Could Connecticut accept a lottery winner’s consent to pay his hospital debt from future winnings?

Plain-English summary

In April 1993, Connecticut’s AG said the Division of Special Revenue could honor a lottery winner’s written consent directing his last two annual prize payments to the state. The winner owed $49,973.43 for care at John Dempsey Hospital and did not dispute the debt. The lottery regulation said a prize “shall not be assignable,” and the Division had normally refused assignments. The AG applied the rule that a legal restriction is not read to bind the state itself unless its text or necessary implication says so. The regulation contained no such express restriction on the state as creditor.

The state had also obtained a garnishment order against the prize money. The AG expressly declined to decide whether a garnishment by the state against itself could be maintained, because the winner’s effective consent made that question unnecessary. His holding addressed this written direction to pay an acknowledged debt, not a general right for winners to sell or assign lottery prizes to private creditors.

Lottery administrators at the time

The opinion allowed the Division to recognize this winner’s consent in favor of the state as creditor despite its ordinary no-assignment rule.

State collection officials at the time

The AG treated the voluntary direction as effective and left the separate garnishment question unanswered.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the lottery pay the state from this winner’s remaining prizes?
A: Yes. The AG said the anti-assignment regulation did not prevent the Division from honoring the winner’s written direction to pay his state hospital debt.

Q: Did the opinion allow a lottery winner to assign prizes to any creditor?
A: No such conclusion appears in it. The AG’s reasoning turned on the state’s position as creditor and the particular consent document.

Q: Did the state’s garnishment order settle the issue?
A: The AG did not decide whether the garnishment could be maintained. He found the winner’s consent effective and therefore treated the garnishment question as moot.

Background and statutory framework

Lottery Regulations § 12-568-5(d) prohibited assignment of a prize. The AG applied a rule of construction discussed in State v. Goldfarb: a limit on rights does not bind the government without clear language or necessary implication. He concluded that the regulation did not disable the state from receiving this winner’s voluntary payment direction.

Citations and references

Regulation: Lottery Regulations § 12-568-5(d).

Case: State v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 320, 323, 278 A.2d 818 (1971).

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1993-formal-opinions/robert-w-werner-division-of-special-revenue-1993008-formal-opinion-attorney-general-of-connecticut

Original opinion text

Robert W. Werner, Division of Special Revenue, 1993-008 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal

April 29, 1993

Robert W. Werner

Executive Director

Division of Special Revenue

555 Russell Road

Newington, CT 06111

Dear Mr. Werner:

In your letter of February 11, 1993, you ask whether the State of Connecticut, as a creditor, is disabled from being the assignee of a Connecticut lottery winner because of a regulation which prohibits any assignment of lottery funds. In our opinion, the State does not suffer any such disability.

The relevant facts may be briefly stated as follows: John J. Durbis, in February of 1975, was declared to be a Connecticut State Lottery winner entitled to annual payments of $16,875.00.1 Mr. Durbis currently owes the State of Connecticut $49,973.43 which represents the cost of medical care rendered by John Dempsey Hospital. Mr. Durbis contests neither the fact nor the amount of this indebtedness.

The State of Connecticut has initiated a civil lawsuit against Mr. Durbis to collect this amount and, as an adjunct thereof, has secured an order of garnishment from the Superior Court directed specifically against the funds in question.2 Mr. Durbis subsequently executed and delivered to the Division, a document entitled "Consent and Direction to Disburse Lottery Winnings", which purports to authorize the Division to make the final two payments of the lottery proceeds to the State of Connecticut as partial restitution for his acknowledged debt.

You ask whether, in light of the provisions of Lottery Regulations § 12-568-5(d), the Division may honor the written direction of Mr. Durbis. This regulation, in pertinent part, provides: "A prize to which a purchaser may become entitled shall not be assignable." You inform us that, on the basis of this regulation, the Division has consistently refused to honor requested assignments of any lottery winnings.

It is a time honored axiom of statutory construction that a statute is not to be construed as applying against the State unless the same statute, in express terms or by necessary implication, so provides.

"It may be stated we think as a universal rule in the construction of statutes limiting rights, that they are not to be construed to embrace the government or sovereignty unless by express terms or necessary implication such appears to have been the clear intention of the legislature, and the rights of the government are not to be impaired by a statute unless its terms are clear and explicit, and admit of no other construction." State v. Shelton, 47 Conn. 400, 404; State v. Hartford, 50 Conn. 89, 90.

State v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 320, 323, 278 A.2d 818 (1971).

Thus, even if a Connecticut General Statute provided that a prize to which a purchaser may become entitled shall not be assignable, such a provision would not be construed to limit the right of the State to demand assignment absent explicit language wherein the State was disabled.3 The same reasoning applies, perhaps with more force, when the limitation is regulation based.

Thus, it is our opinion that the cited regulation does not prohibit the Division from recognizing the "Consent" document executed by Mr. Durbis.

Very truly yours,

Richard Blumenthal

Attorney General

Richard M. Sheridan

Assistant Attorney General

RB/RMS/td

1 Two such annual payments, totalling some $33,750.00, remain outstanding.

2 Your request for opinion also asks whether such a garnishment proceeding may be maintained in circumstances such as these, i.e., by the State against the State. In light of our conclusion that the "Consent" of Mr. Durbis is effective, we respectfully decline to address this issue since it is, in essence, moot.

3 See for example: Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-361a(g) (State, as employer, is subject to court order of wage execution); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 31-51m (State, as employer, may be named as defendant in civil suit for wrongful discharge).