Did Connecticut liquor permit holders lose a fee rebate if the qualifying event happened before the 1991 repeal but they applied afterward?

Plain-English summary

The Connecticut Attorney General concluded that repeal of the liquor permit fee rebate statute did not erase claims that had vested before the repeal was signed on September 19, 1991. The key date was when the event giving rise to a rebate occurred, not when the permit holder filed the request. A qualifying death, voluntary surrender, permit never used or recorded, catastrophe, or taking by eminent domain before that date could still support a rebate application afterward. The application still had to satisfy the former statute's filing deadline and other conditions.

If the qualifying event occurred after September 19, the Attorney General said the rebate application should be denied because the repealed statute no longer supplied authority. The opinion relied on Connecticut's vested-rights exception to the general rule that repeal eliminates statutory rights. It discussed about 294 pending applications claiming roughly $142,109 in refunds, but did not determine which individual applications qualified.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1991. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

For permit holders: Under the former Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-42, filing after the September 19 repeal did not by itself defeat a claim based on a qualifying event that occurred earlier. The former filing periods still controlled: claims based on death, surrender, catastrophe, or taking had to be made within the permit period; claims based on nonuse or failure to record the permit had to be made within sixty days of its issuance.

For Liquor Control: The opinion called for processing allowable claims that had arisen before repeal and denying claims first arising afterward. Each application still had to meet the old statute's other qualifications, including the applicable deadline.

For the Comptroller: The former statute had allowed refunds subject to deductions for state taxes and a processing charge and excluded refunds below $100 after those calculations. The opinion said those former conditions still applied to vested claims.

Common questions

Did an application have to be filed before September 19, 1991 to survive repeal?

No. The Attorney General said a claim arising from a qualifying event before the repeal was signed could be filed afterward, provided it met the deadline in the former statute.

What happened if a liquor permit was surrendered after the repeal?

The opinion said an event occurring after the repeal did not create a rebate right under the repealed statute, so an application based on that event should be denied.

How long did a permit holder have to claim a rebate for a permit never used or recorded?

The opinion's footnote quoted the former law's sixty-day period measured from permit issuance. That historical deadline still applied to a claim that arose before repeal.

Background and statutory framework

The 1991 repeal took effect on passage and was signed September 19. The former Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-42 had provided fee refunds for specified events during a permit's life. The Attorney General recognized the usual rule that repeal eliminates purely statutory rights without a savings clause, then applied Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147 (1939), to protect rights that vested while the statute remained in force. In the opinion's analysis, an enumerated event created the right, and timely filing and the former statute's other qualifications still governed payment.

Citations and references

The original text below states the repeal date, the qualifying events, the former filing deadlines, and the vested-rights reasoning.

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1991-formal-opinions/william-v-sullivan-chairman-department-of-liquor-control-1991035-formal-opinion-attorney-general-of

Original opinion text

William V. Sullivan, Chairman, Department of Liquor Control, 1991-035 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal

December 4, 1991

William V. Sullivan, Chairman

Department of Liquor Control

165 Capitol Avenue

Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on the impact of the repeal of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-42, which directed the refund of liquor permit fees under certain circumstances, on pending requests for such liquor permits rebates. The statute was repealed, effective on passage, in 1991 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 91-14 Sec. 28 (June Session). It was signed by the Governor on September 19, 1991. The question you have asked is which, if any, of the pending requests should be honored.

As of the date of your request, some 294 applications were pending before the department with claimed rebates totaling approximately $142,109. See Memo from Tom Ort dated October 10, 1991; Attachment A. For the following reasons, we believe that rebates should be allowed and paid on any allowable claims which came into existence prior to the signing of the repeal as long as the applications for such rebates were filed within the time limits prescribed by the former Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 30-42.

By way of background, the statute on rebates of liquor permit fees generally allowed the Comptroller to pay refunds on requests made "within the period for which the permit was allowed", that is, before the relevant permit year expired. It also provided for the subtraction of taxes due the state, and a processing charge, and it excluded refunds if the ultimate amount involved was less than $100. According to Section 30-42, rebates were allowed "upon the death of a permittee . .. the voluntary surrender of a permit, ... whenever a permit is issued but not used or recorded with the clerk of the town in which the permit premises are located" or "[w]henever, by reason of any catastrophe, act of God or serious natural disaster, a permit business is discontinued or whenever the site of any permit premises is taken in the exercise of the power of eminent domain...." We understand that the pending applications concern all of these categories, and that some were filed before September 19 and some after that date.

The general rule of statutory construction provides that, absent a savings clause or other clear expression of intention, all rights which are of purely statutory derivation and unknown at common law are eliminated by the repeal of the statute which granted them, irrespective of the time of their accrual. 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) § 23.33; accord 24 Conn. Op. Atty. Gen. 28 (1945). No savings clause is applicable to the present situation and the legislative history of 1991 Conn. Pub. Acts. No. 91-14 reveals no intent to save such claims.1 This rule, however, has been tempered in Connecticut to the extent that it is not applied to impair rights that have vested while the statute was in force. Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147 (1939). Id. In the problem presented, the licensees whose claims for a rebate came into existence prior to the repeal of the statute have a vested right to the rebates and are entitled to pursue those claims.

Vested rights include title, legal or equitable, "to the present or future enforcement of a demand ... although it must be something more than a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general laws." Id. (citations omitted). The right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional; independent of a contingency. 23 Conn. Op. Atty. Gen. 376 (1944); see Hagerty v. Administrator, 137 Conn. 129, 133 (1950). Under Section 30-42 permittees became unconditionally entitled to a rebate upon the occurrence of one of the enumerated time periods, neither the department of liquor control not the Comptroller had any discretion but to provide the rebates.2 Therefore, those licensees whose claims for a rebate came into existence prior to the repeal of the statute are entitled to pursue those claims as a vested right. See e.g. Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector, 297 U.S. 666, 671, 56 S.Ct. 651, 80 L.Ed. 967 (1936); Parsippany Hills Assoc. v. Rent Leveling Board, 194 N.J. Super. 34, 476 A.2d 271 (1984), cert. denied, 97 N.J. 643, 483 A.2d 169 (1984); but see People v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 21 N.E. 2d 318 (1939) app. dis., 308 U.S. 505 (1939).

Accordingly, if the right to the claim came into existence prior to the signing of Public Act 91-14, that is if the death, surrender, lack of use, or discontinuance due to catastrophe or taking occurred prior to signing, then the rebate should be processed and paid, even if the application was made after September 19, 1991. Of course, all qualifications under the old statute would apply and any disqualification would result in the denial of the refund. On the other hand, if the right came into existence after the signing of the Act, then any such application should be denied for lack of statutory authority due to repeal.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Assistant Attorney General

RB/RFV/lmr

1 Public Act 91-14 does not contain a savings clause no do other statutes provide one: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1(t) is not relevant on its face; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-1(u) and 55-3 are mere codifications of the rules of construction respecting retrospective legislation. See Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 402 (1962); Schieffellin v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 194 Conn. 165, 174 (1984). The legislative debates are silent.

2 According to Section 30-42, an application for a rebate because of the death of a permittee, the voluntary surrender of a permit or because of a catastrophe or taking by eminent domain must be made "within the period for which such permit was issued." An application for a rebate because a permit was not used or recorded with the town clerk must be made "within sixty days of issuance of the permit."