How does the Colorado House of Representatives impeach a state official, and what conduct can get an official removed from office?

Plain-English summary

Colorado has not impeached a state officer since 1939. So when the Speaker of the House asked Attorney General Phil Weiser in March 2024 how impeachment is supposed to work, there was almost no recent practice to point to. The opinion answers two questions: what is the procedure, and what conduct can support impeachment.

On procedure, the answer is straightforward: nothing in Article XIII, the House Rules, the Joint Rules, or the Colorado Revised Statutes lays out a specific impeachment process. Historically, the House has started impeachment proceedings by introducing a House resolution. Once introduced, that resolution falls under House Rule 26, which gives the Speaker discretion to either bring it to the floor for action or refer it to a committee.

On the substantive standard, the opinion focuses on "malfeasance in office," which is one of three grounds Article XIII names (alongside high crimes and misdemeanors). Drawing on People v. Schneider, a 1956 Colorado Supreme Court case, the AG sets a two-part test: (1) the officer must have willfully committed a wholly wrongful and unlawful act, and (2) the act must have either (a) breached a specific statutory duty imposed on the officer, or (b) involved the corrupt or improper exercise of the discretion the law gave the officer.

That standard has teeth. It means policy disagreements, ordinary mistakes, or even gross negligence don't get you to malfeasance. The conduct must be willful, must be wrongful and unlawful, and must either break a specific legal rule or involve corrupt motive in the exercise of authority.

What this means for you

If you are a Colorado state legislator

You now have a roadmap. To start an impeachment inquiry, introduce a House resolution. That resolution is treated like any other House resolution: the Speaker can bring it to the floor or refer it to a committee. House Rule 26(c) controls. You don't need a separate impeachment-only procedure; the existing resolution machinery applies.

On grounds, treat malfeasance in office as a two-element test (willful wrongful act + breach of statutory duty or corrupt exercise of discretion). The opinion is explicit that constitutional rights exercised by the officer cannot supply the willful wrongful act unless the exercise itself violated a separate constitutional limitation. So an officer who, say, makes controversial public statements in the course of their duties is not committing malfeasance unless those statements break a specific legal rule.

If you are a state officer or judicial officer

Read this as the operative standard for what conduct in office could get you removed under Article XIII. Three things matter:

1. The act has to be willful, not negligent or merely mistaken.
2. The act has to be wholly wrongful and unlawful, meaning unauthorized conduct, not a contestable interpretation of your authority.
3. Either (a) you broke a positive statutory duty, or (b) you exercised lawful discretion with a corrupt or improper motive (kickbacks, extortion, conflict of interest used to benefit yourself).

The opinion notes the 1935 Colorado articles of impeachment alleged extortion and solicited kickbacks. That is the kind of conduct in mind. Mere ownership of land that creates a perceived conflict of interest is not enough (that was the actual holding of People v. Schneider, where the Colorado Supreme Court quashed an indictment of a county commissioner for malfeasance because the indictment alleged only land ownership, not any willful corrupt act).

If you are a journalist or citizen tracking an impeachment effort

Two practical filters:

1. Procedure: Has a House resolution been introduced? That is the conventional starting point. If it has, the Speaker decides whether to send it straight to the floor or to a committee. Both routes have historical precedent (the 2004 effort went to a committee; the 1939 effort went straight to the full House).

2. Substance: Look for allegations of willful wrongful conduct that either breaks a specific statute or shows corrupt motive. Allegations that an officer is unpopular, made bad decisions, or holds policy positions opponents dislike are not, on this opinion's reading, malfeasance.

The opinion notes that the House has considered six impeachments since 1876, and only impeached three times (1935 and twice in 1939). The Senate has never convicted. So historically, this is rare.

If you advise an officer or legislative body during an impeachment

The Schneider standard is the lodestar. The reporters in the citations matter: People v. Schneider, Groditsky v. Pinckney, City & Cnty. of Denver v. Rinker, and the more recent Colorado Ethics Watch case are all Colorado Supreme Court decisions. The In re Speakership case is also from the Colorado Supreme Court, decided in 1891.

