Do Connecticut probation officers have to intervene to stop excessive force by a fellow officer and report it, the same way police officers and corrections officers do under the 2020 Police Accountability Act?

Plain-English summary

After George Floyd's murder in 2020, Connecticut passed the Police Accountability Act (Public Act 20-1). Two parts of that Act, now codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-282e and a parallel section for corrections, require certain officers to intervene if they witness another officer using unreasonable, excessive, or illegal force, and to report it afterward. Those officers are also protected from retaliation by their employers when they intervene or report.

The Judicial Branch's Court Support Services Division asked Attorney General William Tong whether those duties apply to its probation officers. The AG concluded they do not, for two reasons:

1. Probation officers are not "correction officers." Section 43 of the Act limits "correction officer" to Department of Correction employees. Probation officers work for the Judicial Branch's Court Support Services Division. (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-1d.)
2. Probation officers are not "police officers." The Act borrows the definition from Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a. The only category that could plausibly apply is "any member of a law enforcement unit who performs police duties." But the Judicial Branch is not a "law enforcement unit," because its primary function is adjudication, not law enforcement. Treating the Judicial Branch as a law enforcement unit would also conflict with separation-of-powers principles.

The opinion is careful to limit itself to the two specific duties in §§ 30 and 43 of the Act. It does not address whether probation officers may have duties to intervene or report under other sources of law (constitutional, regulatory, agency policy, ethical codes). It also does not opine on whether the law should be different. It also noted that the Act separately imposes some requirements on "peace officers," a broader category that does include adult probation officers under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3(9). But the intervention and reporting requirements at issue are narrower than the peace-officer duties, and they do not reach probation officers.

The AG also addressed an older 1993 AG opinion (93-28) that had treated probation officers as police officers for training and certification purposes. The legislature overruled that 1993 opinion the next year by enacting Public Act 94-6, now codified at § 7-294d(f)(2), which exempts Judicial Branch employees from POST training and certification. So the 1993 opinion does not control here.

What this means for you

If you are a Connecticut probation officer

Sections 30 and 43 of the Police Accountability Act do not impose the intervention or reporting duties on you. That said, the AG took pains to flag that other sources of obligation may exist: constitutional rules, other statutes, agency policy, professional and ethical codes. Talk to your supervisor and your union if you witness force you believe was excessive. The AG's opinion is narrow.

If you are a Court Support Services Division administrator

You can plan your training, intervention protocols, and disciplinary policies without folding §§ 30 and 43 of PA 20-1 into them. If your agency adopts internal policies that mirror those statutory duties anyway, that is a policy choice, not a legal mandate. The opinion explicitly says the AG "does not speak to what the law or policy should be."

If you are a Connecticut police officer or correction officer

This opinion does not affect you. You remain subject to the duty to intervene and the duty to report under § 7-282e (police officers) and PA 20-1 § 43 (correction officers). The AG simply explained that your statutory peers do not include Judicial Branch probation officers.

If you are a police accountability advocate or legislator

If you want probation officers covered by the intervention and reporting duties, you would need a statutory amendment. The AG's reasoning hinges on the §§ 7-294a definition of "law enforcement unit" and the structural fact that the Judicial Branch's primary function is adjudication. An amendment could either expand the definition of "police officer" for purposes of § 7-282e or impose the duties directly on probation officers (or all peace officers).

If you are a criminal defendant or defense attorney concerned about probation-officer conduct

This opinion narrows the statutory remedies. If a probation officer witnesses excessive force by another officer (in a custodial transport, for example) and does not intervene or report, you cannot rely on §§ 30 or 43 of PA 20-1 to claim the probation officer violated a statutory duty. You would have to look to constitutional theories, agency policy, or other statutes.

If you are a civil rights attorney bringing a Section 1983 or state-law civil action

You cannot anchor a state-law duty-to-intervene claim on PA 20-1 §§ 30 or 43 against probation officers. Federal constitutional theories (the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, depending on context) and state common-law claims may still be available. The AG's narrow reading of "law enforcement unit" may also affect parallel theories that depend on Connecticut characterizing probation work as law enforcement.

