CT Formal Opinion 2021-01 2021-02-25

How much oversight does Connecticut's State Contracting Standards Board have over the Connecticut Port Authority?

Short answer: Very little. AG William Tong concluded that the Board's authority over quasi-public agencies in general is narrow, and the Port Authority's enabling statute (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15)) goes further by carving almost all of the Port Authority's real estate transactions out of state-agency review entirely. The Board's only meaningful role is deciding bid protests under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-36 involving Port Authority contracts that do not involve real property. Expanding oversight would require the General Assembly to change the law.
Disclaimer: This is an official Connecticut Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Connecticut attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

State Contracting Standards Board chair Lawrence Fox asked AG William Tong whether the Board could meaningfully oversee the Connecticut Port Authority's contracting activity. The question landed in 2021 against the backdrop of a real-estate-related controversy at the Port Authority that had drawn legislative scrutiny, and the Board wanted to know exactly how much it could do.

Tong's answer pointed out two structural limits stacked on top of each other. First, the Board's enabling statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4e-1 to 4e-69) draw a careful line between "state contracting agencies" (executive branch agencies, boards, and the like) and "quasi-public agencies" (the Port Authority, the Connecticut Airport Authority, the Connecticut Lottery Corporation, and 14 other entities listed in § 1-120(1)). Most of the Board's contract-review powers run only to state contracting agencies. The Board has narrower hooks into quasi-public agencies: appointing a Chief Procurement Officer who can review their procurement processes (a position that had been vacant since March 2017), requiring them to post on the State Contracting Portal, deciding bid protests under § 4e-36, and a few brownfield-related certifications under § 4e-50.

Second, the Port Authority's own enabling statute, § 15-31b(a)(15), goes further: almost all of the Port Authority's real estate transactions "shall not be subject to approval, review or regulation by any state agency." The only carve-out is for fee-simple sales, which require approval by the State Properties Review Board and the Attorney General, not the Standards Board. Reading the two statutes together, Tong concluded the Board's only enforceable authority over the Port Authority is deciding § 4e-36 bid contests involving Port Authority contracts that do not involve real property. Anything more would require the legislature to change the statute.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2021. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What is a quasi-public agency in Connecticut?
A: A nonprofit-style entity that the legislature created outside the structure of state government to act faster and with more flexibility than a regular state agency, while still operating in the public interest. There were 17 of them in 2021, listed in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-120(1), ranging from the Connecticut Lottery Corporation to the Capital Region Development Authority. Each has its own enabling statute, so the rules vary.

Q: What baseline rules apply to all quasi-publics?
A: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-120 to 1-134. They include public notice and comment for procedures (§ 1-121), biennial compliance audits by the State Auditors (§ 1-122), annual reports to the Governor and Auditors (§ 1-123), and whistleblower protections (§ 1-125a).

Q: Why does the Board have so little authority over quasi-publics?
A: Because the Board's statutes mostly use the term "state contracting agency," and § 4e-1(28) excludes quasi-publics (with one tiny exception, the State Education Resource Center, and only for one statute, § 4e-19). Under State v. Acordia, Inc., 310 Conn. 1 (2018), courts must follow a statute's defined terms. The Board cannot stretch "state contracting agency" to capture quasi-publics; only the legislature can.

Q: What does § 15-31b(a)(15) actually carve out?
A: It says the Port Authority's investments, acquisitions, leases, purchases, ownership, management, holdings, dispositions, and "agreements with respect to such property" in real estate are not subject to approval, review, or regulation by any state agency. The single exception is conveying property in fee simple, which requires sign-off from the State Properties Review Board and the Attorney General.

Q: What is a § 4e-36 bid contest?
A: A formal protest filed by a bidder or proposer who believes a state contract solicitation or award was conducted improperly. The Board has authority to decide those contests, and that authority extends to quasi-public-agency contracts because § 4e-36 uses the broad "contract" and "state contract" defined terms rather than the narrower "state contracting agency."

Q: Could the Chief Procurement Officer fix the oversight gap?
A: Statutorily yes, practically no. The CPO position can review and monitor procurement processes at quasi-publics, but it had been vacant since March 2017 and the AG flagged that fact. Without the position filled, the only oversight tool actually working in 2021 was the bid-protest process.

Q: Are the Airport Authority and Lottery Corporation under similar carve-outs?
A: Yes. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120cc(b)(4) (Airport Authority) and § 12-806(b)(16) (Lottery Corporation) both contain materially identical language. The opinion is about the Port Authority but the analysis transfers cleanly to those two as well.

Q: How can the legislature expand oversight if it wants to?
A: By either (a) adding the Port Authority to the definition of "state contracting agency" in § 4e-1(28), (b) deleting or narrowing the exclusion in § 15-31b(a)(15), or (c) writing new statutes that explicitly subject Port Authority contracts to Board oversight. None of those is judicial work; only legislation can change the structure.

Background and statutory framework

The Board was created in 2007 to consolidate state contracting oversight and to professionalize procurement practice across executive-branch agencies. Its statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4e-1 to 4e-69) are largely framed around "state contracting agencies," a defined term that excludes the judicial and legislative branches and most constitutional officers, and that says nothing about quasi-publics. A few provisions (the Chief Procurement Officer's review authority, the Contracting Portal posting requirement, the brownfield certification language, and the bid-protest jurisdiction) reach beyond that core, but they are the exception.

The Port Authority was created in 2014 (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-31a to 15-31i) to consolidate state-level coordination of port and harbor development. Like other quasi-publics, it was given express flexibility to "make and enter into all contracts and agreements that are necessary, desirable or incidental to the conduct of its business" (§ 15-31b(a)(9)). The real-estate exclusion in § 15-31b(a)(15) was the legislature's specific decision to keep the Port Authority's land deals out of the slow-moving state real-property review process. The opinion treats this as a deliberate, fact-bound legislative choice that the AG cannot rewrite by interpretation, noting that under § 1-2z the statute's text is clear enough that legislative history adds little.

Two general administrative-law canons frame the analysis: an agency has only the authority the legislature gives it (Pereira and Glastonbury Ethics Commission), and the legislature's defined terms control (Acordia). Together, they cabin the Board's reach in a way that is hard to expand without statutory amendment.

Citations and references

State Contracting Standards Board statutes:
- Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4e-1 to 4e-69
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-1(28) (definition of "state contracting agency")
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-2(g)(2)(D) (Chief Procurement Officer)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-7(a) (review and termination authority)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-13 (State Contracting Portal)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-36 (bid contests)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-50 (brownfield certification)

Quasi-public agency framework:
- Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-120 to 1-134
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-120(1) (list of quasi-public agencies)

Port Authority enabling statutes:
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31a(a)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(9), (15)

Parallel exclusions for other quasi-publics:
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120cc(b)(4) (Airport Authority)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-806(b)(16) (Lottery Corporation)

Administrative-authority cases:
- Pereira v. State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1 (2012)
- Ethics Commission of Town of Glastonbury v. FOIC, 302 Conn. 1 (2011)
- State v. Acordia, Inc., 310 Conn. 1 (2018)
- State v. Panek, 328 Conn. 219 (2018)

Source

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Original opinion text

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONNECTICUT

SOO

LEX ET Justity,

WILLIAM TONG
ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 25, 2021

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
165 Capitol Avenue

Suite 1060

Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Chairman Fox:

You have requested a formal legal opinion concerning the scope of the
State Contracting Standards Board’s (“the Board’s”) jurisdiction with
respect to the Connecticut Port Authority (“the Port Authority”), a
quasi-public agency. As explained below, the Board’s jurisdiction over
quasi-public agencies in general is quite limited and the Board’s
jurisdiction is even more circumscribed with regard to the Port
Authority.

The Board’s power derives from its statutes. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§
4e-1 to 4e-69. Those statutes draw distinctions between state
contracting agencies and quasi-public agencies, such as the Port
Authority. Most of the Board’s rights, powers, duties, and authorities
extend only to state contracting agencies, as opposed to quasi-public
agencies. In addition, the Port Authority’s enabling statutes include a
| provision that excludes certain of the Port Authority’s agreements from
approval, review or regulation by the Board and other state agencies.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15).

We conclude that the Board’s jurisdiction with respect to the Port
Authority would primarily be limited to regulating a bidder’s contest
under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-36 involving a Port Authority contract
that did not involve real property. The General Assembly would have
to change the statutes to expand the Board’s oversight.

165 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

An Affirmative Action/ Equal Opportunity Employer

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 2

Background on Quasi-Public Agencies

Connecticut currently has seventeen quasi-public agencies. See Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 1-120(1).! Their roles vary, but the General Assembly’s
“major reason for establishing” each quasi-public agency “was their
organizational location outside the structure of state government,
which meant they could avoid many of the requirements and controls
imposed on governmental agencies.” Office of Legislative Research,
Connecticut General Assembly, Report No. 2019-R-0182, Quasi-Public
Agencies, p. 2 (September 3, 2019). The General Assembly believed
that the quasi-public agencies’ structure would allow them to “respond
to problems and opportunities faster and more efficiently than a
comparable state agency while maintaining a degree of oversight and
accountability.” Id.

The balance the General Assembly struck between flexibility and
oversight varies from one quasi-public agency to another. Chapter 12
of the General Statutes applies to quasi-public agencies generally. See
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-120 to 1-134. It provides that quasi-public
agencies’ procedures are subject to public notice and comment absent
emergency circumstances. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-121. It also
requires that quasi-public agencies submit to biennial compliance
audits by the Auditors of Public Accounts (“the Auditors”), see Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 1-122, and submit annual reports to both the Governor

1 They are Connecticut Innovations, Incorporated, the Connecticut
Health and Educational Facilities Authority, the Connecticut Higher
Education Supplemental Loan Authority, the Connecticut Student
Loan Foundation, the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, the
Connecticut Housing Authority, the Materials Innovation and
Recycling Authority, the Capital Region Development Authority, the
Connecticut Lottery Corporation, the Connecticut Airport Authority,
the Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange, the Connecticut Green
Bank, the Connecticut Retirement Security Authority, the Connecticut
Port Authority, the Connecticut Municipal Redevelopment Authority,
the State Education Resource Center, and the Paid Family and
Medical Leave Insurance Authority. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-120(1).

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 3

and the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-123. In addition, Chapter 12
prevents quasi-public agencies from engaging in conduct that could
impede their employees’ ability and incentive to blow the whistle on
misconduct. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-125a.

Beyond those general provisions, each of the quasi-public agencies has
its own statutory provisions. Some of those provisions expressly
exempt the quasi-public agency from aspects of state oversight. An
example that we reference above and will discuss in detail below is
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15), which provides—with certain specific
exceptions—that almost all of the Port Authority’s real estate
transactions “shall not be subject to approval, review or regulation by
any state agency pursuant to title 4b or any other provision of the
general statutes.” Real estate transactions by the Connecticut Airport
Authority and the Connecticut Lottery Corporation are insulated by
similar provisions. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120cc(b)(4); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 12-806(b)(16).

The Board’s Power Concerning Quasi-Public Agencies

As with any state agency, the Board is a statutory creation and may
only work within the boundaries of its statutes. See, e.g., Pereira v.
State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1, 40-41 (2012); Ethics
Commission of Town of Glastonbury v. Freedom of Information
Commission, 302 Conn. 1, 8 (2011). The Board’s statutes draw a broad
distinction between state contracting agencies and quasi-public
agencies, such as the Port Authority. The Board’s statutes define
“State contracting agency” as

any executive branch agency, board, commission,
department, office, institution or council. “State
contracting agency” does not include the judicial branch,
the legislative branch, the offices of the Secretary of the
State, the State Comptroller, the Attorney General, the
State Treasurer, with respect to their constitutional
functions, any state agency with respect to contracts
specific to the constitutional and statutory functions of

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 4

the office of the State Treasurer. For the purposes of
section 4e-16, “state contracting agency” includes any
constituent unit of the state system of higher education
and for the purposes of section 4e-19, “state contracting
agency” includes the State Education Resource Center,
established under section 10-4q.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-1(28). That definition does not reference quasi-
public agencies generally and its inclusion of a single quasi-public
agency—the State Education Resource Center—for purposes of a single
statutory provision—section 4e-19—suggests that other quasi-public
agencies are not “state contracting agencies” for purposes of the
Board’s statutes.

These provisions alone would weigh heavily toward a conclusion that
when the Board’s statutes grant the Board power over state
contracting agencies, that power does not extend to quasi-public
agencies other than the State Education Resource Center. “When
legislation contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept
that definition.” State v. Acordia, Inc., 310 Conn. 1, 21-22 (2018)
(quotation marks omitted). In any event, other provisions in the
Board’s statues draw an explicit distinction between state contracting
agencies and quasi-public agencies and remove any doubt about that

conclusion. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4e-1(8); 4e-1(16); 4e-2(g)(2)(D);
4e-10(a), (b).

Many of the statutes setting forth the Board’s rights, powers, duties,
and authorities reference only state contracting agencies and therefore
do not extend to quasi-public agencies. See, e.g., Acordia, Inc., 310
Conn. at 21-22. For example, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-7(a) provides inter
alia that “[flor cause, the State Contracting Standards Board may
review, terminate or recommend to a state contracting agency the
termination of any contract or procurement agreement undertaken by

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 5

any state contracting agency.” The Board’s power under § 4e-7(a) does
not apply to quasi-public agencies.”

By contrast, some of the Board’s statutes do apply to quasi-public
agencies. An example of a statute that explicitly refers to quasi-public
agencies is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-2(g)(2)(D), which allows the Board to
appoint a Chief Procurement Officer and provides that the Chief
Procurement Officer shall “review and monitor the procurement
processes of each state contracting agency, quasi-public agencies and
institutions of higher education.”3 (The position of Chief Procurement
Officer has been vacant since March 2017.) Another example is Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 4e-13, which requires quasi-public agencies—as well as
other entities—to post contracting opportunities and other information
on the State Contracting Portal. In addition, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-50
requires quasi-public agencies—among other entities—to include a
certain provision in documents relating to the environmental
remediation of a brownfield property.

Some of the Board’s operative statutes, in turn, use statutorily defined
terms in ways that make clear that the operative statutes apply to
quasi-public agencies. Most significantly, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-36—
entitled “Contest of the solicitation or award of a contract by bidder or
proposer”—applies to “contracts” and “state contracts.” Both of those

2 Although “contract” is a defined term that includes quasi-public
agencies, it is clear from its structure that § 4e-7 applies only to state
contracting agencies. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-1(8) (defining
“contract”). Section 4e-7 repeatedly refers to state contracting agencies
and uses “contract” as one “undertaken by” a state contracting agency.
3 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-1(22) defines “Procurement” to mean

contracting for, buying, purchasing, renting, leasing or
otherwise acquiring or disposing of, any supplies, services,
including but not limited to, contracts for purchase of
services and personal service agreements, interest in real
property, or construction, and includes all government
functions that relate to such activities, including best
value selection and qualification based selection.

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 6

defined terms encompass quasi-public agencies, and no other language
in § 4e-36 creates any ambiguity on the issue. There is no reference to
a “state contracting agency” in § 4e-364 and § 4e-36(d)’s references to
“such agency” are consistent with applying the statute to quasi-public
agencies.5

The Board’s statutes draw a clear distinction between state contracting
agencies and quasi-public agencies.6 Most of the Board’s statutes give
the Board authority over only state contracting agencies. That is not to
say the Board completely lacks authority over quasi-public agencies;
for example, the Board has authority over a § 4e-36 bid contest,
appoints the Chief Procurement Officer who may review procurement
processes, and quasi-public agencies must use the State’s Contracting
Portal. Nonetheless, the Board’s authority regarding quasi-public
agencies is much more limited and circumscribed relative to its
authority over state contracting agencies.

The Board’s Statutory Authority Regarding the Port Authority

The Board’s questions focus upon whether, and if so, in what manner,
the Board has statutory authority regarding procurement and
contracting engaged in by the Port Authority. Therefore, the general
limitations on the Board’s scope of authority over quasi-public agencies
discussed above apply with equal force to the Port Authority

4 This is in contrast to statutes like Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-7 (discussed
above), which only apply to state contracting agencies despite the
isolated use of the word “contract”.

5 Other statutes give the Board authority to issue regulations relating
to “contracts,” a defined term that includes contracts to which a quasi-
public agency is a party. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4e-1(8); 4e-22. See
also Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4e-1(16); 4e-24 (emergency procurements).

6 The text of the Board’s statutes is sufficiently clear that a court
would be unlikely to look to their legislative history for guidance. See,
e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-2z. In any event, the legislative history sheds
little light on the issues this Opinion addresses. To the extent the
legislative history applies, it is consistent with the statutes’ text.

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 7

specifically. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-120(1); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. §
15-31a(a) (providing inter alia that “[t]he [Port A]uthority shall not be
construed to be a department, institution or agency of the state”).
Moreover, the Port Authority’s enabling statute provides for an express
and explicit exclusion of state agency oversight of its real estate
transactions, except for the sale of real estate in fee simple. Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15). Between the Board’s admittedly narrow scope of
authority over quasi-public agencies generally, and the Port
Authority’s express exclusion from state agency oversight for most real
estate transactions, the Board has very limited oversight over the Port
Authority’s transactions.

The Port Authority was “established and created for the performance
of an essential public and governmental function,” but it “shall not be
construed to be a department, institution or agency of the state.” Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 15-31a(a). As one of Connecticut’s quasi-public agencies,
the Port Authority’s purposes include “coordinat[ing] the development
of Connecticut’s ports and harbors, with a focus on private and public
investments,” “market[ing] the economic development of such ports
and harbors,” working with “other state, local and private entities to
maximize the economic potential of the ports and harbors,” and
“develop[ing] strategic entrepreneurial initiatives that may be
available to the state.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a). “To accomplish”
the Port Authority’s “purposes,” the Port Authority has “the duty and
power to” inter alia “[m]Jake and enter into all contracts and
agreements that are necessary, desirable or incidental to the conduct of
its business.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(9).

The Port Authority’s statutes also grant the Port Authority “the duty
and power to” inter alia “[iJnvest in, acquire, lease, purchase, own,
manage, hold and dispose of real property and lease, convey or deal in
or enter into agreements with respect to such property on any terms
necessary or incidental to carrying out the purposes of sections 15-3la
to 15-31i, inclusive.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15). The Port
Authority’s statutes explicitly exclude these real estate transactions
from state agency oversight, providing that

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 8

such transactions shall not be subject to approval, review
or regulation by any state agency pursuant to title 4b or
any other provision of the general statutes, except the
authority shall not convey fee simple ownership in any
property associated with the ports or harbors under its
jurisdiction and control without the approval of the State
Properties Review Board and the Attorney General.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15). That exclusionary language is a clear
statement by the General Assembly that actions the Port Authority
takes pursuant to its § 15-31b(a)(15) power “shall not be subject to
approval, review or regulation by any state agency” unless the action is
to convey property by fee simple, and then approval is required from
the State Properties Review Board and the Attorney General, and not
the Board. ?

As a result, what, if any, power the Board has over procurement and
contracting the Port Authority engages in further depends on the scope
of § 15-31b(a)(15). That, in turn, depends on whether: (1) the Board is a
“state agency” for purposes of § 15-31b(a)(15); and (2) the Port
Authority’s conduct at issue is within the scope of § 15-31b(a)(15). The
answer to the first is yes. The answer to the second will depend on the
specific factual circumstances.

  1. The Board Is a “State Agency” for Purposes of §
    15-31b(a)(15).

The initial question is whether the Board is a “state agency” for
purposes of the exclusion included in the Port Authority’s § 15-
31b(a)(15) provision. If the Board is a “state agency” for these
purposes, § 15-31b(a)(15) bars the Board’s ability to approve, review or
regulate the Port Authority’s real estate transactions.

7 The text of § 15-31b(a)(15) is sufficiently clear that a court would be
unlikely to look to its legislative history for guidance. See, e.g., Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 1-2z. In any event, § 15-31b’s legislative history sheds no
light on the issues this Opinion addresses.

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 9

The Port Authority’s statutes do not define “state agency.” As a result,
we look to dictionaries and other statutes for guidance. See, e.g., State
v. Panek, 328 Conn. 219, 227 (2018). Here, both weigh strongly in favor
of concluding that the Board is a “state agency” for purposes of §15-
31b(a)(15). Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines “state agency” as “[a]
department, commission, board, committee, or body of any form
operating as an instrumentality of the state government.” Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969). Consistent with that definition, multiple
statutes define the term “state agency” to include state boards.®
Consequently, we conclude that the Port Authority’s exclusion limits
the Board’s power when the conduct at issue is within the exclusion’s
scope.

  1. Whether the Port Authority’s Conduct Involves a
    Transaction that § 15-31b(a)(15) Insulates from
    Review.

The second question is whether the Port Authority’s conduct at issue
involves a transaction that § 15-31b(a)(15) insulates from review.
Specifically, § 15-31b(a)(15) applies when the Port Authority exercises
its power to “[iJnvest in, acquire, lease, purchase, own, manage, hold
and dispose of real property and lease, convey or deal in or enter into
agreements with respect to such property on any terms necessary or
incidental to carrying out the purposes of sections 15-31a to 15-31i,
inclusive.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-31b(a)(15).

Whether given conduct by the Port Authority comes within the scope of
the statutory exception will be fact dependent. The Port Authority’s
general contracting authority in § 15-31b(a)(9) is broader than the
transactions referenced in the § 15-31b(a)(15) exception. That said, the

8 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-79(20) (including “board” in definition of
“state agency”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-166 (including “state board” in
definition of “agency”). See also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-1(28) (in the
Board’s enabling statute, includes “any executive branch ... board” in
definition of “state contracting agency”).

Lawrence Fox

Chair, State Contracting Standards Board
February 25, 2021

Page 10

§ 15-31b(a)(15) exception does exclude almost all real estate
transactions from the Board’s approval, review or regulation.®

Reading those two provisions together indicates that the Board could
exercise authority over Port Authority contracts that do not involve
real estate, at least to the extent the Board could exercise authority
over other quasi-public agencies that entered into similar contracts.
The Board’s enforcement authority appears to be limited to deciding a
bidder’s contest under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4e-36 involving a Port
Authority contract that does not involve real property.

Again, whether a given action by the Port Authority falls both within
the scope of the Board’s general power over quasi-public agencies and
outside the scope of § 15-31b(a)(15)’s exclusion will depend on the facts
and circumstances at issue. Ultimately, the Board’s power is relatively
limited when it comes to quasi-public agencies generally and § 15-
31b(a)(15) limits the Board’s power further when it comes to the Port
Authority’s real estate transactions. The General Assembly would have
to change the statutes to expand the Board’s oversight.

We trust that the foregoing responds to your inquiries.

WILLIAM TONG

9 The Connecticut Airport Authority and Connecticut Lottery
Corporation share the same exception in their enabling statutes. See
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120cc(b)(4); § 12-806(b)(16).