The opinion is careful to say that an officer doesn't need to be criminally convicted of malfeasance before the General Assembly can impeach (footnote 10). The two tracks are independent. Likewise, the dictionary and treatise authorities (Black's Law Dictionary 1910, Mechem's Treatise on Public Officers 1890) are used to confirm that the "wholly wrongful and unlawful" formulation reflects the meaning of "malfeasance" in 1876, when the Colorado Constitution was adopted.

Common questions

Q: How does an impeachment start in Colorado?
A: Historically, a member introduces a House resolution. Under House Rule 26(c), the Speaker then decides whether the resolution lays over one day before being acted upon by the full House, or whether it gets referred to a committee for consideration. Both routes have been used.

Q: What majority is required to impeach?
A: A simple majority of the House to impeach, and two-thirds of the Senate to convict. If convicted, the officer is removed and disqualified from holding "any office of honor, trust or profit in the state" (Article XIII, §§ 1–2).

Q: What are the grounds for impeachment in Colorado?
A: Article XIII, § 2 lists three: high crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office. The opinion focuses on malfeasance in office because all three Colorado House impeachments (1935 and twice in 1939) were based on that ground.

Q: What does "malfeasance in office" mean?
A: Per the opinion, it requires a willful, wholly wrongful and unlawful act, plus either a breach of a specific statutory duty or corrupt/improper exercise of the officer's discretion. It is not bad judgment, unpopular decisions, or ordinary mistakes.

Q: Does an officer have to be convicted of a crime first?
A: No. The opinion expressly says the General Assembly's impeachment power is independent of any criminal proceeding. The same conduct can be the basis for both, but neither requires the other.

Q: When was Colorado's last impeachment?
A: The most recent impeachment resolution considered by the House was in 2004 (postponed indefinitely in committee). The last actual impeachment by the House was in 1939 (two members of the Civil Service Commission, both acquitted by the Senate). The Senate has never convicted.

Q: Who tries the impeachment?
A: The Senate. The House votes whether to impeach; if it does, the matter moves to the Senate for trial. Two-thirds of the Senate must vote to convict.

Q: Can the Governor be impeached?
A: Article XIII, § 1 vests the impeachment power in the General Assembly to remove "state and judicial officers." The Governor is a state officer, so yes in principle. Whether the standard is met in any given case is a separate question.

Background and statutory framework

Article XIII of the Colorado Constitution is original to the 1876 founding document. It vests the General Assembly with the impeachment power, requires impeachment proceedings to start in the House, requires a Senate trial if the House impeaches, and lists the three grounds (high crimes, misdemeanors, malfeasance in office).

Beyond that, Article XIII is sparse. It says nothing about how the House should consider an impeachment resolution, what constitutes adequate notice, who has the right to participate, or how the Senate should structure its trial. The General Assembly's rule-making power under Article V, § 12 (described as "plenary" by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Speakership) fills the procedural gap.

The opinion's substantive analysis of malfeasance leans heavily on People v. Schneider (1956). Schneider arose in a different context: a county commissioner was indicted under a criminal malfeasance statute for holding a private interest in land that conflicted with his duties. The Colorado Supreme Court quashed the indictment because mere ownership of conflicting interests, without a willful wrongful act, was not enough.

The AG translates that criminal-law holding into the impeachment context for two reasons. First, the language of the criminal malfeasance statute interpreted in Schneider is nearly identical to the malfeasance statute on the books in 1876 when Article XIII was adopted, and the framers are presumed to have known existing law. Second, dictionary definitions from the era (1832 American Dictionary, 1890 American & English Encyclopedia of Law, 1910 Black's Law Dictionary) all describe malfeasance as the willful doing of a wholly wrongful and unlawful act.

The opinion also points to current Colorado statutes (§ 22-44-116 on school district employees, § 35-23-110 on inspectors) that use "malfeasance" in ways consistent with Schneider. The Schneider standard is, in effect, the legal definition of malfeasance in Colorado law across criminal, statutory, and now constitutional contexts.

The two-part test is significant for what it excludes. Negligent acts, mistaken acts, and acts within the officer's lawful discretion (even controversial ones) are not malfeasance unless paired with corrupt motive or a breach of specific statutory duty. The opinion frames this as a feature, not a bug: it prevents impeachment from becoming a tool for unseating officers based on policy disagreement, which is what Article XIII was designed to avoid (per Groditsky v. Pinckney, the article was meant to permit removal "for cause" instead of "for purely political reasons").

Citations and references

Constitutional and statutory authority:
- Colo. Const. art. XIII, §§ 1–2 (impeachment power and grounds)
- Colo. Const. art. V, § 12 (House rule-making power)
- § 24-31-101(1)(a) & (d), C.R.S. (AG formal opinion authority)
- § 2-2-404(1), C.R.S. (legislative rules authority)
- § 2-2-404(7), C.R.S. (rules have force and effect of law)
- § 22-44-116, C.R.S. (school district malfeasance)
- § 35-23-110, C.R.S. (malfeasance of inspectors)

Colorado Supreme Court cases:
- In re Speakership of the House of Representatives, 25 P. 707 (Colo. 1891) (House rule-making power is plenary)
- In re Interrogatory on H.R.J. Res. 20-1006, 2020 CO 23 (legislative rules have force of law)
- Groditsky v. Pinckney, 661 P.2d 279 (Colo. 1983) (Article XIII removal "for cause" not political)
- People v. Schneider, 292 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1956) (defines malfeasance in office)
- City & Cnty. of Denver v. Rinker, 366 P.2d 548 (Colo. 1961) (legislatures presumed to know existing law)
- Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12 (electorate presumed to know existing law)
- Common Sense All. v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748 (Colo. 2000)
- Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146 (Colo. 2005) (dictionary definitions for undefined terms)
- Havens v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 517 (Colo. 1996) (give effect to every word)
- Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32

House and historical materials:
- House Rule 26 (resolution procedure)
- House Rule 46 (Speaker's authority on novel procedural questions)
- 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 101 (S.B. 177)
- 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 330 (H.B. 226)

Source

• Landing page: https://coag.gov/attorney-general-opinions/
• Original PDF: https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2024/03/AG-Formal-Opinion-No-24-01.pdf

Original opinion text

PHIL WEISER
Attorney General

RALPH L. CARR
COLORADO JUDICIAL CENTER
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Phone (720) 508-6000

NATALIE HANLON LEH
Chief Deputy Attorney General
SHANNON STEVENSON
Solicitor General
TANJA WHEELER
Associate Chief Deputy Attorney
General

STATE OF COLORADO

Office of the Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

FORMAL
OPINION
of
PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

No. 24-001
3/19/2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General of the State of Colorado, as chief legal representative for the State, issues this Formal Opinion sua sponte pursuant to his authority under § 24-31-101(1)(a) & (d), C.R.S. (2023), following a request from the Speaker of the Colorado House of Representatives.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND SHORT ANSWERS

Question Presented.
(1) When an impeachment comes before the House of Representatives pursuant to Article XIII of the Colorado Constitution: what legal frameworks, statutes, or case law govern the impeachment process by the House of Representatives; and what grounds exist under the law for a state or judicial officer to be impeached, tried, and removed from office?

Short Answer.
(1) No Colorado law or rule provides express procedural requirements for consideration of an impeachment proceeding by the House of Representatives. To date, however, impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives have begun with a House resolution. As with all House resolutions, a resolution calling for impeachment of a state officer is subject to Rule 26 of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

The Colorado Constitution provides that a state or judicial officer may be impeached, tried, and removed from office for having committed "high crimes or misdemeanors or malfeasance in office." Malfeasance in office occurs when: (1) an officer willfully engages in a wholly wrongful and unlawful act; and (2) such act either (a) breaches a specific statutory requirement imposed on the officer, or (b) involves the corrupt or improper exercise of the discretion vested in the officer.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

An original provision of the Constitution of the State of Colorado—article XIII—vests the General Assembly with authority to impeach, try, and remove state and judicial officers for "high crimes or misdemeanors or malfeasance in office." COLO. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1–2. Impeachment proceedings must begin in the House of Representatives. Id., § 1. If a majority of the House members vote to impeach a state officer, the matter moves to the Senate for a trial. Id. If two-thirds of the Senate vote to convict the state officer, then the officer is removed from office and disqualified from holding "any office of honor, trust or profit in the state." Id., §§ 1–2.

The General Assembly has rarely exercised the impeachment power. Since 1876, the House has considered impeachments of six state officers, three of which resulted in impeachment. The most recent impeachment resolution considered by the House was in 2004. See H.R. Res. 04-1007, 64th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004). The last time the House impeached a state officer was in 1939. See H.R. Res. 4 & 5, 32d Gen. Assemb., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 1939) (impeaching two members of the Civil Service Commission). The Senate has never convicted a state officer impeached by the House.

Neither article XIII, the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Joint Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, nor the Colorado Revised Statutes prescribe specific processes for impeachment. Furthermore, article XIII of the Colorado Constitution provides limited guidance on impeachable offenses—restricting impeachment solely to "high crimes or misdemeanors or malfeasance in office." COLO. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. This opinion discusses the laws governing the House's impeachment process, as well as when conduct by a state officer constitutes an impeachable offense.

ANALYSIS

This opinion analyzes both procedural and substantive aspects of impeachment. Each is addressed in turn below.

I. The Speaker has discretion to bring a resolution seeking the impeachment of a state officer before the full House or to refer the resolution to a committee of reference.

Article XIII grants the House the "sole power of impeachment" and requires that a majority of the House vote in favor of impeachment for the matter to proceed to a trial in the Senate. COLO. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. Aside from the reference to a majority vote to approve an impeachment, article XIII is silent on both how the House should begin an impeachment proceeding and the process the House must follow when considering whether to impeach a state officer.

Article V, section 12 gives the House the "power to determine the rules of its proceedings." That power is plenary, subject only to other constitutional limitations. In re Speakership of the House of Representatives, 25 P. 707, 710 (Colo. 1891).

Exercising this power, the House has adopted legislative rules to govern its affairs. § 2-2-404(1), C.R.S.; COLO. LEGIS. RULES, RULES OF THE H.R. (Nov. 2023) ("House Rules"). These rules—the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Colorado General Assembly ("House Rules")—have "the force and effect of law." § 2-2-404(7); In re Interrogatory on H.R.J. Res. 20-1006, 2020 CO 23, ¶ 35. The House Rules—much like article XIII itself—do not specifically address the process by which the House initiates and conducts an impeachment inquiry. See generally House Rules. Indeed, the House Rules contain no express reference to impeachment.

Historically, the House has commenced an impeachment inquiry by introduction of a House resolution. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1, 30th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 1935). The House Rules dictate procedures for consideration of resolutions in Rule 26. Rule 26(c) states:

(c) House resolutions . . . upon introduction shall be read by title only and ordered printed. At the discretion of the Speaker they shall then either:
(1) Lay over one day before being acted upon; or
(2) Be referred to a committee of reference, where they shall be considered as House bills are considered.

House Rule 26(c). As such, pursuant to Rule 26(c), the Speaker—at their discretion—may have the resolution acted upon by the full House or referred to a committee of reference. Both approaches have been used for past pending impeachment resolutions. H.R. Journal, 64th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 951 (Colo. 2004) (referring H.R. 04-1007 to a committee of reference); H.R. Journal, 32d Gen. Assemb., 1st Extraordinary Sess. 11–13 (Colo. 1939) (considering H.R. Res. No. 1—which would have initiated an impeachment inquiry—before the entire House).

In short, article XIII does not specify how the House must initiate and conduct an impeachment inquiry. Article V, section 12 empowers the House to enact its own procedural rules. Assuming the impeachment process was initiated through a House resolution (as has been the House's past practice), Rule 26(c) governs the House's consideration of the resolution and directs the Speaker to either bring the resolution to the House floor or refer the resolution to a committee of reference.

II. The Colorado Constitution authorizes the impeachment of state officers for malfeasance in office.

Article XIII, section 2 sets forth three grounds for impeachment, including "malfeasance in office." COLO. CONST., art. XIII, § 2. Article XIII does not further define that term. Colorado case law specifically addressing article XIII is also limited, suggesting only that article XIII was intended to permit removal of certain officers "for cause" instead of for purely political reasons. See Groditsky v. Pinckney, 661 P.2d 279, 282–83 (Colo. 1983). Other authorities and interpretive principles, however, shed light on what it means for a state officer to have engaged in malfeasance in office meriting impeachment and removal from office.

A. The Colorado Supreme Court held that malfeasance in office requires a wholly wrongful and unlawful act done willfully that involves the violation of a statutory duty or the improper or corrupt exercise of discretionary authority.

In People v. Schneider, 292 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1956), a grand jury indicted a county commissioner for malfeasance in office based on the allegation that he held a private interest in land that was in conflict with his duties as a county commissioner. Id. at 985. The district court quashed the indictment, and the People appealed. Id. at 983–84.

In considering the malfeasance count, the Colorado Supreme Court explained:

Malfeasance consists of the doing of an act which is wholly wrongful and unlawful; it involves an act which the officer has no authority to do. Malfeasance in office cannot be charged except for breach of a positive statutory duty or for the performance of a discretionary act with an improper or corrupt motive.

Id. at 985 (emphasis added). As the Court's later statements indicate, the act supporting malfeasance in office must be willful. Id. Because the indictment in Schneider alleged mere ownership of the land and no intentional or willful corrupt act in office, the Court found it insufficient to support the charge of malfeasance in office, and thus affirmed the district court's decision to quash. Id. In short, under Schneider, malfeasance in office requires (1) a willful act that is wholly wrongful and unlawful, and (2) that involves either (a) a breach of a positive statutory duty, or (b) the performance of a discretionary act with an improper or corrupt motive.

While Schneider did not involve an article XIII impeachment, the Court's holding is instructive. First, the language in Schneider speaks broadly to the concept of malfeasance in office without limiting its analysis to the criminal context. Notably, the court was generally opining on what constituted malfeasance in office.

Second, the statute interpreted in Schneider—the criminal act of malfeasance in office—is nearly identical to the malfeasance in office statute that existed at the time of the adoption of the Colorado Constitution in 1876 and the one that was passed during the first territorial Legislative Assembly. Compare An Act Concerning Criminal Jurisprudence § 100, Acts 1st Sess. 311 (1861) ("Omission of duty") and Criminal Code § 115, Colo. Gen. Laws (1877) ("Malfeasance or corruption in office") and § 40-7-47, C.R.S. (1953) ("Malfeasance in office—removal"). The framers of the Colorado Constitution are presumed to have been aware of the offense, and their decision to use the same term of "malfeasance in office" in the constitution suggests an intent that the two should be interpreted similarly. City & Cnty. of Denver v. Rinker, 366 P.2d 548, 550 (Colo. 1961) (stating "there is a presumption that all laws are passed with knowledge of those already existing"); see also Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12, ¶ 20 (holding "The electorate, as well as the legislature, must be presumed to know the existing law at the time it amends or clarifies the law." (quoting Common Sense All. v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 754 (Colo. 2000)).

B. The commonly understood meaning of the term "malfeasance" at the time of the Colorado Constitution's adoption supports applying the Schneider interpretation of malfeasance in office to article XIII.

In addition to consulting precedent, dictionary definitions are instructive in determining the meaning of undefined constitutional terms. See Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146, 152 (Colo. 2005). Here, dictionary definitions from the era when the Colorado Constitution was adopted support applying Schneider's interpretation of malfeasance in office to article XIII.

