Do California public works contractors have to pay forepersons California's prevailing wage rate for their supervisory work?

Plain-English summary

Assemblymember Ash Kalra asked the Attorney General whether the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) must publish a separate prevailing wage rate for "forepersons" on public works projects, where a collective bargaining agreement the Director already uses to set other prevailing rates also lists a foreperson pay rate. The requestor described forepersons as "experienced workers who perform on-site work with the tools of the trade while also having responsibility for reading the plans and directing the work of the crew."

The opinion concluded no. California's prevailing wage law, codified in the Labor Code, only requires publishing rates for "workers," a term the opinion read (based on its 1931 origins as "laborers, workmen and mechanics") to cover people doing manual, craft-level labor, not people doing supervisory or managerial work. Because the requestor's definition of "foreperson" centers on supervising and directing a crew, that role itself isn't a covered "worker" classification requiring its own published rate. But the opinion was careful to say duties, not titles, control: a foreperson who spends part of the day actually performing hands-on craft work (using tools of the trade) must still be paid at least the prevailing rate for the hours spent doing that craft work.

What this means for you

Public works contractors, both union and nonunion

The opinion treats a foreperson's purely supervisory and directing duties as outside the prevailing wage law's coverage, so DIR is not required to publish a prevailing rate for that supervisory role, regardless of what any collective bargaining agreement pays a foreperson. However, if the foreperson personally performs work in a covered craft (using tools of the trade), the opinion holds that time must be compensated at no less than the prevailing rate for that craft.

Building trades unions and their contractors

The opinion acknowledges the competitive concern that union contractors bound by collective bargaining agreements may pay forepersons a negotiated rate while nonunion contractors are not compelled to match a published prevailing rate for that same role, because no such rate exists. The opinion did not resolve that competitive dynamic; it noted the concern and observed that "the Legislature can, if it sees fit, adjust the statutory definition" of covered workers, leaving any fix to the Legislature rather than to this office.

The Department of Industrial Relations

The opinion agrees with and reinforces DIR's own longstanding position (predating this request, including in DIR's 2023 Public Works Manual) that supervisory work performed by foremen, supervisors, and managers is not covered "worker" activity under the prevailing wage law, while confirming that DIR's duties-not-titles approach for partial craft work performed by supervisors is correct.

Forepersons and other workers with mixed duties

Under this opinion, a foreperson's own pay entitlement depends on what they actually did during working hours, not on their job title. Hours spent supervising or directing a crew are not covered by the prevailing wage law. Hours spent performing manual craft work (the "tools of the trade" portion of the job) must be paid at least the prevailing rate for that craft.

Common questions

Q: Does this mean forepersons never get a prevailing wage?
A: No. The opinion is specific to the supervisory and directing portion of a foreperson's duties, as defined by the requestor. Any time a foreperson spends actually performing craft-level manual work is still covered and must be paid at least the applicable prevailing rate for that craft.

Q: Can a collective bargaining agreement force the state to publish a foreperson prevailing wage rate?
A: No. The opinion holds that collective bargaining agreements only inform how the Director sets a rate for classifications that are already covered "workers" under the statute. They do not expand who counts as a covered worker in the first place.

Q: Why does it matter whether the law is based on "duties" versus "titles"?
A: The opinion adopts DIR's longstanding duties-based approach because tying pay coverage to a job title (like "foreperson") rather than to the actual work performed would let employers dodge prevailing wage obligations for craft work simply by labeling a worker a supervisor, or would sweep in genuinely managerial work that the 1931 Legislature never intended to cover.

Q: Does this opinion apply to every worker anyone calls a "foreperson"?
A: No. The opinion expressly limits itself to the specific definition of "foreperson" the requestor provided, on-site workers who use tools of the trade while also directing a crew, and says the same conclusion would not necessarily follow for people with different job duties who happen to carry the same title.

Background and statutory framework

California's prevailing wage law dates to 1931, enacted alongside a similar federal law in response to contractors exploiting Depression-era labor oversupply by hiring cheap, out-of-market workers on government projects. The law functions as a minimum-wage floor for public works: covered workers must be paid no less than the general prevailing rate for their craft or classification in the local labor market, as determined by DIR's Director based on rates in the area, including rates set by collective bargaining agreements.

