infraction" contained in 18 D.C.M.R. sec. 9901, namely: "a violation of any law, rule or regulation providing for or regulating the parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle."

Sincerely,

Judith W. Rogers
Corporation Counsel, D.C.