Can a California county pass its own ordinance against copper wire theft, or does state law preempt it?

Plain-English summary

The Fresno County District Attorney asked the Attorney General whether Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008, which makes it a violation to possess, transport, or strip the protective sheathing from scrap commercial-grade copper or aluminum wire (with exceptions for licensed dealers, contractors, and agricultural or manufacturing businesses), is preempted by state criminal and scrap-dealer laws.

The opinion concluded that it is not preempted. Comparing the ordinance to the two most relevant state statutes, receiving stolen property (Penal Code section 496) and vandalism (Penal Code section 594), the opinion found the ordinance neither duplicates those statutes (because it targets a narrower category of property and conduct, with different proof requirements and penalties) nor contradicts them (it doesn't command what the statutes forbid or forbid what they command). On field preemption, the opinion found the Legislature never expressly said it meant to occupy the field of copper wire theft, and the existing patchwork of state theft, vandalism, and scrap-dealer statutes was enacted piecemeal over decades without the kind of comprehensive, interlocking regulatory scheme that courts have found to impliedly preempt local law in areas like firearms, sex offender registration, or vehicle forfeiture.

What this means for you

County governments and boards of supervisors

The opinion gives counties a validated legal framework for adopting supplemental local ordinances targeting persistent local crime problems, like copper wire theft, that existing general state criminal statutes have proven inadequate to address, so long as the local law is narrower than the state statute, doesn't contradict it, and doesn't intrude into a field the Legislature has comprehensively occupied.

Law enforcement and county code enforcement officers

The opinion confirms that Fresno's ordinance can be enforced criminally, civilly, and through administrative citations alongside (not instead of) existing state theft, receiving-stolen-property, and vandalism statutes, giving officers an additional regulatory tool, including a public-welfare-style possession offense that doesn't require proving the suspect knew the copper was stolen, for cases where state law's proof requirements have made it difficult to act.

Scrap metal dealers, contractors, and agricultural or utility businesses

The opinion notes that Fresno's ordinance expressly exempts junk dealers and recyclers, licensed contractors and subcontractors, commercial agricultural and manufacturing businesses, and licensed hauling and transport businesses (and their employees), so these categories of legitimate handlers of copper and aluminum scrap are not subject to the ordinance's possession, transport, or stripping restrictions.

Other California counties considering similar ordinances

The opinion's preemption analysis, duplication, contradiction, and the three paths to implied field preemption, provides a template other counties can use when evaluating whether their own local ordinances addressing a specific, persistent local problem might conflict with existing general state criminal law.

Common questions

Q: Does this mean any county can pass a copper wire ordinance without worrying about state law?
A: Not automatically. The opinion's conclusion rests on the specific structure of Fresno's ordinance, its narrow scope, its exceptions for legitimate businesses, and the absence of any comprehensive state scheme covering exactly this conduct. A broader or differently structured local ordinance could still run into duplication, contradiction, or field-preemption problems.

Q: Can someone be charged under both the state theft statute and the county ordinance for the same conduct?
A: The opinion doesn't resolve that directly, but it emphasizes that the ordinance and Penal Code section 496 punish different things, mere possession of specified scrap items without proof of guilty knowledge under the ordinance, versus knowing receipt of stolen property under the statute, so they aren't simply duplicative parallel charges for the identical act.

Q: Why didn't the collection of state copper-theft-related statutes count as full field occupation?
A: The opinion explains that a preempted field cannot just be statutes that share a common subject; there has to be evidence the Legislature intended those statutes to function together as one coordinated scheme. Because California's copper-theft-related statutes were enacted separately over many decades without such coordination, the opinion found no comprehensive scheme to occupy the field.

Q: Does the ordinance affect junk dealers or recyclers?
A: No. The ordinance expressly excludes junk dealers and recyclers from all three of its core prohibitions (possession of scrap copper, possession of stripped copper, and stripping copper), leaving existing state scrap-dealer recordkeeping and reporting laws to govern those businesses.

Background and statutory framework

Fresno County adopted Ordinance No. 25-008 after finding that copper wire theft, particularly the theft and stripping of transmission and telecommunications lines serving the county's agricultural infrastructure, was a persistent local problem that existing state law tools weren't effectively addressing. The county's findings noted that metal theft in Fresno was carried out overwhelmingly by individuals with no legitimate business affiliation, and that stripped wire becomes difficult for law enforcement to trace to its owner, making prosecution under the general receiving-stolen-property statute difficult in practice.

The opinion applied California's standard local preemption framework under article XI, section 7 of the state constitution: a conflict exists if a local ordinance duplicates, contradicts, or enters a field fully occupied by state law (either expressly or impliedly, in one of three recognized ways). Working through Penal Code section 496 (receiving stolen property) and section 594 (vandalism) in turn, the opinion found no duplication because Fresno's ordinance is narrower and imposes different proof burdens and remedies; no contradiction because the ordinance doesn't conflict with what either statute commands or forbids; and no field preemption because neither statute, nor the broader collection of copper-theft-related statutes, reflects the kind of comprehensive, interlocking legislative scheme found in areas like firearms regulation, sex offender registration, or vehicle forfeiture. The opinion also noted that Penal Code section 594.5 expressly preserves local authority to regulate graffiti-adjacent conduct, reinforcing that the Legislature did not intend exclusive state control over property-damage-adjacent local ordinances.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7, county and city authority to enact local ordinances not in conflict with general state laws
- Fresno County Code, ch. 6.27, §§ 6.27.010-6.27.130, the copper wire ordinance at issue
- Pen. Code, § 496, receiving stolen property
- Pen. Code, § 594, vandalism, and § 594.5, preserving local graffiti-related ordinances
- Pen. Code, §§ 487, 487j, 591, grand theft, grand theft of copper, and cutting utility lines
- Bus. & Prof. Code, § 21600 et seq. and § 21609, scrap and junk dealer recordkeeping and reporting requirements
- Gov. Code, § 53069.4, local agency administrative citation and hearing process

Cases:
- O'Connell v. City of Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061, framework for state preemption of local ordinances (duplication, contradiction, field occupation)
- Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, examples of duplication and contradiction
- Tosi v. County of Fresno (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 799, prior Fresno preemption case on scrap-dealer recordkeeping burdens
- Kirk v. City of Morgan Hill (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 976, an ordinance covering some of the same ground as state law is not automatically duplicative
- Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, duplication requires criminalizing precisely the same acts as the state statute
- Harrahill v. City of Monrovia (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 761, a local ordinance discouraging conduct already addressed by a state scheme is not automatically preempted
- People v. Nguyen (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1168, example of a comprehensive state scheme (sex offender regulation) that did impliedly preempt a local ordinance
- Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, courts are reluctant to infer preemptive intent where local interests vary by locality
- In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, the "transient citizens" factor in implied field preemption analysis

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
• Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/25-902.pdf

Original opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General

OPINION
of
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
SUSAN DUNCAN LEE
Deputy Attorney General

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No. 25-902
May 28, 2026

The HONORABLE LISA A. SMITTCAMP, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
FRESNO COUNTY, has requested an opinion on whether state law preempts a Fresno
County Ordinance addressing copper wire theft.
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
Is Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008, which regulates the possession or
transportation of commercial copper wire, preempted by state law?
No, Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008, regulating the possession or
transportation of commercial copper wire, is not preempted by state law.
BACKGROUND
Fresno County has adopted Ordinance No. 25-008, regulating certain activities in
connection with the possession of scrap, commercial-grade copper wire by individuals
without a licensed business. 1 The ordinance declares the prohibited activities to be a
Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008, which is codified at Fresno County Code, ch.
6.27, § 6.27.010 et seq., is set out in full at the foot of this opinion.

1

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public nuisance and authorizes county officials to enforce the ordinance through criminal,
civil, and administrative actions. 2
California law criminalizes receipt of stolen property generally, as well as theft of
copper components specifically. California law also closely regulates secondhand sales
of scrap metals, specifically including copper components, imposing both administrative
and criminal penalties depending on the nature of the violation.
Thus, Ordinance No. 25-008 operates within legal areas where state laws are in
effect. This circumstance gives rise to the possibility that state law might preempt
Ordinance No. 25-008. Recognizing this possibility, the Fresno County District
Attorney's Office has requested our opinion as to whether its ordinance is preempted.
ANALYSIS
We will begin our analysis by describing Fresno's copper wire ordinance. Next,
we will lay out the general principles under which state law may preempt local law, and
then identify the relevant state statutes that might preempt Fresno's ordinance. Finally,
we will compare the potentially preemptive aspects of the relevant state statutes to the
ordinance. We end by concluding that state law does not preempt Fresno's ordinance.
1. Fresno County Copper Wire Ordinance
Last year, the Fresno County Board of Supervisors enacted Ordinance No. 25-008,
pertaining to the illegal possession and transportation of scrap commercial-grade copper
wire. 3
Findings and declarations in the ordinance describe the particular conditions in
Fresno County that have made copper wire theft such a problem there. 4 Fresno County is
a preeminent locus of commercial agriculture, providing food and other agricultural
resources throughout California and across the nation. Its modern operations are
characterized by wide-open spaces made productive by large-scale waterworks and
machinery. Energy and telecommunication networks are essential to the industry,
requiring transmission lines, often made of copper or aluminum, to operate. These metals
2

Fresno County Code, §§ 6.27.060, 6.27.090.

Section 6.27.020(A) defines "commercial grade" as "copper or aluminum wire or cable
with a total diameter of .15 inches or greater, exclusive of any sheathing or coating, or
telecommunications cable with fifty or more pairs of conductors in a single cable."
Section 6.27.020(C) defines "scrap" as "material derived from manufactured
components, such as transmission or telecommunications lines, which is no longer useful
for its intended purpose and is primarily valuable for recycling."

3

4

See Fresno County Code, § 6.27.010 (title, purpose, and intent).
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are valuable for resale, and therefore frequently vandalized, stolen, and sold as scrap. A
recycler may pay only several dollars per pound of copper wire, but the economic impact
can be much higher. In the process of stealing the wire, thieves often damage the
equipment that houses it, leaving victims stuck with the cost of repairs far exceeding the
value of the stolen wire. Worse, wire theft leaves the vandalized and expensive
infrastructure inoperable until repaired, thereby harming not only the agricultural industry
but also the population that depends on agriculture. 5
In support of its ordinance, the County of Fresno made findings that commercial
copper lines "are nearly always sheathed in a protective, insulating coating of rubber,
plastic or similar material which contains markings that identify the type of wire or cable
and its lawful owner. Once the sheathing is removed it is difficult for law enforcement to
identify the lawful owner of the wire or cable. Wire or cable which has had the sheathing
removed also sells for more money to recyclers and junk dealers. For both reasons, metal
thieves typically strip off, burn off, or otherwise remove this protective sheathing before
attempting to sell the stolen metal as scrap." 6 Further, the County of Fresno found that
metal theft in the County is overwhelmingly carried out by "individuals acting on their
own, with no legitimate business affiliation or purpose." 7
Based on its findings, Fresno County enacted Ordinance No. 25-008 prohibiting a
person to possess ten or more pounds of commercial grade scrap metal ("receive, possess,
or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, cable, transformer coils
[or other electrical components] with a total aggregate weight of 10 lbs. or more"). 8 A
separate provision prohibits possession of stripped commercial grade copper wire
("receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable
which has had its sheathing stripped, burned off, or otherwise removed"). 9 And a third
provision prohibits the act of stripping or burning the coating off of commercial wire. 10
See ibid.; see also California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement,
Information Bulletin No. 2025-DLE-12, "State Statutes Applicable to Copper Wire
Theft," June 5, 2025, p. 1, https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-12.pdf.
5

6

Fresno County Code, § 6.27.010 (title, purpose, and intent).

7

Ibid.

Id., § 6.27.030 (receipt, possession, and transportation of commercial grade scrap metal)
(italics added).

8

Id., § 6.27.040 (receipt, possession, and transportation of stripped commercial
grade wire) (italics added).

9

Id., § 6.27.050 ("No person shall strip, burn, or otherwise remove the sheathing from
commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable").

10

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None of the ordinance's provisions apply to "a junk dealer or recycler" nor to "any
licensed general contractor, subcontractor, or business engaged in the construction,
repair, or demolition of buildings, to commercial agricultural businesses, to commercial
manufacturing businesses, to licensed businesses engaged in the transport or hauling of
materials including scrap metal or commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, or to the
agents or employees of those entities." 11
2. Principles Governing State Preemption of Local Laws
Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides that a county or city
"may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws." This provision means that "[a]ny
conflicting ordinance is preempted by state law and thus void." 12
Under California Supreme Court precedent, a conflict between state and local law
arises if a local law duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by state law. 13
An ordinance duplicates state law when it is coextensive with state law. 14
An ordinance contradicts state law when it is "inimical to or cannot be reconciled
with" state law. 15
An ordinance can enter a field fully occupied by state law in either of two ways.
First, the Legislature may fully occupy a legal field by expressly stating its intent to
preclude local legislation on the subject. 16
11

Id., §§ 6.27.030, 6.27.040, 6.27.050.

12

E.g., O'Connell v. City of Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061, 1065.

Id. at p. 1067; see T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6
Cal.5th 1107, 1116; Tosi v. County of Fresno (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 799, 804.

13

See Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
546, 563-564; see Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893,
897-898 (duplication exists where local law imposes same criminal prohibition as state
law).

14

O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1068; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
County of Monterey (2023) 15 Cal.5th 135, 145; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898 (contradiction exists where local law sets maximum
speed limit below that set by state law).

15

O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1068; Prime Gas, Inc. v. City of
Sacramento (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 697, 703.

16

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Second, the Legislature may impliedly occupy a given field of law. 17 California
case law describes three situations where this may occur:
(1) the subject is so completely covered by state law as to clearly indicate
that it is now a matter of exclusive state concern;
(2) the subject is partially covered by state law, and "couched in such terms
as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate
further or additional local action"; or
(3) the subject is partially covered by state law, and the "adverse effect of a
local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible
benefit" to the locality. 18
With these principles in mind, we turn to a survey of the state laws that are
potentially implicated by Fresno's ordinance.
3. Relevant State Laws
In 2025, the California Department of Justice prepared a compilation of California
laws pertaining to vandalism and theft of copper wire. Recognizing a statewide rise in
copper wire thefts, the Department issued a law enforcement bulletin summarizing
existing California statutes related to copper wire theft, and laws governing junk dealer or
recyclers' obligations to collect and report information regarding the receipt, purchase,
and sale of copper wire. 19
Laws relating to copper wire theft include:
• Penal Code section 487 (grand theft, i.e., stealing, taking, or carrying
away another's personal property exceeding $950);
• Penal Code section 487j (theft of copper materials exceeding $950);
• Penal Code section 496 (receiving stolen property, i.e., buying,
receiving, concealing, selling, or withholding property from the owner);
O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1068; Prime Gas, Inc. v. City of
Sacramento, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.

17

O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1068; Prime Gas, Inc. v. City of
Sacramento, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.
18

California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin
No. 2025-DLE-12, "State Statutes Applicable to Copper Wire Theft," June 5, 2025,
pp. 1-2, https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-12.pdf.
19

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• Penal Code section 591 (cutting or disconnecting a utility line);
• Penal Code section 594 (vandalism, i.e., damaging or destroying the real
or personal property of another).
There is also a body of laws regulating secondhand dealers and recyclers, who buy
and sell scrap metals. These include:
• Business and Professions Code section 21600 et seq. (recordkeeping
and reporting requirements for dealers trading in scrap copper wire);
• Business and Professions Code section 21609 (peace officer having
probable cause may place 90-day hold on property in possession of
scrap dealer);
• Penal Code section 496a (scrap dealer to record seller's identity; to
maintain records; not to receive metals belonging to public utility).
While all these statutes might be deployed to support a general goal of preventing
copper wire theft, two of them are most relevant to our preemption analysis. There is no
need for us to dwell on the scrap dealer statutes because Fresno's ordinance expressly
does not apply to secondhand scrap dealers or recyclers, and nothing in the scrap dealer
laws reflects an intent to occupy the field covered by Fresno's ordinance. 20 Nor need we
engage in extended analysis of the theft crimes (Pen. Code, §§ 487, 487j) because
Fresno's ordinance only forbids a person to "receive, possess, or transport" stripped
copper wire, or commercial-grade copper wire in quantities of ten pounds or more. 21 The
crime of theft, in contrast, involves elements that are not in issue here, such as stealing,
taking, or carrying away the personal property of another. 22
Fresno County Code, §§ 6.27.030, 6.27.040, 6.27.050; cf. Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 21608.5, subd. (i) ("This section is intended to occupy the entire field of law related to
junk dealer or recycler transactions involving nonferrous material") (italics added).

20

21

Fresno County Code, §§ 6.27.030, 6.27.040.

See Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a) ("Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry,
lead, or drive away the personal property of another . . . is guilty of theft"). Under
California law, a person may be convicted either of stealing an item of property, or of
unlawfully possessing the stolen item, but not both. (See Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) ["A
principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section.
However, no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the
same property"].)
22

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And we can set aside the crime of cutting a utility line, which entails maliciously
taking down, removing, injuring, cutting, disconnecting, or removing a line. 23 By its
terms, Fresno's ordinance only comes into play after a line has been severed; the
ordinance does not apply to the act of severing.
Consequently, we will focus our preemption analysis on two general laws—Penal
Code section 496 (receiving stolen property), and Penal Code section 594 (vandalism)—
which are most relevant in evaluating Fresno's ordinance. We will also consider whether
the collection of state statutes in this area has preemptive effect.
4. Application of Preemption Principles to Fresno's Ordinance
In determining whether state law preempts local law, the ultimate question we
must answer is whether the ordinance conflicts with the state statute. As set out above, a
conflict exists if the ordinance duplicates the statute, contradicts it, or intrudes into a field
that is already fully occupied by state law. Field preemption may be either express or
implied (in one of three ways).
We will proceed through this sequence twice—once for the sections of the
ordinance concerning possession of stolen property (Penal Code section 496), and again
for the section of the ordinance concerning vandalism (Penal Code section 594).
a. Possession of Stolen Property (Penal Code section 496)
The first preemption question we take up is duplication: Does Fresno's copper
wire ordinance duplicate state law in Penal Code section 496, which prohibits possession
of stolen property? We conclude that there is no duplication because the ordinance is not
coextensive with the statute.
Penal Code section 496(a) prohibits receipt of "any" stolen property, stating, in
relevant part:
(a) Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or
that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion,
knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells,
withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from
the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be
punished by imprisonment in a county jail . . . .
Fresno County's ordinance addresses similar behavior, but limits the applicable
property to specified items of scrap metal, as follows:
23

See Pen. Code, § 591.
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Section 6.27.030 states, in relevant part:
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade
copper or aluminum wire, cable, transformer coils, transformer bands,
power conducting components, or control system components of the type
commonly found in electrical switch gear, or any combination thereof, with
a total aggregate weight of 10 lbs. or more.
Section 6.27.040 states, in relevant part:
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade
copper or aluminum wire or cable which has had its sheathing stripped,
burned off, or otherwise removed.
Comparing the state law to Fresno's ordinance, it becomes plain that one does not
duplicate the other, because they are not coextensive. While the state law applies to any
kind of property stolen under any circumstances, Fresno's law targets a narrow set of
scrap metal items associated with a particular type of local theft. "[C]overing some of the
same ground as a state law is not enough to render an ordinance duplicative for
preemption purposes." 24
The two laws differ in other ways as well, having to do with the burden of proof
and the imposition of penalties. Penal Code section 496 makes it a crime to buy, receive,
conceal, sell, or withhold the property of another, knowing that the property was stolen.
So, possession alone is not sufficient to violate Penal Code section 496; while possession
creates a strong inference of guilty knowledge, it must be accompanied by at least some
corroborating evidence of guilty knowledge, that is, that the defendant was aware of the
stolen character of the property. 25 Section 496 is enforceable through criminal penalties
alone, with no administrative enforcement mechanism.
Fresno's ordinance is different. It takes the form of a "public welfare" offense,
imposing regulatory liability for possession of controlled items without the necessity of
specifically proving guilty knowledge that the items were stolen. 26 Laws of this nature
are generally upheld when the importance of the public interest in controlling a noxious
item justifies holding violators liable without proof of more specific intent. 27 In this case,
Fresno's ordinance closely defines the controlled items (scrap, commercial-grade copper
24

Kirk v. City of Morgan Hill (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 976, 981-982.

See People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 224; People v. Tessman (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1293, 1302.

25

See, e.g., In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 872; City of Vacaville v. Pitamber
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 739, 744.

26

See In re Jorge M, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 872-873; City of Vacaville v. Pitamber,
supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.

27

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wire, either stripped or in a quantity exceeding ten pounds), while confining the
circumstances in which possession can create liability (that is, in the absence of any
licensed purpose). And unlike Penal Code section 496, Fresno's ordinance is enforceable
administratively (as well as criminally), through immediate issuance of a citation and
fine, followed by an opportunity for a hearing and review of the citation. 28 For these
reasons, we conclude that Fresno's ordinance does not duplicate state law. 29
The second preemption question we must answer is whether the ordinance
contradicts the statute. It does not. The ordinance does not prohibit anything that the
statute commands, nor command anything that the statute prohibits.
That leaves field preemption, which asks whether the ordinance intrudes into an
area that is already fully occupied by the statute. Field preemption may be either express
or implied.
As for express preemption, we conclude that the Legislature did not expressly
manifest its intent to fully occupy any area when it passed Penal Code section 496. No
such intention is stated within the text of Penal Code section 496, nor in the legislation
enacting it. 30
As for implied preemption, recall that courts have identified three situations in
which state enactments will impliedly preempt local laws. The first is when the subject
matter of the local ordinance has been so fully and completely covered by state law as to
clearly indicate that the field has become exclusively a matter of state concern. Here,
Penal Code section 496 sweeps in a broad range of conduct, including buying, receiving,
concealing, selling, withholding, or aiding in concealing, selling, or withholding any
See Fresno County Code, § 6.27.090 ("Pursuant to Section 53069.4, of the California
Government Code, a County code enforcement officer or Sheriff's deputy may issue an
administrative citation to any person for a violation of this chapter occurring in the
presence of the enforcement officer, or deputy, or upon the enforcement officer or
deputy's reasonably reliable confirmation of a violation"); see generally Gov. Code,
§ 53069.4 (administrative hearing process for local agency).

28

See Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, 865
(ordinance not duplicative because it did not criminalize "precisely the same acts" which
were prohibited by statute); Kirk v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 982,
quoting Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 292, fn. 12 (ordinance
duplicative only if it "covers no different ground, so ' "a conviction under the ordinance
will operate to bar prosecution under state law for the same offense" '").

29

Pen. Code, § 496 (formerly § 496bb), added by Stats. 1935, ch. 434, § 1, p. 1483;
renumbered § 496 and amended by Stats. 1951, ch. 97, § 2, p. 354.

30

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stolen property, not just copper wire. 31 But does this broad sweep amount to field
preemption? Does Penal Code section 496 so completely cover the field of "receiving
stolen property" that it leaves no room for a local government to add a supplemental
solution for a persistent local problem of copper wire theft specifically? We do not
believe so.
As a matter of law, a general criminal statute does not automatically occupy the
field to preempt local government regulation in the same subject matter area. 32 "Case
law establishes that an ordinance designed to discourage criminal acts is not necessarily
preempted by the statute proscribing those acts." 33 For example, Harrahill v. City of
Monrovia involved an ordinance prohibiting minors to be in a public place during school
hours; violators would be issued an administrative citation in "juvenile traffic court." 34
At the same time, state truancy statutes under the Education Code imposed a detailed
schedule of fines and penalties on truant students (including school discipline,
community service, or judicial supervision) for repeated absences from school. 35 Even
though the state law created a general scheme for enforcing truancy rules, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the local ordinance's juvenile daytime curfew did not intrude into
a field fully occupied by state law. The court reasoned that "the 'field' at issue is the
regulation of off-campus juvenile activity during school hours. And there is no indication
that the Legislature has sought to occupy this field, either expressly or by implication." 36
Likewise, here, there is no indication that the Legislature has sought to occupy the field
of receiving stolen property to the exclusion of any local regulation.
Implied preemption has sometimes also been found when a collection of statutes
works together to occupy an entire legal field. This may be seen, for example, in the
areas of firearms regulation, sex offender regulation, and crime-related vehicle
forfeiture. 37 Thus, looking at the 2025 Department of Justice bulletin compiling laws
See People v. Boyce (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 726, 733-734 (observing statute's broad
scope).

31

32

Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 409.

33

Ibid.

34

Harrahill v. City of Monrovia (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 761, 769.

35

Id. at pp. 769-771.

36

Id. at pp. 770-771.

See O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1069-1071 (comprehensive
drug crimes and penalties scheme preempted local vehicle forfeiture ordinance associated
with controlled substance offenses); People v. Nguyen (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1168,
1180-1182 (state's "comprehensive and standardized system" for regulating sex
offenders precluded local law banning sex offenders from city parks); Fiscal v. City and
(continued…)
37

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pertaining to copper wire theft, one might ask whether this collection of statutes is the
kind of collection that can preempt Fresno's ordinance. In our view, it is not.
"A preempted field 'cannot properly consist of statutes unified by a single
common noun,' but rather requires closely related statutes that regulate an area in a
manner that reveals a legislative intent to occupy the field." 38 So it is not enough that
each of the statutes collected here pertains to the subject of stolen copper wire. To find
preemption, there must also be evidence that the Legislature intended for the selected
statutes to work collectively and interactively. 39 There is no such evidence here. 40
Unlike areas where the Legislature has enacted a single, comprehensive legislative
scheme, the statutes relevant to copper wire theft were enacted over time, in piecemeal
fashion. 41 And nothing in the legislative record suggests that, through this series of
enactments, the Legislature intended to calibrate a complete set of offenses pertaining to
copper wire theft, excluding any further local regulation. 42 Rather, the Legislature has
emphasized that theft of copper wire and other metals is a "growing problem," which it
has sought to combat over time through an expanding collection of state-law measures. 43
County of San Francisco (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 895, 909-911 ("broad, evolutional
statutory regime" for firearms ownership preempted local ban on handgun possession and
sales).
People v. Nguyen, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178, quoting Galvan v. Superior
Court of City and County of San Francisco (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851, 862.

38

Id. at pp. 1180-1181 (taken collectively, scope and nature of statutes coupled with
statement of legislative intent expressed comprehensive scheme).

39

See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149
("The party claiming that general state law preempts a local ordinance has the burden of
demonstrating preemption").

40

See Pen. Code, §§ 487, enacted 1993 (grand theft), 487j, enacted 2011 (grand theft
copper), 496, enacted 1935 (receiving stolen property), 591, enacted 1872 (cutting utility
lines), 594, enacted 1998 (vandalism); Bus. & Prof. Code, § 21600 et seq., enacted 1941
(regulating junk dealers and recyclers); cf. O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41
Cal.4th at pp. 1069-1071 (discussing California Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
Health & Saf. Code, § 11000 et seq., enacted as comprehensive scheme in 1972).

41

See Tosi v. County of Fresno, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 806-807 (Legislature
carefully calibrated record-keeping burdens on junk dealers and recyclers, precluding
local regulation that imposed additional burdens).

42

Sen. Pub. Safety Com., analysis of Assem. Bill No. 316 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as
amended May 27, 2011, p. 8; see id. at p. 9 (documenting previous legislative efforts that
had proven inadequate, prompting enactment of grand theft copper prohibition).

43

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Furthermore, Fresno's ordinance is the product of years of trying to address the
local problem of copper wire theft using tools, such as Penal Code section 496, that failed
to serve the purpose. At a hearing before the Fresno County Board of Supervisors to
consider the ordinance at issue here, the Fresno County Sheriff's Office reported that
deputies had repeatedly encountered suspects in possession of commercial-grade copper
wire that had been severed and stripped of its protective sheathing, but deputies were
unable to seize the wire or arrest the suspects because there could be no hope of finding a
victim or witness to identify the now-anonymized wire as their stolen property. 44
Fresno's experience demonstrates that the state statute addressing receipt of stolen
property is failing to meet the specific local issue that Fresno is facing. 45 Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that Penal Code section 496 and related statutes so
completely cover the field of receiving stolen property that they impliedly preempt
Fresno's ordinance.
That leaves the second and third possible paths to implied preemption. The
second path explores whether the subject matter of the ordinance is partially covered by
the statute in a way that clearly indicates a paramount state concern will not tolerate
additional local governmental action. Field preemption happens only when "the nature
and extent of the coverage of a field is such that it could be said to display a patterned
approach to the subject." 46 For example, in the areas of firearms regulation, convicted
sex offender regulation, and crime-related vehicle forfeiture, state laws have been found
to preempt their respective fields because they contain interacting sets of statutes
imposing a planned, calibrated regulatory system across a defined set of events. 47 We see
no such pattern or comprehensive scheme here. Penal Code section 496 plainly does
partially cover the field of possessing stolen copper wire, but not in such a way as to
preclude local government action. The acts and penalties set out in section 496 describe a
common crime, not a network of interactive statutory parts supporting a greater
legislative scheme. And when we examine the group of statutes as a whole, no pattern or
Fresno County Board of Supervisors Meeting, April 8, 2025, Agenda Item No. 8,
available at Meeting Information - County of Fresno,
https://fresnocounty.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx (search for meeting dated Apr. 8, 2025;
go to Agenda Item 8; view video 47:45 – 51:00).

44

See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1149 ("We
have been particularly 'reluctant to infer legislative intent to preempt a field covered by
municipal regulation when there is a significant local interest to be served that may differ
from one locality to another'").

45

46

People v. Nguyen, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175; see id. at pp. 1178-1179.

Cf. O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1069-1071 (vehicle
forfeiture); People v. Nguyen, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1180-1182 (sex offenders);
Fiscal v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 909-911
(firearms).

47

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planned scheme emerges either. Instead, this appears to us to be an area where state law
leaves room for specific local legislation to supplement the general state law without
offending any "paramount state concern." 48
The third, and least-traveled, path to implied preemptive intent explores whether
the subject matter of the ordinance has been partially covered by the statute and is of
such a nature to cause undue adverse effects on transient persons. This factor is often
cited but little explained in the governing case law. 49 It is described as guarding against
local laws "in which transient citizens of the state are peculiarly concerned, as they are or
might be in regulation of traffic or registration of criminals." 50 We understand this factor
as a concern for people who, travelling from place to place within the state, might be
disadvantaged by unexpected variations in the prevailing local rules. Applying the factor,
we do perceive that state law partially covers the problem of possessing stolen copper
wire, but we do not perceive any danger that the ordinance will have undue adverse
effects on transient citizens. The ordinance specifically does not apply to those
individuals most likely to be blindsided by it, including "a junk dealer or recycler" or
"any licensed general contractor, subcontractor, or business engaged in the construction,
repair, or demolition of buildings, to commercial agricultural businesses, to commercial
manufacturing businesses, to licensed businesses engaged in the transport or hauling of
materials including scrap metal or commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, or to the
agents or employees of those entities." 51 Given its broad exceptions, we conclude that
the ordinance is not preempted because of an adverse effect on transient persons.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that Penal Code section 496 does not
preempt sections 6.27.030 and 6.27.040 of Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008.
b. Vandalism (Penal Code section 594)
We now repeat the steps of the preemption analysis for section 6.27.050 of
Fresno's ordinance, which prohibits the act of stripping copper wire of its sheathing. The
first preemption question we take up is duplication: Does the ordinance duplicate state
law prohibiting vandalism? Is the ordinance coextensive with the statute?
48

Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 905.

See Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 862863; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 898, 905-906;
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 485, 487; In re
Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 128; Galvan v. Superior Court of City and County of San
Francisco, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 859-860.

49

50

In re Hubbard, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 128.

51

Fresno County Code, §§ 6.27.030, 6.27.040, 6.27.050.
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Looking first at the state statute, we see that Penal Code section 594 states, in
relevant part:
(a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with
respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other
than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism:
(1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material.
(2) Damages.
(3) Destroys.
...
We compare this statute with section 6.27.050 of the ordinance, which states in
relevant part:
No person shall strip, burn, or otherwise remove the sheathing from
commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable.
Again, both provisions address doing damage to the property of another. But the
differences in scope are stark: Where section 594 makes it a crime for a person to
maliciously "damage" "any" property of another, section 6.27.050 focuses only on a
particular type of damage, confined to stripping, burning, or otherwise removing, and
only as those acts are directed at a particular set of objects (sheathed commercial-grade
wire). In our view, the ordinance does not duplicate the statute.
The second preemption question we must answer is whether the ordinance
contradicts the statute. It does not. The ordinance does not prohibit what the statute
commands or command what it prohibits.
The third preemption issue is whether the ordinance intrudes into an area of law
that has been fully occupied by the statute.
The first question for field preemption is whether there is express preemptive
intent. We conclude that the Legislature did not expressly manifest an intent to fully
occupy an area when it passed Penal Code section 594. No such intention appears either
on the face of the statute or in the legislation enacting it. 52
After express preemption, we consider whether there is implied preemptive intent.
Again, there are three ways that implied preemption may occur. The first asks whether
the subject matter of the ordinance has been so completely covered by state law as to
52

Pen. Code, § 594, added by Stats. 1998, ch. 853, § 1.6.
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clearly indicate that the field has become exclusively a matter of state concern. In this
case, section 594 describes vandalism as a crime in which a person "maliciously defaces
with graffiti" or "damages" or "destroys" property of another. Subsequent provisions of
the statute, and of the surrounding statutes, describe detailed schemes of punishment and
remediation for graffiti-related crimes, especially for youthful offenders. 53 But there is
no similar proliferation of provisions respecting acts of "damage" or "destruction" of
property. In fact, there is no further detail about criminal destruction of property at all.
The contrast between the detail surrounding the term "deface[] with graffiti" and the
absence of detail surrounding its neighboring term "damage" illustrates that vandalism in
the form of non-graffiti "damage" is not treated as a matter of exclusive state concern.
We therefore conclude that Penal Code section 594 does not so completely cover the field
of damage to personal property that it impliedly preempts Fresno's copper wire
ordinance.
The second path to implied preemption asks whether the ordinance's subject
matter has been partially covered by the statute "in such terms as to clearly indicate that a
paramount state concern will not tolerate local governmental action." 54 By its terms,
Penal Code section 594 generally addresses malicious damage to property, but it is silent
on the specific conduct addressed in the ordinance, which is removing the protective
sheathing from commercial-grade copper wire. From this we see that the statute does
partially cover the subject matter of the ordinance. But does it do so in such a way that
indicates property damage is a paramount state concern foreclosing local regulation? We
think not. To be sure, section 594 and its surrounding statutes evince the Legislature's
concern with the problem of vandalism in the form of graffiti, especially with respect to
youthful offenders. 55 But Penal Code section 594.5 expressly leaves open the possibility
for local governments to adopt additional measures addressing graffiti. 56 And again,
Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (b)-(f) (vandalism); see id., §§ 594.05 (damages for
vandalism statute), 594.1 (etching creams), 594.2 (drill bits and cutting tools), 594.3
(places of worship), 594.35 (cemeteries), 594.37 (funerals), 594.4 (caustic chemicals),
594.8 (destructive implements), 640.5 (government facilities), 640.6 (community service
and abatement), 640.7 (highways), 640.8 (freeways).

53

54

O'Connell v. City of Stockton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1067-1068.

55

See Pen. Code, §§ 594-594.8, 640.5-640.8.

56

Penal Code section 594.5 states:
Nothing in this code shall invalidate an ordinance of, nor be construed to
prohibit the adoption of an ordinance by, a city, city and county, or county,
if the ordinance regulates the sale of aerosol containers of paint or other
liquid substances capable of defacing property or sets forth civil
administrative regulations, procedures, or civil penalties governing the
(continued…)
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there are no further details about non-graffiti damage or destruction to personal property;
on that subject, the statute is silent. The stripping of commercial-grade copper wire is
thus not a field in which the state has asserted a paramount interest that cannot tolerate
local government action. 57 We therefore conclude that, although section 594 does
partially cover the relevant subject matter, this is not a field of exclusive state concern
such that the statute preempts the ordinance.
Lastly, there is no preemption by the third path here either. Again, for the same
reasons identified above in connection with possession of copper wire, the act of
stripping copper wire is not a matter in which transient persons would be particularly
vulnerable. 58
Accordingly, we conclude that Penal Code section 594 does not preempt section
6.27.050 of Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008
is not preempted by state law.
placement of graffiti or other inscribed material on public or private, real or
personal property.
See also Pen. Code, § 13825 (state graffiti clearinghouse for abatement grants and
programs).
57

See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 904-905.

58

In re Hubbard, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 128.
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FRESNO COUNTY ORDINANCE NO. 25-008
Chapter 6.27 - ILLEGAL POSSESSION OR TRANSPORTATION OF
COMMERCIAL COPPER WIRE
§ 6.27.010 - Title, purpose, and intent.
This Chapter shall be known as the Commercial Grade Scrap Metal
Ordinance. The Board of Supervisors finds that commercial agriculture is
vital to the economy of the County of Fresno. Businesses engaged in
commercial agriculture rely upon infrastructure, such as energy
transmission and telecommunication lines, to operate. Transmission and
telecommunication lines, and related infrastructure, are often made of
copper or aluminum, which can be sold as scrap metal to recyclers or junk
dealers. Although these components are much more valuable to their
lawful owners when used for their intended purpose, they are nevertheless
frequently stolen by thieves seeking to sell copper or aluminum
components as scrap. The process of stealing copper and aluminum
components renders vital infrastructure inoperable until repaired, thereby
harming the public health, safety and welfare which depend on such
infrastructure. The cost of repairing and replacing infrastructure damaged
by metal thieves substantially burdens businesses, public utilities, law
enforcement and the public generally. Although the damage caused by
metal thieves burdens all residents of the County, commercial agricultural
businesses are particularly vulnerable to metal thieves due to the rural
nature of agriculture. It is estimated that metal thieves inflicted over $3
million in damage to commercial operations in the County of Fresno alone
in 2023.
Telecommunications and transmission lines are nearly always sheathed in a
protective, insulating coating of rubber, plastic or similar material which
contains markings that identify the type of wire or cable and its lawful
owner. Once the sheathing is removed it is difficult for law enforcement to
identify the lawful owner of the wire or cable. Wire or cable which has had
the sheathing removed also sells for more money to recyclers and junk
dealers. For both reasons, metal thieves typically strip off, burn off, or
otherwise remove this protective sheathing before attempting to sell the
stolen metal as scrap.
Existing California law regulates the businesses of junk dealing and
recycling, requiring businesses to adhere to extensive regulations when
accepting scrap metal for recycling, but those laws are not readily applied
to individuals without a business affiliation. However, metal theft in the
County of Fresno is overwhelming carried out by individuals acting on
their own, with no legitimate business affiliation or purpose. Additionally,
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Fresno is a largely rural and agricultural county and is uniquely and
particularly vulnerable to theft and destruction of infrastructure because its
telecommunications and energy infrastructure are spread out over vast
distances that cannot be feasibly secured or observed. Consequently,
existing California law is insufficient to address the unique circumstances
faced by the County of Fresno, and the Board of Supervisors finds that a
county ordinance is necessary to address these issues. It is the purpose and
intent of this chapter to support and supplement existing state law by giving
law enforcement officials tools to deter, prevent, and punish the theft and
vandalism of transmission and telecommunication lines by individuals
without connection to a lawful business. It is not the purpose or intent of
this chapter to impede or interfere with ordinary and lawful recycling, or
duplicate or contradict existing state law pertaining to junk dealers and
recyclers. Based upon the foregoing, the Board finds that it can be
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that this ordinance is both
necessary and addresses a unique problem specific to the County of Fresno
that cannot effectively be addressed by existing law.
§ 6.27.020 - Definitions.
For the purposes of this chapter:
A. "Commercial grade" refers to copper or aluminum wire or cable with a
total diameter of .15 inches or greater, exclusive of any sheathing or
coating, or telecommunications cable with fifty or more pairs of conductors
in a single cable.
B. "Sheathing" means the coating, typically made of plastic, rubber or a
similar substance, which insulates and protects commercial grade wire or
cable, and often bears markings which identify the lawful owner, purpose,
or source of the wire or cable.
C. "Scrap" means material derived from manufactured components, such as
transmission or telecommunications lines, which is no longer useful for its
intended purpose and is primarily valuable for recycling.
§ 6.27.030 - Receipt, possession and transportation of commercial grade
scrap metal.
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade
copper or aluminum wire, cable, transformer coils, transformer bands,
power conducting components, or control system components of the type
commonly found in electrical switch gear, or any combination thereof, with
a total aggregate weight of 10 lbs. or more. This section does not apply to a
junk dealer or recycler within the meaning of California Business and
Professions Code section 21601, or to a person with a current and valid
business license from the County of Fresno to operate as a junk dealer,
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secondhand dealer, itinerant dealer, used goods dealer, or flea market
operator as set forth in Chapter 6.24 of this Ordinance Code, or to the
agents or employees of those entities. This section does not apply to any
licensed general contractor, subcontractor, or business engaged in the
construction, repair, or demolition of buildings, to commercial agricultural
businesses, to commercial manufacturing businesses, to licensed businesses
engaged in the transport or hauling of materials including scrap metal or
commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, or to the agents or employees
of those entities.
§ 6.27.040 - Receipt, possession, and transportation of stripped commercial
grade wire.
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade
copper or aluminum wire or cable which has had its sheathing stripped,
burned off, or otherwise removed. This section does not apply to a junk
dealer or recycler within the meaning of California Business and
Professions Code section 21601, or to a person with a current and valid
business license from the County of Fresno to operate as a junk dealer,
secondhand dealer, itinerant dealer, used goods dealer, or flea market
operator as set forth in Chapter 6.24 of this Ordinance Code, or to the
agents or employees of those entities. This section does not apply to any
licensed general contractor, subcontractor, or business engaged in the
construction, repair, or demolition of buildings, to commercial agricultural
businesses, to commercial manufacturing businesses, to licensed businesses
engaged in the transport or hauling of materials including scrap metal or
commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, or to the agents or employees
of those entities.
§ 6.27.050 - Stripping of commercial grade wire.
No person shall strip, burn, or otherwise remove the sheathing from
commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable. This section does not
apply to a junk dealer or recycler within the meaning of California Business
and Professions Code section 21601, or to a person with a current and valid
business license from the County of Fresno to operate as a junk dealer,
secondhand dealer, itinerant dealer, used goods dealer, or flea market
operator as set forth in Chapter 6.24 of this Ordinance Code, or to the
agents or employees of those entities. This section does not apply to any
licensed general contractor, subcontractor, or business engaged in the
construction, repair, or demolition of buildings, to commercial agricultural
businesses, to commercial manufacturing businesses, to licensed businesses
engaged in the transport or hauling of materials including scrap metal or
commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, or to the agents or employees
of those entities.
19

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§ 6.27.060 - Enforcement.
A violation of this chapter is subject to enforcement through criminal
prosecution, civil action, administrative citation, and civil penalties, as
provided herein, including by injunction. Any violation of this chapter is a
misdemeanor, punishable by up to 180 days in the County Jail, a fine of up
to $1,000.00, or both.
§ 6.27.065 - Licensed businesses and proof of ownership.
A. Notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter 6.27 of the Fresno
Ordinance Code, it shall be a defense to any criminal or civil enforcement
of this Chapter, if, at the time of the alleged violation of Sections 6.27.030,
6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, the person alleged to have violated
these sections possesses a valid business license for one of the types of
commercial activities listed in sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050, or
other valid state or local business license which would render the activity
prohibited by Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 a legal and legitimate
commercial activity.
B. Notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter 6.27 of the Fresno
Ordinance Code, it shall be a defense to any criminal or civil enforcement
of this Chapter, if, at the time of the alleged violation of Sections 6.27.030,
6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, the person alleged to have violated
these sections possesses adequate written evidence of legal ownership of
the scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable that is the
subject of the alleged violation.
C. Notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter 6.27 of the Fresno
Ordinance Code, no citation shall be issued to, and no arrest made of, any
person having in their possession at the time of the alleged violation of
Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, a business license
as described in Subsection A, of this Section or adequate written evidence
of ownership of the of the scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum
wire or cable that is the subject of the alleged violation as described in
Subsection B, of this Section.
D. Any person who presents, shows or uses false, counterfeit or fraudulent
written evidence of ownership of the scrap commercial grade copper or
aluminum wire or cable alleged to be the subject of a violation of Sections
6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, in an attempt to prove
ownership of those materials shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject
to the criminal penalties provided in Section 6.27.060.
§ 6.27.080 - Public nuisance.
A violation of this chapter is hereby declared to be a public nuisance.
20

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§ 6.27.090 - Administrative remedies.
A. Administrative Citations. Pursuant to Section 53069.4, of the
California Government Code, a County code enforcement officer or
Sheriff's deputy may issue an administrative citation to any person for a
violation of this chapter occurring in the presence of the enforcement
officer, or deputy, or upon the enforcement officer or deputy's reasonably
reliable confirmation of a violation.
B. Administrative fine amounts. The fine amounts for any administrative
citation issued under this chapter shall be:
1. Five hundred dollars ($500) for a first violation.
2. Seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750) for a second violation of this
chapter within one year of the first violation.
3. One thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation of the same ordinance
within one year of the first violation.
Revenues received from citations issued pursuant to the chapter shall be
deposited in the account of the county department which issued the citation.
C. Contents of the Administrative Citation. An administrative citation
issued for a violation of this chapter shall contain the following
information: (a) the date of the violation and any previous administrative
citations for violation of this chapter issued with the proceeding one-year
period; (b) a description of the violation; (c) a reasonably clear description
of where the violation occurred or was confirmed to have occurred; and (d)
evidence identifying the person receiving the administrative citation as the
person responsible for the violation.
D. Service of citations. An administrative citation issued pursuant to this
chapter shall be served on the responsible person as follows:
1. The enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may personally serve the
responsible person at any time. The enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff
may obtain the signature of the responsible person on the administrative
citation, which shall create a presumption of personal service. The lack of
signature shall in no way affect the validity of the administrative citation.
2. Alternatively, or in addition to personally serving the administrative
citation, the enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may provide notice by
mailing the administrative citation to the responsible person by first class
mail, postage prepaid.
3. Alternatively, or in addition to, personally serving or mailing the
administrative citation, an enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may utilize
21

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any other means fairly and reasonably calculated to provide notice of the
violation.
E. Effective date of service. Service of the administrative citation shall be
effective on the date it was personally served, mailed, or otherwise
delivered by the enforcement officer or deputy, regardless of when it is
actually received by the responsible person.
F. Finality. Unless the responsible person properly requests a hearing to
challenge an administrative citation issued pursuant to this chapter within
30 days of the date of issuance, the administrative citation shall constitute
the final administrative order, and the imposition of the administrative
penalty shall become a final order.
§ 6.27.100 - Appeals of administrative citations.
The procedures to appeal an administrative citation issued pursuant to this
chapter are as follows:
A. Hearing Request. Any person issued an administrative citation for
violation of this Chapter may contest the citation by requesting a hearing
according to the procedures found in Section 1.13.170 of this code. A
person financially unable to pay the administrative fine as provided in
Section 1.13.170 may request an advance deposit hardship waiver as set
forth in Section 1.13.180.
B. Hearing Officer. For hearings to challenge an administrative citations
issued pursuant to this Chapter, the County Administrative Officer, or the
designee thereof, in consultation with the Director of the enforcing
department of the county, or the designee thereof, or the Sheriff-Coroner, or
the designee thereof, shall appoint a hearing officer to preside over an
administrative citation hearing that has been properly requested under the
provisions of this chapter and this code.
C. Hearing Procedures. The procedures for a hearing to contest an
administrative citation issued pursuant to this Chapter are the same as those
procedures listed in Section 1.13.200 of this code.
D. Hearing Officer's Decision. A hearing officer appointed to hear a
contest to an administrative citation issued pursuant to this Chapter shall
follow the procedural requirements of Section 1.13.210 of this code.
E. Right to Judicial Review. Any person aggrieved by the decision of an
administrative hearing officer in any hearing on an administrative citation
under this Chapter, may obtain review of the administrative decision by
filing a petition for review with the Fresno County Superior Court, in
accordance with the timeline and other provisions set forth in Section
53069.4 in California Government Code.
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F. The procedures of Sections 1.14.020—1.14.050 of this code are
applicable to this chapter.
G. Recovery of Administrative Citations and Civil Penalties. The county
may collect any past due administrative citation(s) or unpaid civil penalties,
assessed, and issued pursuant to this Chapter, by use of any and all
available legal means, including, without limitation, as a personal
obligation or a lien recorded against any real property owned by the
person(s) found to have violated this Chapter. County Counsel may bring a
civil action in the name of the county to recover any past due administrative
citation(s) or unpaid civil penalties and may enforce any judgment to
collect any unpaid sum in the same manner as civil judgments.
§ 6.27.110 - Civil actions.
A. In addition to the remedies provided in this chapter, County Counsel
may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any
person found to have violated this Chapter. In the civil action, County
Counsel may pursue all available remedies authorized by law and may seek
to recover all Costs related to the action.
B. The court in which such a proceeding is heard may assess a civil penalty
in amount not to exceed $1,000 for each separate violation of this chapter.
In determining the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall take into
consideration all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, the
extent of harm caused by the violation, the nature and persistence of the
violation, the fact of any past violations, and corrective action, if any taken
by the violator.
§ 6.27.120 - Non-exclusive remedy.
This chapter is not the exclusive regulation or penalty for acts prohibited
hereby. It supplements and is in addition to other regulatory codes,
statutes, and ordinances heretofore or hereafter enacted by the County, state
or any legal entity or agency having jurisdiction.
§ 6.27.130 - Severability.
If any portion of this chapter is held to be invalid by any court of competent
jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of
the remaining portions of this chapter. The Board hereby declares it would
have passed each remaining portion irrespective of the fact that any one or
more portions are declared invalid.
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