The statute's coverage turns on the definition of "worker" in Labor Code section 1723 ("laborer, worker, or mechanic"), a term traced back to the 1931 statute's "laborers, workmen and mechanics." The opinion applied ordinary statutory interpretation tools, plain meaning, the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, legislative history, and case law, including the California Supreme Court's decisions in Whitsett and Busker v. Wabtec Corp., to conclude the Legislature meant to cover people performing manual labor, not people managing or supervising others. The opinion also drew on the parallel federal prevailing wage law and U.S. Department of Labor regulations, which similarly exclude supervisory duties from coverage while requiring pay at prevailing rates for any time a supervisor spends on hands-on mechanic or laborer work.

Citations and references

Statutes and regulations:
- Lab. Code, § 1720 et seq., California's prevailing wage law
- Lab. Code, § 1771, requiring prevailing wages for "workers employed on public works"
- Lab. Code, § 1723, defining "worker" to include "laborer, worker, or mechanic"
- Lab. Code, § 1773, Director's authority to set prevailing wage rates, including adopting collective bargaining agreement rates
- Lab. Code, § 1770, requiring the awarding body to obtain the general prevailing wage rate from the Director
- Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 16202, special prevailing wage determination requests
- 40 U.S.C. § 3142, the federal prevailing wage law's coverage of "laborers and mechanics"
- 29 C.F.R. § 5.2, U.S. Department of Labor regulation on "laborer or mechanic," excluding mental or managerial work

Cases:
- Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, history and purpose of prevailing wage laws
- Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Whitsett (1932) 215 Cal. 400, enumerating covered manual trades shortly after the law's enactment
- Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1147, prevailing wage law's purposes, including letting union contractors compete with nonunion contractors
- Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, statutory interpretation starting with plain language
- State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, codification changes were not substantive
- International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, ejusdem generis canon of construction
- City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, California's law is similar to and shares purposes with the federal prevailing wage law
- Independent Roofing Contractors v. Department of Industrial Relations (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 345, the statutory scheme does not require adopting terms private parties agree to
- Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, prevailing wage law's goal of letting union contractors compete with nonunion contractors
- Ruelas v. County of Alameda (2024) 15 Cal.5th 968, Attorney General opinions are entitled to considerable weight

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
• Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/25-601.pdf

Original opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General

OPINION
of
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
NICOLE WELINDT
Deputy Attorney General

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No. 25-601
June 23, 2026

The HONORABLE ASH KALRA, ASSEMBLYMEMBER, has requested an
opinion on a question relating to California's prevailing wage law.
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
If the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations determines that the
prevailing wage for a journey-level classification is the rate set by a collective bargaining
agreement, and that agreement provides a separate classification for a foreperson who
performs on-site work while supervising the work crew, does the Labor Code require the
Director to publish the prevailing wage rate for the foreperson classification?
No. We do not reach a categorical conclusion for all forepersons, but instead
evaluate the requestor's definition—"experienced workers who perform on-site work
with the tools of the trade while also having responsibility for reading the plans and
directing the work of the crew." The Labor Code does not require the Director to publish
the prevailing wage rate for forepersons as defined by the requestor, because California's
prevailing wage law does not cover supervisory work. It is individuals' duties, and not
their titles, that determine whether individuals are entitled to prevailing wages, however.
That means that forepersons who perform work in a covered craft in addition to
performing supervisory work are entitled to wages at no less than the applicable
prevailing rate for the work they perform in the craft.
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BACKGROUND
During the Great Depression, contractors exploited the oversupply of labor to win
government contracts, recruiting out-of-market workers and paying low wages. 1 In
response to these "dire economic conditions," in 1931 the California Legislature and the
United States Congress each passed prevailing wage laws. 2 A prevailing wage law is
"essentially a minimum wage law" for certain government contracts. 3 The laws
guaranteed that workers on public building projects would be paid wages "commensurate
with those prevailing in the local area." 4 The Legislature's "overall purpose" was "to
protect and benefit employees on public works projects." 5 And the law's "specific goals"
were to protect against the risk of substandard wages, promote efficiency through wellpaid employees, "permit union contractors to compete with nonunion contractors," and
provide a benefit to nonpublic employees, who otherwise have fewer benefits than public
employees. 6
Today, California's prevailing wage law is codified in the Labor Code. 7 It
operates as follows. Except on certain low-cost projects, workers employed on public
works must be paid wages at not less than prevailing rates. 8 "'Worker' includes [a]
laborer, worker, or mechanic." 9 The body awarding the contract "shall obtain the general
prevailing rate" of wages in the locality "from the Director of Industrial Relations." 10
The Director determines the general prevailing wage rate "for each craft, classification, or
type of worker needed to execute" public works contracts. 11 To do so, the Director "shall
See Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 165-166; see
also Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu (1981) 450 U.S. 754, 774 (the federal law
"was intended to combat the practice of 'certain itinerant, irresponsible contractors, with
itinerant, cheap, bootleg labor'").

1

2

Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 165-166.

Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Whitsett (1932) 215 Cal. 400, 417,
capitalization altered.

3

Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1147, 1155; see Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1;
Pub.L. No. 71-798 (Mar. 3, 1931) 46 Stat. 1494, 1494; 40 U.S.C. § 3142.

4

5

Busker v. Wabtec Corp., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1156.

6

Ibid.

7

Id. at p. 1155; see Lab. Code, § 1720 et seq.

8

Lab. Code, § 1771.

9

Lab. Code, § 1723.

10

Lab. Code, § 1773.

11

Lab. Code, §§ 1770, 1773.
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ascertain and consider the applicable wage rates established by collective bargaining
agreements and the rates that may have been predetermined for federal public works,
within the locality and in the nearest labor market area." 12 "If the director determines
that the rate of prevailing wage for any craft, classification, or type of worker is the rate
established by a collective bargaining agreement, the director may adopt that rate by
reference[.]" 13
In practice, the Director carries out these statutory responsibilities by listing
prevailing wage rates online. Twice each year, the Director updates the prevailing wage
determinations. 14 The Director lists numerous crafts—such as "Carpenter," "Cement
Mason," "Drywall Installer (Carpenter)," and "Operating Engineer." 15 Within each craft,
the Director may list specific classifications. 16 For example, the "Elevator Constructor"
craft in Southern California includes classifications for "Mechanic," "Mechanic
(employed in industry more than 5 years)," "Helper," and "Helper (employed in industry
more than 5 years)." 17 Prevailing wage determinations for a given classification may
cover the entirety of the State or may differ by region. 18
Which craft or classification an individual falls within depends on the duties the
individual performs. DIR publishes "Scope of Work provisions," which provide
12

Lab. Code, § 1773.

13

Ibid.

See Department of Industrial Relations, Index 2025-2 General Prevailing Wage
Journeyman Determinations, https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/2025-2/PWD/index.htm (as
of Mar. 11, 2026). Additionally, if a body awarding a contract thinks that a particular
craft, classification, or type of worker is not covered by DIR's existing determinations,
the body may request that the Director issue a special prevailing wage determination.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 16202.)
14

Department of Industrial Relations, Index 2025-2 Southern California Basic Trade
Journeyman Rates, https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/2025-2/PWD/Southern.html (as of
Mar. 11, 2026).

15

16

Ibid.

Department of Industrial Relations, General Prevailing Wage Determination, Craft:
Elevator Constructor, https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/20252/PWD/Determinations/Southern/SC-062-X-999.pdf (as of Mar. 11, 2026).

17

See Department of Industrial Relations, Index 2025-2 General Prevailing Wage
Journeyman Determinations, supra.

