Did a handgun sale started before October 1995 avoid the new permit rule if delivery came later?

Plain-English summary

In September 1995, Connecticut’s AG addressed a timing problem created by a new handgun eligibility law. The earlier transfer statute required a two-week wait after purchase paperwork was mailed. Transactions begun in the second half of September could therefore reach delivery after the new law’s October 1 effective date. Some dealers argued that beginning the transaction before October 1 kept it under the older requirements alone.

The AG rejected that reading. The new law’s wording barred any person from purchasing or receiving a pistol or revolver on or after October 1 without a listed permit or eligibility certificate, unless the person fell into one of the specified officer categories. A pre-October transaction date did not excuse compliance if purchase or receipt occurred on or after the effective date. The opinion interpreted the transition in 1995; its permit categories and timing are historical.

Dealers and purchasers at the time

The opinion tied the new qualification rule to purchase or receipt on or after the effective date, regardless of when the dealer began the paperwork.

Public safety officials at the time

The AG read the new qualification provision together with the existing waiting period, without creating a grandfather exception for pending transactions.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a customer start a handgun purchase in September and receive it after October 1 without the new qualification?
A: No. The AG said purchase or receipt after the effective date had to meet the new law.

Q: Did the two-week waiting period postpone the new permit requirement?
A: No. The waiting period could carry delivery past October 1, but it did not change when the new qualification rule applied.

Q: Was everyone required to hold the same carry permit?
A: No. The 1995 statute also listed a retail sale permit, an eligibility certificate and certain officer exceptions.

Background and statutory framework

The AG reconciled the waiting period in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(b) with the new purchase-or-receipt restriction in § 29-36j(a). The plain effective-date wording controlled his answer.

Citations and references

Statutes: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36j(a).

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1995-formal-opinions/honorable-kenneth-kirschner-commissioner-of-public-safety-1995025-formal-opinion-attorney-general-of

Original opinion text

Honorable Kenneth Kirschner, Commissioner of Public Safety, 1995-025 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal

September 21, 1995

Honorable Kenneth Kirschner

Commissioner of Public Safety

21111 Country Club Road

Middletown, Connecticut 06457

Re: Purchase or receipt of pistols or revolvers on or after October 1, 1995

Dear Commissioner Kirschner:

Recently, it has come to the attention of this office that certain retail firearms dealers have advertised that customers may purchase handguns until October 1, 1995 without a permit to carry such weapons, and without an eligibility certificate. This "policy" is apparently prompted by their interpretation of the interplay between Connecticut General Statutes §§ 29-33 and 29-36j. The purpose of this letter is to (1) clarify the relationship between these two statutes, and (2) afford the Department of Public Safety appropriate guidance concerning the proper implementation of the statutes' provisions.

Until recently, the process by which sale of a pistol or revolver was accomplished was governed solely by the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(b). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that

No person, firm or corporation shall sell, deliver or otherwise transfer any pistol or revolver except upon written application on a form prescribed and furnished by the commissioner of public safety. Such person, firm or corporation shall send one copy of such application by first class mail on the day of receipt of such application to the chief of the police department of the municipality within which the applicant resides or, where there is no chief of police, the first selectman or warden of such municipality, as the case may be, and one copy to the commissioner of public safety, and shall retain the application for at least five years. No sale, delivery or transfer of any pistol or revolver shall be made unless the person making the purchase or to whom the same is delivered or transferred is personally known to the person selling such pistol or revolver or making delivery or transfer thereof or provides evidence of his identity in the form of a motor vehicle operator's license, identity card issued pursuant to section 1-1h or valid passport. No sale, delivery or other transfer of any pistol or revolver shall be made until the expiration of two weeks from the date of the mailing of such copies.

In 1994, the General Assembly enacted Public Act No. 94-1 (July Special Session). Section 12 of that Act, now codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36j(a), altered the above scheme. This statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

On and after October 1, 1995, no person may purchase or receive any pistol or revolver unless such person holds a valid permit to carry a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to subsection (b) of section 29-28, a valid permit to sell at retail a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to subsection (a) of section 29-28 or a valid eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to section 29-36f or is a federal marshal, sheriff, parole officer or peace officer.

The confusion over the interplay between these two statutes has arisen since September 17, 1995. Persons attempting to purchase handguns cannot, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(b), take possession of the weapon until after the passage of the fourteen day waiting period provided for by that statute. However, on or after September 17, 1995, the passage of the fourteen day waiting period necessarily crosses the October 1, 1995, date on and after which the new provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36j(a) apply.

Some firearms dealers have taken the position that they should continue to apply only the provisions of § 29-33(b) for purchases initiated through September 30, 1995, and apply the requirements of § 29-36j(a) only to transactions initiated thereafter. This interpretation is not in keeping with the plain language of the statute. "The starting point in any case involving a question of statutory construction must be the language used by the legislature." Nickel Mine Brook Associates v. Joseph E. Sakal, P.C., 217 Conn. 361, 364, 585 A.2d 1210 (1991). "When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature." Norwich v. Housing Authority, 216 Conn. 112, 117-118, 579 A.2d 50 (1990). The provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36j are clear and unambiguous. According to the plain wording of the statute, on and after October 1, 1995, no person may purchase or receive any pistol or revolver unless such person is a federal marshal, sheriff, parole officer or peace officer or holds (1) a valid permit to carry a pistol or revolver, (2) a valid permit to sell at retail a pistol or revolver, or (3) a valid eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver.

It is our opinion, therefore, that persons purchasing or receiving a pistol or revolver on or after October 1, 1995, must comply with the requirements set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36j regardless of when the transaction was initiated. We hope that this opinion is of some assistance to you in discharging your regulatory duties under the law.

Very truly yours,

Richard Blumenthal

Attorney General