In 1890, for example, one source defined malfeasance as "[t]he unjust performance of some act which the party had no right, or which he had contracted not to do," and "the doing of an act wholly wrongful and unlawful." Malfeasance, 14 JOHN HOUSTON MERRILL, AM. & ENGLISH ENCYCL. OF LAW 5 & n.2 (1890). Similarly, a 1910 dictionary defined malfeasance as "the wrongful or unjust doing of some act which the doer has no right to perform, or which he has stipulated by contract not to do." Malfeasance, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910); see also Malfeasance, AM. DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1832) (defining the term as "evil doing; wrong; illegal deed").

These definitions bear remarkable resemblance to the Court's initial definition of "malfeasance" in Schneider. As the Court held:

Malfeasance consists of the doing of an act which is wholly wrongful and unlawful; it involves an act which the officer has no authority to do.

Schneider, 292 P.2d at 985 (emphasis added). These general definitions of "malfeasance," however, fail to give full effect to the constitutional language because they do not address "malfeasance in office." COLO. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (emphasis added); Havens v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 517, 523 (Colo. 1996) ("Wherever possible, we must give effect to every word of the provision.").

Schneider addresses that issue by clarifying that malfeasance in office is even more specific, requiring that the action not only be wholly wrongful and unlawful, but also involve a violation of specific legal obligation or the corrupt or improper use of the discretion the law vests in the officer. Schneider, 292 P.2d at 985 ("Malfeasance in office cannot be charged except for breach of a positive statutory duty or for the performance of a discretionary act with an improper or corrupt motive."); see also FLOYD R. MECHEM, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS § 457 (1890) (noting that if removal is for malfeasance in office, the misconduct "must be such as affects [the officer's] performance of his duties as an officer and not only . . . his character as a private individual"). Thus, Schneider's interpretation of "malfeasance in office" comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of that term at the time the Colorado Constitution was adopted, further supporting its application in an impeachment inquiry under article XIII.

C. Current statutory references to malfeasance focus on violations of statutory duties and corrupt activity, consistent with the Court's "malfeasance" definition in Schneider.

Schneider's interpretation of "malfeasance in office" is also consistent with several current references to malfeasance in office in the Colorado Revised Statutes. For example, section 22-44-116, C.R.S., provides that school district employees are guilty of "malfeasance in office or position of employment" if they "knowingly and willfully violate[ ] any provision of this part 1 or fail[ ] to perform any duty required by this part 1." Another statute specifically includes the concept of engaging in corrupt activity. § 35-23-110, C.R.S. (titled "malfeasance of inspectors" and stating that "accept[ing] money or other consideration directly or indirectly for an incorrect or improper performance of the inspector's duty" is a petty offense). These statutes demonstrate that Schneider's understanding of malfeasance in office continues to exist in statutory law today.

D. In an impeachment inquiry, malfeasance in office requires a wholly wrongful and unlawful act done willfully that either violates the state officer's legal obligations or involves the corrupt or improper exercise of the discretion vested in the officer.

Applying these legal authorities, a state officer may be impeached, tried, and removed from office under article XIII of the Colorado Constitution if: (1) the officer has willfully engaged in a wholly wrongful and unlawful act; and (2) that act has either (a) breached a specific statutory requirement imposed on the officer, or (b) involved the corrupt or improper exercise of the discretion vested in the officer. Consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's description, this standard gives effect to both the general understanding of malfeasance, as well as what it means to engage in malfeasance in office specifically.

CONCLUSION

A House resolution seeking the impeachment of a state officer is subject to the same processes applicable to other House resolutions. Under House Rule 26(c), the resolution must either be acted upon or referred to a committee of reference by the Speaker.

For a state officer to be impeached, tried, and convicted in an impeachment inquiry, conduct amounting to a high crime or misdemeanor or malfeasance in office must have occurred. To impeach, try, and convict a state officer of malfeasance in office, the House and Senate must determine (1) the officer has willfully engaged in a wholly wrongful and unlawful act; and (2) such act either (a) breached a specific statutory requirement imposed on the officer, or (b) involved the corrupt or improper exercise of the discretion vested in the officer.

Issued this 19th day of March, 2024.

/s/ Philip J. Weiser
PHILIP J. WEISER
Colorado Attorney General