18

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information on duties performed within a craft. 19 In some instances, an individual may
perform work in multiple classifications on a single project. 20
We are asked whether the Director must publish a prevailing wage rate for
forepersons, where foreperson rates are listed in a collective bargaining agreement that
the Director has adopted to set prevailing wage rates for other classifications. 21 The
requestor describes forepersons as "experienced workers who perform on-site work with
the tools of the trade while also having responsibility for reading the plans and directing
the work of the crew." 22 According to the requestor, collective bargaining agreements
may pay forepersons "a higher hourly rate than the rate applicable to journey-level
workers"—that is, those workers performing on-site labor in a craft without supervisory
responsibilities. 23 The Director does not provide prevailing wage rates for forepersons,
even if the Director has adopted other prevailing wage rates from a collective bargaining
agreement that includes foreperson classifications. As a result, commenters explain,
nonunion contractors can underbid union contractors for public works contracts by
paying their forepersons at a lower rate than the rate provided for in unions' collective
bargaining agreements. The commenters conclude that a foreperson is a "classification"
needed to execute public works projects and that the Director therefore must promulgate
prevailing wage rates for forepersons.
The Department of Industrial Relations has taken the position that it is complying
with the prevailing wage law by not publishing a foreperson rate. The Department does
not address whether a foreperson is a "craft, classification, or type of worker." Rather,
the Department concludes that "work of a supervisory nature[,] such as that performed by
foremen, supervisors, and managers, is not covered by California's prevailing wage
See Office of the Labor Commissioner, Public Works Manual (Oct. 2023), p. 40,
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/pwmanualcombined.pdf.

19

Id. at pp. 25, 41. The Department of Industrial Relations explains, for example, that
"[i]f a worker is performing work in the Inside Wireman's classification for four (4)
hours and then performs work in the Painter's classification for six (6) hours, the worker
would be entitled to no less than the total of four (4) hours of pay at the Inside Wireman's
straight time rate of pay, four (4) hours of pay at the Painter's straight time rate of pay,
and two (2) hours of pay at the Painter's overtime rate of pay for the two (2) hours
worked in excess of eight (8) hours per day." (Id. at p. 25.)

20

Assemblymember Ash Kalra, letter requesting opn. to former Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Marc
J. Nolan, Opn. Unit, Dept. of J., June 4, 2025 (on file), p. 1 (Request Letter). Where
possible, we adopt gender-neutral terminology: journey-level rather than journeyman,
and foreperson rather than foreman.

21

22

Id. at p. 3.

23

Ibid.
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law." 24 It reasons that the law covers "workers," and the statute's definition of that
term—"laborer[s], worker[s], or mechanic[s]"—does not encompass "personnel in
supervisory or administrative roles." 25 But because it is "the duties performed," and not a
person's "title or status," that matters, the Department concludes that forepersons
performing work in a covered craft would be entitled to wages at the prevailing rate for
that work. 26 That is, if "foremen or other supervisory personnel are performing the work
of a particular craft, then they must be paid at least the prevailing rate for that craft." 27
ANALYSIS
The threshold question—and the only one we ultimately need address—is whether
forepersons, as defined by the requestor, are "workers" covered by California's
prevailing wage law. 28 The requestor defines forepersons as "experienced workers who
perform on-site work with the tools of the trade while also having responsibility for
reading the plans and directing the work of the crew." 29 We describe the legal
framework for evaluating this question, agreeing with the Department's longstanding
view that individuals performing supervisory or managerial work are not "workers"
covered by the prevailing wage law. And we apply that framework to the provided
definition of forepersons, concluding that they are not covered "workers" under the law.
We do not suggest, however, that every individual designated as a foreperson has these
job duties or that the same conclusion would necessarily result for all persons designated
"forepersons." The use of "foreperson" in this opinion refers specifically to the definition
that the requestor has provided and asked us to analyze. We do not attempt to address all
possible facts herein, as "[i]t is our task to examine questions of law that arise from the
interplay between settled facts, which have been provided for our information, and the
body of law applicable to them." 30
Deputy Chief Silvestre Rojas, Off. of the Director-Research Unit, Dept. of Industrial
Relations, letter to Deputy Atty. Gen. Nicole Welindt, Opn. Unit, Dept. of J., Sept. 22,
2025 (on file), p. 1 (Dept. of Industrial Relations com.).

24

25

Ibid.

26

Public Works Manual, supra, at pp. 3-4.

27

Dept. of Industrial Relations com., supra, at pp. 1-2.

See Lab. Code, § 1771 (generally requiring payment of wages at prevailing rates to
"workers employed on public works").

28

29

Request Letter, supra, at p. 3.

92 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 102, 103 (2009). To the extent that individuals designated as
forepersons have different job duties, the legal framework described in this opinion
would need to be applied to those specific facts.

