Does DC's no-fault auto insurance law apply to cars owned by foreign diplomats, the DC government, WMATA, or the federal government?
Apply this to your situation
This page answers the general question as of 1983. Ask about yours and see what current District of Columbia law means for your facts, with citations you can check.
Plain-English summary
DC enacted compulsory no-fault auto insurance in 1982. Every motor vehicle registered in DC has to carry the prescribed insurance or a self-insurance certificate. The DC Department of Transportation, which then handled registration, asked Corporation Counsel Judith Rogers a real-world question: does the law actually apply to vehicles owned by diplomats, the DC government itself, WMATA, and the federal government? Each of those owners has special legal status that might exempt them.
The opinion's answer is yes, all four classes have to comply, but the practical compliance requirement varies. The Director of Transportation can require a certificate of insurance before registering any vehicle. For DC government vehicles and diplomatic vehicles, the Director can demand normal proof of insurance. For WMATA and federal government vehicles, the Director cannot demand more than a statement that the entity is self-insured for claims under its own applicable laws.
The reasoning runs through three different legal channels. Diplomats are required by federal law (Section 6 of the Diplomatic Relations Act and 22 C.F.R. sec. 151.3 and 151.4) to carry liability insurance meeting the requirements of the jurisdiction where their vehicles are garaged, which means full DC no-fault compliance. DC government vehicles have no special exemption in the no-fault statute, and the Council clearly has authority to define the District's own liability. WMATA is governed by the WMATA Compact, which under Art. 80 makes WMATA liable for torts of its agents in proprietary functions "in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory." The opinion cites federal no-fault cases to support its reading of that clause. The United States is similarly subject under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which makes the U.S. liable in the same manner as a private individual under like circumstances. But Supremacy Clause limits and specific federal-law conflicts mean DC cannot enforce the financial-contribution or 30-day-payment rules against the federal government, and the WMATA Compact cannot be unilaterally amended by DC.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1983. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Q: Can a foreign diplomat plead immunity to avoid paying DC no-fault? A: No. Section 6 of the Diplomatic Relations Act and 22 C.F.R. sec. 151.3 and 151.4 require diplomats to carry insurance meeting DC's requirements, which include no-fault. Diplomatic immunity for civil suits is a separate question, but the insurance-carrying obligation is enforced by the State Department.
Q: Why can DC require contribution payments from private self-insurers but not from the federal government? A: Two reasons. The federal vehicle registration statute (50 Stat. 680, § 4) requires DC to register federal vehicles "without charge," which the Corporation Counsel reads to bar any direct or indirect federal payment. And § 602(a) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973 (D.C. Code § 1-233) denies the Council authority to amend any Act of Congress concerning the property of the United States.
Q: What about the WMATA Compact, can DC just amend that to make WMATA pay? A: No. Hellmuth v. WMATA held the Compact governs the relations of the parties and is "superior to both prior and subsequent law." DC cannot unilaterally amend it. Article 78 also exempts WMATA from DC taxes and assessments.
Q: Can I use this 1983 opinion to determine current vehicle insurance duties? A: The opinion addresses the Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1982 and the law cited at that time. Check the current DC statute, federal regulations, and WMATA Compact before relying on its conclusions today.
Q: What if a foreign mission stops paying its insurance? A: The State Department can revoke driver's licenses and license plates of mission staff under the Diplomatic Relations Act. As a practical matter, missions face significant pressure to maintain coverage.
Q: Are DC police cars subject to no-fault?
A: They are owned by the DC government, which has no statutory exception. The DC government can self-insure or buy commercial coverage. The substantive PIP rules apply.
Background and statutory framework
DC enacted the Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act in 1982 (D.C. Law 4-155). The Act required every owner of a motor vehicle registered in DC to maintain compulsory no-fault insurance (§ 4(a)). It defined "owner" and "person" to include any natural person, firm, association, government agency, or instrumentality (§§ 3(21), 3(23)). The only express exception was for taxicabs (§ 12(e)). Sections 9(c)(3) and 9(e) required self-insurers to contribute to the assigned claims plan and the administration fund; § 11(c)(1) required claim payments within 30 days; § 14(c)(7) authorized the Mayor to issue self-insurance certificates.
The DOT Director's question was how to apply this framework to four classes of unusual owners.
Diplomats. Section 6 of the federal Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-393, 92 Stat. 809; 22 U.S.C. § 254e) directs each foreign mission, members, and their families to comply with regulations establishing liability-insurance requirements. The implementing regulations (22 C.F.R. sec. 151.3 and 151.4) require missions and persons to maintain insurance meeting the legal requirements of the jurisdiction where the vehicle is principally garaged, including compulsory insurance, uninsured motorist coverage, and first-party no-fault coverage. So the DC no-fault requirements apply to diplomatic vehicles via federal regulation.
District of Columbia. The Council has authority to define the District's own tort liability (cf. District of Columbia Unjust Imprisonment Act of 1980). Without any expressed statutory exception, the no-fault Act applies to DC-owned vehicles like any other.
WMATA. Vehicles are governed by the WMATA Compact (D.C. Code § 1-2431). Hellmuth v. WMATA, 414 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1976), held the Compact governs the parties' relations and is superior to both prior and subsequent law; one party may not impose burdens absent the concurrence of the other signatories. Article 77 exempts WMATA transit service from signatory laws except those relating to safety, inspection, and testing. But Art. 80 makes WMATA liable for the torts of its agents in proprietary functions "in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory." The opinion cites a federal no-fault case applying parallel FTCA language to U.S. liability. Art. 80 therefore subjects WMATA to DC no-fault.
United States. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), makes the United States liable to a claimant "in accordance with the law of the place," and 28 U.S.C. § 2674 makes the U.S. liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." The opinion reasoned that this language brought DC no-fault rules into the analysis of claims against the United States.
But on the financial-contribution and 30-day-payment requirements, three obstacles defeat DC enforcement against the federal government:
- The DC vehicle-registration statute (50 Stat. 680, ch. 690, Title IV, § 2) requires DC to register federal vehicles "without charge," precluding direct or indirect payment from the federal government (citing In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 591 (1938)).
- Section 602(a) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973 (D.C. Code § 1-233) denies the Council authority to amend any Act of Congress concerning U.S. property.
- Federal employee compensation law (5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.) provides an exclusive remedy for federal employees injured in on-duty auto accidents, and the Supremacy Clause bars DC from requiring the U.S. to pay different or additional benefits (Demetriadis v. United States Postal Service, 465 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)). Federal accounting rules also do not permit the 30-day claim payment.
The opinion's compromise: the DOT Director can require a self-insurance statement from WMATA and the U.S. but cannot demand more.
Citations and references
Statutes and regulations:
- D.C. Law 4-155 (Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1982)
- 50 Stat. 680, ch. 690, Title IV, § 2 (1937), D.C. Code § 40-102 (vehicle registration)
- D.C. Code §§ 40-401 et seq. (Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act)
- Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. 95-393, 22 U.S.C. § 254e
- 22 C.F.R. §§ 151.3, 151.4 (1982)
- WMATA Compact, D.C. Code § 1-2431 (Articles 77, 78, 80)
- Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
- 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.
- 41 C.F.R. Subpart 101-38.2 (1981)
- District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973 § 602(a), D.C. Code § 1-233
Cases:
- Hellmuth v. WMATA, 414 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1976), Compact superior to prior and subsequent law
- Hohman v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Pa. 1979), same analysis under Federal Medical Care Recovery Act
- Demetriadis v. United States Postal Service, 465 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), Supremacy Clause bars state no-fault from requiring different federal benefits
- In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 591, 14 N.E.2d 392 (1938), "without charge" language precludes indirect federal payment
License
This opinion is published by the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia. Per the DC.gov terms of use, content is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0, which permits commercial use, redistribution, and modification with attribution.
Source
- Original PDF: https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/Opinion-July-2014-No-Fault-Vehicle-Insurance.pdf
Original opinion text
••
~nu~r1tmr1tt nf 14~ Btstrid nf Qtnlumhitt
OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
DISTRICT BUILDING
WASHINGTON. D.
C.
20004
IN REPLY REFER TO:
LCD:L&O:TB:pm
(82-720)
February 3, 1983
OPINION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
SUBJECI': Application of the Compulsory/
No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance
Act to Vehicles' owned by Diplomats,
the District of Columbia, WMATA,
and the United States •
•
Thomas M. Downs, Director
Department of Transportation
District of Columbia Government
415 12th Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.
Dear f.rr. J):)wns :
This is in reply to your request dated November 2, 1982, for an op1n10n of this Office as to whether the Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1982, D.C. Law 4-155, effective September 18, 1982, requires that the prescribed form of insurance or a certificate of self-insurance be obtain.~d for vehicles CMned by diplomats, by the District of Columbia, by the
~vashin:Jton f>1etropolitan Area Transit Authority (Wt1ATA), and by the United States.
•
In my opinion, the Director of the Depar~~ent of Transportation may require a certificate of insurance as a prerequisite to registering each of these classes of vehicles. HCMever, the Director should not require more of WMATA or t~e United States than the statement that they are self-insured for the payment of clai~s made under all applicable laws •
-2-
•
.
Section 4(a) of D.C. Law 4-155 requires each owner of a rotor vechicle required to be registered in the District 1/ to maintain cort\i?ulsory no-fault insurance as prescribed by the act. Section l4(c)(7) authorizes the Mayor to issue certificates of self-insurance, which provide for payment of benefits in accordance with the act. 2/ Sections 91c)I3) and 91e) require self-insurers to join insurance writers in contributin9 to meeting the cost of the assigned claims plan and. the administration fund-established by the act, in accordance with rules laid down by the Superintendent of Insurance. Section 4{d)(1) requires that every person applying to register a motor vehicle in the District certify to the Director of the Department of Transportation that the insurance required by the act is in effect with respect to that rrntor vehicle. Sections 3{2l) and 3t23} define "owner" and "person" to include any natural person, firm, association, gov~rnlT\ent agency, or instrunentali ty. Under the statute as enacted, the Director of the Department of Transportation would appear to have the authority to require an appropriate c~ulsory/no-fault insurance certificate as a prerequisite to registering cars oNned by diplomats, by the District of Columbia, by WMATA and by the United States. The act includes only one exception, for taxicabs, sec. l21e), and there is no indication in the legislative history that the Council intended any other exception. See Proceedings of the Council of the District of Columbia, Council Period 4, 2d session, (cited hereafter as Proceedings) May 11, 1982, pp. 128-130: June 22, 1982, pp. 133, 200-202,229.
•
J
!!
50 Stat. GSO, ch. 690, Title IV, sec. 2, August 17, 1937, as amended, D.C. cOde, sec. 40-102 t 1981), provides that no rcotor vehicle may be operated on the streets of the District (with limited exceptions for non-residents and others which are not relevant here) unless the owner registers the vehicle with the District Government;'the District Government must provide certificates of registration and identification tags without charge for motor vehicles owned for official use by any duly accredited representative of a foreign govern1nent or ONned by the District or by the United States.
2/
Nowhere does the act give legal effect to the Mayor's issuance or refusal to issue a certificate of self-insurance. Hrywever, a person who has been involved in a motor vehicle accident in the District may use such a certificate in lieu of the deposit of security otherwise required by th~ Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, G8 Stat. 120 t1954), D.C. Code, secs. 40-401 et seq. (1981). The United States and the District of Columbia are exeffiJ?ted frOll this requirement to deposit security •. D.C. Code, sec. 40-4l8(8) •
-3-
Section 6 of the Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. 95-393, 92 Stat.
~809 (1978), 22 U.S.C. sec. 254e, directs each foreign mission, members of
the mission and their families to comply with regulations establishing liability insurance requirements, to be promulgated under the Act. Those regulations require missions and persons to maintain liability insurance with respect to their motor vehicles, which insurance shall meet the legal requirements of the jurisdiction where the vehicle is principally
;Jara;Jed, including cornpulsory insurance, uninsured rcotorist coverage, and first party no-fault coverage. 22 C.F.R. sec. 151.3 and 151.4 (1982). The Council clearly has the authority to define the liability of the government of the District of Columbia. See,~, District of Columbia Unjust Imprisonment Act of 1980, D.C. Law 3-143, effective March 5, 1981, D.C. Code, secs. 1-941 et seq. In the absence of any expressed exception for District-owned-Vehicles the no-fault scheme enacted by the Council would be applicable to District-owned vehicles as well as to privately-owned vehicles. Vehicles owned by WMATA are governed in the first instance by the washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, D.C. Code, sec. 1-2431. "[Tlhe compact governs the relations of the parties with respect to the subject matter of the agreement and is superior to both prior and subsequent law • • • • [O'ne party may not impose burdens upon the cort\f>act absent the concurrence of the other signatories." Hellmuth v. WMATA, 414 F.Supp. 408 (D.Md. 1976). Article 77 of the compact exempts WMATA transit service from all. laws of the signatories except those relating to safety, inspection and testing. See,~, Gay Activists Alliance v. WMATA, Civil No. 78-2217, D.D.C., July 5, 1979; 4 Op.C.C. 203 (1979). However, Art. 80 provides that WMATA shall be liable for its contracts and the torts of its agents committed in the conduct of any proprietary function "in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory." It has been held that parallel language in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346 (b), applies New York's No-Fault Insurance Act to claims against the United States. Liberty Mutual Insurance 00. v. United States. 490 F. Supp. 328 tE.D. N.Y. 1980). Claims by the United States under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 76 Stat. 593 {1962), 42 U.S.C. secs. 2651 et. seq., have similarly been held to be subject to Pennsylvania's no-fault motor vehicle insurance act, even in the absence of such language. Hohman v. United States, 470 F.Supp. 769 tE.D. Pa. 1979). See generi?lly, "Note: The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act in No-Fault Automobile Insurance Jurisdictions" 21 B.C.L. Rev. 623 t1980). The reasoning of these precedents would appear to cort\f>el the conclusion that Art. 80 of the WMATA compact subjects WMATA to the District's Compulsory/No-Fault Insurance Act. The same precedents similarly would appear to compel the conclusion that the United States is subject to the D.C. Compulsory/No-Fault Insurance Act. }/
~
41 C.F.R Subpart 101-38.2 {198l) follows ~~e D.C. Code in requiring that all Federal government rotor vehicles "regularly based or housed in the District" be registered (agencies must subnit documentation attesting ownership) and inspected by the District annually.
