Did Connecticut's 1987 increase in crime-victim compensation limits cover a homicide that happened before the amendment took effect?

Short answer No. The Attorney General concluded that the higher limits and new dependent-claim rule were substantive changes that applied only to injuries or deaths on or after October 1, 1987. Filing a claim after that date did not make an earlier death subject to the new limit.
State
Connecticut
Opinion
Formal Opinion 1990-24
Issued
June 28, 1990
Issued by
Clarine Nardi Riddle, Attorney General of Connecticut
Requested by
John C. Ford, Administrator, Commission on Victim Services

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1990. Ask about yours and see what current Connecticut law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Connecticut Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This historical summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

A victim died from gunshot wounds in January 1987. His mother applied to Connecticut's Commission on Victim Services in December, after an October 1987 amendment had raised the maximum award for homicide dependents from the earlier ten thousand dollars limit to twenty-five thousand dollars. The Attorney General concluded that the higher limit did not apply to this death. The relevant date was when the victim died, before the amendment took effect, rather than when the application was filed.

The amendment also raised the maximum for non-homicide awards to fifteen thousand dollars and made dependents' homicide claims derivative of the victim's claim. The opinion treated these as changes in substantive rights and in the commission's possible obligations, not merely a different procedure. It found no clear legislative intent to apply the amendments backward. Its stated rule was that the 1987 changes should not apply to personal injury or death before October 1, 1987. The opinion decided which statutory limit governed; it did not state the amount of any award actually made on this application.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1990. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

For homicide survivors with pre-October 1987 claims: The opinion concluded that filing after the amendment's effective date did not bring an earlier death under the new twenty-five thousand dollars dependent-award ceiling. It applied the earlier statutory limit to the January 1987 death described.

For the Commission on Victim Services: The Attorney General characterized the higher award limits and derivative-claim rule as substantive changes. The commission was not to apply them to an injury or death before October 1, 1987.

Common questions

Did a December 1987 filing qualify for the new homicide award limit if the death happened in January?

No. The opinion said the victim's death in January 1987 established the relevant claim before the October amendment, so the new limit could not be applied to it.

Why did the Attorney General reject the higher limit?

The amendment increased potential awards and changed how dependents' claims were treated. The opinion called those substantive changes and found no clear legislative intent to make them retroactive.

Did the opinion decide the family's final award amount?

No. It resolved whether the new twenty-five thousand dollars ceiling could apply, not what amount the commission ultimately awarded on the application.

Did the same date rule cover non-homicide injuries?

The opinion's conclusion said the 1987 amendment should not apply to any personal injury or death before October 1, 1987. Its particular file involved a homicide claim.

Background and statutory framework

The older version of section 54-211(c) capped compensation at ten thousand dollars. The 1987 act raised the limit for non-homicide crimes to fifteen thousand dollars and for dependents of homicide victims to twenty-five thousand dollars, while making those dependent claims derivative of the victim's claim. The act took effect on October 1, 1987.

The opinion relied on Connecticut cases presuming substantive amendments operate prospectively unless the legislature clearly says otherwise. It compared the award increase with Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Assoc., Inc., which declined to apply a higher prejudgment-interest rate to an earlier period. It found no clear retroactive instruction in the 1987 amendment or its legislative debates.

Citations and references

The opinion discusses 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, section 10(c), and Conn. Gen. Stat. section 54-211(c). It cites American Mason's Supply Co. v. F.W. Brown Co., 174 Conn. 219, 222-23, 384 A.2d 378 (1978), and Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Assoc., Inc., 199 Conn. 683, 508 A.2d 438 (1986). The official HTML renders the section symbol as “e” in several citations; the original-text section preserves that rendering.

Source

Original opinion text

John C. Ford, Administrator, Commission on Victim Services, 1990-024 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal

June 28, 1990

Mr. John C. Ford

Administrator

Commission on Victim Services

1155 Silas Deane Highway

Wethersfield, CT 06109

Dear Mr. Ford:

You have asked for our opinion whether the provisions of 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, Sec. 10.(c), now Conn. Gen. Stat. e 54-211(c), should be applied retroactively to a claim which arose prior to the effective date of the act.

A review of the Commission file in the matter of Irma Cruz, claim no. 877-87D, reveals the following pertinent information. On December 9, 1987, Ms. Cruz, mother of the decedent Jose A. Rolon, Jr., filed an application for compensation with the Commission pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. e 54-204. The decedent had died of multiple gunshot wounds on or about January 7, 1987. The date of the decedent's death is the point in time in which the decedent became a "victim" as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. e 54-201(1) and became eligible for compensation.