30

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The California Supreme Court instructs us to start our statutory analysis by
examining the statute's plain language, because "statutory language is generally the most
reliable indicator of legislation's intended purpose." 31 "If the relevant statutory language
permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to appropriate extrinsic sources,
such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy." 32
We thus start with the statute's ordinary meaning. Subject to a narrow exception,
Labor Code section 1771 provides that "all workers employed on public works" "shall be
paid" "not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar
character in the locality in which the public work is performed." 33 Today, "[w]orker" is
defined in Labor Code section 1723 to include a "laborer, worker, or mechanic." At the
time of enactment in 1931, prevailing wages had to be paid to certain "laborers, workmen
and mechanics." 34 Several years later, when the law was codified in the Labor Code, the
law provided that wages at not less than prevailing rates "shall be paid to all workmen,"
and provided that "'[w]orkman' includes [a] laborer, workman, or mechanic.'" 35 These
revisions, however, were not meant to work substantive changes to the prevailing wage
scheme. 36 Additionally, the Legislature has, over time, revised "workmen" to "workers"
and "workman" to "worker" throughout the law. 37 These changes similarly were not
substantive. 38 We therefore analyze the ordinary meaning of "laborers, workmen and
mechanics" at the time of enactment. 39
Turning to each term, we conclude that the Legislature intended to cover
individuals performing skilled or unskilled manual labor, not those managing or
supervising others. A statute's plain meaning "would typically be a dictionary
definition." 40 At the time of the prevailing wage law's enactment, a "laborer" was
31

Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, 1170.

32

Ibid.

33

Lab. Code, § 1771, italics added.

34

Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1.

35

Stats. 1937, ch. 90, pp. 241, 243.

State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54
Cal.4th 547, 555; see also Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 185.

36

37

See Stats. 1981, ch. 449, § 1; Stats. 1999, ch. 30, §§ 1, 2, 4; Stats. 2000, ch. 954, § 2;
Stats. 2017, ch. 28, § 18. Some sections still retain "workman" or "workmen." (See Lab.
Code, §§ 1773.4, 1774.)

38

Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co., Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1118, 1130 & fn.
15.

39

People v. Rodriguez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 676, 686.

40

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1035.
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defined as "[o]ne who labors," specifically "[o]ne who does physical labor," especially "a
person who does work that requires strength rather than skill." 41 A "workman" was "[a]
man employed in labor, whether in tillage or manufactures; esp., a skilled artificer or
laborer." 42 And a mechanic was "[o]ne who practices any mechanic art; one skilled or
employed in shaping and uniting materials, as wood, metal, etc., into any kind of
structure, machine, or other object, requiring the use of tools or instruments." 43 The three
terms had similar meanings, with workman as "the general term; it frequently applie[d] to
one who does relatively skilled work, as contrasted with a laborer, whose work demands
strength or exertion rather than skill." 44 While mechanic was "once synonymous with
artisan," by 1931 it was "commonly restricted to a workman who [was] skilled in
constructing, repairing, or using machinery." 45 Thus, the prevailing wage law covered
individuals engaging in manual labor, with the three terms referring to different types of
such labor.
Today, "worker" can be used in a more expansive sense. A "worker" is still a
"laborer, toiler" and "one who is employed esp. at manual or industrial labor for a wage,"
but "worker" may also be used to refer to "one who works in a particular field." 46
Adopting the latter definition would include supervisory work. But "[u]nder the principle
of noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates) . . . a court will adopt a restrictive
meaning of a listed term if acceptance of a more expansive meaning would make other
items in the list unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item markedly
dissimilar to the other items in the list." 47 Adopting the more expansive modern
definition of "worker" would make the term markedly dissimilar—much broader and
more inclusive—than "laborer" or "mechanic." The principle of ejusdem generis also
supports adopting the narrower definition, because where there is a general term followed
by a list of examples, the "general term or category is 'restricted to those things that are
similar to those which are enumerated specifically,'" otherwise the specific descriptions
"would be surplusage." 48 If we adopted the broad use of "worker," then that term would
sweep far beyond individuals referenced by "laborer" and "mechanic," rendering those
41

Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (1930) p. 1201.

42

Id. at p. 2350.

43

Id. at p. 1338.

44

Id. at p. 2350, capitalization altered.

45

Ibid., italics omitted.

46

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 2634, capitalization altered.

Busker v. Wabtec Corp., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1160, fn. 11, ellipsis in original and
internal quotation marks omitted.

47

48

International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO
v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 341-342.
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terms superfluous. We are thus further persuaded that the Legislature intended to cover
only those performing manual labor.
Case law also supports our conclusion that the law specifically covers manual
labor. Shortly after the prevailing wage law's enactment, the California Supreme Court
in Whitsett explained that the law "was intended for the benefit of the great body of
laborers and mechanics to be employed on the job," including "blacksmiths, bricklayers,
carpenters, concrete mixer operators, crane operators, hod carriers, iron workers—
structural, reinforcing and ornamental—laborers, lathers, marble workers, mechanics,
painters, pile driver men, plasterers, powder men, traction operators, truck drivers, [and]
teamsters." 49 While the Court did not specifically address whether supervisors or
managers are covered by the law, the Court's enumeration of specific types of manual
laborers supports the interpretation that the Legislature intended to cover skilled or
unskilled manual labor only.
The prevailing wage law's historical context reinforces our interpretation. "The
wider historical circumstances of a law's enactment may assist in ascertaining legislative
intent, supplying context for otherwise ambiguous language." 50 The prevailing wage law
was a response to the Great Depression and ensured that public works projects would not
simply "be awarded to contractors who hired cheaper out-of-market labor." 51 The
California Supreme Court has explained that although many individuals work on a public
works project, including architects and lawyers, the prevailing wage law was not
designed to protect individuals doing that type of work, but was tailored to protect the
"local daily wage workers" actually "hired to do the work." 52 Indeed, a California
Supreme Court Justice, although dissenting on an issue not presented here, has reasoned
that the definition of worker "provid[es] a clear limit" on the prevailing wage statute, as
"[p]ertinent legislative history and DIR job classifications confirm that the law has
generally applied only to craftspersons and manual laborers." 53
A prior Attorney General opinion accords with that conclusion. Attorney General
opinions are entitled "to considerable weight." 54 In 1949, an Attorney General opinion
issued to the Department of Industrial Relations evaluated the scope of a different public
works provision. In construing that provision, the opinion considered who was "covered
Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Whitsett, supra, 215 Cal. at
pp. 415-416.

49

50

Busker v. Wabtec Corp., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1157-1158.

51

Id. at p. 1155.

52

Id. at pp. 1156-1158.

53

Id. at p. 1181 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).

54

Ruelas v. County of Alameda (2024) 15 Cal.5th 968, 974.
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by the provisions of the Labor Code." The opinion reasoned that in Whitsett, the
California Supreme Court had enumerated a "long list" of covered individuals, but
"[o]ffice worker, professional or supervisory worker are not mentioned and we find no
indication in the statute or in this case that it was the intention of the Legislature that the
law was to cover this type of employee." 55
The Department of Industrial Relations' position also supports that interpretation.
The California Supreme Court has explained that while "ultimate responsibility for
statutory interpretation rests with the courts, an agency's interpretation 'is one among
several tools available . . .' when judging the [statute's] meaning and legal effect." 56 "An
agency's interpretation is entitled to deference if it is long standing, consistent, and
contemporaneous." 57 The Department of Industrial Relations reports that its
"longstanding position is that work of a supervisory nature such as that performed by
foremen, supervisors, and managers, is not covered by California's prevailing wage
law." 58 The Department had published that position well before this request, for example
in 2023. 59 And we have no reason to doubt the Department's assertion that its position
has been consistent and longstanding. The Department's interpretation therefore bolsters
our conclusion that the prevailing wage law does not cover supervisory or managerial
work.
The Department further explains, however, that "[a] worker's title or status with
the employer is not determinative of an individual's coverage by the prevailing wage
laws." 60 Rather, the Department looks to "the duties performed by the individual." 61
That means that "[a]n individual who performs skilled or unskilled labor on a public
works project is entitled to be paid the applicable prevailing wage" for that labor. 62 An
individual who does some supervisory work but who also "performs labor on the project"
would be "entitled to compensation at not less than the prevailing rate for the type of
work performed." 63 Thus, while the Department concludes that supervisory and
55

13 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 45, 46 (1949).

Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 178, brackets in
original.

56

57

Ibid.

58

Dept. of Industrial Relations com., supra, at p. 1.

59

See Public Works Manual, supra, at pp. 3-4.

60

Id. at p. 3.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid.

63

Id. at pp. 3-4.
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managerial work is not covered, forepersons are entitled to wages at no less than the
prevailing rates when performing covered labor.
The U.S. Department of Labor's interpretation of an analogous federal prevailing
wage law also supports the conclusion that California's law does not cover supervisory
work—and that it is individuals' duties, and not their titles, that determine whether they
are entitled to wages at prevailing rates. The California Supreme Court has recognized
that "California's prevailing wage law is similar to the federal act and shares its
purposes," entitling interpretations of the federal law to weight when interpreting
California's law. 64 The federal prevailing wage law covers "laborers and mechanics." 65
The U.S. Department of Labor has by regulation provided that "'laborer or mechanic'
includes at least those workers whose duties are manual or physical in nature (including
those workers who use tools or who are performing the work of a trade), as distinguished
from mental or managerial." 66 The agency concludes, however, that forepersons are
entitled to wages at prevailing rates for the time spent on "mechanic or laborer duties." 67
The fact that the federal regime excludes supervisory work but provides that forepersons
are entitled to prevailing wages for their time performing manual labor further persuades
us that the same interpretation should apply to forepersons, as defined in the request,
under California's prevailing wage law. 68
The presence of foreperson classifications in certain collective bargaining
agreements does not alter our interpretation of California's labor law. As described
above, the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations is directed to consider
collective bargaining agreements when setting the prevailing rate for a certain craft,
classification, or type of work. 69 But collective bargaining agreements do not inform the
threshold question of who falls within the statutory definition of a "worker," the central
inquiry in these circumstances. Collective bargaining agreements therefore cannot
expand the statutory coverage of the prevailing wage law. And, in any event, the
64

City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 954.

65

40 U.S.C. § 3142(a).

66

29 C.F.R. § 5.2.

"Forepersons who devote more than 20 percent of their time during a workweek to
mechanic or laborer duties . . . are laborers and mechanics for the time so spent." (Ibid.)

67

While California's law additionally included "workmen" (now "worker"), we do not
think that term was meant to work such a significant broadening of the regime as to cover
supervisory work. (See ante, fns. 31-48 & accompanying text.)

68

69

Lab. Code, § 1773.
10

25-601

statutory scheme "does not contemplate that the Department will necessarily adopt terms
agreed to by private parties." 70
We received comments from labor unions and others identifying policy concerns
attendant to not publishing a foreperson classification. Commenters explained that
failing to include a prevailing wage rate for forepersons puts unions at a competitive
disadvantage: union contractors must pay the higher collective bargaining agreement
rates for forepersons, but nonunion contractors need not, because forepersons are not
included in the prevailing wage rates. This discrepancy, commenters argued, undercuts
the prevailing wage law's goal "to permit union contractors to compete with nonunion
contractors." 71 We appreciate this weighty policy concern, and observe that "[t]he
Legislature can, if it sees fit, adjust the statutory definition to align with its current
conception of the appropriate scope of the prevailing wage law[.]" 72
After review of the statutory language, the statute's history and purpose, and other
extrinsic sources, we conclude that the prevailing wage law does not cover supervisory
work. The Director of the Department of Industrial Relations therefore does not need to
publish a prevailing wage rate for the forepersons described by the requestor—
"experienced workers who perform on-site work with the tools of the trade while also
having responsibility for reading the plans and directing the work of the crew." When
these forepersons perform work on a qualifying public works project in a covered craft,
however, they would be entitled to wages at no less than the applicable prevailing rate for
that craft.
Independent Roofing Contractors v. Department of Industrial Relations (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 345, 355-356, italics added.

70

71

Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 987.

Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 182 (conc. opn. of
Kruger, J.).

72