•
-4This conclusion is supported by the language of the Federal Tort Claims ~ct, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(b) supra, which provides that u.s. District Courts shall hear claims against the united States "if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place;\' another section of the A.ct provides that the United States shall be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. sec. 2674. Nothwithstanding the applicability to diplo~ts, the District, WMATA and the United States of the C~~ulsory/No-Fault Insurance Act, there are statutory restrictions on what the Director of the Department of Transportation may require certain owners to certify regarding the existence of insurance before registering their vehicles under section 4(d). There appear to be no such restrictions on the Director's authority over vehicles owned by the District or by diplomats. Indeed, 22 C.F.R. sections 151.3 and 151.4 affirmatively sanction ~osing the same insurance requirements on diplomatic owners of vehicles as on private owners. However, the Director may encounter substantial legal difficulties if he attempts to require any certification from WMATA or the United states beyond the sbnple statement that they are self insurers.
• First, it appears to have been the intent of the Council that cOmpliance with the self-insurance requirements by the federal government and by \'l'1ATA would be simple and pro forma. When the Council specifically considered \~A and government vehicles, no-fault features had not yet been added to the bill, which had been reported out of cormnittee as a sL~le compulsory insurance bill: the assumption of Councilmembers Rolark and Wilson in debate on the bill was that WMATA and the government could continue to do what they were already doing. Proceedings, May 11, 1982, pp. 128-130. Remarks made by Councilmember Wilson after no-fault provisions were added to the bill are consistent with this assumption. Proceedings, June 22, 1982, p. 133. But see remarks of Councilmember Moore, ibid.; pp. 184-188,229. Second, ~~e District has no legal authority to enforce against the United States the financial contribution requirements which secs. 9(c)(3) and 9(e) of the act place on self-insurers. Cf. Proceedings, June 22, 1982, pp. 184-188. The District may not unilaterally amend the WMATA Compact. Hellmuth v. WMATA, supra. Article 78 of the Compact exempts ~~A.TA from all federal, state, District of Columbia, municipal and local taxes anQ assessments including, without limitation, all motor vehicle license fees. Section 602(a) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 813, D.C. Code, sec. 1-233., denies the Council authority to impose any tax on the property of the United States or to amend any Act of Congress which concerns the property of the United States. If the Director were to enforce contribution requirements against the united States, such an action could be construed as effectively amending 50 Stat. 680, ch. 690, Title IV, sec. 2, supra, D.C. Code, sec. 40-102, requiring the District to'register vehicles ONned by the
~~~TA or
•
-5-
".
united states IIwithout charge. II Such language precludes payment frOl"'ll the
United States in any way directly or indirectly. See In re Opinion of the
Justices, 300 Mass. 591, 14 N.E. 2d 392 (1938).
Third, the District may not enforce against the United States
the requirement of sec. 14(c)(7) that self-insurance provide for the
payment of benefits to the extent required by ~~e act. For example,
the Federal Enployees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. secs. 8101 et. seq.,
provides an exclusive remedy for federal e:nployees injured by autortCbile
accidents within the scope of their employment;'under the Supremacy
Clause, u.S. Constitution Art. VI. cl.2, a State no-fault law may not
require the united States to pay different or additional benefits.
Demetriadis v. United States Postal Service, 465 F.Supp. 597 (E.D. N.Y
1979). The Tort Claims Section, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, also reports that present federal government accounting
procedures do not permit it to make continuing payments of claims
wiL~in 30 days of loss, as required by sec. ll(c)(l).
In conclusion, the Director of the Department of Transportation
may require a certificate of insurance as a prerequisite to registering
cars CMned by diplomats, by the District of Columbia, by W'1ATA, and by
the United States. However, the Director should not require more of
WMATA or the United States than the statement that they are self-insured
for the payment of claims made under all applicable laws.
•
•
,Sincerely,
\
.")
_.. ~l~t,h!" C--6 f--~
/Judi~ W. Rogers
Corporation Counsel
\
What does District of Columbia law say today, for your facts?
This opinion is from 1983. Ezel checks the current District of Columbia statutes and case law, applies them to your situation, and cites what it relies on.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace