If the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles grants a pardon that bars the recipient from possessing firearms, are the criminal records associated with that conviction still erased?

Plain-English summary

The Judicial Branch asked whether a conviction record gets erased when the underlying conviction is wiped out by a "conditional" pardon, in particular pardons that the Board of Pardons and Paroles had been issuing with the caption "CERTIFICATE OF PARDON (NO PISTOL/REVOLVER/HANDGUN)" while also calling the pardon "full, complete, absolute and Conditional." The AG said the records do not get erased.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a(b) lets the Board grant three kinds of pardons: absolute, conditioned (the AG treated "conditioned" and "conditional" as synonymous), and provisional. Only an absolute pardon triggers erasure of the underlying conviction record under § 54-142a(d)(2). Provisional pardons (those granted only to relieve barriers to employment or licensure) expressly do not trigger erasure under § 54-130a(e). The statutes are silent on conditional pardons, but the AG read that silence against erasure: the legislature knew how to specify when erasure applies and chose to do so only for absolute pardons.

A pardon that says "absolute and conditional" but contains a real condition (here, no firearm possession) is conditional for erasure purposes. An absolute pardon, by definition, has no conditions. Putting a firearms restriction on the pardon makes it conditional. The Freedom of Information Commission had reached the same conclusion in Wood v. Chairperson, Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Superior Court affirmed on other grounds.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The Connecticut pardoning power belongs to the legislature, which delegated it to the Board of Pardons and Paroles. McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267 (1988); Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121 (1938). Under § 54-130a(b), the Board "shall have authority to grant pardons, conditioned, provisional or absolute, or certificates of rehabilitation for any offense against the state at any time after the imposition and before or after the service of any sentence."

The 2006 legislature added "provisional" pardons to the Board's toolkit, defined in § 54-130e(a)(8) as relief from barriers or forfeitures to employment or licensure. The Board's regulations, Conn. Agencies Regs. § 54-124a(j)(2)-1(6), define a "pardon" as "the conditional or absolute release from the legal penalties resulting from the conviction of a crime," but do not separately define "conditional" or "absolute." The AG used the standard legal-dictionary definitions (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.): an absolute pardon "frees the criminal without any condition whatever," while a conditional pardon is "[o]ne to which a condition is annexed, performance of which is necessary to the validity of the pardon."

The erasure statute, § 54-142c(a) (read together with § 54-142a(d)(2) and § 54-142a(e)(3)), provides that an erased record cannot be disclosed and that the subject "shall be deemed to have never been arrested." Section 54-142a(d)(2) expressly extends erasure to absolute pardons received on or after October 1, 1974. Section 54-130a(e) expressly states that provisional pardons do not result in erasure. The statutes say nothing about conditional pardons. Under Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, the legislature's express grant of erasure to absolute pardons but not conditional ones implies that erasure was not intended for conditional pardons. The AG also relied on DiLieto for the rule that courts cannot supply omitted statutory language.

Common questions

If I get a pardon that bars me from possessing a firearm, is my criminal record erased?

No. The firearms restriction makes the pardon conditional, and conditional pardons do not trigger erasure under Connecticut law. The conviction record remains on the books and can be disclosed and accessed. Only an absolute pardon, with no conditions attached, results in erasure under § 54-142a(d)(2).

What's the difference between an absolute, conditional, and provisional pardon?

An absolute pardon has no conditions, releases the person from all penalties, and erases the record. A conditional pardon has a condition attached (such as no firearm possession or other limitations) and does not erase the record. A provisional pardon is a narrower form of relief, available only to lift barriers or forfeitures to employment or licensure, and also does not erase the record.

Why does the Board sometimes label a pardon "absolute and conditional"?

The AG noted this is what the Board was actually doing on certificates captioned "CERTIFICATE OF PARDON (NO PISTOL/REVOLVER/HANDGUN)" and described as a "full, complete, absolute and Conditional pardon." The AG concluded that for erasure purposes the pardon must be treated as conditional. Calling a pardon both absolute and conditional cannot make it both, and adding a real condition (no firearms) makes it conditional.

How does the FOIC decision in Wood fit in?

The FOIC reached the same conclusion in two 2014 decisions: an "absolute pardon subject to condition" is a conditional pardon for erasure purposes, so the records are not erased. The Connecticut Superior Court affirmed Wood v. FOIC on other grounds in 2015. The AG's opinion is consistent with those administrative and judicial rulings.

Can the legislature change this?

Yes. The AG's reading rests on what the statutes say now. The legislature is free to amend the erasure statute to either include or expressly exclude conditional pardons. Until it does, conditional pardons leave the conviction record intact.

Citations

Statutes and regulations

• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a (pardoning authority)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a(b) (three kinds of pardons)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a(e) (provisional pardons do not result in erasure)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130e(a)(8) (definition of provisional pardon)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130e(b) (provisional pardons relieve employment / licensure barriers)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(d)(2) (erasure follows absolute pardon)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(e)(3) (deemed never arrested)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142c(a) (non-disclosure of erased records)
• Conn. Agencies Regs. § 54-124a(j)(2)-1(6) (regulatory definition of "pardon")

Cases and prior opinions

• McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267 (1988) (legislature delegated pardoning power to Board)
• Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121 (1938)
• State v. Menditto, 315 Conn. 861 (2015) (use of dictionary for undefined statutory terms)
• State ex rel. Forbes v. Caperton, 481 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1996) (definition of conditional pardon)
• Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608 (2013) (legislature's express provision implies exclusion of unspecified)
• DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, 316 Conn. 790 (2015) (courts cannot supply omitted statutory language)
• Wood v. Chairperson, Board of Pardons and Paroles, Dkt. No. FIC 2013-082 (Jan. 30, 2014), aff'd on other grounds, Wood v. FOIC, 2015 WL 601517 (Conn. Super. Jan. 21, 2015)
• Wood v. Executive Director, Board of Pardons and Paroles, Dkt. No. FIC 2013-359 (May 28, 2014)

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/ag/opinions/2016/2016-02_judicial_conditionalpardons-pdf.pdf?rev=ef9824a066b249feabf48002e6158713

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

55 ELM STREET
P.O. BOX 120
HARTFORD, CT 06141-0120

GEORGE JEPSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Office of the Attorney General
State of Connecticut

March 7, 2016

Martin R. Libbin
Director of Legal Services
State of Connecticut Judicial Branch
Court Operations Division
100 Washington Street, P.O. Box 150474
Hartford, CT 06115-0474

Dear Attorney Libbin:

You have requested an opinion, on behalf of Judge Patrick L. Carroll III, Chief Court Administrator, and the Judicial Branch, concerning whether the records associated with a conviction for which a conditional pardon has been granted are subject to erasure under state law. We conclude that they are not.

You indicate that current practice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) and the Judicial Branch has been to treat conditional pardons as requiring erasure. You further indicate that the Board has issued pardons, for which the certificate of pardon is captioned "CERTIFICATE OF PARDON (NO PISTOL/REVOLVER/HANDGUN)" and which purports to grant a "full, complete, absolute and Conditional pardon (as noted above) . . . ." Finally, you state that your office was asked about these "Conditional pardons" in light of varying practices of state and national criminal history record systems regarding a pardon or expungement imposing restrictions on the ability to possess firearms and that you have concerns about the treatment of these "Conditional pardons" as requiring erasure.

Absolute and Conditional Pardons

In Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the legislature, which has delegated its exercise to the Board. McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267, 271 (1988); Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121 (1938). Section 54-130a of the General Statutes provides that the Board "shall have authority to grant pardons, conditioned, provisional or absolute, or certificates of rehabilitation for any offense against the state at any time after the imposition and before or after the service of any sentence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a(b) (emphasis added).

The Board's statutory authority thus permits it to issue three types of pardons: absolute, conditioned, and provisional. Provisional pardons are defined by statute as "a form of relief from barriers or forfeitures to employment or the issuance of licenses granted to an eligible offender by the [Board] . . . ." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130e(a)(8). Absolute and conditioned pardons, however, are not statutorily defined. In the absence of statutory definitions, we may turn to the common understanding of words expressed in contemporaneous dictionaries, including legal dictionaries where, as here, a legal term is used. State v. Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 866-67 (2015).

A pardon is generally understood to be "[a]n act of grace from the governing power which mitigates the punishment the law demands for the offense and restores the rights and privileges forfeited on account of the offense." Black's Law Dictionary 1002 (5th ed.). An absolute pardon is commonly defined as a pardon that "frees the criminal without any condition whatever." Id. at 1003. By contrast, a conditional pardon is "[o]ne to which a condition is annexed, performance of which is necessary to the validity of the pardon." Id.; accord State ex rel. Forbes v. Caperton, 481 S.E.2d 780, 784 (W. Va. 1996).

It is axiomatic that a pardon cannot at once be both absolute and conditional. An absolute pardon relieves a person from the penalties and legal disabilities associated with a conviction without any condition, while a conditional pardon does so with some condition or limitation attached to it. To place a condition on a pardon, for example, the condition that the pardoned person is ineligible to obtain a handgun permit, obviously makes the pardon conditional, and not absolute.

The statute refers to "conditioned" pardons. The pardons you reference use the term "conditional." We discern no difference in meaning and treat those terms as synonymous for purposes of this opinion.

The Board's regulations define "pardon" as "the conditional or absolute release from the legal penalties resulting from the conviction of a crime . . . ." Conn. Agencies Regs. § 54-124a(j)(2)-1(6). The regulations do not define the terms "conditional" or "absolute."

Erasure and Conditional Pardons

Under state law, criminal records under certain prescribed circumstances are subject to erasure. For such erased criminal records, "[t]he clerk of the court or any person charged with retention and control of erased records by the Chief Court Administrator or any criminal justice agency having information contained in such erased records shall not disclose to anyone the existence of such erased records or information pertaining to any charge erased . . ." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142c(a). "Any person who shall have been the subject of such an erasure shall be deemed to have never been arrested within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under oath." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(e)(3).

The erasure statute expressly provides that absolute pardons result in erasure of criminal records associated with the conviction. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(d)(2) ("Whenever such absolute pardon was received on or after October 1, 1974, such records shall be erased."). Section 54-130a expressly provides that provisional pardons do not result in erasure. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a(e) ("The granting of a provisional pardon or certificate of rehabilitation does not entitle such person to erasure of the record of the conviction of the offense or relieve such person from disclosing the existence of such conviction as may be required.") The statutes, however, are silent as to conditional pardons.

The failure of the legislature to state explicitly whether conditional pardons implicate the erasure of criminal records, however, does not mean that erasure applies. First, it is telling that the legislature only expressly provided that absolute pardons result in erasure of criminal records. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(d)(2). Prior to 2006, the Board had authority to issue absolute pardons and conditional pardons. By the express language of the statute, only absolute pardons resulted in erasure. Where, as here, the statutory context shows that the legislature knew how to convey its intent expressly, the failure to do so implies that the legislature did not intend to include the absent language. Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608, 618 (2013). The clear implication of expressly providing for erasure in the case of absolute pardons is that erasure was not to follow from a conditional pardon.

This conclusion is not altered by the legislature's later amendment that expressly provides that provisional pardons do not result in erasure. In 2006, the legislature granted the Board the additional authority to grant provisional pardons, which differ from conditional and absolute pardons in that they are intended only "to relieve an eligible offender of barriers or forfeitures" relating to employment or licensure resulting from a conviction. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130e(b). In so amending the Board's authority, the legislature expressly stated that such provisional pardons did not "entitle such person to erasure of the record of conviction of the offense . . . ." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a(e). Given this context, it would be unreasonable to infer that, by making clear the new provisional pardons were not to result in erasure, the legislature meant or understood conditional pardons to do so, when the language prior to 2006 implied erasure did not follow from a conditional pardon. Courts will not supply language that the legislature chose to omit. DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 316 Conn. 790, 803 (2015). In sum, only records associated with a crime for which one has received an absolute pardon are subject to erasure under the statutes.

Your inquiry specifically references pardons the Board has described as "full, complete, absolute and *Conditional." Although it is not entirely clear what the Board intended by this description, for purposes of erasure, such pardons should be treated as conditional. They place a condition, in the case of the example you reference, a limitation on possession of handguns, on the pardon. As you noted, this conclusion is consistent with recent decisions by the Freedom of Information Commission. Wood, et al. v. Chairperson, State of Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al., Dkt. No. FIC 2013-082, ¶ 145 (Jan. 30, 2014) (concluding that an "absolute pardon subject to condition" is a conditional pardon for purposes of erasure), aff'd on other grounds, Wood v. FOIC, 2015 WL 601517 (Conn. Super. Jan. 21, 2015); Wood, et al. v. Executive Director, State of Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles, Dkt. No. FIC 2013-359, ¶ 42 (May 28, 2014) (same). Accordingly, erasure does not apply to the records associated with the convictions that are the subject of such pardons.

We trust this is responsive to your question.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE JEPSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL