Could UConn lease the donated Holcomb family farm to a nonprofit for its own farming program while keeping the land's deed restriction?

Plain-English summary

Laura and Tudor Holcomb gave the University of Connecticut about 335 acres in Granby. Their deed treated the land as two groups. It placed no use restriction on the roughly 147-acre Newton farm. It required the roughly 188-acre family farm to further programs of UConn's College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including wildlife protection, farming improvement, crops, and research involving animals and birds.

A consultant proposed that UConn keep title but lease the land long term to a nonprofit for a farming program, with facilities made available to UConn and other schools for research and education. The Attorney General concluded that this was the tenant's program, not a UConn College program. Merely retaining title and gaining access to facilities fell short of the deed's condition. The opinion left open the possibility of a different use that conformed to the deed.

The opinion also discussed a separate route sometimes available when a charitable-use restriction can no longer be fulfilled: a court's doctrine of approximation. It concluded that the Holcomb deed's clause transferring the family farm to the Town of Granby if UConn no longer had use for the stated purposes controlled, preventing that doctrine from changing this restriction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1990. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

For UConn and the proposed nonprofit tenant: The opinion rejected the consultant's specific long-term lease plan for the family farm because the activities would be the tenant's program. It identified no restriction on UConn's use of the separate Newton farm parcels.

For donors and the Town of Granby: The Attorney General treated the family-farm condition as a restriction on a charitable gift. It read the deed's clause naming the Town as the controlling disposition if UConn stopped using that farm for the stated purposes.

Common questions

Did the Holcomb deed restrict all 335 acres?

No. The opinion divided the gift into the Newton farm and the family farm. It said the deed placed no use restriction on the Newton farm; the College-program condition applied to the family farm.

Could UConn satisfy the family-farm restriction by letting a nonprofit run its own program there?

The Attorney General said the consultant's proposal did not satisfy it. Under that proposal, UConn would retain title and have access to facilities, but the farm program itself would belong to the tenant.

Did the opinion rule out every possible lease or new use?

No. It rejected the described consultant plan and said that a use conforming to the deed could still be formulated. It did not approve a different lease structure.

Could a court remove the family-farm restriction if it became impossible to fulfill?

The opinion said the deed's clause transferring title to Granby if UConn no longer had use for the family farm's stated purposes prevented use of the doctrine of approximation to modify this restriction.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion quoted the deed's requirement that the family farm “is to be used to further programs of the University of Connecticut College of Agriculture and Natural Resources.” It characterized the gift as charitable and public. It quoted Conn. Gen. Stat. section 47-2 for the rule that property granted for public and charitable use remains devoted to the grantor's intended use. It also quoted the statute under which UConn accepted the gift, which required donated property to be used consistently with any conditions on the gift.

The consultant's report contemplated a long-term nonprofit lease for a “low-input integrated acquaculture/vegetable production farm” and access for research and educational programs. The opinion said the report did not specify those programs or their feasibility. Its decisive point was that the proposed farm would be run as the tenant's program. The deed's gift-over language supplied the separate reason the opinion rejected modifying the charitable-use restriction through approximation.

Citations and references

The opinion quotes Conn. Gen. Stat. section 47-2 and discusses the university-gift statute. Its official HTML renders some section symbols as “e” and many digits as “l”; the original-text section preserves that rendering. The opinion also names Connecticut decisions on charitable gifts and the doctrine of approximation, but their reporter numbers in the official HTML are garbled, so no corrected case citations are supplied here.

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Opinion page: https://portal.ct.gov/ag/opinions/1990-formal-opinions/john-t-casteen-iii-president-university-of-connecticut--1990001-formal-opinion-attorney-general-of-c

Original opinion text

John T. Casteen, III, President, University of Connecticut, 1990-001 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

Attorney General's Opinion

Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal

January 3, 1990

John T. Casteen, III

President, University of Connecticut

352 Mansfield Road

Storrs, CT 06268

Dear President Casteen:

You have requested our advice on a question concerning the use of real property in Granby which was received by the University of Connecticut (hereinafter: "the University") in l976 as a gift from Laura and Tudor Holcomb. Specifically, you ask whether use of the property as recommended by a consultant would be consistent with the terms of the deed to the University from the grantors. For the reason set forth below, our advice is that the recommended use is not consistent with the restriction placed by the deed on the use of that portion of the property known as the "family farm."

The property in question is about 335 acres. It consists of seven parcels which the deed groups into two categories: l) the Newton farm and 2) the family farm.

The Newton farm comprises approximately l47 acres. The deed places no restriction whatsoever on the use to which the University may put this portion of the property. Accordingly, your question is inapplicable to the parcels which constitute what the grantors refer to as the Newton farm.

The family farm comprises approximately l88 acres. The deed provides that the family farm "is to be used to further programs of the University of Connecticut College of Agriculture and Natural Resources including protection of wildlife, the improvement of farming operations, arboretum purposes, development of crops, research involving animals and birds, and the like." The gift is for educational purposes and, therefore, is a charitable gift. Lockwood v. Killian, l72 Conn. 496, 500, 375 A.2d 998 (l977). It is also a gift for public purposes as the University is a public institution. Klein v. City of Bridgeport, l25 Conn. l29, l3l, 3 A.2d 675 (l939). As such, the University holds the family farm subject to Conn. Gen. Stat. e 47-2 which provides,

All estates granted for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel, or of schools of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or for the preservation, care and maintenance of any cemetery, cemetery lot or monuments thereon, or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain to the uses to which they were granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no other use whatever.

[underscoring added]

Moreover, the deed recites that the grantee is acting pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. e l0-328a, now codified in substantially similar form as Conn. Gen. Stat. e l0a-l50, which in l976 read as follows:

The boards of trustees of each of the constituent units of the state system of higher education are empowered to accept, on behalf of the state, any gifts of lands, money or other property donated to the institutions under their control. Said boards shall direct the application, distribution or disbursement of such lands, money or other donated property, or the income therefrom, for any purpose connected with said institutions under their respective control, consistent with the conditions, if any, upon which the gift was created, provided the state treasurer shall be advised of the receipt of any such gift of money and where practicable shall hold on behalf of the respective boards of trustees, any such gift of money or income therefrom.

[underscoring added]

Accompanying your request for advice was a copy of the consultant's report. The consultant recommends that the University retain title to the property, that the property be leased on a long-term basis to a non-profit entity, that the tenant should conduct a "low-input integrated acquaculture/vegetable production farm" on the site, that land resources not used by the above programs be subleased for other programs and that the facilities, once developed and operating, should be made available to the University and other educational institutions to carry on research and educational programs. The consultant does not specify what the research and educational programs should be or, indeed, whether such programs are feasible.

This recommendation is not consistent with the deed. The grantors expressly provided that the family farm is to be used for programs of the University's College of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The consultant's recommended use would not be a University program; nor would it be an extension of a University program. Rather, it would be a program of the proposed tenant. Indeed, the only role for the University mentioned in the report is that it would retain title to the property and that the facilities would "be made available to the University." This role is impermissibly short of what the deed requires. Of course, there is nothing prohibiting the formulation of a use which would conform with the deed restriction.

We think it is useful to note here that under the doctrine of approximation, the Superior Court is empowered to remove or modify a charitable use restriction if the restriction is no longer capable of being fulfilled. Second Ecclesiastical Society of Hartford v. Attorney General, l33 Conn. 89, 93-94, 48 A.2d 266 (l946). An exception to this authority is where the grantor provides in the gift instrument for an alternative disposition of the property upon the occurrence of a specified event. Here, the deed provides that "[s]hould the grantee no longer have use of the family farm for its purposes as aforesaid, the title shall thereupon vest in the Town of Granby." This gift-over clause is controlling and precludes application of the doctrine of approximation. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Oak Bluffs First Baptist Church, ll6 Conn. 347, 35l, l64 A.884 (l933); Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cyril and Julia C. Johnson Memorial Hospital, 30 Conn. Supp. l, 8, 294 A.2d 586 (l972).

Shortly after our receipt of your request for advice, we also received a request for advice from Agriculture Commissioner Kenneth B. Andersen regarding the same property. Therefore, a copy of this advice is being sent to Commissioner Andersen in response to his request.

Very truly yours,

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

David E. Ormstedt

Assistant Attorney General

CNR/DEO/spr