Did Connecticut’s 1998 registry transition require a newly probationary sex offender to register?

Plain-English summary

In November 1998, Connecticut’s AG answered two questions about the transition between sex offender registration acts. The Department of Public Safety asked about a person whose probation began just before the newer act took effect. Under the earlier law, the Office of Adult Probation could register the person near the end of supervision. The department wondered whether that timing left the person outside both laws.

The AG said no. He read P.A. 98-111, §3(b) to cover anyone who “has been subject to the registration requirements” of the earlier statute. That included the described person convicted of sexual assault and placed on probation. In his reading, the transition provision moved registration forward to shortly after the new act’s effective date, instead of allowing it to wait until near the end of probation. He cited legislative debate supporting registration from the start of probation.

The second question concerned people convicted under a provision involving a minor who were already registered under the earlier act. The AG said the transition rule placed them in the new act’s sexually violent offender registration category, while people entering the system after the effective date could fall under a different category for offenses against minors. He identified two differences: documentation of treatment for certain conditions and how long registration lasted or could be ended by court application. He invited the department to raise other differences if it needed further advice.

Public safety and probation staff at the time

The AG concluded that the sample probationer was covered by the transition provision and had to register on the new act’s timetable. Existing registrants in the department’s second example followed the sexually violent offender category identified in that provision.

Registrants at the time

The opinion distinguished registration categories by when and how the person entered the system. It did not treat those categories as identical in their reporting or duration rules.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did probation starting before the new law took effect leave the example offender unregistered?
A: No. The AG said the transition language covered a person already subject to the earlier registration requirements.

Q: Did all people convicted of an offense against a minor fall under the same registration category?
A: No. The AG described a difference between people already registered under the earlier act and people entering under the new act after its effective date.

Q: Were the two categories identical in what had to be reported?
A: No. The opinion identified a treatment-documentation requirement for the sexually violent offender category and different rules on registration duration.

Background and statutory framework

The department sought clarification of an earlier AG opinion on P.A. 98-111. The AG compared that act’s transition provision with the registration duties imposed under P.A. 97-183 and described how the categories differed.

Citations and references

Acts: P.A. 98-111, §3(b); P.A. 97-183(1)(a).

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1998-formal-opinions/dr-henry-c-lee-commissioner-department-of-public-safety-1998023-formal-opinion-attorney-general-of-c

Original opinion text

Dr. Henry C. Lee, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety, 1998-023 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General Richard Blumenthal

November 16, 1998

Dr. Henry C. Lee, Commissioner

Department of Public Safety

1111 Country Club Road

Middletown, CT 06457-9294

Dear Commissioner Lee:

In a memorandum dated October 5, 1998, your agency asked for our opinion regarding two questions that have arisen since the issuance of our September 28, 1998 opinion regarding Public Act 98-111. The first question asks the following:

1) A review of the opinion would seem to indicate that an individual convicted of, for example, C.G.S. Sec. 53a-71(a)(1), and sentenced to a term of probation commencing September 28, 1998 would not have to be registered under either Public Act 97-183 or Public Act. 98-111. Under Public Act 97-183, such individual would not have been registered as registration would not have occurred until approximately five days before the end of his probation term. Under Public Act 98-111, such an individual would have been released into the community before October 1, 1998 as that term is defined in the Act and therefore would not fall within the scope of section 2 of the Act. Would you kindly advise this office if your view of the Act's scope is consistent with the foregoing?

It is our opinion that P.A. 98-111, §3(b) requires the individual you refer to above to register. That section provides that:

Any person who has been subject to the registration requirements of section 54-102r of the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1997, as amended by section 1 of public act 97-183, shall, not later than three working days after the effective date of this act, register under this section and thereafter comply with the provisions of this act.

The individual referred to in your inquiry, who was convicted of a violation of §53a-71(a)(1) and sentenced to a term of probation commencing on September 28, 1998, is a "person who has been subject to the registration requirements" set forth in §54-102r, revised to January 1, 1997, as amended by P.A. 97-183(1). Subsection (b) of that statute provides, in relevant part, that:

Whenever a person who has been convicted of sexual assault [as that term in defined in subsection (a) of the act]...is to be released from the supervision of the Office of Adult Probation upon completion or termination of a sentence of probation...said office...shall, not later than five days prior to such release..., register such person with the chief of police of the police department or resident state trooper for the municipality in which such person will reside.

In accordance with that statute, the individual to whom you refer is subject to the registration requirements in that he has been convicted of a sexual assault as that term is defined in P.A. 97-183(1)(a) and that statute, prior to its being repealed by §12 of P.A. 98-111, required the Office of Adult Probation to register the individual at some point "not later than five days prior to release" from the supervision of that office. In our view, the effect of P.A. 98-111, §3(b) is to change the point at which such an individual must register by requiring that such registration be accomplished "not later than three working days after the effective date of [the] act", rather than allowing the registration to occur at an unspecified time that could be close to the end of the probationary period.

This conclusion is consistent with and supported by the legislature's stated intent that such individuals be required to register under the act. During the debate in the House of Representatives on the bill that became P.A. 98-111, Rep. Lawlor stated that the bill "...clarifies that person [sic] who are on probation who are sex offenders in one of these categories, must begin to register from the inception of their probation rather from the completion of their probation." 41 Conn. H.R. Proc., pt. 11, 1998 Sess. 3717 (May 2, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Lawlor). (Emphasis added.) Thus, the language of these statutes as well as the legislative history compel the conclusion that the individual referred to in your question is required to register.

Your second question is as follows:

2) Section 3(b) of the Act provides that any individual who has been subject to the registration requirements of Public Act 97-183 must register under Public Act 98-111 in the manner required for sexually violent offenders. One result of this mandate is that individuals who were convicted of C.G.S. Sec. 53-21(2) and registered under Public Act 97-183 will be treated as sexually violent offenders whereas individuals who are convicted of C.G.S. Sec. 53-21(2) and released into the community on or after October 1, 1998 will be registered as individuals convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor. Is there any different approach the agency should be taking with respect to these offenders?

Although your question is somewhat unclear with regard to the "different approach" that the agency might take with respect to these offenders, we see two significant differences in the registration requirements as they apply to individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses (§3) verses those convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor (§2). The first difference is that §3 requires sexually violent offenders to register "documentation of any treatment received for mental abnormality or personality disorder", while no such requirement is contained in §2. In addition, those sections contain different language regarding the length of the required registration period. Section 2(a) requires that a person required to register under that section "shall maintain such registration for ten years", while §3(a) requires a sexually violent offender to "maintain such registration until released from this obligation in accordance with section 6 of this act". Section 6 requires that a person required to register under §3 "shall maintain his registration for not less than ten years from the date of his release into the community, after which he may apply to the court in which he was convicted...for release from the obligation to register."

If you are aware of any other differences in the registration requirements that you would like us to comment on, please feel free to contact us.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Margaret Q. Chapple

Assistant Attorney General