Common questions

Q: What did the Police Accountability Act actually require?
A: Section 30 (now Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-282e) requires police officers to intervene when they witness another officer using force the witnessing officer objectively knows to be unreasonable, excessive, or illegal, and to report such incidents to the law enforcement unit that employs the officer who used the force. Section 43 imposes the same duties on correction officers and bars the Department of Correction from retaliating.

Q: Why are probation officers not 'correction officers'?
A: Because § 43(3) of the Act bars retaliation against correction officers by their employers, and the only employers it lists are "the Department of Correction or any employee of the department." That language defines who counts as a correction officer for the Act's purposes. Probation officers work for the Judicial Branch's Court Support Services Division, not for the Department of Correction (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-1d).

Q: Why are probation officers not 'police officers'?
A: Because the statutory definition (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a(9)) requires them to be either sworn members of a local police department, state police, an appointed constable, a special policeman, or a "member of a law enforcement unit who performs police duties." Probation officers are none of the first four. And the Judicial Branch is not a "law enforcement unit," because its primary function is adjudication, not enforcement.

Q: What is a 'law enforcement unit' under the statute?
A: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a defines it as a government agency or department whose primary functions include "the enforcement of criminal or traffic laws, the preservation of public order, the protection of life and property, or the prevention, detection or investigation of crime." The AG concluded that the Judicial Branch's primary function is adjudication, not any of these enforcement functions.

Q: Are probation officers 'peace officers'?
A: Yes, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3(9). But that category is broader than 'police officer' or 'correction officer.' All police and correction officers are peace officers, but not the other way around. The intervention and reporting duties in §§ 30 and 43 attach to police officers and correction officers, not to all peace officers.

Q: Did a 1993 AG opinion treat probation officers as police officers?
A: Yes, for training and certification purposes (1993 Conn. Ag. Op. 93-28). The legislature overruled that opinion the next year by enacting Public Act 94-6, codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294d(f)(2), which exempts Judicial Branch employees from POST training. The 2023 AG opinion treats the 1993 opinion as superseded.

Q: Could a probation officer still face liability for failing to intervene or report?
A: Possibly, but not under PA 20-1 §§ 30 or 43. The AG explicitly limited the opinion to those two provisions and noted that other sources (constitutional, statutory, regulatory, agency policy, ethical) might still impose duties.

Background and statutory framework

Public Act 20-1, "An Act Concerning Police Accountability," was enacted in a July 2020 special session called by Governor Lamont in response to national outrage over the murder of George Floyd. The Act made wide-ranging changes to Connecticut law enforcement: it created a duty to intervene, a duty to report, an inspector general for police-involved deaths, restrictions on use of force, and new training and certification requirements.

The two provisions at issue here, § 30 (now Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-282e) and § 43, mirror each other. Each imposes intervention and reporting duties on a category of officer (police officers under § 30, correction officers under § 43). Each ties the officer's duty to a status definition: "police officer" as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a, and "correction officer" as implicitly defined by § 43(3)'s anti-retaliation language tying the term to Department of Correction employees.

The AG's analysis follows that statutory text strictly. There is no expansion by analogy. If the legislature wanted probation officers covered, it could have said so expressly, especially because § 53a-3(9)'s "peace officer" definition (which the Act invokes for some purposes) does include adult probation officers. The choice not to extend §§ 30 and 43 to peace officers more broadly is treated as a legislative choice the AG must respect.

The separation-of-powers point at the end of the opinion is doing real work. Even if "law enforcement unit" could be stretched to cover the Judicial Branch in some hypothetical reading, the AG flags Washington v. Comm'r of Correction, 287 Conn. 792, 828 (2008), and State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 580 (2003), for the proposition that adjudication is the judicial branch's job and arrest and prosecution belong to the executive. Designating the Judicial Branch as a law enforcement unit would tip that balance.

Citations and references

Statutes and acts:
- Public Act 20-1 §§ 30, 43 (Police Accountability Act intervention and reporting duties)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-282e (codified police officer intervention/reporting)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a (definitions, including 'police officer' and 'law enforcement unit')
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294d(f)(2) (Judicial Branch employees exempt from POST training)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-1d (Court Support Services Division within Judicial Branch)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3(9) (peace officer definition includes adult probation officers)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-8 (criminal liability for accomplices)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-165 to 53a-167 (hindering prosecution)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4-61dd, 31-51m (whistleblower protections referenced in PA 20-1 § 30)
- Public Act 94-6 (overruled 1993 AG opinion 93-28)

Cases:
- Hasychak v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 296 Conn. 434, 446 (2010) (statutory plain meaning in light of context)
- Washington v. Comm'r of Correction, 287 Conn. 792, 828 (2008) (judicial branch role in criminal justice)
- State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 580 (2003) (judicial branch interprets and applies law)
- Connecticut State Police Union v. Rovella, 36 F.4th 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2022) (context for Police Accountability Act)
- 1993 Conn. Ag. Op. 93-28 (superseded by PA 94-6)

Other reference:
- A Proclamation from His Excellency the Governor (July 17, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/News/20200717-Call-of-July-2020-Special-Session.pdf

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/ag/opinions/2023/2023_2_ago_formal_opinion_for_judicial_branch.pdf?rev=df2123d4d233432988455b4654b4d08a

Original opinion text

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONNECTICUT

william tong
attorney general

January 24, 2023
By Email
Gary Roberge, Executive Director
Judicial Branch Court Support Services Division
Office of the Chief Court Administrator
455 Winding Brook Drive
Glastonbury, Connecticut 06033

Re: Request for Formal Opinion

Dear Director Roberge:

By letter dated November 15, 2022, you requested a formal opinion on "the issue of whether the duty to intervene and duty to report excessive use of force incidents, contained in the Police Accountability Act (P.A. 20-1), are applicable to Judicial Branch probation officers." As we explain in this formal legal opinion, the answer is no.[1]

I. The Act's Intervention and Reporting Requirements Only Bind Police and Correction Officers

In the summer of 2020, responding in part to national outrage over the murder of George Floyd, Governor Lamont convened the Connecticut General Assembly in special session to "enact legislation to promote greater transparency and accountability for law enforcement."[2] On July 31 of that year, the Governor signed Public Act 20-1, "An Act Concerning Police Accountability," enacting a suite of law enforcement reforms. Two of the Act's provisions are at issue here.

Section 30 of the Act, now codified at General Statutes § 7-282e, requires "police officers" to intervene (subsection 1) and report (subsection 2) certain uses of force, and protects intervening and reporting officers from retaliation (subsection 3). In full, § 30 provides:

(1) Any police officer, as defined in section 7-294a, who while acting in such officer's law enforcement capacity, witnesses another police officer use what the witnessing officer objectively knows to be unreasonable, excessive or illegal use of force, shall intervene and attempt to stop such other police officer from using such force. Any such police officer who fails to intervene in such an incident may be prosecuted and punished for the same acts in accordance with the provisions of section 53a-8 as the police officer who used unreasonable, excessive or illegal force. The provisions of this subdivision do not apply to any witnessing officer who is operating in an undercover capacity at the time he or she witnesses another officer use unreasonable, excessive or illegal force.

(2) Any police officer who witnesses another police officer use what the witnessing officer objectively knows to be unreasonable, excessive or illegal use of force or is otherwise aware of such use of force by another police officer shall report, as soon as is practicable, such use of force to the law enforcement unit, as defined in section 7-294a, that employs the police officer who used such force. Any police officer required to report such an incident who fails to do so may be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of sections 53a-165 to 53a-167, inclusive.

(3) No law enforcement unit employing a police officer who intervenes in an incident pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection or reports an incident pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection may take any retaliatory personnel action or discriminate against such officer because such police officer made such report and such intervening or reporting police officer shall be protected by the provisions of section 4-61dd or section 31-51m, as applicable.

Section 43 imposes the same requirements on "correction officers." It also prohibits "the Department of Correction or any employee of the department" from taking retaliatory action or discriminating against a correction officer who intervenes or reports.[3]

The Act imposes these intervening and reporting requirements on police and correction officers, and only on those officers. But as explained below, the Judicial Branch's probation officers are neither.

II. Judicial Branch Probation Officers Are Not Correction Officers

The General Statutes do not explicitly define "correction officers," either in the Act or elsewhere. But immediate context reveals the term's plain meaning. See, e.g., Hasychak v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 296 Conn. 434, 446 (2010) (determining statutory language's plain meaning "in light of its context"). Recall that subsection 43(3) bars retaliation against "correction officers" by their employers, a category limited to "the Department of Correction or any employee of the department." So, for the purposes of § 43, correction officers are necessarily Department of Correction employees. But probation officers work for the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-1d.

III. Judicial Branch Probation Officers Are Not Police Officers Because They Do Not Work for a "Law Enforcement Unit"

Unlike "correction officer," "police officer" has a statutory definition. Section 30 of the Act adopts the definition given in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a:

(9) "Police officer" means a sworn member of an organized local police department or of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, an appointed constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, 29-18a or 29-19 or any member of a law enforcement unit who performs police duties[.]

Probation officers are plainly not sworn members of local police departments; state troopers; constables; or special police officers. So if they are police officers within the meaning of § 7-294a, and under the Act's § 30, it is because they are both "member[s] of a law enforcement unit" and "perform[] police duties."

This opinion need not determine whether probation officers ever meet the second criterion, performing "police duties," because it is clear that they do not meet the first. The Judicial Branch, which employs probation officers, is not a "law enforcement unit" within the meaning of the statute.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a explains that "law enforcement unit" means a government "agency" or "department" whose "primary functions" include "the enforcement of criminal or traffic laws, the preservation of public order, the protection of life and property, or the prevention, detection or investigation of crime."

Assuming without deciding that the Judicial Branch is a state "agency" or "department" for these purposes, probation officers still do not fit the bill, because the Branch's primary function is adjudication and not law enforcement: "The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch," as the Branch itself explains, "is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner."[4] Designating the Judicial Branch as a law enforcement unit for these purposes would risk upsetting a separation of powers in which the judiciary adjudicates offenses and pronounces sentence, leaving arrest and prosecution to the executive. See, e.g., Washington v. Comm'r of Correction, 287 Conn. 792, 828 (2008) ("With respect to our criminal justice system, we have recognized that there are duties and responsibilities that are dedicated to each of our three branches of government… We have recognized that the judicial branch is charged with the responsibility of adjudicating criminal charges and ultimately determining the sentence of incarceration, if any, to be imposed."); State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 580 (2003) ("Simply put, the task of… the judicial branch is to interpret and apply [laws] in the context of specific cases.").

Conclusion

The Police Accountability Act required police officers and correction officers to intervene and report certain uses of force. But the intervention and reporting requirements in the Act's §§ 30 and 43 do not apply to probation officers, who are neither correction officers nor police officers for this purpose.

I trust this opinion responds to your request.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM TONG

[1] We offer three notes at the outset. First: This opinion considers only whether the Police Accountability Act requires Connecticut probation officers to intervene and report. It does not consider whether any other source of authority, including constitutional rules, other statutes, regulations, agency policy, or ethical, professional, and moral codes, might apply.
Second: This opinion explains what existing law requires. It does not speak to what the law or policy should be.
Third: In 1993, the Connecticut Attorney General's Office issued an opinion explaining that, under the statutory regime then in place, probation officers were considered "police officers" subject to certain training and certification requirements. 1993 Conn. Ag. Op. 93-28. That opinion was swiftly superseded by Public Act 94-6, now codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294d(f)(2), which exempted Judicial Branch employees, including probation officers, from that training and certification. Because the legislature overrode the 1993 opinion on the sole squarely presented legal question, we do not consider that opinion controlling as to whether probation officers are police officers within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294a who must intervene and report.

[2] A Proclamation from His Excellency the Governor 3 (July 17, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/News/20200717-Call-of-July-2020-Special-Session.pdf. And see Connecticut State Police Union v. Rovella, 36 F.4th 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2022) (summarizing context of Police Accountability Act).

[3] Separately, the Act also imposes some requirements on all "peace officers," a term defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3(9) to include adult probation officers. But the intervention and reporting required by §§ 30 and 43 of the Act and addressed in this opinion is limited to "police officers" and "correction officers." All police officers and correction officers are, by definition, peace officers. Id. But not every peace officer is either a police officer or a correction officer.

[4] Welcome to the Connecticut Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, https://jud.ct.gov/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2023).