Could Connecticut’s Historical Commission open gift shops at state historic properties?

Plain-English summary

In August 1994, Connecticut’s AG said the Historical Commission could not rely on its historic-property statute to establish gift shops at the sites it maintained. The statute expressly allowed the commission to restore, maintain and operate properties for public visitation and charge reasonable admission fees to defray their costs. It said nothing about selling merchandise or operating another commercial venture for revenue.

The AG stressed that a state agency has only powers the legislature gives it expressly or by implication. He contrasted the commission’s statute with separate laws that expressly let the parks department operate concessions and another state board run food and merchandise stands. Those examples showed the legislature knew how to grant a commercial power when it wished. The opinion decided whether the cited commission statute supplied the power; it did not identify another authority for these proposed gift shops.

Historic-site administrators at the time

The opinion recognized authority to charge admission but found no grant of authority for gift shops under the property statute.

Legislators at the time

The AG’s comparison with other agencies showed that an express commercial authorization was absent from the statute he examined.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the Historical Commission sell souvenirs to help maintain its sites?
A: The AG said the cited statute did not authorize that gift-shop activity, even though the revenue would support site operations.

Q: Could it charge visitors an admission fee?
A: Yes. The statute expressly allowed reasonable visitation fees to help defray maintenance and operation costs.

Q: Why did concession laws for other agencies matter?
A: They illustrated that the legislature had expressly authorized commercial revenue at other public facilities, while not doing so for this commission in the statute at issue.

Background and statutory framework

The AG read Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-321d as authorizing historic-site operation and admission fees, not general commerce. He compared it with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 23-26(a), which expressly addressed concessions and other revenue at state parks.

Citations and references

Statutes: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-321d; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 23-26(a).

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1994-formal-opinions/john-w-shannahan--connecticut-historical-commission--1994020-formal-opinion-attorney-general-of-conn

Original opinion text

John W. Shannahan , Connecticut Historical Commission , 1994-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General Richard Blumenthal

August 12, 1994

John W. Shannahan

Director

Connecticut Historical Commission

59 South Prospect Street

Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Mr. Shannahan:

You have asked our opinion on whether the Connecticut Historical Commission may establish gift shops in historic properties that are maintained by the Commission for the purpose of generating revenues to be used to help defray the costs associated with the operation of the properties. As authority for the proposed action, you cite Section 10-321d of the Connecticut General Statutes. In our opinion, Section 10-321d does not provide the Commission with the requisite authority to establish gift shops. Being creatures of the legislature, administrative agencies have no general, inherent or common-law powers, but only those powers expressly conferred upon them by statute and such as are implied by their grant of authority. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law §§ 55, 59. Here the Commission looks to § 10-321d as a potential source of authority to engage in a revenue generating commercial activity. This statute reads as follows:

The commission may, using such funds as may be appropriated to it or available from any other source, acquire by gift, grant, bequest, devise, lease, purchase or otherwise historic structures or landmarks, including such adjacent land as may be necessary for the comfort and safety of the visiting public, which the commission determines to be of national or state historical importance and to be of such concern to the public at large that they should be held forever in good condition for visitation by the public and for the protection of the heritages of the people of this state and nation. The commission may restore, maintain and operate such properties in such a condition as to render them suitable for public visitation and to inform the public of the historic event or circumstance connected therewith. The commission may charge reasonable visitation fees in order to help defray the cost of maintenance and operation. The commission may cooperate with the department of environmental protection and any other appropriate municipal, state or federal agency or private organization in carrying out functions under this section, and may enter into agreements for such purposes. (emphasis added)
As always, an analysis of a statute begins by examination of its language. "The starting point in any case involving a question of statutory construction must be the language used by the legislature." Nickel Mine Brook Associates Joseph E. Sakal, P.C., 217 Conn. 361, 364, 585 A.2d 1210 (1991). In this regard, the above quoted language of § 10-321d provides express authority to the Commission to "charge reasonable visitation fees in order to help defray the cost of maintenance and operation" of historic properties that it has acquired. However, the statute is silent as to any authority to engage in other revenue-producing activities for this purpose.

It is our duty to interpret a statute as it is written. Glastonbury Co. Gillies, 209 Conn. 175, 179, 550 A.2d 8 (1988). We cannot, by construction, read into a statute provisions which are not clearly stated. Id.; Robinson Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972). "In the interpretation of statutes, the intent of the legislature is to be found not in what it meant to say but in what it did say." Federal Aviation Administration v. Administration, 196 Conn. 546, 549-50, 494 A.2d 564 (1985). We think it is plain from the language of § 10-321d that the legislature has not delegated to the Commission the authority to engage in general commercial ventures as a revenue producing source. Rather, it would appear that the legislature simply intended the Commission to have the more traditional authority to charge admission fees.1

In marked contrast to the lack of express language in § 10-321d is the language in other provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes empowering particular state agencies to engage in revenue generating commercial activities. For example, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection is authorized to "enter into contractual relations with other persons for the operation of concessions [and to] establish other sources of revenue to be derived from services to the general public using [state] parks, forests and facilities." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 23-26(a). Similarly, the Board of Education and Services for the Blind is authorized to operate food service facilities and vending machine or stands for the sale of newspapers, periodicals, confections, tobacco products, food and other merchandise in any building or property owned, operated or leased by the state or any municipality. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-303.

It is therefore our opinion that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-321d, while authorizing the Commission to charge an admission fee, does not authorize it to engage in other revenue generating activities to help defray the cost of maintenance and operation at historic properties.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Alan N. Ponanski

Assistant Attorney General

RB/ANP/aes

Footnote:

1 See also subsection (b)(14) of Section 10-321 of the Connecticut General Statutes wherein the Commission is authorized to ". . .operate the Henry Whitfield House of Guilford, otherwise known as the Old Stone House, as a state historical museum and, in its discretion, charge a fee for admission to said museum and account for and deposit the same as provided in section 4-32."