Could Colorado redistribute unused county child-welfare funds when an overspending county's caseload did not exceed estimates?

Plain-English summary

In 2008, the Colorado Attorney General concluded that unused capped child-welfare funds could be reallocated to a county that had spent more than its allocation if either of two conditions was met. The excess spending could be for functions "other than administrative and support functions," or it could be attributable to caseload increases beyond the estimate used to set the allocation.

The opinion rejected a reading that would require both conditions at once. It reasoned that the statute's structure gave independent meaning to nonadministrative spending and unexpected caseload growth.

That interpretation also accounted for child-welfare costs that could rise without a larger caseload. The opinion noted that a difficult case or lengthy out-of-home placement could consume a substantial share of a small county's allocation even when the number of cases stayed within the estimate.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical significance for affected readers

County child-welfare departments

At the time, a county did not have to show an unexpected caseload increase when its excess spending was for child-welfare functions other than administration and support.

State budget and human-services officials

The opinion read section 26-5-104(7) to allow year-end redistribution when either statutory category applied. It also said the administering department's interpretation was entitled to significant deference if the language was ambiguous.

County commissioners

The capped allocation functioned as a block grant for child-welfare purposes, but a county ordinarily was not entitled to reimbursement above the cap. The year-end redistribution provision supplied the limited exceptions discussed in the opinion.

Common questions

Did a county always need an unexpected caseload increase to receive unused funds?

No. The opinion said nonadministrative and nonsupport expenditures could qualify independently.

Could administrative overspending qualify without a caseload increase?

Under the opinion's reading, no. Administrative and support costs needed the separate basis of an increase beyond the estimated caseload.

Why did the AG read the statute as using an either-or test?

The opinion sought to give meaning to every phrase. Requiring both conditions would have made the separate treatment of nonadministrative spending less effective.

What kinds of costs could rise without more cases?

The opinion gave examples such as unusually intensive services and expensive or lengthy out-of-home placements.

Background and statutory framework

Colorado funded county-administered child-welfare services through federal, state, and county money. The state distributed annual capped allocations based partly on estimated county caseloads. At fiscal year-end, some counties had unused funds while others had exceeded their caps.

The question concerned section 26-5-104(7), which allowed redistribution subject to limits involving administrative and support costs and unexpected caseload growth. The AG applied the rule that every statutory word and phrase should receive meaning.

Citations discussed

• § 26-5-104(3) and (4), C.R.S. (2007), cited for allocating the annual appropriation among counties
• § 26-5-104(7)(a) and (b), C.R.S. (2007), the year-end redistribution provision interpreted in the opinion
• State Department of Social Services v. Board of County Commissioners, 697 P. 2d l(Colo. 1985), cited on child-welfare financing
• Blue River Defense Committee v. Town of Silverthome. 33 Colo. App. 10, 14, 516 P.2d 452, 454 (1973), quoted on giving effect to every part of a statute
• Bishop v. Department of Institutions, 831 P.2d 506 (Colo. App. 1992), cited on deference to the administering agency

Source

• Landing page: https://coag.gov/attorney-general-opinions/
• Original PDF: https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2019/08/No.-08-2-Whether-Unexpended-Capped-Funds-for-Child-Welfare-Services-may-be-Allocated-to-Counties-that-have-Exceeded-their-Capped-Allocation-for-Child-Welfare-Services.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF COLORADO

J o h n W . Su th er s

Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

C y n t h ia H . C o ffm a n

Chief Deputy Attorney General

O ffic e o f t h e A t t o r n e y G en e r a l

S t a t e S e r v ic es B u il d in g

1525 Sherman Street - 7th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Phone (303) 866-4500

D a n ie l D . D o m e n ic o

Solicitor General

FORMAL
OPINION

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OF

No. 08-02
AG Alpha: HSCWAGBCN

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JOHN W. SUTHERS
Attorney General

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February 21,2008

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Karen L. Beye, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services, requested an opinion from this office concerning the question of whether, under § 26-5-104(7), C.R.S. (2007), unexpended capped funds for child welfare services may be allocated to counties that have exceeded their capped allocation for child welfare services even if the counties have not experienced caseload increases beyond the caseload estimate used to determine their capped allocation.

QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
Question:
Under § 26-5-104(7), C.R.S. (2007), may unexpended capped funds for child welfare services be allocated to counties who have exceeded their capped allocation for child welfare services even if the counties have not experienced caseload increases beyond the caseload estimate used to determine their capped allocation? Answer: Unexpended capped funds for child welfare services may be allocated to counties that exceed their capped allocation if either: (1) the expenditures were for other than administrative and support functions, or (2) the expenditures were attributable to caseload increases beyond the caseload estimates used to establish the capped allocation for child welfare services.

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DISCUSSION

1.

Child Welfare Services

The State Department of Human Services (“State Department”) has the duty to adopt rules establishing a program of child welfare services. § 26-5-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (2007). These services include the investigation of allegations of child abuse and neglect, placing children out of their homes (including foster care), services to families to prevent placing children out of home or allowing children to return to their homes, and adoptions. § 26-5-101(3), C.R.S. (2007). This program of child welfare services is supervised by the State Department and is administered by the county departments of social services (“county departments”). The rules governing this program can be found at 12 CCR 2509-1 to 2509-8, § § 7.000 to 7.719.71. 2.

Financing Child Welfare Services

Like most social services, child welfare services are financed by federal, state and county funds. See generally State Department of Social Services v. Board of County Commissioners, 697 P. 2d l(Colo. 1985). If a county department administers its child welfare program in accordance with the rules of the State Department, it is generally entitled to be reimbursed for 80% of the program and administrative costs associated with the program. § 26l-122(3)(b) and (4)(b) and § 26-5-104(1), C.R.S. (2007). 3.

Capped Allocations for Child Welfare Services

State and federal funds to reimburse county departments for the costs associated with the child welfare services program are not limitless. Each year, the General Assembly appropriates a specific amount of funds for the child welfare services program. The statutes require the State Department, with the assistance of a Child Welfare Allocations Committee, to allocate this annual appropriation among all of the county departments. § 26-5-104(3) and (4), C.R.S. (2007). Among many other factors, these allocations are based on an estimated caseload of child welfare cases in each county. The statute refers to these allocations as “capped” allocations because, except as explained below, a county department is not entitled to reimbursement beyond the amount of the allocation. The statute permits the State Department to make more than one annual capped allocation to the counties for specific child welfare services. § 26-5-104(3)(a), C.R.S. (2007). In practice, the State Department of Human Services makes a single capped allocation to each county department each year, and the capped allocation is treated as a block grant, which allows the county department to use the funds in the capped allocation for any child welfare purpose. This includes administrative and support costs, which include: developing the program, maintaining substantiated complaint files, developing agreements, monitoring program activities for compliance with program requirements, preparing reports, providing local

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officials and citizens with information about the program, including the conduct of public hearings, coordination activities, coordination of the resolution of monitoring and auditing findings' evaluation of program results, management of personnel involved in these activities, travel, rent, equipment, and supplies related to child welfare services, administrative and legal services, and other administration functions generally associated with line staff work and first line supervision. See State Department Agency Letter ABA98-13-1 (September 1, 1998). 4.

Close Out Process for County Allocations

At the end of each fiscal year, some county departments will have spent less than their capped allocation, while other county departments will have spent more than their capped allocation. Subject to the limitations discussed below, the State Department can allocate unspent capped funds to county departments whose have spent more for child welfare services than their capped allocation. The relevant statute provides in pertinent part: (a)
... subject to the limitations set forth in this subsection (7), the state department may, at the end of a state fiscal year ... allocate any unexpended capped funds for the delivery of specific child welfare services to any one or more counties whose spending has exceeded a capped allocation for such specific child welfare services, (b) A county may only receive funds pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (7) if the requirements of section 26-5-103.5(4) have been satisfied, for expenditures other than those attributable to administrative and support functions as referred to in section 26-5-101(3)(m), as defined in accordance with the provisions of 26-5-103.5(4), and for authorized expenditures attributable to caseload increases beyond the caseload estimate established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section for a specific caseload allocation.
§ 26-5-104(7)(a) and (b), C.R.S. (2007) (emphasis supplied). The italicized portions of the statute show that child welfare costs are distinguished in two ways: (1) costs of administrative and support function and costs of all other functions, and (2) cost increases attributable to unanticipated caseload increases and cost attributable to other causes. In general, we must assume that every word in a statute is intended to have meaning and that no words are superfluous and can be disregarded. As the courts have said, “It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that, ‘in ascertaining the intent of a legislative body, and the meaning of its enactments, (courts are required) to give effect to 3

every word, phrase, clause, sentence, and section, if it can be done, and we are not to presume that the legislative body used the language idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language.’” Blue River Defense Committee v. Town of Silverthome. 33 Colo. App. 10, 14, 516 P.2d 452, 454 (1973) (citation omitted). See also Smith v. Town of Estes Park. 944 P. 2d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 1996). Applying this rule, we must give meaning to both factors contained in the statute. That is, whether the costs are for administrative and support costs or not, and also whether the costs were caused by unanticipated caseload increases. Logically, this can be done in one of two ways. First, we might conclude that an over expenditure must be both for a function other than administration and support and caused by an unanticipated caseload increase before it can be reimbursed from unexpended capped allocation funds. Alternatively, we might conclude that an expenditure is eligible for reimbursement if it is either for a function other than administration and support or if it is caused by an unanticipated caseload increase. The structure and language of the statute supports the view that over expenditures are eligible for reimbursement if either factor is present. Removing the language that is not relevant to this analysis, the statute says, “A county may only receive funds ... for expenditures other than those for administrative and support functions ... and for authorized expenditures attributable to caseload increases beyond the caseload estimate....” This appears to be the best reading of the statute because it gives meaning to all of the words and phrases in the statute and to the language and structure of the statute. To the extent that the language of the statute is ambiguous, the interpretation given to the statute by the State Department is entitled to significant deference. Bishop v. Department of Institutions, 831 P.2d 506 (Colo. App. 1992). This interpretation also leads to a just and reasonable result. Expenditures for functions other than administration and support can fluctuate for many reasons other than caseload increases. Some difficult cases require more intensive and costly services or more expensive and lengthy out-of-home placement than others. In some small counties, a single expensive long-term out-of-home placement could exhaust a significant part of the county’s allocation without any increase in caseload. Administrative and support costs, on the other hand, do not fluctuate nearly as much between cases, and we should not expect administrative and support costs to change significantly in the absence of an increase in caseload.

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CONCLUSION

Therefore, I conclude that unexpended capped funds for child welfare services may be allocated to counties that exceed their capped allocation if either: (1) the expenditures were for other than administrative and support functions, or (2) the expenditures were attributable to caseload increases beyond the caseload estimates used to establish the capped allocation for child welfare services. Issued this 21st day of February, 2008.

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