At the time of the decedent's death, Conn. Gen. Stat. e 54-211(c) provided that "[n]o compensation shall be awarded for the first hundred dollars of injury sustained and no such compensation shall be in an amount in excess of ten thousand dollars...." However, the Legislature, through the enactment of 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, Sec. 10.(c), made numerous changes to the aforementioned statutory provision. These amendments became effective on October 1, 1987. The changes included increasing the maximum amount of an award in non-homicide crimes from ten thousand to fifteen thousand dollars. In addition, in the case of awards to dependents of homicide victims, benefits were increased to a maximum of twenty-five thousand dollars. The statutory revision also provided that "[t]he claims of the dependents of a deceased victim, ... shall be considered derivative of the claim of such victim and the total for all claims arising from the death of such victim shall not exceed a maximum of twenty-five thousand dollars."

It is the position of the applicant that 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, e 10(c) should be applied to the claim, thereby making available a maximum award of twenty-five thousand dollars rather than ten thousand dollars. We believe this position would require a retroactive application of the Public Act. In our judgment, because 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, e 10(c) effects a substantive change in the law, it must be applied prospectively.

In American Mason's Supply Co. v. F.W. Brown Co., 174 Conn. 219, 222-23, 384 A.2d 378 (1978) the Court stated:

This court has consistently expressed its reluctance to construe statutes as having retroactive application. [citations omitted]. A statute "affecting substantial changes in the law" is not to be given a retrospective effect unless it clearly and unequivocally appears that such was the legislative intent. [citations omitted]. The test of whether a statute is to be applied retroactively, absent an express legislative intent, "is not a purely mechanical one" and even if it is a procedural statute, which ordinarily will be applied retroactively without a legislative imperative to the contrary, "it will not be applied retroactively if considerations of good sense and justice dictate that it not be so applied. [citations omitted]." These aids to legislative interpretation apply with equal force to amendatory acts which effectuate changes in existing statutes. [citations omitted]. The rule that statutes which are general in their terms and affect matters of procedure can be applied retroactively, however, does not include a statute which, though in form providing but a change in remedy, actually brings about changes in substantive rights. [citations omitted].

See also Sherry H. v. Probate Court, 177 Conn. 93, 100-01, 411 A.2d 931 (1979).

The Court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lighty, 3 Conn.App. 697, 491 A.2d 1118 (1985) applied this rule of statutory construction to legislation which created new obligations and imposed new liability. The Court stated:

"A statute will not be given a retroactive construction by which it will impose liabilities not existing prior to its passage. 'Laws which create new obligations ... because of past transactions, have been universally reprobated by civil and common law writers, and it is to be presumed that no statute is intended to have such effect unless the contrary clearly appears.'" [citations omitted].

Id., at 703.

In Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Assoc., Inc., 199 Conn. 683, 508 A.2d 438 (1986), the Court refused to give retroactive application to a legislative increase of prejudgment interest awarded pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. e 37-3a. This case is analogous to the present matter. The Court stated:

The amendment to e 37-3a, raising the statutory interest rate to 8 percent, clearly effectuates a substantial change in the law because debtors then became exposed to greater financial consequences for the "detention of money after it becomes payable." General Statutes e 37-3a. We find nothing in the amendment or its legislative history indicating an intent to authorize the increased interest rate for a period prior to its enactment.

Id., at 691.

In the present matter, we are of the opinion that 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, e 10(c) effects a substantive change in the law and therefore should not be applied retroactively. The amendment increases the maximum limit on awards both for homicide victims and non-homicide victims of crime. In addition it establishes a rule which provides that, in the case of a homicide, the claims of dependants are derivative of the claim of the victim.

This legislation creates additional obligations and liabilities upon the Commission. The 1987 amendments to Conn. Gen. Stat. e 54-204 did not merely effectuate a change in remedy, but brought about a change in substantive rights. American Mason's Supply Co. v. F.W. Brown Co., 174 Conn. 219, 223, 384 A.2d 378 (1978) In addition, a review of the legislative debates fails to disclose a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent that the amendment be given retroactive effect. Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 232-233, 477 A.2d 988 (1984).

Accordingly, it is our opinion that 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 87-554, e 10(c) should not be applied to any personal injury or death occurring prior to October 1, 1987.

Very truly yours,

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Peter E. Wiese

Assistant Attorney General

CNR/PW/br

What does Connecticut law say today, for your facts?

This opinion is from 1990. Ezel checks the current Connecticut statutes and case law, applies them to your situation, and cites what it relies on.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace