Could Connecticut’s governor commute a death sentence, or only grant a reprieve?

Plain-English summary

In July 1992, Connecticut’s AG distinguished a reprieve from a commutation in a capital case. The state constitution gave the governor power to postpone execution of a sentence after conviction, but only until the end of the next General Assembly session. It did not give the governor authority to replace a death sentence permanently with a lesser punishment.

The statute then vested death-sentence commutations in the Board of Pardons. The AG relied on Connecticut Supreme Court decisions describing a reprieve as a temporary stay and a commutation as a substitution of punishment. He concluded that permanent clemency over a death sentence rested with the Board. The opinion spoke to the allocation of powers under 1992 law, not to the present availability of capital punishment.

Governor and pardons officials at the time

The opinion assigned a temporary reprieve to the governor and permanent commutation to the Board. It described the Board’s clemency discretion as broad under the statute then in force.

People facing a death sentence at the time

The AG said the governor could delay execution for the constitutional period; a lasting reduction in sentence required Board action.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could Connecticut’s governor permanently reduce a death sentence?
A: The AG said no. Under the law he analyzed, the Board of Pardons held the power to commute it.

Q: What could the governor do after a death sentence?
A: The opinion described the governor’s power to grant a temporary reprieve after conviction, ending no later than the next legislative session’s end.

Q: Did the opinion say a prisoner was entitled to clemency?
A: No. It quoted a Connecticut decision stating that the statute created no entitlement to a pardon or commutation.

Background and statutory framework

The governor and Board chair asked who controlled pardons in death-sentence cases. The AG read the state constitution’s reprieve clause beside Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-26, which placed death-penalty commutations with the Board of Pardons. He treated reprieve and commutation as different acts.

Citations and references

Statute: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-26.

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1992-formal-opinions/honorable-lowell-p-weicker-jr-governorstate-of-connecticut-1992020-formal-opinion-attorney-general-o

Original opinion text

Honorable Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Governor-State of Connecticut. 1992-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal

July 27, 1992

Honorable Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.

Governor-State of Connecticut

State Capitol

Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Governor Weicker:

In your letter of May 12, 1992, you join with Howard G. lger, M.D., Chairman of the Board of Pardons, in seeking our opinion as to the respective authority of the Governor and the Board in the granting of pardons for persons sentenced to death. For the reasons discussed below, it is our opinion that the pardoning authority in I such "cases lies with the Board of Pardons.

Article Fourth, Sec. 13 of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut provides that:

The governor shall have power to grant reprieves after conviction, in all cases except those of impeachment, until the end of the next session of the general assembly, and no longer.

In Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 124, 198 A.265 (1938), the Court reviewed this aspect of the Governor's power and concluded, in relevant part, that:

The thought in the minds of the makers of the Constitution in giving the Governor the power to grant reprieves until the end of the next session of the General Assembly was evidently that if, upon the facts before him, he believed that the General Assembly should have , an opportunity to determine whether to extend clemency to a prisoner beyond a merely temporary stay of execution, a reprieve might be granted until the Assembly had had an opportunity to act in the matter....A reprieve does no more than stay the execution of a sentence for a time; it is ordinarily an act of clemency extended to a prisoner in order to afford him an opportunity to procure some amelioration of the sentence which has been imposed upon him. Often the purpose is to enable him to take advantage of remedial measures which may result in his being pardoned of the offense of which he has been convicted, or in a commutation of sentence, or in an opportunity to present his case for review before an appellate tribunal or to secure a new trial. (Underlining added).

In contrast to the power to grant reprieve as provided for in Article Fourth, Sec. 13 of the Connecticut Constitution as construed by the Court in Palka, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-26 provides, in part, that:

(a) Jurisdiction over the granting of, and the authority to grant, commutations Of punishment or releases, conditioned or absolute, in the case of any person convicted of any offense against the state and commutations from the penalty of death shall be vested in the board of pardons. (Underlining added).

In McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267, 270-71 537 A.2d 1004 (1988), the court construed this statute to provide, in part, that:

Commutation of sentence is the substitution of a lesser punishment for that to which a person has been sentenced. Schick v. Reed , 419 U.S. 256, 273, 95 S. Ct. 379, 42 L. Ed. 2d 430, reh. denied, 420 U.S. 939, 95 S. Ct. 1150, 43 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480. 483, 47 S. Ct. 664, 71 L. Ed. 1161 (1927); 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole § 5 (1987). Power to commute a sentence is part of the pardoning power, under which it may be exercised. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole § 23 (1987). Ordinarily, the pardoning power resides in the executive. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 432 F. Sup. 1310, 1312 (D. Conn. 1977) (Dumschat I), aff'd, 593 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1979), remanded, 618 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 458, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1981). In Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the legislature; Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 198 A. 265 (1938); which has delegated its exercise to the board of pardons. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 452 U.S. 458, 463, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1981) ( Dumschat II). Granting of a commutation is an act of clemency. State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 72-73, 138 A.2d 786, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 46, 79 S. Ct. 70, 3 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1958). Section 18-26 creates no right or entitlement that may be claimed by any prison inmate. Dumschat II, supra, 467. Furthermore, the statute vests in the board unfettered discretion in making its pardon and commutation decisions; it imposes no definitions, no criteria and no mandates giving rise to a duty to commute a sentence or grant a pardon, or creating a constitutional entitlement to an exercise of clemency. Id., 466. (Underlining added).

It is clear from reading and comparing the powers of the Governor and the Board of Pardons that the authority to permanently commute a death sentence lies with the latter. The authority of the Governor is limited "to grant[ing] reprieves after conviction . . . until the end of the next1 session of the General and no Assembly and no longer."

Very truly yours,

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Stephen J. O'Neill

Assistant Attorney General

RB/S.O'N/gab

cc: Howard G. Iger, M.D.

1 "The word 'next' in the constitutional provision does not refer to a session of the General Assembly in existence when I reprieve is granted but to one which begins thereafter." Palka, supra, at 124.