Did Connecticut’s Board of Pardons have to hold a commutation hearing before every scheduled execution?

Plain-English summary

In July 1996, Connecticut’s AG answered the Board of Pardons’ questions about possible future executions and commutation hearings. He did not predict the first execution date, instead directing that question to the Chief State’s Attorney. For hearing timing and who could request a hearing, he said the board had discretion. The board could also initiate a hearing without a request.

The letter treated commutation as an exercise of the pardoning power delegated to the board. It cited authority describing clemency as discretionary rather than an entitlement of a prisoner. The AG offered help drafting regulations but said their substance and direction had to come from the board. The opinion did not prescribe a mandatory hearing schedule for every case.

Board members at the time

The board could set rules about timing and requests and could begin a hearing itself. The AG left the regulatory choices to it.

Prisoners and counsel at the time

The opinion did not establish a right to a hearing at a particular stage or a right to commutation. It described the board’s discretion under the law then cited.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was a commutation hearing automatically required in every execution case?
A: The AG did not impose that requirement. He placed hearing decisions within the board’s discretion.

Q: Could the board schedule a hearing without a prisoner’s request?
A: Yes. The opinion said it appeared the board could initiate one on its own.

Q: Did the AG identify the likely first execution date?
A: No. He referred that question to the Chief State’s Attorney.

Background and statutory framework

The Board of Pardons asked about execution timing, hearing timing and who could request a special session. The AG relied on the board’s delegated clemency power and the authority cited in the letter concerning Section 18-26, while leaving specific procedures to the board.

Citations and references

Statute: Section 18-26.

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1996-formal-opinions/mr-burton-s-yaffie-secretary-trumbull-park-business-center-1996010-formal-opinion-attorney-general-o

Original opinion text

Mr. Burton S. Yaffie, Secretary, Trumbull Park Business Center, 1996-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General Richard Blumenthal

July 17, 1996

Mr. Burton S. Yaffie, Secretary

Board of Pardons

Trumbull Park Business Center

935 White Plains Road

Suite 203

Trumbull, CT 06611

Dear Mr. Yaffie:

The Board of Pardons asked this office the following questions with regard to the possibility of future executions in the State of Connecticut:

When is the first execution likely to be scheduled?

When will a hearing be required in anticipation of an execution date? On the date of execution? Just before the execution? After all other appeals have been exhausted?

Is it necessary for the Board to convene a commutation hearing in all cases whether requested or not?

Who could request the convening of this special session: the defendant, his attorney, the Governor, a family member, etc.?

In response to inquiry 1, you should discuss this matter with the Chief State's Attorney. With regard to inquiries 2, 3 and 4, it is our view that it is within the discretion of the Board of Pardons to provide when hearings will be held and the person(s) who may request such a hearing. Moreover, it appears that the Board may initiate a hearing without any request at all.

Power to commute a sentence is part of the pardoning power, under which it may be exercised. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole § 23 (1987). Ordinarily, the pardoning power resides in the executive. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 432 F.supp. 1310, 1312 (D. Conn. 1977) (Dumschat I), affd, 593 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1979), remanded, 618 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd. 452 U.S. 458, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981). In Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the legislature; Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 198 A. 265 (1938); which has delegated its exercise to the board of pardons. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 452 U.S. 458, 463, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (Durischat II). Granting of a commutation is an act of clemency. State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60,72-73,138 A.2d 786, cert denied, 358 U.S. 46, 79 S. Ct. 70, 3 L.Ed.2d 45 (1958). Section 18-26 creates no right or entitlement that may be claimed by any prison inmate. Dumschat II, supra, 467. Furthermore, the statute vests in the board unfettered discretion in making its pardon and commutation decisions: it imposes no definitions, no criteria and no mandates giving rise to a duty to commute a sentence or grant a pardon, or creatinga constitutional entitlement to an exercise of clemency. Id., 466. There exists no right to judicial review of denial of commutation. State v. Walters, supra, 73.
McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267, 271, 537 A.2d 1004 (1988).

If you wish the assistance of the Attorney General's Office in drafting regulations dealing with these subjects, we shall be pleased to provide that assistance. You should remember, however, that the substance and direction of these regulatory provisions must come from the Board of Pardons.

Very truly yours,

Richard Blumenthal

Attorney General

Ann E. Lynch

Assistant Attorney General